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Studies of post-conflict peacebuilding have flourished in recent decades. Most, however, focus 
on cases of externally led peacebuilding in fragile states with weak state institutions and 
inadequate national funding. By making a case study of peacebuilding in Aceh, Indonesia, this 
thesis contributes to the literature by examining state-led peacebuilding in a regional power 
with working bureaucracy and an ample national budget to finance peacebuilding 
programmes. Given that the peace in Aceh has lasted 13 years without major violence or 
breaches of the agreement, this thesis also investigates peacebuilding in the normalisation 
phase. This study is conducted through two phases of field research in three areas in Aceh, 
supported by extensive secondary data collection. 
 
Five hypotheses are presented in this thesis. The first is that a peace agreement which 
addresses grievances will contribute to the durable peacebuilding process in middle-income 
countries with relatively strong governments, like Indonesia. Second, to secure sustainable 
post-conflict peacebuilding, a peace agreement should be enacted in national and local law. 
Third, participation aspects of peacebuilding will contribute to unification, recognition of 
identity, and legitimacy to address the underlying grievance. Fourth, institution-building will 
increase legitimacy, secure resources, and stabilise the conditions for lasting peace. Finally, in 
a country where the bureaucracy, state institutions and national identity have been relatively 
strong and settled, like Indonesia, state-led peacebuilding that combines participation and 
institution-building contributes to a durable post-conflict peacebuilding process.  
 
The peace-building process in Aceh is firstly analysed by employing the concept of multiple 
grievances in politics, in the economy, around identity, and in human rights-justice, as the 
underlying factors of conflict. It is then followed by the analysis of various peace agreements 
and their subsequent regulations at the national and local levels in Aceh to test the proposed 
hypothesis that a peace agreement which addresses grievances and is enacted in national and 
local law will contribute to the durable peacebuilding process in a strong middle-income 
country like Indonesia. This thesis found that MoU Helsinki has addressed the grievances 
sufficiently and that the MoU has also been translated well into subsequent regulations at the 
national and local levels to maintain peace in Aceh. However, this thesis also reveals that 
grievance-alleviation through regulation in the subject of human rights and justice is halted at 
the national level but emerging at the local level through the promulgation of local law on the 





Rather than applying specific peacebuilding approaches such as liberal, illiberal, or hybrid 
peace, this thesis observes the implementation of the peacebuilding process in Aceh through 
the methods of participation and institution-building. This thesis discovered that the 
combination of participation and institution-building had contributed significantly to the 
durability of peacebuilding. It occurs because the institution-building that is manifested 
through the establishment of reconstruction and reintegration agencies as well as customary 
and religious institutions helped to secure resources and strengthened the legitimacy of former 
combatants and religious group in Aceh. Meanwhile, participation in some aspects of 
peacebuilding, especially in electoral politics, has successfully alleviated grievances of political 
centrality during the conflict period.  
 
Another important finding is when approaching the normalisation process, there is an 
indication of a stronger link between Aceh local government, dominated by ex-insurgents and 
the central government, to achieve political goals at both provincial and national levels. A 
patron-client network within he circle of a former insurgent group in the transition phase is 
sustained during the normalisation era through the utilisation of a special autonomy fund as 
a peace dividend. Regarding participation, this thesis further demonstrates the achievement 
of some bottom-up participation from the community and civil society in establishing the Aceh 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the normalisation phase.  
 
This thesis illuminates the trend of elite-based peacebuilding in post-conflict Aceh. 
Sustainable peace must be carefully managed to avoid the domination of a powerful group in 
Aceh. The prolonged supremacy of one group over another will potentially repeat the 
grievances that triggered the conflict in Aceh many years ago. In addition to durability, 
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RPJP - Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang / Long Term Development Planning) 
RPJM -Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah / Mid- Term Development Planning) 




SAF- Dana Otonomi Khusus (Special Autonomy Fund) 
SIRA – Sentra Informasi Referendum Aceh (Aceh Referendum Information Center) 
SKPA - Satuan Kerja Pelaksana Aceh/Aceh Government Work Unit 
SMUR - Solidaritas Mahasiswa Untuk Rakyat (Student’s Solidarity for People) 
TNI – Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia National Army) 
TNA – Tentara Nasional Aceh (Aceh National Army) 





List of Acehnese and Indonesian Terms 
 
Bupati: Regent 
Dinas:  Government, Local Offices  
Gampong: Aceh’s Village Administration  
Keuchik: Head of Village 
Imam: Religious Leader  
Pesantren: Islamic Boarding School 
Qanun: Arabic term for regional or local regulation (bylaw)  
Qanun Jinayah: Islamic Criminal Law 
Ulama:   Religious Scholar 
Uleebalang: Aristocrats who are given the power to supervise districts and district warlords 
Teuku: Honorary title for members of uleebalang families 






Chapter 1: Sub-national Conflict, State-led Peace-Building, and Durable 
Peace in Aceh, Indonesia 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Aceh, the westernmost province of Indonesia, is known for its long history of war, resistance, 
and rebellion. It experienced the longest battle against the Dutch colonial government of any 
region in Indonesia. Anthony Reid described the Acehnese struggle over Dutch occupation as 
“Southeast Asia’s first successful guerilla strategy against modern European arms” (Reid, 
2006b: 99). The war between the Dutch and Aceh was brought to an end by around 1903 when 
the Dutch conquered and assassinated the Acehnese Sultan, Muhammad Daud Syah (Smith, 
2002). However, Aceh consistently fought against colonial power until Indonesia proclaimed 
its independence in 1945.  
Following independence, Indonesia started the intricate process of building both a state and a 
nation. Indonesia as a nation state is not based on ethnic affinity or belief in common descent, 
and its boundary was not coterminous with any indigenous ethnic group or state (Aspinall, 
2008a). The Dutch colonists united a diverse collection of societies into a single colony based 
on the territory of their imperial conquest and the treaties they signed with other European 
colonial powers (Aspinall, 2008a). Hence, it is not surprising that in the aftermath of 
colonisation the diverse societies of Indonesia strived hard to build national cohesion, 
particularly between the subjects of nation-building and state-building, including centre-
periphery relations. While Aceh was a strong supporter of the establishment of the new 
republic, the first central-local tension occurred between Jakarta and Aceh over religion and 
the new provincial arrangement. The first disappointment was triggered by the exclusion of 
Islamic terms from the constitution of this newly established republic. The constitutional 
debates over the choice between religion and nationalism were concluded with the option 
promoted by the nationalist-secular group led by Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president 
(Antoine-Braud,2005). The Acehnese leader and ulama (Islamic cleric) considered it to be a 
major setback because their nationalism was deeply ingrained with the ideals of an Islamic 
State (Bertrand, 2004).  
  
A second decision from Jakarta caused further discontentment when Jakarta abolished the 
province of Aceh and incorporated it into the province of North Sumatra in 1950 (Sulaiman, 
2006). This decision was considered to be an attempt to diminish Aceh’s autonomy within 
Indonesia. The Acehnese felt that they were left behind and forgotten after Indonesia had 




rebellion, the first post-colonial insurgency in Aceh. This rebellion was diffused by the decision 
of the central government to make Aceh a separate province with attributes as a special region, 
and restored autonomy in the areas of religion, customary law and education. It met the 
demands of a section of the rebel movement, and the insurgency ended for a time. 
The second rebellion in Aceh commenced amid increasing centralism of Suharto’s New Order 
government. In December 1976, Tengku Muhammad Hasan di Tiro, otherwise known as 
Hasan Tiro, established the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) which was later 
renamed the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM). Hasan Tiro is the 
descendant of a prominent Acehnese family and the grandson of Teuku Cik Di Tiro, an 
Indonesian national hero during the struggle against Dutch colonialism (Schulze, 2004). 
Grievances over centre-periphery antagonism, economic-natural resource distribution, 
political participation and cultural acknowledgement fuelled the mobilisation organised by 
GAM.  
The central government responded to this rebellion by launching a series of counterinsurgency 
operations that caused extensive casualties, widespread human rights violations and 
heightened the scale of the conflict. Many years later in 1998, Suharto fell from power. It was 
followed by dramatic changes in the overall Indonesian political landscape, including the way 
the government dealt with internal conflict. Under President Abdurrahman Wahid and 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, two efforts towards a peaceful resolution in Aceh were initiated under 
the facilitation of the Henry Dunant Center1. In May 2000, the Government of Indonesia and 
GAM agreed to sign a cease-fire agreement, the Humanitarian Pause, followed by a Cessation 
of Hostilities Agreement in December 2002. Neither agreement lasted very long, owing to 
unsatisfied demands between GAM and the Government of Indonesia regarding the issue of 
Aceh’s independence.  
 
Conflict in Aceh as a case study of this research is classified as subnational conflict. 
Subnational conflict is defined as “armed conflict over control of a subnational territory within 
a sovereign state, where an opposition movement uses violence to contest for greater self-rule 
for the local population” (Park, Colleta and Oppenheim, 2013).  This type of conflict is not 
confined to poor and failing states. Middle-income countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and 
the Philippines, emerging giant economies such as India, and highly developed countries like 
                                                        
1A new Geneva-based NGO with no organizational experience at conflict resolution at the time of its 








the UK and Spain are also troubled by the unrest in parts of their territories (Barron, Arthur 
and Bartu, 2012).   
 
Over the past 20 years, there have been 26 sub-national conflicts in South and Southeast Asia 
that are described by Park, Colleta and Oppenheim as “among the world’s longest-running 
armed struggle[s] and has been the most common form of armed conflict in Asia since 1955” 
(Park,et al,  2013: 1). During 2004-2014, 60 per cent of the world’s sub-national conflict 
occurred in Asia and took more than 100,000 lives in Asia alone (Barron, 2014) The average 
duration of sub-national conflicts is various regions in the world is depicted in Table 1.1 below: 
 
Table 1-1 Average Duration of Sub-National Conflict 1946-2010 
Region  Average Duration (Years) 
Asia  33,3  
Middle East  28,4 
Africa 12,0 
Europe   5,2 
Global  16,8  
 Source: Uppsala Data Centre as cited from Barron (2014) 
 
Despite its partial and peripheral nature, the overall impact of sub-national conflict is 
substantial as it affects over 131 million people. At least 1.35 million people have been killed in 
such conflicts since 1946 (Park et al., 2013). In Aceh, the casualties of the conflict were 
immense: out of a population of four million Acehnese, 10,000 people were killed, 
compounded by arbitrary arrest and destruction of property (Antoine-Braud and Grevi, 2005).  
 
1.2 Towards Peace Settlement and Peace-Building 
In December 2004, Aceh was hit by a calamitous earthquake and tsunami which caused more 
fatalities. According to data from the Indonesia National Board of Disaster Management 
(Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, or BNPB), there were 165,792 people dead and 
missing, 2,830 wounded and 556,993 homeless (Indonesia National Board of Disaster 
Management, 2005). In the aftermath of the tsunami, a historic agreement between the Aceh 
Rebel Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) and the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia (GoI) was signed in Helsinki, Finland on 15 August 2005.  This peace agreement 
was mediated by Martti Ahtiisari, former president of Finland, under the auspice of the  Crisis 
Management Initiative (CMI).  Since the peace agreement was signed in 2005, peace in Aceh 




have been no major outbreaks of violence or breaches of the agreement. The former 
combatants have secured seats in Parliament and the Executive branch of government. 
Economic indicators have gradually improved, and development projects are robust.  
 
Peace in Aceh is a microcosm of the trajectory of global peacebuilding.  Peace-building is the 
final phase of the Agenda for Peace which was proposed by United Nations Secretary-General, 
Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992. The other three phases are preventive diplomacy, peace-
making, and peacekeeping. Post-conflict peacebuilding is defined as “action to identify and 
support structures which would tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict “(Ghali, 1992). It is a crucial phase in preventing the recurrence of conflict. 
Collier (2003:83) reveals that a typical country reaching the end of a civil war faces a 44 per 
cent risk of returning to conflict within five years. It occurs due to the fragility of peace in the 
aftermath of the war, which often means a minor subsequent accident will generate fatal 
impact and conflict relapse (Genet, 2007). Thus, there is a need to develop an approach in 
post-conflict that goes beyond conflict termination but also ensures durable peace, a project 
widely known as peacebuilding. 
 
In a March 2005 report of the Secretary-General that outlined the reform agenda, the risk of 
recidivism was restated more strongly than previously. The reform agenda was specifically 
cited to justify the need for a UN Peace-building Commission: 
 
Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements is 
sadly blemished by some devastating failures . . . for instance in Angola in 1993 
and Rwanda in 1994. Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse 
back into violence within five years. These two points drive home the message: 
if we are going to prevent conflict, we must ensure that peace agreements are 
implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner . . . I, therefore, propose to 
the Member States that they create an Intergovernmental Peace-building 
Commission [emphasis added] 2 
 
Other global institutions like the World Bank in partnership with the United Nations have 
developed joint approaches to supporting Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA). Post 
Conflict Needs Assessments have been used by national and international actors as an entry 
point for conceptualising, negotiating and financing a shared strategy for recovery and 
development in fragile, post-conflict settings (UN/ World Bank PCNA Review Report, 2007).  
                                                        
2UN General Assembly, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, cited 




This development has also been supported by flourishing research on peacebuilding in 
government-funded think tanks such as the United States Institute of Peace or prominent 
universities around the globe. These developments illustrate the global acknowledgement of 
peacebuilding efforts together with supported research and study which is aimed at 
maintaining sustainable peace in post-conflict countries.  
 
1.3 Rationale of the Research 
According to Hartzell, Hoodie and Rothschild (2001), durable peace has occurred if there is 
no return to war within five years of signing the agreement, while Kreutz (2015) suggests a 
longer period, ten years, as a benchmark of post-conflict stability. The durability of the peace 
in the aftermath of internal wars is a complex subject, as Collier (2002) warns that on average, 
countries face a 50 per cent risk of renewed conflict during the next five years. Kreutz (2015) 
also notes that only 43 per cent of all civil wars that have been terminated could reach ten 
years of post-conflict stability. Therefore, as peace in Aceh has been maintained for 13 years 
with only minor violence, it can be considered as a successful case of enduring peace.  
 
However, despite the generally successful results, peacebuilding in Aceh has faced various 
problems. Political intimidation, electoral violence, marginalised former combatants, poor 
development planning, and unequal distribution of the peace dividend were rampant during 
the first years after the peace deal was reached, and through the beginning the normalisation 
phase. While these illicit practices are somehow being managed to integrate the former rebels 
into peacebuilding, the lingering habit of predatory politics and corruption will harm the 
future of peace. It may create another cycle of grievance over the gaps of political participation, 
economic development and identity. Those factors, ironically, were the trigger of the GAM 
rebellion several decades back, such that they may be a significant cause for concern.  It 
eventually may lead to the repetition of the internal colonialism pattern, in which GAM has 
inevitably grown as the hegemonic power in post-conflict peacebuilding in Aceh. It is in this 
consideration that this research was conducted. The durability of peace in Aceh requires 
further investigation about how peacebuilding is conducted in Aceh and whether it is as 
successful as appears from the democratic electoral process and economic growth.  
 
1.4 Thesis Aims and Research Questions  
This thesis is a study of the peacebuilding process in a strong middle-income country. It aims 
at examining practices of peacebuilding in political participation, economic settlement, 
human rights, justice and identity in Aceh. These are the subjects that represented the most 




Furthermore, this thesis also seeks to analyse the impact of peacebuilding implementation on 
the alleviation of grievances that are perceived as the underlying factors of the conflict.  
 
The research questions underpinning this thesis are:  
1. To what extent have the peace agreement and the series of national and local laws 
addressed grievances as the source of conflict in Aceh?  
2. What were the dynamics of authority and legitimacy between the incumbent/central 
government and former insurgents/GAM in the post-conflict peacebuilding period?  
3. How were peacebuilding practices implemented in Indonesia, a country where the 
bureaucracy, state institutions and national identity have been relatively strong and 
settled? 
 
1.5 Significance of the Research and Contribution to Knowledge  
While middle-income countries with a generally stable and relatively strong government are 
also vulnerable to sub-national conflict, most peacebuilding efforts occur in fragile states with 
limited economic resources and are conducted under the supervision of UN agencies or foreign 
countries. The UN agencies or foreign governments rebuild the state from scratch, including 
establishing government offices, supervising elections, and regulating the market and micro-
macroeconomic policies. The examples of post-conflict intervention efforts with varied results, 
strengths and weakness in fragile states are beneficial in producing peace lessons and for 
peacebuilding.  However, such examples will not be entirely relevant to stronger and middle-
income countries like Indonesia that have working bureaucracies, strong state institutions, 
and adequate internal funds (Barron and Burke, 2008). 
Peacebuilding in Aceh is a peculiar case because it is predominantly conducted by the national 
government or is termed “state-led peacebuilding”. The peace agreement process was indeed 
mediated by a third party, and the post-agreement was supervised by an Aceh Monitoring 
Mission (AMM), a civilian mission that comprises monitors from EU, Norway, Switzerland, 
and five ASEAN states (Schulze, 2007). AMM’s first mandate period covered six months, 
initially encompassing the period between 15 September 2005 and March 2006. However, the 
mandate period was extended three times until 15 December 2006 and focused mostly on the 
subjects of disarmament, demobilisation, amnesty and reintegration of combatants and 
security. Nonetheless, during the AMM deployment period and its aftermath, the national 
government maintained its strong role in directing and supervising the peacebuilding.  
 
Despite the devastating impact of the tsunami coupled with the legacy of conflict, the presence 




remained strong (Barron and Burke, 2008). This situation was different from post-conflict 
peacebuilding in countries with a weak state prescence, inadequate domestic resources and 
limited government capacity (Barron and Burke, 2008). In these countries, international 
actors have exercised varying degrees of governing authority, including the creation of 
functioning law enforcement and judicial systems and economic revitalisation. On the other 
hand, in a stronger state, the government still holds the primary role in regulating politics, 
law, economy and social aspects. The international actors are working together with the 
government in conducting peacebuilding efforts while maintaining peaceful relationships with 
former separatist groups. 
 
Thomas Park (2013) identifies the problem of the assessment of the post-sub-national conflict 
in stronger middle-income countries. Assessments have heavily focused on developmental 
indicators such as the number of students enrolled in schools, health service or poverty 
reduction. Those indicators seem more appropriate for peacebuilding cases in fragile states 
that are lagging in development projects compared to middle-income states.  In sub-national 
conflicts within stronger and middle-income countries, development itself does not 
necessarily reduce violence and often exacerbates conflicts (Park, 2013). Post-conflict 
assessments are lacking when it comes to monitoring the key dynamics in post-conflict periods 
such as the perception of government and the peace process, the level of political support for 
different key actors, dynamics of conflicts and other transformative processes (Park, 2013). 
Therefore, there is a need to fill the gap by conducting more research on the peacebuilding 
practices in strong middle-income countries in order to comprehend the dynamics between 
the central government and former insurgent groups as well as with civil society. It is argued 
that the dynamics among the key actors in peacebuilding phases involves the process of 
legitimacy and authority and is conducted through participation, institution building or a 
combination of both. It is also important to investigate whether the provisions in the peace 
settlement and peacebuilding practices are working effectively to alleviate grievances as the 
underlying factor of the long-standing sub-national conflict.  This research aims to provide 
insight into the dynamic of the peacebuilding process in alleviating grievances in Aceh and as 
such, is intended to contribute to the existing literature of peacebuilding by emphasising 
practices in strong middle-income countries.  
 
To achieve its research goals, this thesis will primarily utilise the theory of grievance and 
relative deprivation as the impetus for the conflict in Aceh as well as the basis of the peace 
building approach. Wilmer (1998) argues that grievances are the basis of the distribution of 
political resources, and the failure of the state to redress grievance may lead to the breakdown 




the breakdown of the system after the failure to deliver resources as the cause of grievance has 
been fundamental to the literature on ethnic conflict (Ockey, 2019), in which the case of Aceh 
falls into this category of conflict.  I argue that grievance that refers to the transformation from 
perceived deprivation to frustration (Lu and Thies, 2011) can accommodate political 
repression, economic disadvantage or racial, religion or cultural discrimination into the 
analysis of this thesis. The multiple deprivations that have been experienced by Acehnese for 
decades in forms of political centralisation, economic inequality, the lack of the 
acknowledgement of identity and the rampant violations of human rights became an impetus 
for rebel movement. Hence, the peace agreement and the subsequent regulations in the 
national and local level should be aimed at alleviating the grievances. The grievance alleviation 
then is translated  into the implementation of peace building through the methods of 
participation, institution building or both. I also choose not to employ a liberal peace building 
approach due to the absence of an external actor to impose liberal values and a sufficient 
institutional framework in Indonesia. The presence of an international actor that is either 
represented by international agencies or foreign countries is crucial in the liberal peace 
building literature (Richmond : 2008, Hartzell:  2014, Moore :  2011). In Aceh, support from 
the international actor was primarily performed by the Aceh Monitoring Mission, a short term 
civilian mission,  but the rest of the peace building process is carried out by the Indonesian 
government. The insufficient institutional framework is also not applicable to Indonesia due 
to its working bureaucracy, strong military and police force and preceeding democratisation 
process. I further argue that the liberal peace approach is not applicable to be utilised to 
examine the peace building process in a strong and middle income country like Indonesia. 
Therefore, the lens of a relative deprivation-grievance approach will be more pertinent to 
answer the research questions that underpin this thesis about the durability of peace in Aceh, 
Indonesia, as a case study of peacebuilding in a strong-middle income country. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis  
The thesis is presented in seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction and background 
of the study and a statement of the problem to be investigated. Chapter 2 consists of a review 
of the literature and an identification of some gaps in our understanding followed by the 
explanation of methodology, framework, research question and hypotheses. Chapter 3 
describes the historical background of separatism in Aceh, including the grievances as 
underlying factors of the conflict and the dynamic of proposed conflict resolution.  
 
Chapters 4 to 7 discuss the post-conflict peacebuilding which will be categorised into four 




the process of political participation in the post-conflict era, including the transformation of 
GAM into a political party, local elections and broader mass participation such as that of 
women in politics.  Chapter 5 provides insights into the economic aspects of the peace 
settlement. There are three main features: the reconstruction process, reintegration, and the 
special autonomy fund as peace dividend are elaborated in this chapter. Chapter 6 focuses on 
aspects of identity in peacebuilding by analysing the role of sharia and customary institutions.   
Chapter 7 investigates human rights and justice and discusses past human rights violations 
and the series of legal attempts and reconciliation. Chapter 8, the final chapter, articulates the 
discussion on the impact of peacebuilding practices in the subject of political participation, 
economic settlement, human rights and justice and identity on the alleviation of grievance in 
Aceh as well as the dynamics of authority, legitimacy, participation and institution building 
among key actors. Finally, this chapter draws conclusions, outlines the limitation of the study 







Chapter 2: Literature Review and Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a literature review and methodology in order to 
lay a strong foundation for this study. While the major emphasis is the investigation of state-
led peacebuilding in Aceh, Indonesia, this thesis is also complemented by the analysis of 
conflict, the formation of rebel movement and the dynamics of conflict resolution. Hence, the 
body of literature in this chapter will be divided into two major sections. The first outlines the 
scholarly works about the impetus for conflict and the establishment of insurgent groups. This 
is followed by a discussion of the concept of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The first six 
frameworks consist of internal conflict, grievance, internal colonialism, legitimacy, collective 
action frame, conflict resolution, and peace settlement. These support the understanding of 
chapter three, which is focused on the development of the conflict, separatist movement and 
peace processes. The frameworks related to peacebuilding will be utilised to explain grievance 
alleviation and peacebuilding implementation in chapter four, five, six and seven with the 
inclusion of the concept of grievance and legitimacy. The next section of this chapter focuses 
on methodology, research questions and hypotheses. This chapter concludes with the 
elaboration of Aceh and Indonesia as a case study.   
 
2.2 Internal Conflict: Conceptual Definition 
The conflict in Aceh which is elaborated throughout this thesis is an internal conflict defined 
by Brown (1996) as a violent intrastate political dispute that primarily occurs within the 
borders of a single state. Other scholars use the term of intra-state war or intra-state conflict.  
According to Sarkees, Wayman and Singer (2003: 59) intra-state wars are “wars between or 
among two or more groups within the internationally recognised territory of the state”. While 
in the same vein, Yilmaz (2007: 12) describes the intra-state conflict as “conflicts that occur 
within the borders of states”. Park, Colleta and Oppenheim (2013:1) use the term “sub-
national” instead of internal conflict and define it “as armed conflict over control of a sub-
national territory within a sovereign state, where an opposition movement uses violence to 
contest for greater self-rule for the local population”. Thus, it could be concluded that the 
primary marker of internal conflict is the locus that must be based within the border of a 
sovereign state. This study will purposefully use sub-national conflict as the term that fits best 
with conflict in Aceh. Sub-national conflict is chosen particularly because of the emphasis of 
“the contest for greater self-rule for the local population” a prevalent feature in the thirty years 




2.2.1 Types of Internal Conflict  
Internal conflict can take the form of a riot or short-term unrest, or a civil war (Brown, 1997). 
Sarkees et al. (2003) classified internal war into civil war and inter-communal conflicts. Brown 
(1997) emphasises that the distinguishing features of a civil ware are at least 1000 casualties 
and a sustainable group identity and organisational capacity of the protagonists. Collier 
employed a similar definition: “civil war occurs when an identifiable rebel organisation 
challenges the government militarily, and the resulting violence results in more than 1,000 
combat-related deaths, with at least five per cent on each side” (Collier, 2003: 11).  Park et al. 
(2013) categorised internal conflict into three types:  
1) State-Minority Conflict, which involves the active struggle over the presence, 
role, authority, and legitimacy of government actors and institutions in the 
conflict area; 2) Competition and Conflict between Local Elites that include rival 
clans, families and/or political factions that compete for dominance in their area 
3) Inter-communal Conflict that comprises competition between different ethnic 
and/ or religious groups living close together, and often competing for scarce land 
and other resources (Park, et al, 2013 : 4). 
Conflict in Aceh thus falls into the category of civil war (Brown 1997, Collier 2003) or state-
minority conflict as defined by Park et al (2013) due to the massive number of casualties, 
sustainable identity and organisational capacity of the challenger group, and active struggle 
over the presence and legitimacy of government in the conflict area.  
2.2.2 Internal Conflict, Identity and Secessionism  
The demise of the Cold War has given opportunities for developing countries to express their 
demands for self-determination, independence and advancement, which had been suppressed 
during superpower rivalry (Olson, 2010). There was an increasing demand from ethnic groups 
for rights and recognition that was divided into several aspirations such as establishing 
autonomy and obtaining full independence or improvement of their status as an alternative to 
separation (Gurr, 2000). The right to secede itself is derived from the right 0f self-
determination that is universally acknowledged in the UN Charter and the 1960 Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. However, this principle 
was only applied to the case of decolonisation and not to cases of separatism of people or 
national groups within a nation-state (Carley, 1996). It, therefore, became one of the sources 
of conflict in the post-Cold War era. States mostly opposed this demand as they tend to 
consolidate and expand their power while ethnic groups seek to pursue their interest. This 




The primary objection of states to devolving power to territorially-concentrated minorities is 
the possibility of secession. It may disturb the entire ethnic balance in the country and provoke 
groups in other regions to rethink their position in a state with a new ethnic balance (Horowitz, 
2003). This trend was seen in Yugoslavia, which fragmented into five states; the Soviet Union, 
which split into fifteen; and Czechoslovakia, which divided into the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia.  These emerging trends of secession in Europe have given momentum to new drives 
for other separatists in other regions and countries (Orentlicher, 2003), including the Asia- 
Pacific region. Asia and the Pacific have been plagued by severe ethno-nationalist strife. Reilly 
and Graham (2004) argue that the weakness of Asia-Pacific countries towards internal 
insurgencies is caused by the vulnerable state structures which deal with identity-based 
conflict insurgencies. Due to the impact of colonialism, many states in Southeast Asia and the 
South Pacific are artificial creations of the twentieth century, incorporating diverse ethnicities, 
races or religious group without strong cohesion (Reilly and Graham, 2014). Ganguly and 
Taras (1998) view the outbreak of ethnic violence as the result of ignorance of cultural 
divisions and popular aspirations. Thus, the emergence of religious or ethnically-based 
insurgencies could easily weaken the artificially strong state structure and make the conflict 
even more protracted.  
In Indonesia, identity-based internal conflict first occurred in the post-colonial era. The 
nation-building process of post-colonial Indonesia was intricate due to its cultural-religious 
diversity and contested aspiration toward the future of the new nation. Islamic groups 
represented by M. Natsir aimed to combine nationalism with Islamic values to prevent the 
inclination of ultra-nationalism in Indonesia (Basyir, 2016). Other groups demanded a federal 
rather than unitary government for the new republic.  The first Indonesian government under 
Sukarno was challenged by several domestic disturbances from religiously motivated DI/TII,3 
to centre-periphery discontentment such as PRRI/Permesta.4 
After Suharto came into power as the second President of the Republic of Indonesia, any 
possible eruption of internal conflicts was restrained by a strong military presence and 
draconian laws. Suharto sought to forcefully integrate ethnically and religiously diverse 
Indonesia by promoting “Unity in Diversity” as the national motto. According to Sarsito 
                                                        
3  DI/TII stands for Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army), a post-
independence rebellion that strived to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia. This insurgency broke out in several 
areas such as Aceh, West Java, Central Java South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan. 
4 PRRI/PERMESTA: Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic 
of Indonesia/Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam/ Universal Struggle Charter, a regional but not separatist rebellion 
which was mainly based in the central part of Sumatera and northern part of Sulawesi (Minahasa). They opposed 
President Sukarno’s guided democracy and demanded a less centralised government. This movement was a 
reaction of the political polarisation in national politics, center-periphery economic discrimination and the 




(2010), Suharto used Javanese culture and philosophy in his official duties, presenting himself 
like a Javanese King to concentrate power. Suharto also brought Javanese migrants to less 
densely populated provinces under the banner of a transmigration programme; many 
interpreted it as Javanisation of non-Javanese people and regions. His resignation resulted in 
social, political and economic instability, including a large number of horizontal conflicts in 
the form of inter-ethnic or inter-religious clashes, heightening the tensions of vertical-
separatist conflict.   
To sum up, among the types of internal conflict, ethnic conflict or identity-based conflict has 
been mounting which is driven by the aspiration of self-determination. The Asia-Pacific 
region, including Indonesia, is one of the worst affected areas for this type of conflict, due to 
the colonial project of the nation-state which created an artificial boundary regardless of 
ethnicity or race. It was exacerbated by the forced cultural assimilation strategy during 
Suharto’s New Order era. This brief background of internal conflict and identity-based conflict 
and secessionism is beneficial to give a foundation of the conflict in Aceh which comprises the 
case study of my thesis. 
2.3 Internal Colonialism  
Michael Hechter offers a concept of internal colonialism, a broad-based approach which is 
beneficial for the analysis of identity and grievance. Hechter (1975) emphasises how 
heightened core-periphery interaction can result in structural inequality between various 
regions. The inequality is the result of the modernisation process which endows the group in 
the core with advantage at the expense of ethnically different groups in the periphery (Verdery, 
1979). The superordinate group in the core attempts to stabilise and maintain the advantages 
through policies of the institutionalisation of existing stratification system and denying access 
to the less advanced groups based on the cultural distinction (Hechter, 1975).  Hechter (1975) 
strengthened the standpoint that views primordial ties such as ethnicity as the stronger basis 
of identity rather than social class and argued that the impetus of social, regional unrest is the 
socio-economic deprivation of the peripheral region and its cultural community. Thus, the 
initial goal of an ethno-political movement is directed to obtain more intensive access and 
freedom in managing their natural resources (Brown, 1994).  
In sum, as defined by Smith and Ng (2002: 95) internal colonialism is “an unequal exchange 
between the centre and periphery within a nation state, specifically entitled to the regions that 
are ethnically distinct and economically exploited”. The core which is an ethnically different 
entity exploits the periphery either by concentrating the development of industries in the 
centre, transporting natural resources to the core or unfairly distributing the revenue between 




important feature of internal colonialism aside from the structural characteristics is the 
presence of an identity component (Smith and Ng, 2002). Ethnicity, religious, race or 
language used by people in the periphery is different from people in the core.  
This theory has been commonly utilised to test the occurrence of separatism or political 
tension in numerous countries. Brown (2008) explains how the concept of internal 
colonialism manifested in separatism in Southeast Asia. Uneven regional economic 
development between core and the peripheral regions of multi-ethnic societies in Southeast 
Asian countries is the result of policies of “internal colonialism”. People who are culturally 
distinct in periphery perceive either that “their” resources are being diverted to the benefit of 
other communities or regions in the states or that they deserve a larger degree of influence in 
government due to their economic contribution. It reflects a perception of relative deprivation 
that could lead to the aspiration of separation if the demands are not well responded to by the 
central government (Brown, 2008). Liow (2006), as cited by Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 
(2013), emphasises the factor of longstanding grievances among Malay Muslims in Southern 
Thailand and Bangsamoro in the southern Philippines which stem from overt socio-political 
and economic marginalisation and repressive central authorities.  Internal colonialism 
positively contributes to the analysis of civil war, identity and grievances, particularly in 
development and modernisation settings that are experienced by most newly democratic 
countries in Asia and Africa. Grant Evans (2018) relates the theory of internal colonialism with 
the indigenous people and minorities rights in Vietnam. The indigenous highlander people in 
Vietnam struggle for regional autonomy by claiming the area of Central Highland as their 
tributary domain. This claim is denied by the Vietnamese government as well as by the 
academic community by accentuating the characteristic of central highland as “pre-nation 
social assemblages”. The renunciation to the demand for regional autonomy from the 
indigenous people is reinforced by the communist regime to safeguard the unification of 
Vietnam.   
Internal colonialism will also be a useful framework to analyse Indonesia’s problem of 
separatism in Aceh. This thesis will elaborate internal colonialism in the period of conflict in 
Aceh and the possible repetition in peacetime. The cyclical pattern of internal colonialism in 
the post-conflict era warrants a careful analysis given the heterogeinity of the Acehnese 
community. The Gayo people in Central Aceh, for example, are categorised as indigenous and 
are not a major supporter of the rebel group in Aceh.  Thus, it is important to examine their 
position vis a vis Acehnese and GAM as the dominant ethnic group as well as the exponent of 
the separatist movement after the peace agreement.  In this thesis, internal colonialism will be 
used to complement the analysis of grievance as a major driver of conflict in Aceh, as described 




2.4 Grievance (Greed) and Conflict  
Analyses of conflicts that emerged during the Cold War have often drawn on anthropological 
perspectives which emphasised grievance and the nature of post-colonial states (Jackson and 
Beswick, 2011). Zartman (1993), Azar (1990), Burton (1990) and Gurr (2000) are among the 
best-known advocates of grievance theory. A strong correlation between grievance and 
identity is stressed by Murshed. According to Murshed (2010:76) “central to grievances is 
identity and group formation; an individual’s value may be related to his or her identity. 
Specifically, the relative position of the groups he/she identifies within the social order”. 
Murshed (2010) argues that ethnic identities, whether based on race, language, religion, tribal 
affiliation or regional differences could be more effective causes for the formation of the group 
rather than temporary difference such as socio-economic class. In other words, grievance often 
correlates with seeking justice and the motivation emerging from a sense of injustice. It may 
occur when ethnically distinct people are marginalised and do not get a fair share of the natural 
wealth of the region that they inhabit (Tadjoeddin, 2007).  
The construction of grievance could be explained by the theory of relative deprivation. Gurr 
(1970), one of the prominent scholars on political violence, described perceived or relative 
deprivation as:  
A perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectation and their value 
capabilities, where value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to 
which people believe they are rightfully entitled, while value capabilities are the 
goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, 
given the social means available to them. (Gurr, 1970: 13) 
Furthermore, Gurr (1970) explains that relative deprivation occurs if the situation is unequal; 
only one party is improving while the other one is stagnant or worse. Concerning relative 
deprivation and conflict, Azar (1990: 12) coined the famous concept of Protracted Social 
Conflict, defined as “conflict which occurs when communities are deprived of the satisfaction 
of their basic needs based on communal identity”.5 Azar argued that deprivation of human 
needs is the underlying source of protracted social conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse: 2005). Azar differentiated human needs into several categories, such as political 
access needs, security needs, and acceptance needs (Reimann, 2002). Azar (1990) includes 
the effective participation of individuals in political, market, and decision-making institutions 
as the component of political needs. Security needs refer to the material for physical security, 
                                                        
5Azar used the term “community” as a generic reference to politicised groups whose members share ethnic, 




nutrition and housing, while acceptance needs relate to recognition of distinctive identity in 
culture and religion (Azar, 1990).  
While grievance has been a dominant stream in the analysis of the causes of conflict, another 
perspective sees greed as the main factor. Collier and Hoffler assert that countries with rich 
natural resources are prone to civil war due to elite competition in seeking rent (cited in 
Beswick and Jackson, 2011). Their findings led to another stream of conflict analysis, very 
popular among economists, which put greed as the more powerful explanation of civil war. 
Collier and Hoffler argue that grievances are real causes, but they do not suffice to create a 
successful rebellion without the presence of greed (Beswick and Jackson, 2011). Collier (2006) 
discovered that in societies with a high proportion of young men who have few opportunities 
for employment (characterised by lack of education), but which depend significantly on 
primary exports, greed is as an important motive for violence, because there are opportunities 
for instant gratification through looting.  
Ross used greed to analyse conflict in Aceh. He discovered that conflict in Aceh fits the Collier-
Hoeffler model of civil war well. In terms of the natural landscape, Aceh is mountainous, has 
a small diaspora and a long history of conflict (Ross, 2003). Politically, it is semi-democratic 
and economically relatively poor, depending on natural resource exports (Ross, 2003). 
However, Ross also found four other factors that support rebellion in Aceh: entrepreneurship 
of Hasan Tiro to mobilise GAM, grievances such as an imbalanced distribution of LNG benefit, 
influx of Javanese migrant and military repression, the demonstration effect of the East Timor 
referendum and the credibility of central government in dealing with the conflict (Ross, 2003).  
Therefore, Ross’ analysis does not strengthen the role of greed as the sole factor of conflict in 
Aceh, but more a mixture between greed and grievance because it also includes inequality of 
natural resources distribution, ethnicity and human rights abuse. Kingsbury & McCulloch 
(2006) also stresses greed as a contributing factor to the conflict in Aceh but focuses his 
analysis on the military business interest inside conflict in Aceh. However, Aspinall (2007b) 
challenges the theory of greed as the primary factor of the civil war in Aceh. He argues that 
natural resource exploitation became a part of the conflict in Aceh because it supports the 
construction of identity and narration as victims of Indonesia. The hydrocarbon industries in 
Aceh stimulated armed rebellion because of the presence of a collective action frame that 
turned localised grievances, such as land acquisition, into a perception of national suffering 
and liberation (Aspinall, 2007b). A similar opinion is written by McCarthy (2007), who 
emphasises that the management of Aceh natural resources was not the primary cause of the 
conflict. Rather, the main cause was state-managed exploitation of natural resources, which 
magnified other grievances and encouraged separatist discourse. The narration of natural 





From these studies on the causes of internal conflict, it can be seen that the grievance approach 
has been dominant in the post-cold war era, particularly in early phases, and basing greed 
purely on economic motives. While greed has been increasingly popular especially among 
economists due to its measurability, there are critics of this approach, who see it as deceptively 
satisfying, but explaining conflict only partially. On the other hand, grievance, the 
transformation from perceived deprivation to frustration, can accommodate political 
repression, economic disadvantage or racial, religious or cultural discrimination into the 
analysis. It can be concluded that internal conflict is generally initiated by people deprived of 
their basic needs for communal identity. This deprivation can lead to grievances which 
eventually lead to the establishment of a rebel group. 
 
Due to its ability to encompass other explanations, this thesis will mainly employ grievance to 
explain the impetus of conflict in Aceh. The perceived deprivation and grievances in Aceh is 
necessary to comprehend the underlying factors of conflict since it is closely related to the 
dynamics of conflict resolution. The grievance alleviation is depicted in most provisions of 
peace settlement in Aceh, including in subsequent national and local laws.  
 
2.5 Legitimacy, Authority and Capacity  
This thesis will employ the concept of authority, capacity and legitimacy to explain the 
dynamics of key actors of the peacebuilding process in Aceh. According to Teskey, Schnell and 
Poole (2012) authority, legitimacy and capacity need to be strengthened and forged to enable 
the state to deliver across key domains.  These three concepts are frequently used to examine 
the process of state building and hence, will be beneficial to support the research framework 
in peacebuilding research. 
 
2.5.1 Authority 
One prominent area of literature regarding authority and legitimacy is derived from the 
writings of Max Weber. Weber defines authority as the probability that a certain specific 
command (or all commands) from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons” 
(Weber, 1947: 324). World Bank (2012) outlines state authority as “the ability of the state to 
project its political power over all its territory, to reach all citizens regardless of their location, 
to maintain law and order and protect citizens from predation and violence. It is the ability of 
the laws and rules of the state to trump all other laws and rules”. Leslie Green adds that state 
authority “claims to bind many persons, to regulate their most vital interests, and to do so with 




the legal component by defining authority as “state ability routinely to obtain compliance with 
its laws and with the orders of its officials” (Crook, 1987: 553). According to Taskey et al. 
(2012), to exercise its authority, the state will rely on some degree of capacity to operate and 
some support from the population in the form of legitimacy. From the abovementioned 
definitions, authority is commonly associated with legal or de jure. However, in the conflict 
setting, particularly in fragile states with hybrid political order, the actual or de facto authority 
exercised by the informal institution could be more respected than legal authority exercised 
by formal institutions. As my case study is taking place in a stronger middle-income country 
in the post-conflict period, state authority remains strong and respected. Therefore, this thesis 
will primarily equate state authority with law, particularly the laws that regulate peacebuilding 
efforts in national and local levels.  
 
2.5.2 Capacity 
McAdams, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) define state capacity as the “degree of control that state 
agents exercise over persons, activities, and resources within their government’s territorial 
jurisdiction (p. 78). Geddes (1994) defines it as “the capacity to implement state-initiated 
policies” (p. 14); Sofiter (2013) as “the ability of the state to effectively implement its chosen 
policies” (p. 2); and Besley and Persson (2011) as “the institutional capability of the state to 
carry out various policies that deliver benefits and services to households and firms” (p. 6).   
 
However, Taskey et al. (2012) argue that state capacity is more than the sum of the capacity of 
individual organisations, but it depends on how a broader set of institutions interact and how 
they align with existing power relations and the goals of the ruling elites. As a result, not every 
state that has the sound capacity in delivering service and resources will gain legitimacy from 
the entire population of their territory, as will be further explained in the next section on 
legitimacy. Taskey also highlights critiques which point out that in peacebuilding efforts, the 
external peace builders primarily focus on building state capacity and neglecting legitimacy 
and authority (Taskey et al., 2012). In this thesis, a capacity that is described as the “the ability 
of the state to effectively implement its chosen policies “(Soifer, 2013: 2) will be utilised to 
assess the ensuing process after the transfer of authority from central government to former 
combatant. The former combatants must employ and maximise their capacity to gain output 
or performance legitimacy from the broader Aceh community in the post-conflict era. 
 
2.5.3 Legitimacy 
As a prominent scholar in the subject of the authority, power and order, Weber conceptualised 




order (Weber, 1947: 124). Thus, belief is the core understanding of Weber’s definition of 
legitimacy. The emphasis on belief in legitimacy influenced other scholars such as Seymour 
Lipset and Robert Dahl.  According to Lipset, “legitimacy involves the capacity of a political 
system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institution is the most 
appropriate or proper ones for the society” (Lipset, 1959: 86). Dahl defines legitimacy as the 
“belief that the structure, procedures, acts, decisions, policies, officials or leaders of 
government possess the quality of “rightness”, proper or moral goodness” (Dahl, 1963: 19).  
While according to Bernauer, Mohrenberg & Koubi (2016), legitimacy is described as “a 
situation where citizens believe that political authority delegated to policy-makers and 
political institutions is being appropriately exercised and thus deserves to be obeyed” 
(Bernauer et al., 2016: 2).   
 
Mitchell (2018) argues that one of the sources of intractable intra-state conflict is competing 
for legitimacy between socio-political adversaries or between the incumbent (state and its 
agencies) and the insurgents (guerillas, protestors, secessionist or non-violent movement). It 
is supported by Park, Colleta and Oppenheim (2013)’s opinion that the legitimacy of the state, 
not capacity, might count as the essential factor in local contestation. Based on the two 
arguments about the competing legitimacy in conflict, this thesis will largely focus on the 
dynamics of legitimation between central government, GAM and broader Aceh society in the 
post-conflict era. While conflict is a time of contested legitimacy, peacebuilding could be 
interpreted as the process of developing the legitimacy of the former adversaries: the 
Government of Indonesia and GAM. 
 
2.5.3.1 Approaches to Legitimacy  
Mitchell (2018) categorises two approaches to legitimacy. The first approach is organic, 
departing from the “mythical precept” that the state represents the nation which demands 
loyalty, service, obedience and even lives from the people (Mitchell, 2018). In the post-colonial 
setting, the state and nation failed to converge because one state could consist of multiple 
ethnic and linguistic groups that weaken the organic basis of state legitimacy. The second 
approach is contractual, which implies a contract between the state and its citizen: the state 
must provide certain things (security, welfare, freedom) in return for the loyalty and obedience 
of the people (Mitchell, 2018). The violation of the contract by the state will break the 
agreement and result in disobedience, a transfer of loyalty and declining of legitimacy 





2.5.3.2 Sources of Legitimate Authority  
Classical literature on legitimacy by Max Weber classified three sources of legitimate 
authorities (Weber, 1978): 
1. Rational grounds: a legitimacy that is based on a belief in normative rules and the 
rights of authorities under such rules to issue commands.  
2. Traditional grounds: a legitimacy that is based on the existing belief of the sacredness 
of traditions and legitimacy of the authority that exercises the tradition. 
3. Charismatic grounds: a legitimacy that is based on sacredness, heroism or peculiar 
character of an individual person. 
 
Hancock and Mitchell (2018) offer three broad bases of legitimacy that seem applicable in a 
protracted conflict setting:  
1. Identity-based: a legitimacy that is based on the shared identity of affinity. 
2. Ideology-based: a legitimacy that is based on ideology, value and norms. 
3. Contractual-based: a legitimacy that is based on a social contract arising from a 
pragmatic or functional approach. 
 
Identity and ideology are seen as the most secure sources of legitimacy that present a priori, 
while contractual-based or pragmatic legitimacy must be earned and sustained over time 
(Mitchell, 2018). The concept of legitimacy on rational grounds by Weber and contractual-
based legitimacy by Mitchell have a similar meaning in that both parties are bound by a set of 
uniform principles or social contract. In the protracted conflict situation when identity or 
ideological legitimacy is hardly gained by incumbent/state/central government and often 
more easily obtained by locally-based insurgents, the common customary strategy for both 
parties is back to contractual based legitimacy (Mitchell and Hancock, 2018).  
2.5.3.3 Types of Legitimacy  
Scharpf (2003) defined two major types of legitimacy: input and output legitimacy. Input 
legitimacy is perceived as legitimacy through participation to ensure that decisions are made 
by involving the governed (Scharpf, 2003).  Input legitimacy will increase if more people could 
take part in the decision making process. Output legitimacy is legitimacy through performance 
or policy solutions. If the needs of more people in society are met by performance or policy 
decisions, the output legitimacy will increase (Scharpf,2003).   
 
This thesis will primarily use three sources of legitimacy (identity, ideology and contractual) 
from Hancock and Mitchell and rational-based legitimacy from Weber. They are chosen 




conflict period between GAM and the Government of Indonesia and in the peacebuilding 
process. According to Hancock and Mitchell (2018), in a conflict situation, the legitimacy 
between state and insurgent groups competes, and it could shift to or is claimed by insurgent 
groups due to the following reasons: state incapacity (lack of functionality), historical 
identities (identity) and accepted principles and norms (ideology). GAM claimed identity 
legitimacy based on their historical trajectory and affinity with most Acehnese along with 
ideology-based legitimacy through Aceh ethnonationalism. Regarding contractual-based or 
functional legitimacy, the legitimacy of the incumbent or Indonesia Central Government 
declined due to the perceived deprivation over the distribution of welfare, access to political 
participation, security, human rights protection and acknowledgement identity to Acehnese.  
This situation led to conflict when the insurgent/GAM challenged the central government and 
claimed the legitimacy that was previously owned by the state. Peace agreements between 
these two adversaries were designed to transfer authority from the central government to 
GAM. In doing so, the central government expects to gain legitimacy from insurgents/GAM. 
Subsequently, insurgents as the new local political power in Aceh also expect to gain legitimacy 
from the people in Aceh by exercising the authority given by the central government.   
 
An important element to understand the dynamics of legitimacy from the incumbent/central 
government to insurgent/GAM and vice versa during the peacebuilding phase is input and 
output/performance legitimacy. Throughout the peacebuilding phases, we could expect to see 
the interplay of legitimacy between state/incumbent and GAM/insurgent based on the input 
and output legitimacy, in the forms of electoral politics, welfare and services provided by these 
two former adversaries. The people of Aceh that are governed by insurgents as the new 
legitimate political power will evaluate whether the new ruler fulfils input legitimacy by 
opening access to participation in the decision-making process or could outperform 
incumbent/central government in delivering output legitimacy. Conversely, the incumbent, 
due to strong and well-established various supporting institutions are better than the 
insurgent in input and output legitimacy.  This dynamic might lead the incumbent to regain 
legitimacy from an insurgent or the people of Aceh. However, the interplay of legitimacy in the 
post-conflict era between the incumbent/central government and insurgent/GAM does not 
necessarily lead to contestation. The legitimacy of two parties could increase together 
especially when two parties build a political coalition to accomplish certain goals at the 
national level. On the other hand, the legitimacy of both sides is possibly going down together 
if they could not deliver satisfying output/performance legitimacy or if they do not open wide 





2.6 Social Movements, Collective Action and Framing  
In analysing rebel movements, we need to include the aspect of social movements to 
understand how structurally-induced grievances can be mobilised into violent collective 
action.  Grievances alone are not sufficient to create organised internal conflict; mobilisation 
is also needed (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994). According to Mihalka (2006) “social movements 
emerge and are sustained when they seek to redress perceived grievances, have sufficient 
resources to organise successfully, can exploit political opportunities as they arise, and can 
maintain coherence through attractive ideology”.  
Regan and Norton (2005) emphasise that the rational behaviour behind political mobilisation 
of a state in response to current or anticipated deprivation is based on common interests. This 
deprivation can be rooted in access to either material or political resources, although both are 
often linked and intertwined (Regan and Norton, 2005). 
Other scholars underline political opportunities to explain social movements. Tarrow (1996: 
54) describes political opportunities as “consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or 
national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them from 
using their internal resources to form social movements”. Gurr (2000) argues that incentives 
and opportunities are two critical aspects of the likelihood of group protest or rebellion. 
Incentives are caused by “various forms of discrimination, while opportunity depends on 
several factors, one of which is the authority of the rebel leadership” (Gurr, 2000).  
In addition to existing scholarly work on resource mobilisation theory and political 
opportunities, Benford and Snow (2000) observe a growing literature on collective action 
frame and framing processes to explain the character and course of a social movement. 
Collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meaning (Simunovic, 2012). 
From a collective action frames perspective, a social movement is not viewed merely as a 
carrier of ideas and meaning that grows spontaneously without structural arrangements and 
existing ideology (Benford and Snow, 2000). The actors of social movements are seen as active 
agents engaging in production and maintenance of meaning for various groups: constituents, 
antagonists, bystanders or observers (Benford and Snow, 2000). The raw material of a 
grievance is not sufficient to encourage violent actions. It must be supported by the presence 
of collective collection action frames that accentuate the injustice (Aspinall 2007b).  In the 
case of Aceh, the grievance is mobilised well by the narration of the ideology of Aceh 
nationalism and supported by the leader with charisma and strong authority. 
 
Collective action frames and political opportunities are significant to analyse the occurrence 




economic grievances, but only one or some of them could organise successfully into a cohesive 
movement. Collective action frames have become the distinct characteristic in the insurgency 
in Aceh. While other provinces in Indonesia such as Riau or East Kalimantan are also 
resource-rich, no significant insurgency movement either based on centre-periphery 
discontentment or identity has emerged. Chapter 3 of this thesis will explore the utilisation of 
the collective action frame in the mobilisation of conflict in Aceh.   
2.7 Conflict Resolution and Peace Settlement  
This section focuses on the resolution and settlement phases of the conflict in Aceh. Zartman 
(1995) argues that internal conflicts are the most difficult conflicts to negotiate. According to 
Licklider (2001: 698) “it was expected [that] civil wars conventionally would end with military 
victory as in the American Civil War or French Revolution”. The theory was straightforward: 
“in interstate wars foreign conquerors might leave at some point, but in civil wars the stakes 
were permanent control of the government, losing such control would be fatal to the interest 
of either side and therefore compromise was impossible” (Ikle, 1971 as cited in Licklider, 2001: 
670). In most civil wars, the process of resolution is elusive because of the asymmetrical nature 
of the conflict: the government is strong; the insurgency is weak. Negotiations are thus difficult 
because equality and mutual relations are the keys to a successful negotiation outcome 
(Zartman, 1995). However, over time, more combatants seem willing to discuss settlements 
with different outcomes, such as successful result in El Salvador, South Africa and Nicaragua 
failed case in Angola and Sudan (Licklider, 2001)  
A negotiated settlement is seen as an attractive alternative way to end large scale violence 
because it seeks a middle ground among the adversaries. Specifically, each side will get enough 
concessions as an encouragement to participate in a common government which is expected 
to alleviate societal problems, forge ties with former adversaries and eliminate the risk of 
future conflict (Licklider, 2001). Sisk (2001: 788-789) gives three examples of the result of the 
negotiated settlement: partition, power-sharing and autonomy.  
Partition refers to the creation of entirely new states granted full sovereignty and international 
recognition (Sisk, 2001). Some civil wars of the 1990s did end up in partition, including the 
breakup of former Yugoslavia and the independence of East Timor and Eritrea. Power-sharing 
is often conceived as a system to ensure group security in a multi-ethnic society which includes 
all segment of a diverse society in the decision-making process and consensus building (Sisk, 





The last example of a negotiated settlement, autonomy, has no consensus definition (Sisk, 
2001). This term is used differently depending on the context because the concept of 
legalistically is not well-defined. One of the definitions of autonomy is given by Heintze 
(1998:7): “autonomy is the granting of internal self-government to a region or a group of 
persons, thus recognising partial independence from the influence of the national or central 
government”. The Basque Country and Northern Ireland are examples of autonomy 
arrangements in Europe.  
Despite the absence of a consensual definition, one of the forms of autonomy, political 
decentralisation, has emerged as a frequent option in contemporary civil war settlements 
because it combines political aspiration and spatial acknowledgement (Lake and Rotchild, 
2005). Decentralisation is perceived as the ideal middle ground between desire for self-
determination and sovereignty (Lake and Rotchild, 2005). However, the principle of sub-state 
autonomy for national minorities is difficult to implement because of the rejection of 
devolution of power by the central government and the requirement of to reach a mutually 
satisfying agreement (Gurr, 2010).  The common process is usually begun with demands for 
full independence and ended by a middle ground solution through autonomy for the ethno-
nationalist rebel groups (Gurr, 2010). This thesis will further elaborate political 
decentralisation as the primary resolution of the conflict in Aceh.  
Not all negotiated settlements are enduring; many of them have failed. Particularly for 
identity-based war, the risk of failure is even greater, often two-thirds of the time (Licklider, 
2001). The difficulty for resolution is not limited to the resistance to negotiated settlement but 
also in maintaining its durability. Thus, the arrangement of socio-economics, politics and 
security are crucial in peace settlement to give confidence for the conflicting parties to comply 
with the agreement. Licklider (2001: 701-713 )  suggests several conditions to support the 
endurance of peace settlements: the principle of inclusiveness, which includes the integration 
of elites, resolving the security dilemma, establishing a working government, creating a 
working economy, the establishment of transitional justice/retribution and renegotiation of 
the settlement.  Also, Crocker and Hampson (1996) propose specific requirements for a peace 
settlement:  
(1) it clearly states a discussion about a new constitution (or a new regional law 
in secessionist revolt) and the political order that will be created after the 
fighting stops, (2) it contains power-sharing provisions (Crocker and 





Hartzell (1999) identified three aspects: 
(1) they regulate control of the coercive apparatus of the new state, (2) they deal 
with the allocation of political power in the new state, and (3) they address 
possible uneven economic advantage within the new state” (Hartzell 1999: 4).   
Furthermore, Hartzell (1999) found that most enduring peace settlements are the agreement 
which institutionalises these three elements. Smith (2002) notes the necessity of addressing 
the factors underlying the conflict. Thus, this thesis argues that to support successful 
peacebuilding efforts, the implementation of a peace settlement which addresses grievance as 
an underlying factor of the conflict is crucial.  
Tajik (2011) categorised the content of peace settlement in three components: 
1) Procedural components are related to the process to establish and maintain 
peace, such as timelines of schedules of substantive issues such as elections, 
retrospective justice and disarmament along with the designated institutions to 
execute the programme. 
2) Substantive components are aspects pertaining to mid and long-term post-
peace settlement arrangements. They relate to the distribution of power, 
management of natural resources and structural changes to address past 
grievances and bring equality.  
3) Organisational components are arrangements intended to promote the peace 
consolidation efforts after the agreement. They particularly consist of a neutral 
monitoring process and steering capacity. (Tajik 2011: 1-2) 
The substantive component is the provision which is closely related to the elimination of 
grievances in the peace settlement.  Substantive provisions are created to appease grievances 
on justice (Yawaranajah and Oulett, 2003). They include changes in social, political, and/or 
economic structures that allow for more resources, more opportunities, and more power for 
the previously aggrieved groups (Yawaranajah and Oulett, 2003).  
A fair and just arrangement based on the characteristics of the conflict and conflicting parties 
is very important to sustain peace. In many cases, the new peace cannot be sustained because 
the content of the peace agreement does not properly address the underlying factors of the 
conflict or fails to establish firm and clear security. The peace settlement also needs to pay 
particular attention to power-sharing and economic arrangements. Power-sharing becomes a 




contestation through elections. Economic inequality, which is often the main source of 
grievance, has to be properly addressed by appropriate regulations in the peace settlement. 
More specifically in the case of peace settlement in Aceh, Ronnie (2016) uses the core concept 
of readiness from Pruitt to argue that the success of the peace process depends on the 
perception of the conflicting parties in the existing conditions that shape their motivations to 
achieve the peace process.  The existing condition comprises of the perception both from the 
GoI and GAM. On the GoI side, President Yudhoyono used the cost-benefit analysis in re-
evaluating the military operation with GAM and found that the economic cost of the military 
operation was higher than a negotiated settlement. The ongoing internal conflict is also 
perceived to be detrimental to domestic stability and foreign investment. There is also a 
perception of the infeasibility of a truly winning strategy to combat GAM.  Yudhoyono 
perceived that amidst the weakened force of GAM and the chance that a military operation 
might have been able to destroy it, a military victory would not completely diminish the 
separatist idea, as long as the root causes of the conflict are not alleviated. On GAM’s side, 
there was a pragmatic perception of the infeasibility of victory. The first reason is the failure 
of GAM diplomacy to attain international recognition, caused by the shift of international 
conditions following the global war on terror in 2001. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was 
greater attention given to terrorism issues than to human-rights based ones, including the 
right to self-determination as the basis of GAM struggle. GAM also perceived that their forces 
had been weakened during the martial law era. These various perceptions had shaped the GoI 
and GAM motivation to end the conflict and enter the new round of negotiation.   
However, Ronnie (2016) argues the perception of readiness and motivation are influenced by 
various conditions interlinked in a different process. The pre-conditions occur in three layers: 
international, national and local. As previously mentioned, in the international setting post 
9/11, the position of a state or a nation became a more important issue than the people, 
community or ethnic minorities. At the national level, the Yudhoyono administration built a 
strong coalition with political parties to secure a political decision in parliament, including 
proposing a negotiated settlement with the separatist organisation like GAM. Locally, there 
was a growing influence of civil society organisation in Aceh that encouraged the democratic 
mechanism of resolving the separatist issue through a referendum. In addition to the pre-
conditions, Ronnie also calculates the availability of the Tsunami Fund to finance peace-
building projects and the pre-negotiation process as an effort to enhance trust-building during 
the negotiation as the contributing factor to the successful peace settlement in Aceh.  
While Ronnie’s findings on supporting factors of the successful peace agreement in Aceh are 




peacebuilding (Ronnie, 2016: 9). Therefore, his research is  primarily intended to examine the 
durability of the peace agreement but not the durability of peace in general. My thesis is 
intended to examine the next process after the peace agreement, that is the durability of peace 
building. I argue that in the peace building process, the factors that maintain the durability of 
peace building will be different from those which supported the durability of the peace 
agreement. One of the distinct factors that contribute to the durability of peace in Aceh is the 
characteristic of the MoU Helsinki that properly addresses the multiple grievances in this 
province. The other two factors are the well-translated MoU’s provisions into subsequent 
national and local law and the combination of participation and institution building methods 
in peacebuilding.   
This thesis will explore the dynamics of conflict resolution in Aceh from the military operation 
to negotiated settlements in chapter 3. The earlier method of military operation created 
another grievance among Acehnese people. Among the series of negotiated settlements, only 
the negotiation in Helsinki which accommodated grievances and their alleviations succeeded 
to bring peace to Aceh.  
2.8 Peace-Building  
The second part of the literature review in this chapter will be focused on peacebuilding. Peace-
building started to gain international prominence in the aftermath of the Cold War when UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali introduced the “Agenda for Peace” in 1992. The 
Agenda for Peace consists of preventive-diplomacy, peace-making, peace settlement and 
peacebuilding. While preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace settlement are designed 
before and during the conflict to enable hostile parties to find compromised solutions, 
peacebuilding is a post-conflict arrangement that is directed to maintain the durability of 
peace. It is a complex process that is aimed at preventing the recurrence of violence by 
alleviating the underlying causes of conflict through a wide range of aspects including 
economic transformation, political participation, grass roots and elite reconciliation and 
institution building (Maiese, 2003). Peace-building contains the components of resolution 
and prevention and is multidimensional to reach the sustainability of peace.  
2.8.1 The Peace-Building Concept 
The first official definition of peacebuilding mentioned in the Agenda for Peace is “action to 
identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse 
into conflict” (Ghali, 1992:104). Ghali includes activities such as “rebuilding the institutions 
and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strifes strives”, and “building bonds of 
peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war and addressing the deepest causes of 




emphasises the avoidance of conflict relapse as the achievable goals of peacebuilding. The 
International Peace Academy includes a local perspective by defining peacebuilding as “an 
attempt to reduce the sources of present and ongoing antagonism and build local capacities 
for conflict resolution in divided societies—often in the face of open hostilities and raw 
trauma” (IPA 2001:2). Call and Cousens (2008) add the indicators of the absence of violence 
and participation in their definition of peacebuilding as “the actions undertaken by 
international and national actors to institutionalize peace and understood as the absence of 
amred conflict and a modicum of participatory politics” (Call and Cousens, 2008 : 10).  
Peacebuilding involves a process comprising various functions and roles. It often involves a 
wide range of sequential activities that range from cease-fire and refugee resettlement to the 
establishment of a new government function that provides basic social services (Jeong, 2005). 
According to Bell (2001), however, the peacebuilding phase revolves around the efforts to 
strengthen the political institution, consolidate internal and external security and revitalise 
the economy and security.  
Peacebuilding can be analysed through positive peace and negative peace lenses, a concept 
introduced by Johan Galtung. The absence of direct violence such as conflict or war is defined 
as negative peace. Stedman (2002: 2) proposes that “peacebuilding success can be measured 
in relation to the ending of violence and the conclusion of the war on a self-enforcing basis: 
when the outsider leaves, the former warring parties refrain from returning to war”. Most 
peace settlements nowadays are directed to create negative peace, adopting the narrow 
approach of peacebuilding focusing upon stopping armed violence and maintaining a ceasefire 
over the short term.  
In contrast, a positive peace embraces a broader understanding of peace that goes beyond the 
absence of direct violence (Jeong, 2000). This approach includes removal of structural 
violence, promotion of democratic values, development and national reconciliation (Newman, 
2009). Galtung (1975, quoted in Miall et al. 1999:187) defined peacebuilding as “encompassing 
the practical aspects of implementing peaceful social change through socio-economic 
reconstruction and development”. Galtung argues that cross-cutting issues such as gender and 
culture are the crucial element in the peace debate (Galtung, 2002, xvi). This thesis uses a 
broad definition of peacebuilding that closest o positive peace and is not only aimed at 
preventing the recurrence of the conflict but also at building sustainable peace.  
Most peacebuilding operations under UN auspices have aimed to achieve negative peace. It is 
reasonable because successful maintenance of a ceasefire and quantifiable benchmarks such 
as numbers of refugees resettled, demobilisation and disarmament targets and employment 




frames. This approach is commonly found in African and Middle East countries where the 
state institutions and physical infrastructure have been severely damaged, coupled with 
protracted hostility amongst ethnic groups or tribes. Peace-building operations with long term 
indicators such as establishing a culture of peace, economic equality, and national 
reconciliation are more feasible for implementation in emerging democratic countries with a 
working bureaucracy and adequate resources, such as some countries in Southeast Asia, 
including Indonesia.  
2.8.2 Peace-Building in Practice  
Bercovitch and Jackson (2009) stress the lack of general agreement about peacebuilding in 
practice. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Stedman (2001) tend to take a broad view and 
include all cases of post-civil war transitions to peace. Other authors such as Miall, 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999) and Paris (2001) focus merely on UN peace support 
missions. Chandler (2001), meanwhile, argues that fully developed peacebuilding covers 
operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Bercovitch and Jackson (2009) aim to resolve 
this issue by suggesting three forms of peacebuilding operation:  
1) Fully formed, comprehensive UN-directed peacebuilding operations 2) 
Peacekeeping operations with significant peacebuilding dimensions and 
post-conflict transition 3) A plethora of peacebuilding policies, projects and 
program within the wider activities of a large number of international, 
national and non-governmental development agencies (Bercovitch and 
Jackson, 2009: 177) 
Worldwide, current peacebuilding missions are dominated by categories 1 and 2, especially in 
African and Middle Eastern countries. The last category fits the peacebuilding efforts in the 
Asia Pacific region, especially within Southeast Asia, where the role of the national government 
is visibly strong to control the direction of peacebuilding. Thus, it is interesting to investigate 
how the original concepts of the peacebuilding missions that are usually executed by UN 
agencies, regional organisations or foreign countries are predominantly conducted by the 
national government such as in Indonesia2.8.3 The Peace-Building Approach 
Roland Paris (1997) argues that the growing number of peacebuilding operations in the world 
is not supported by attention to theoretical premises of the concept of peacebuilding, including 
the underlying assumptions. This lack of theoretical premise could lead to the false 
assumption that the motivation behind the peacebuilding is neutral (Phillipe-David, 2002). 




At root, full-scale peacebuilding efforts are nothing short of attempts at nation 
building; they seek to remake a state’s political institution, security forces and 
economic arrangements (Betram, 1995 as cited in Phillipe-David, 2002: 25). 
Bertram's notion of peacebuilding depicts the trajectory of peacebuilding operations in the 
post-Cold War era. The way peacebuilding is conducted is an emulation of the process of 
democratisation. The international community’s involvement in promoting liberal democratic 
principles and institutions in societies emerging from internal violence is derived from the 
revival of the perceived link between peace and liberal democracy.  
This following section will elaborate on the theoretical premise of peacebuilding that is divided 
into three approaches: Liberal Democratic Peace, Illiberal Peace-building and Non-
Western/Hybrid Peacebuilding. While several elements of liberal, illiberal and hybrid 
peacebuilding will be useful as a tool in the analysis of my research, this thesis will not rely 
heavily on the prescribed approaches. I argue that state-led peacebuilding in consolidated 
democracies like Indonesia has its dynamic that does not specifically fit particular approaches.  
2.8.3.1 Liberal Peace-Building 
The liberal democratic approach was initially directed to foreign relations due to the disastrous 
impact of World War I. This approach was also applied to internal conflict that occurred in the 
aftermath of World War II. Based on the idea of democratic peace, Rummel (1995) argued that 
democratic countries have been more resistant to civil war because it is supported by a 
democratic mechanism such as mediation, negotiation and voting to deal with potential 
violent conflict.  There is also concern that unstable countries marred with violent domestic 
conflict will be a prominent threat for regional and global security, which makes the imposition 
of liberal democratic peace more important (Sahin, 2009).  
The liberal democratic approach is applied in several aspects, such as politics, economics, and 
human rights. In the political context, liberal peacebuilding is translated into free and fair 
elections and the limitation of government power. In the economic realm, it means the 
introduction of market economies and free trade while in human rights, it relates to the 
guarantee of freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of association. To outline, Paris 
(2001: 56) sees peacebuilding as “the effort to transplant western model of the social, political 
and economic organisation into post-conflict countries, or in other words, pacification through 
political and economic liberalisation”.   
Liberal peacebuilding is commonly conducted in a short to medium time frame to push 
political democratisation, economic liberalisation, and establishing the rule of law as the 




Valters, Van Veen and Denney, 2015). The element of democratisation, economic 
liberalisation and the rule of law are perceived as important aspects to building effective state 
institution (DFID, 2010).  
2.8.3.2 Institutions before Liberalisation 
Liberal peace as the major approach in peacebuilding has invited criticism. Some scholars 
(Miall et al. 1999; Paris 1997, 2001; Ramsbotham 2000; Tschirgi 2004) argue that the 
implementation of liberal peacebuilding amplifies the underlying factors of conflict: poverty 
and exclusion. Roland Paris is one scholar with profound criticism of liberal peace. Based on 
the failure of liberal peace in Rwanda and Angola that resulted in a resurgence of conflict, Paris 
(1997) argues that the primary fault of liberal peace is the introduction of market democracies. 
Liberalisation brought by international agencies has created destabilising side effects and 
harms the newly gained peace.  
Paris’ arguments were affirmed by Snyder (2000) who sees the impact of liberal peace from 
the aspect of the ethnic and cultural setting that often mislead democratisation into 
polarisation. In a certain cultural setting that is based on communities, tribes and clans, such 
as in Sub-Sahara, the Pacific and Asia, liberal human rights and democratic contestation can 
be culturally inappropriate and leads to fragmentation (Snyder, 2000). It is caused by political 
space created by democratisation that resulted in the establishment of new groups that are 
aimed to compete for political power (Snyder, 2000). The emergence of new groups is seen 
negatively by old elites as they threaten the status quo that they had been enjoying for decades. 
The old elites tend to secure their position by mobilising masses along primordial lines such 
as religion, ethnicity and race (Ottaway, 2002) 
Richmond (2006) argues that liberal peacebuilding creates weak, dependent states that are 
marred by contested power-sharing and corruption. It occurs because post-conflict countries 
have an insufficient institutional framework to undergo the process of liberalisation 
(Fukuyama, 2004), while on the contrary, liberal peacebuilders believe that the population 
will simultaneously adopt the institutions implanted by international agencies regardless of 
their particular characteristics, culture and priorities (Richmond and Franks, 2008).  
Paris (2007) affirms that some form of peacebuilding remains necessary and advocates fixing 
the peacebuilding mechanism and not abandoning it. Paris’ (2007) primary suggestion is to 
delay the process of liberalisation until the establishment of capable political and economic 
institutions, as the early phase of democratisation and liberalisation can be very vulnerable 
(Snyder, 2000). In other words, Paris suggests the establishment of political stability rather 




liberalisation” (Paris, 2007). Paris also calls it as strategic liberalisation because it shares the 
primary goal of a liberal internationalist to promote political and economic liberalisation 
through peacebuilding operations but carefully attempts to avoid the destabilising effect of 
liberal internationalism (Paris, 2007).  
2.8.3.3 Illiberal Peacebuilding  
While at one end there is liberal democratic peace that adopts Westphalian principles, which 
often is used as a model in war-to-democracy transitions, there is illiberal peacebuilding at the 
other end of the continuum. De Oliviera defines illiberal peacebuilding as follows:   
a process of post-war reconstruction managed by local elites in defiance of liberal 
 peace precept regarding civil liberties, the rule of law, the expansion of economic 
 freedoms and poverty alleviation, with a view to constructing a hegemonic order and 
 an elite stranglehold over the political economy (De Oliviera, 2011: 288) 
The failure of global consensus to respond to civil war and inter-communal conflict has led to 
the emergence of illiberal practices in peacebuilding. After two decades of the domination of 
liberal peace during 1990 to 2010, norms of peace have become contested as they are gradually 
replaced by military victories as shown by the cases of Chechnya and Sri Lanka (Lewis, 
Heatershaw and Megoran, 2018). Lewis et al. (2018) offer the concept of Authoritarian 
Conflict Management (ACM) as a form of illiberal peacebuilding. Several characteristics of 
ACM are the rejection of international mediation, neglecting of the underlying factors of the 
conflict and opting to use state coercion and a hierarchical structure of power.  Smith (2012) 
also mentions the use of military power as a major characteristic of illiberal peace. Regarding 
the cause of conflict, illiberal peacebuilding does not trust grievance and sees the conflict as 
mainly driven by greed (Lewis et al., 2018) 
 
Illiberal peace is characterised by victor peace, where the victorious leadership determines the 
process of post-war reconstruction. Sri Lanka is one of the prominent cases of illiberal 
peacebuilding, where the Rajapaksa’s government opted to use indiscriminate force to end its 
internal conflict. The post-conflict arrangement in Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Rwanda and 
Eritrea fit with illiberal peacebuilding precepts.  
 
2.8.3.4 Hybrid Peace  
Due to the destabilising impact of the western theoretical tradition of liberalisation and 
democratisation, there is a need to put more focus on the outcome of democratic contestation. 




different result if it is implemented in countries with different cultural settings. The 
establishment of a democratic institution must be adaptive and sensitive to local culture and 
political tradition (Jeong, 2005). Based on the cultural relativity and the evidence of the failed 
liberal peacebuilding, there is an increasing need to consider the implementation of hybrid or 
non-western peacebuilding approaches. MacGinty (2008) advises that “more attention must 
be given to non-state traditional actors and methods and their combination with modern 
forms of conflict transformation, be they state-based or civil-society-based”. Furthermore, 
MacGinty (2008) reveals that traditional non-western approaches to conflict transformation 
and peacebuilding have not gained sufficient attention in political practice or academic 
research despite their promising success as an alternative method of conflict transformation 
in the contemporary era.  
 
The main differing characteristic of hybrid peace compared to liberal peace is the acceptance 
of traditional institutions and values based on tribal, kinship, religion and ethnicity, combined 
with contemporary values such as democratisation and state institution (Yamashita, 2014).  
Many types of hybridity span between liberal state and illiberal institutions, norms, and 
practices. Jarstad and Belloni  (2012: 1 ) define hybrid peace as follows`:   
a wide array of hybrid conditions, ranging from the formal inclusion of warlords into 
state institutions, to the influence of informal and traditional institutions and actors 
(such as clientelism, neo-patrimonialism, and non-state authorities like local chiefs), 
to instances where the state may possess formally democratic elements such as 
periodic elections, but is actually "captured" by narrow, illegal, and even violent 
groups.  
 
The mixture between the implementation of liberal democratic practices and illiberal values 
is often unavoidable in several post-conflict countries in the transition period. Elements of 
clientelism and neo-patrimonialism occur particularly during the early stage of peace to keep 
the peacebuilding inclusive and ensure that all parties benefit from peace. However, Ockey 
(2019) criticised the “division of labour” of hybrid peacebuilding. Institution building is mainly 
carried out by well-financed and powerful international actors such as the UN, World Bank, 
or IMF and the participation aspect is left to civil society as the weaker actor.  
 
From a different perspective, Ockey (2019) based on Eckstein’s (1980) notion of contingent 
and inherent approach to conflict, argues that peacebuilding tends to adopt the contingent 
approach. The contingent approach is based on the assumption of the failure of the institution 
as the impetus of conflict and tends to focus on fixing or rebuilding state and economic 




central focus of peacebuilding must be centred on the creation of effective mechanisms for 
past and newly emerging conflict and not only focus on state building or transformation of a 
single conflict (Ockey, 2019).  
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, these frequently cited approaches – liberal, 
illiberal and hybrid – are not entirely relevant to explain the state-led peacebuilding in 
Indonesia. The major incompatibility with the liberal approach is that the peacebuilding 
process in Aceh occurs in the country with existing democratic institutions, albeit it contains 
significant shortcomings in its norms and institutions. The proponents of liberal peace 
strongly emphasise the establishment of a capable institution to provide security and 
development as the indicators of stable and functional states (Rotberg 2003; Doyle, 2005 as 
cited in Hartzell, 2014). Even before undergoing the democratic reformation in 1998, 
Indonesia already had strong military, police and governance institutions as well as a 
functional bureaucracy to deliver development and security to its people. There was also an 
absence of strong international peacebuilding actors in a long period in supervising 
peacebuilding in Aceh to enable the promotion (or imposition) liberal democratic values. The 
presence of international actors is one important characteristic in liberal peacebuilding as 
accentuated by Richmond:  
 
“guidance in, or control of, almost every aspect of state and society is provided by 
external actors, which construct liberal regimes through a mixture of consensual and 
punitive strategies. All of these approaches effectively combine an outside-in 
construction of peace, whereby outside actors import the specialised knowledge, 
procedures, and structures, with an inside-out approach, whereby disputants attempt 
to renegotiate this process according to their own interests, culture, and frameworks” 
(Richmond, 2010: 23)  
 
Peace-building in Aceh was only supervised by the short term (sixteen months) and unarmed 
Aceh Monitoring Mission. The rest of the process is fully overseen and directed by the central 
government. De Rouen (2014) emphasises the possibility of the recurrence of peripheral 
ethnic wars that ended in a settlement (such as the case of Aceh) if the provisions of the peace 
agreement are slowly implemented or if there is a growing distrust by the former rebel 
movement of the government. Thus, it is appealing to observe the dynamics between former 
insurgents and the central government in managing post-conflict arrangements in state-led 
peacebuilding in Aceh where most of the peace building program and evaluation are carried 





Most of the liberal peace building literature concerns the incompatibility of the liberal norms 
with existing local values and the inadequate institutional framework. Snyder (2000) and 
Ottaway (2000) highlight the clash between the participatory democratic channel through the 
election with the tribal or clan system while Fukuyama (2004)  emphasises the problem of the 
insufficient institutional framework for the liberalisation process. However, peace building in 
Aceh is not plagued with these problems. Given the state-led building characteristic and the 
preceding democratisation process, peace building in Aceh is supported by existing state 
institutions, functional bureaucracy and the common practices of liberal democracy such as 
direct elections and the development of political parties. The two aforementioned factors: the 
absence of external actors and  the sufficient institutional framework, all mean peacebuilding 
in Aceh does not fit with the liberal peace approach. Therefore, I choose not to employ the 
liberal peace framework in the analysis of this thesis.   
 
The case of Aceh is equally incompatible with the illiberal peacebuilding stream as there was 
no obvious return of military role, the total victory of one group over another and total 
negligence of democratic principles. Hybrid value with a strong reliance on local norms also 
does not perfectly fit peacebuilding in Aceh. Even though MoU Helsinki and the subsequent 
regulations accommodate provisions related to local identity, the entire peacebuilding in Aceh 
could not be classified as “local peacebuilding”.  
 
Based on abovementioned considerations, this thesis will use neither a liberal, illiberal or 
hybrid approach to peacebuilding. I will rather employ the relative deprivation-grievance 
approach to analyse the durability of peace in Aceh. This thesis will also include a contingent 
and coherent approach in observing the dynamics of the peacebuilding process in Aceh, 
particularly during the implementation process that involved the methods of institution 
building and participation.  
 
2.8.4 Timing and Phases in Peace-Building 
The discourse over the timing and phases in peacebuilding emerged from the result of the 
third wave of democratisation. The difficult path from democratic transition to consolidation 
has led to the emergence of a new wave of “preconditionists” (Berman, 2007). The emphasis 
on the timing of the introduction of the core element of democracy leads to proposed transition 
strategies, namely sequentialism and gradualism. Sequentialism has been advocated by 
several scholars, including Samuel Huntington (1968), Fareed Zakaria (1997), and Jack 
Snyder (2000), who posit that successful democratisation should be based on sequential 
phases by following well-defined steps. It is commenced by increasing wealth and economic 





This argument is challenged by Carothers (2007) by introducing the concept of gradualism. 
The definition of democratic gradualism is different from sequencing. It does not translate 
into the complete postponement of fair and open processes of political competition, but does 
so in a cumulative and frequentative manner, until it reaches the desired goal (Carothers: 
2007). Carothers offered this competing concept due to the possibility of the abuse of the 
concept of sequentialism in semi-authoritarian countries by “claiming that their partial 
political liberalization is a necessary halfway house on the way to democracy, when in fact it is 
a means to avoid altogether the kinds of far-reaching political changes that would threaten 
semi-authoritarian rule” (Carothers: 2007). In other words, the concept of sequentialism in 
liberal peacebuilding is often manipulated by authoritarian elites to prolong their 
undemocratic governance and political power.  
While the first debate on sequencing has focused on the subject of democratisation, it is also 
influential in the field of peacebuilding. MacGinty (2016) proposed the concept of political 
time and sociological time to explain the phase of implementation of peacebuilding. Political 
time refers to procedural democracy such as an election or constitutional reform, while 
sociological time resonates political equality, broad public participation, transparency, 
accountability and anti-corruption (Brown and Langer, 2016). Most peacebuilding efforts are 
based on political time rather than sociological time, which is characterised by institutional 
reform in democratisation, constitutional reform and economic structural adjustment (Brown 
and Langer, 2016). Interestingly, Brown and Langer (2016: 444) based on Horowitz’s findings 
(2013) conclude that the Indonesian style of incremental reform through a “piecemeal 
approach” might be successful in a post-conflict context. The slow process of constitutional 
reform was negotiated step-by-step with ongoing learning and adjustment, such as the 
transition from parliamentary elected president to direct presidential election found as an 
attractive alternative in peacebuilding (Brown and Langer, 2016). 
In practical implementation, Bercovitch & Jackson (2009) based on data adapted from Miall 
et al. (1999) and Last (2000) make a framework of peacebuilding aims and tasks based on 










Table 2-1 A Framework of Peacebuilding Aims and Tasks 
Peace Building Aspect Interim/Short-
Term Measures 
Medium-Term Measures Long-Term Measures  
Military/Security DDR, Separation 







The consolidation of the 
new national army and 
integration of national 
police. 
The demilitarisation of 
politics and the 
transformation of the 











challenges of the second 




respect for democracy, 
human rights, the rule 
of law, development of 
civil society within 









resettled population and 
demobilised soldiers, 

















local actors.  
Managing conflicting 
priorities of peace and 
justice. 
Healing psychological 
wounds, long term 
reconciliation, peace 
education. 
Source: Bercovitch & Jackson (2009) 
 
The series of tasks and aims in this table reflects peacebuilding efforts in non-emerging 




organisations or foreign countries. It can be seen from the provision of security such as 
separation of army and police, consolidation of the new army and constitutional reform. In 
the state-led peacebuilding process that has been predominantly conducted by national 
government, those processes have been completed. Thus, it is important to investigate the 
different characteristics of task and time measurement in national peacebuilding processes 
that have occurred in Indonesia, particularly when peacebuilding has approached the 
normalisation phase.  
 
2.8.4.1 Transition and Normalisation Phases of Peace-Building  
Due to the period of time my research has focused on, that is  between 2005 and 2018, it is 
important to set out the phases of peacebuilding with more definitive terminology and a 
timeline. Table 2.2 provides samples of the classification of the peacebuilding phase and 
timelines from several institutions: 
Table 2-2 Peacebuilding Phases and Timeline 
Institution  Phase  Time  
The Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Technische 




1-3 years  
4-7 years  
8-10 years 
The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (2012) 
Initial Response  
Transformation 
Fostering Sustainability 
Short Term  
Mid-Term 
Long-Term 
(no specific timeline 
attributed to each stage) 






90 days-1 year 
1-3 years  
4-10 years  
Source: Reychler (2017)  
Ball (2001), as cited in Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), classifies peacebuilding into transition 
and consolidation stages. In the transition phase, the major responsibility borne by 
peacebuilding actors is to provide security for civilians, establish a legitimate government, and 
manage IDP and refugee repatriation as well as commencing the process of political and 
economic reform. During the consolidation stage, the tasks include embarking on substantive 





In a broader meaning beyond conflict resolution, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development/Development Assistance Committee defines a transition period as a “broad 
spectrum of activities along the path out of conflict [and complex disasters] and toward 
sustainable development, greater national ownership and increased state capacity” (OECD-
DAC, 2012 : 1). It includes “recovery and reconstruction activities that traditionally fall 
between the humanitarian and development categories, and security-related and 
peacebuilding activities” (OECD, 2012: 1). Meanwhile, CSIS (2002, as cited in Lemay-Hebert 
and Vizoka, 2017) categorises normalisation based on the withdrawal of outside intervention, 
the functionality of governance and economic activity, and when internal and external 
relations are conducted according to generally accepted norms of behaviour. Richard Caplan 
defines ‘normality’ as ‘a stable peace and the establishment of effective mechanisms of 
domestic democratic governance” (Caplan, 2005 as cited in Lemay-Hebert and Vizoka, 2017: 
150). The Annex of Normalization from the Comprehensive Agreement of Bangsamoro 
between the Government of Philippines and MILF gives us the broad definition of 
normalisation as follows:   
A process whereby communities can achieve their desired quality of life which includes 
sustainable livelihood and political participation within a peaceful deliberative society. 
Normalisation aims to ensure human security. It helps build security that is committed 
to basic human rights where individuals are free from fear of violence and crime and 
where long-held traditions and values continued to be honoured. 6 
Given the trajectory of peacebuilding in Aceh that is entering the normalisation phase, this 
thesis will use and focuses on the transition and normalisation (or consolidation) phases.  
2.8.5 Elements of Peace-Building 
The process of peacebuilding is comprised of various functions and roles. Peacebuilding 
entails wide coverage of activities from “demobilisation of paramilitary groups and other 
security arrangements to refugee resettlement, economic reconstruction and the advancement 
of human rights” (Jeong, 2005: 6). The elements of peacebuilding in practice must be based 
on the grievances that triggered the conflict. Implementation of peacebuilding is the 
opportunity to address the grievance and deprivation that has been felt by the society in the 
deprived region. Among the various peacebuilding efforts in Aceh, political democratisation, 
economic liberalisation and human rights and justice and identity rule are the most profound 
elements to alleviating common and longstanding grievances. 
 
                                                        




2.8.5.1 Political Participation 
Civil war and separatism are types of conflict that need political solutions. Therefore, in post-
conflict areas, the transition from conflict to peace is marked by the participation of former 
combatants in the political process. Political participation is one of the important prerequisites 
for enduring peace. The nexus between political participation and conflict is affirmed by 
Barbara Walters (2004: 372) “countries whose citizens enjoy high levels of economic well-
being and have access to a more open political system are significantly less likely to experience 
multiple civil wars than autocratic countries with low levels of individual welfare”. The 
importance of political participation to reduce conflict is also affirmed by Valters, Van Veen 
and Denney (2015) who state: “political democratisation is assumed to reduce the legacies of 
conflict and marginalisation and to build a sense of civic identity by creating empowered and 
representative institution that can replace personalised political power”. Zartman (1995) 
emphasised that the inclusion of the insurgency group into the political party (or the 
transformation of the armed group into a political party) is important to secure the transition.  
The transition from conflict to peace requires a functioning and acceptable government. In 
post-conflict countries with divided societies, the formation of government and state building 
is difficult because ethnic, religious and regional loyalties often hamper the process of 
institutional building. Thus, it is also important when drafting a new constitution to 
accommodate all parties in the constitutional design of the future of the country to reduce the 
politicisation of ethnicity (Reilly, 2009).   
Political transition in post-conflict areas is usually marked by two means of participation: 
through establishing political parties, and through elections. According to Zeeuw and Curtis 
(2010), the existence of political parties is essential to articulate aspiration from a society and 
to encourage alliances among different interests. The role of political parties is also significant 
in addressing grievances by accommodating different interests and demands from various 
communities and groups and translating them into manageable and workable programmes 
(Kumar, 1998). In terms of electoral politics, political parties are expected to select and 
prepare candidates for government and legislatures, manage electoral competition and get 
involved in political education (Zeeuw & Curtis, 2010). 
While becoming the standard practice in peacebuilding, the establishment of political parties 
in post-conflict countries can have two opposite effects: it may help to consolidate peace by 
forming coalitions and transforming the energy of conflict into political contestation, but it 
can also worsen social fragmentation especially if the party formation is based on former 




Zeeuw and Curtis (2010) emphasise the importance of the integration or transformation of 
armed groups or paramilitaries into political parties or the national army. The dismissed non-
state armed group must be transformed into new entities to prevent them from sparking 
another cycle of violence (Zeeuw and Curtis, 2010).  Another problem arises from the inclusion 
or transformation of rebel movements which aspire to party politics. After spending years in 
the battlefield, rebel leaders or members of the movement have no knowledge about peacetime 
politics such as drafting budgets, public administration, managing development projects and 
dealing with international donors (Von Hehn, 2011). 
While the establishment of political parties is beneficial in transforming former rebel 
movements into non-violent institutions, elections provide the means to start a new post-
conflict political order based on the selection of representatives in parliament or government 
offices and confer legitimacy accordingly (Reilly, 2012). The successful election will positively 
contribute to national unity and reconciliation as it grants the people in the post-conflict area 
the right to vote and to be elected. However, elections might ignite new violence if the parties 
in post-conflict states are not yet ready for democratic contestation. It may occur particularly 
in a country where the competing parties are based on religious, ethnic, racial or tribal 
affiliations. Chapter 4 of this thesis will highlight the aspect of political participation of 
peacebuilding in Aceh, Indonesia. This aspect is one of the essential provisions of 
peacebuilding in Aceh because the conflict in Aceh was exacerbated by the lack of political 
participation, and it was addressed by comprehensive political settlements in the peace 
accord.  
2.8.5.2 Economic Settlement   
Perceived inequality is one of the primary causes of subnational conflict. Thus, in every 
peacebuilding effort, economic development needs to be carefully designed and implemented. 
A peace agreement creates high expectations for economic improvements due to better 
security conditions that lead to a favourable climate for investment and other economic 
activities. Development policies should be considered an integral part of a broader peace 
process, given that poverty and inequality erode peace (Jeong, 2005). Jeong (2005: 13) 
propose the direction of post-conflict development as follows: “equitable development that 
benefits the majority of people in the society combined with income-creating opportunities for 
the poor”. This ideal condition requires development activities to be targeted to mitigate 
economic hardships and reintegrate the society across racial, religious and other divisions 
(Jeong, 2005). 
Boyce (1996) adopted short- and long-term approaches to politics and the economy during the 




must promote microeconomic stability and strengthening of democratic institutions, while the 
long-term approach focuses on macroeconomic policy, with equality and democratisation.  
Collier (2006) advises reducing military spending and accelerating growth.  He argues that 
strong economic growth has proven to be more important for conflict prevention than political 
reform in post-conflict countries (Collier, 2006). The importance of stimulating economic 
growth post-conflict is also affirmed by USAID. In its publication “A Guide to Economic 
Growth in Post Conflict Society”, USAID (2009) stresses the early need for a start in 
addressing the root of conflict in promoting economic growth in a post-conflict society. 
According to USAID, “evidence shows that early attention to the fundamentals of economic 
growth increases the likelihood of successfully preventing a return to conflict and moving 
forward with renewed growth” (USAID, 2009: 8). Each post-conflict situation is different, but 
in general, economic growth programs should aim to fulfil these following objectives. 
Re-establishing essential economic governance restores the government’s legitimacy, boosts 
employment and improves wellbeing as quickly as possible, addresses the root economic 
causes of the conflict, stabilises the economy and positions it to grow rapidly (USAID, 2009: 
9). 
Nevertheless, economic growth must be planned carefully in post-conflict peace settings. 
Robust growth that leads to economic marginalisation or inequality is the most common 
underlying cause of conflict. To prevent this, UNDP (2008) mentions the importance of 
inclusive growth. This approach emphasises the expansion of employment, reduction of 
economic inequality and the eradication of rent-seeking practices around the exploitation of 
natural resources (Pugh, 2011).  
 
Extensive studies of the economic aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding are based on 
experience in African and Middle East countries, where the state institutions have been 
severely damaged or even non-existent. Unsurprisingly, they stress accelerated growth and 
rehabilitation. The situation is different in middle-income states where the economic 
foundation is still intact, and they have adequate resources to rebuild. Economic grievances in 
middle-income countries include the lack of inclusive growth and unequal distribution of 
wealth. Thus, it is important to have more studies on the economic aspects of peacebuilding 
in non-African and Middle East countries to find broader perspective, as I will explore in my 





2.8.5.3 Fiscal Sharing (Peace Dividend) 
The other element of economic development in post-conflict peacebuilding is fiscal power-
sharing. Fiscal sharing is focused on the politics of peace dividends to generate an equal share 
of fiscal resources by reducing the proportion of central government and allocating a bigger 
share to local government (Alesman and Treisman, 2005). The impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on secessionist violence will depend on the true motives of those demanding 
secession. According to Aleman and Treisman (2005), there are three common motives for 
secession: autonomists, opportunities and local ethnic entrepreneurs. Autonomists aim to win 
greater authority to build local entities within existing states. Opportunists extort bigger 
shares of national wealth, while local ethnic entrepreneurs demand independence to gain local 
support (Alesman and Riesman. 2005: 176-177). Therefore, whether peace dividends are well 
utilised for society or are manipulated will depend on the leaders of the separatist movement.  
The importance of fiscal sharing is acknowledged by scholars in the consociational school as 
it is argued by (Lipjhart, 1973; 1993: 188-189 as cited in Roeder and Rothschild 2005: 177): 
“Proportionality in the allocation of public funds is an essential element of successful power-
sharing arrangement among ethnic groups”. The central transfer to the most likely separatist 
region is also considered an effective strategy to prevent secession (Roeder and Rotschild, 
2005).  
Onder & Cordela (2016) state that natural oil revenue-sharing in post-conflict areas would 
generate various results. This scheme works in Aceh because fiscal decentralisation was part 
of the peace agreement between The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free 
Aceh Movement in 2005. It did not work for Colombia Civil War resolution as 1991 fiscal 
reforms led to the appropriation of revenue by the rebel group to finance the movement. In 
Iraq, the result is mixed. Temporarily, oil revenue sharing between Iraq and the Kurdistan 
Regional Government might preserve Iraq territorial sovereignty, but in the long run, it could 
strengthen the Peshmerga fighters in their bid for independence (Onder and Cordela, 2016).  
The subject of fiscal politics as peace dividends is crucial in post-conflict peacebuilding 
especially in sub-national conflict since the central government tends to allocate a large 
amount of funds to redress the imbalance of the distribution of natural wealth during the 
conflict. As was mentioned earlier, the impact of the distribution of the peace dividend will 
depend on the motives of separatism. It may generate optimal welfare for the wider public and 
alleviate grievances or will end up benefiting certain groups of elites who belong to one ethnic 
group. Thus, unless managed fairly, a peace dividend may contribute to the possibility of the 
repetition of internal colonialism, in which one group tends to exploit resources at the expense 




triggered conflict in Aceh.  This deprivation was redressed by the arrangement of fiscal policy 
that allows Aceh to receive a greater share of the revenue from natural resources and an 
additional two per cent from the national budget ceiling for twenty years. This peace dividend 
warrants further investigation in my research because aside from its expected impact in 
remedying economic grievance, this fund is also the strong indicator of state-led peacebuilding 
that utilises a greater share of the internal fund rather than from international donors.  
2.8.5.4 Human Rights and Justice  
The rule of law and human rights are important aspects in peacebuilding to deal with past 
human rights violations, end armed violence and enter the judicial process for perpetrators. 
Human rights violations stemming from military operations are often not the original 
grievance of the conflict but create new grievances or intensify the old ones. However, the 
importance of human rights and the rule of law in peacebuilding is often sidelined and 
superseded by electoral politics and economic development. Lambourne (2004) identifies the 
shortcoming of the inclusion of human rights and justice in peacebuilding studies. Scholars 
such as David (1999), Stedman and Rotchild (1996) did not mention or discuss the aspect of 
transitional justice in their analysis of peacebuilding. Hartzel (1999) recognised the 
importance of justice in peacebuilding but did not include it in the analysis. Other scholars, 
Davis and Unger (2008) emphasise the importance of justice in creating sustainable peace. 
They argue that justice in peacebuilding is not merely about punishment but also as 
recognition of past mistakes, restoring the dignity of the victims, and rehabilitating and re-
establishing their position in the society (Davis and Unger, 2008) 
Practically, this ideal situation of the fulfilment of justice is difficult to achieve. In the interest 
of reaching an agreement and securing peace, the former perpetrators are often part of the 
new government as state apparatuses. They are the crucial elements in maintaining durable 
peace that make any attempt to establish a human rights court and conduct trials for 
perpetrators difficult. Hence, amnesty has become common practice in dealing with past 
human rights violations. If a war crimes tribunal is included in the peace settlement, it might 
be delayed with no definite time frame and require international intervention as occurred in 
the international war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia. Lambourne (2004) 
also points out the lack of effort to analyse the concept of justice and reconciliation in post-
conflict and how they are best achieved in a different post-conflict situation and cultural 
setting.  However, other scholars such as Herman, Martin-Ortega and Sriram (2009) give a 
more optimistic view on the relationship between justice and peace by advocating 
complementary trajectories and not sequencing or delaying the justice process during the 




effort to prevent rejection of external intervention and strengthen the national judicial system 
accordingly (Herman, Martin-Ortega and Sriram, 2009). 
The investigation of human rights and justice in Aceh is important in this thesis. While 
political and economic grievances are two dominant first factors of the impetus of conflict, the 
violation of human rights that occurred during a military operation in combating GAM 
resulted in heightened grievance and stronger resistance. The subject of human rights and 
justice in peacebuilding in Aceh will be further elaborated in chapter 7 of this thesis with the 
emphasis of the establishment of human rights court and transitional justice.  
2.8.5.5 Identity in Peace Settlement  
The acknowledgement of identity in peace agreement provision is, therefore, necessary to 
maintain the durability of peace. One of the attempts to manage problems related to identity 
in a post-conflict situation is to transfom them into the political arrangement. Consociational 
democracy is government by elite cartel designed to turn democracy with the fragmented 
political culture into a stable democracy (Lijphard, 1969). It is the form of governance that is 
commonly used in ethnically, racially or religiously divided society. Countries with a 
consociational democracy system institutionalise their cultural cleavages and use them to 
build a democratic structure through the power-sharing mechanism, either based on political 
parties which represent different groups or based on direct group identities (Ehrlich, 2017). 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is the primary example of post-conflict countries that employ 
consociational democracy to manage the tension of their cultural-religious diversity.  
 
Another arrangement of the accommodation of identity component is the recognition of local 
and indigenous languages, customary institutions, freedom to perform religious worship and 
wear traditional attire, and inclusion of local languages in provincial school curricula in peace 
settlements. The Good Friday Agreement, which sought to end the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, included identity component in one of its provisions about economic, social and 
cultural issues as cited below:  
 
3. All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and 
tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the 
Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, 
all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland. 
4. In the context of active consideration currently being given to the UK signing 
the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the British 
Government will in particular in relation to the Irish language, where appropriate 
and where people so desire it: 
• take resolute action to promote the language; 
• facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in 




• seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or 
work against the maintenance or development of the language; 
• make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, 
representing their views to public authorities and investigating 
complaints; 
• place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and 
facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for 
integrated education; 
• explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-operation 
with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achieving more 
widespread availability of Teilifis na Gaeilige in Northern Ireland; 
• seek more effective ways to encourage and provide financial support for 
Irish language film and television production in Northern Ireland, and 
encourage the parties to secure an agreement that this commitment will 
be sustained by a new Assembly in a way which takes account of the 




The most recent case is the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (OLBARMM), signed by President of the Republic of Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte 
in July 2018. The new law is considered to address the grievance, sentiments and demands of 
Muslims in Mindanao (Marcelo, 2018). This law stipulated the identity component on article 
II as follows:   
Section 1. Bangsamoro People. – Those who, at the advent of the Spaniards, were 
considered natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and 
its adjacent islands including Palawan, and their descendants, whether of mixed or of 
full blood, shall have the right to identify themselves as Bangsamoro by ascription or 
self-ascription. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro.  
Section 2. Freedom of Choice. – The freedom of choice of other indigenous peoples 
shall be respected. There shall be no discrimination on the basis of identity, religion, 
and ethnicity.  
Section 3. Bangsamoro Symbol. – The Bangsamoro Parliament shall adopt the official 
flag, emblem, and anthem of the Bangsamoro (https://peace.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/BBL-FINAL-DRAFT.pdf) 
In the case of Aceh, identity emerged as the backdrop and narration of the conflict. The 
construction of the distinct Aceh identity compared to the “Indonesian Javanese Government” 
by Hasan Tiro, the leader of GAM, functioned as a driving factor to mobilise grievances into a 
consolidated liberated movement. This thesis will analyse the interplay of identity factors in 




The component of peacebuilding is one of the important aspects of this thesis. Political 
participation, economy, human rights and identity represent the most profound grievances in 
Aceh that are addressed by the provisions of the peace settlement and its implementation in 
the aftermath of the negotiations.  
2.9 Framework  
Building upon several concepts in the literature review, this thesis will analyse the durability 
of state-led peacebuilding in Aceh Indonesia by utilising three frameworks: grievance 
alleviation, legitimacy, and peacebuilding methods. Grievance alleviation is instrumental in 
creating durable peace, and it lays a solid foundation for peacebuilding efforts.  Grievance 
alleviation is typically stipulated in peace settlements. In yielding the expected result, 
grievance alleviations must be undertaken through various detailed regulations both 
nationally and locally. Political participation, economy, identity and human rights are chosen 
to represent Aceh’s most profound grievances.   
Legitimacy is chosen due to its ability to explain the dynamics between political adversaries, 
namely the incumbent or central government and insurgent or GAM in Aceh throughout the 
peacebuilding phase. Throughout the regulations (MoU and LoGA), the incumbent central 
government transferred several authorities to Aceh in terms of local politics, economy, 
identity, and human rights. It is, therefore, appealing to observe how the transfer of authority 
from the central government influences the legitimacy of insurgents/GAM to Aceh people in 
times of peace. How is the legitimacy of insurgents/GAM gained, maintained, strengthened 
diminished, or regained by the central government throughout the process of peacebuilding?   
The other influential factor in determining the durability of peacebuilding is how the 
alleviation of grievances is conducted. Whereas this thesis does not specifically use the liberal 
democratic approach, it will utilise the concept of participation and institution building, two 
concepts that are associated with liberal democratic peace, as the methods of peacebuilding 






The framework of this thesis is constructed as follow: 




Another factor in analysing peacebuilding in Aceh is its trajectory from transition to the phase 
of consolidation and normalisation. Peace has been maintained for more than ten years 
without any major setback or escalating violence. Thus, it is important to observe which 
provisions of the peace settlement have been fully (or partially) implemented and which ones 
have yet to be implemented or have been withdrawn. The sequence or timing of each provision 
(politics, economy, human rights and identity) contributes to the durability and dynamics of 
peacebuilding in Aceh.  
 
2.10 Hypothesis  
In answering the research questions, the following hypothesis will be tested in analysing post-
conflict peacebuilding in Aceh, Indonesia.  
H.1. A peace agreement which addresses grievances will contribute to a durable peacebuilding 
process in middle-income countries with a relatively strong government like Indonesia. 
H.2. In order to secure sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding, the peace agreement should 
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H.3. Participation aspects of peacebuilding will contribute to unification, recognition of 
identity and legitimacy to address the underlying grievance. 
H 4. Institution building will increase legitimacy, secure resources and stabilise the conditions 
for lasting peace. 
H.5. In a country where the bureaucracy, state institution and national identity have been 
relatively strong and settled like Indonesia, state-led peacebuilding that combines 
participation and institution building contributes to a durable post-conflict peacebuilding 
process.  
The grievance is constructed by relative deprivation, a perceived inequitable resources 
distribution by the political and economic system because of the failure of institutional 
structure (Ockey, 2019). Legitimacy is described by Bernauer, Mohrenberg & Koubi (2016), as 
“a situation where citizens believe that political authority delegated to policy-makers and 
political institutions is being appropriately exercised and thus deserves to be obeyed” 
(Bernauer et al., 2016: 2). Participation, due to its broad meaning, is limited to the 
peacebuilding realm and understood as “the active involvement of the people in the conflict 
setting in the peacebuilding” (Nascimento, Jacobs and Keeler, n.d: 6). Participation in this 
thesis consists of electoral participation as well as general public participation, including 
women’s political participation in the decision-making process. Institution building refers to 
the approach of liberal peacebuilding that is driven by the belief that the principal “problem” 
with conflict-prone and post-conflict states is the absence of effective state institutions that 
could be solved by (re) building a viable institution and are often based on a generic western 
model (Futamura, Newman & Tadjbakhsh,2010). 
 
The first two hypotheses are formulated to analyse alleviation of grievance in Aceh through 
various conflict resolution methods, a peace settlement and subsequent regulations. The first 
hypothesis focuses on the construction of grievance alleviation in peace settlement while the 
second emphasises the dynamics of grievance alleviation in national law and bylaw (local 
laws).  Hypothesis one and two are mainly used in chapters four, five, six, and seven to examine 
the nexus between regulation and grievance alleviation. Meanwhile, the third to fifth 
hypotheses will be used to examine the peacebuilding process. Hypothesis three and four aim 
to investigate the interplay of authority, capacity, legitimacy, participation, institution 
building and neo-patrimonialism throughout the peacebuilding process in Aceh. Hypothesis 





This research will use qualitative methods to analyse the case study of Aceh, Indonesia. One 
of the main distinctive features of qualitative research is that it allows the researcher to identify 
issues from the perspective of study participants and understand the meaning and 
interpretations that they give to behaviour, events or objects (Hennik, Hutter, Bailey, 2011). 
The researcher also needs to be considered a part of the research setting and be reflective and 
self-critical (Gray, 2009).  
In addition to qualitative methods, this thesis employs a case study approach. According to 
Yin (1994, as cited by Hsieh, n.d), a case study is: 
An empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context especially when the boundary between context and phenomenon are 
not clearly evident [It] copes with the technically distinctive situation in which 
there will be many more variables of interest than data points and as one results 
of multiple sources of evidence that data points with data needing to converge in 
a triangulating fashion, other results benefit from the prior development of 
theoretical proposition to guide data collection and analysis”. 
A case study should be considered to answer “how” and “why” questions (Yin, 2003). Case 
studies allow the researcher to explore or describe a phenomenon in context using a variety of 
data sources (Baxter and Jack, 2008). It is also beneficial to discover grounded theory 
(Eisenhart: 1989), due to its ability for hypothesis testing and theory development, (George 
and Bennet, 2005) and “well suited to new research areas or research areas for which existing 
theory seems inadequate” (Rowley: n.d). A case study approach can be conducted as a single 
case analysis or as a comparison of several individual cases (George and Bennet, 2005).   
However, case studies are also criticised as lacking rigour due to flexibility in data sampling 
and data collection and analysis (Hsieh, n.d).  The selection of sampling depends on the 
researcher, and it invites criticism about researcher bias. The amount of data is often too little 
to contain enough evidence (Hsieh, n.d). In order to minimise the flaws in the case study and 
ensure trustworthiness, Yin (2009) advises the researchers to use multiple sources of 
evidence, develop case study protocols, triangulate data, use theory for a single case study and 






2.11.1 Data Collection Methods and Procedures 
Individual Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews with the inclusion of some open-ended questions were chosen to 
obtain primary data. This was selected due to the flexibility to accommodate and explore new 
themes that arose during the interview process. The information received about the peace 
agreement and its subsequent regulations at national and local level consists of: 
1. The level of engagement of the consultation process of local law derived from peace 
agreement and national law. 
2. The opinion about the implementation of the peacebuilding provisions that consist of 
political participation, economy, human right-justice and identity, and their 
contribution to alleviating the grievances.  
3. The level of political participation through the election and political parties. 
4. The utilisation of peace dividend through fiscal politics (Special Autonomy Fund). 
The interview questions are constructed from the main topics which represent variables in the 
framework as depicted in the table below: 
Table 2-3 The Sample of Topics and Questions of Primary Data Collection 
Sample of Topics  Sample of Questions  Hypotheses 
The Information of Peace 
Agreement and 
Subsequent Regulations  
1. What do you know about 
MoU Helsinki and LoGA? 
2. Have you ever read the full 
text or part of MoU 
Helsinki, LoGA (Law of 
Governing Aceh) or Qanun 
related to MoU and LoGA? 
In order to secure 
sustainable post-
conflict peacebuilding, 
the peace agreement 
should be well enacted 














The opinion about the 
implementation of the 
peacebuilding provisions 
what are their 
contributions to alleviating 
the grievances 
1. What is your opinion about 
the impact of MoU Helsinki 
for political participation in 
Aceh?  
2. What is your opinion about 
the impact of MoU Helsinki 
for economic development 
in Aceh?  
3. What is your opinion about 
the implementation of 
Sharia Law in Aceh?  
4. What is your opinion about 
the progress of human 
rights and justice in Aceh 
after peace agreement?  
In a country where the 
bureaucracy, state 
institution and 
national identity have 
been relatively strong 
and settled like 
Indonesia, the 
implementation of a 
mixed peacebuilding 
approach contributes 




The level of political 
participation through the 
election and political 
parties  
 
1. Did you vote in the past 
legislative, municipality and 
gubernatorial elections? 
2. What is your opinion about 
voter turnout in Aceh local 
elections? Do you think 
people in Aceh were an 
enthusiast to cast their 
vote? What is the reason for 
their enthusiasm (or 
apathy)? 
3. Did you join any political 
parties? Is that local or 
national party?  
4. Why did you decide to join 
this political party? 
5. Who are the constituencies 
of your party? (ex-






























1. What is your opinion about 
the representation of 
women in Aceh election, 
both in the legislative and 
gubernatorial/mayoral 
election? 
2. Do you think political 
parties in Aceh have 
supported the 
representation of women?  
Participation in liberal 
democratic peace will 
contribute to 
unification and 
recognition of identity 
to address the 
underlying grievance 
 
Local Politics Dynamics  1. What is your opinion about 
local political parties in 
Aceh?  Do you think it had 
accommodated MoU? 
2. What do you think the 
causes of the breakup of 
local political parties of 
GAM? How did it happen?  
3. What do you think about 
the dynamics and 
competition among local 
political parties in Aceh?  
Do you think it will bring 
negative impact to the 
peacebuilding process in 
Aceh, or on the other hand, 
competition is necessary for 
healthy political 
development in Aceh?  
 
1. An Institutionalist 
approach will secure 
resources and stabilise 
the conditions for a 
lasting peace 
 2. Illiberal or hybrid 
peace governance with 
the common feature of 
patronage in acquiring 
resources and 
maintaining the old 
structure of power will 
integrate the former 
combatants to peace, 
but in the long run, will 
lead to the 
perpetuation of 
internal colonialism 










Document Analysis  
1. Books and Journals 
Due to its intricate history of conflict, peace and disaster, Aceh has attracted a large 
amount of national and international research, particularly after the tsunami and 
peace agreement. Newspaper and Magazine Online articles and secondary data from 
this category were collected from international, national and local news sources.  I 
attempted to compare articles related to the topic of this research from several sources 
to obtain a balanced viewpoint.  
 
2. Official data from various government agencies  
I gained supplementary statistical data about voter turnout, women’s representation 
in the legislative election and the allocation and disbursement of special autonomy 
funds from government offices such as the National and Provincial Election 
Commission and Local Development Planning Agency.  
3. Reports from international agencies such as World Bank, ADB and UNDP and think 
thank organisations (ICG, IPAC, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch)  
These two methods have their strengths and weaknesses. Primary data guarantees originality 
and targeted information. However, it is time consuming, costly and without adequate skill, I 
will not obtain substantial information, for example in interviewing government officers, the 
answers are rather formal and based on what they have to say rather than what they want to 
say. There are also security constraints, especially if the locus of research is conflict or post-
conflict areas. Secondary data is available in vast supply, time-saving, low cost, and 
comparable with other sources. However, it also contains several weaknesses such as 
incomplete and outdated information and could be very subjective and biased.  Thus, the 
combination of both types of data is beneficial for a strong foundation for the analysis of my 
research.  
2.11.2 Risks and Ethical Considerations 
While Aceh is generally considered to be a safe place after conflict and disaster, I still take a 
cautious approach to doing field research in this province. All interviews are conducted in 
public spaces such as university buildings, government offices or cafes and during working 
hours (9 am to 5 pm). I also paid attention to cultural sensitivity and strong Islamic values in 
Aceh such as wearing modest clothing and covering the hair during the entire phase of data 
collection. 
Although most questions were designed to examine current situations post-conflict, I 




and disaster, given the semi-structured type of interviews. I also anticipated possible suspicion 
or further questions regarding the difference of ethnicity between the researcher and the 
respondents. Ethnicity is an essential element for some respondents. It was proven by the first 
question from some respondents after I introduced myself: “which ethnic group are you belong 
to?” Being half-Javanese, an ethnic group that was considered as the representative of the 
central government and the “enemy” during the conflict era, then I have to be culturally 
sensitive if some respondents resorted to stereotyping or expressed anger and resentment 
toward Javanese people.  
I placed a very high consideration of the safety and confidentiality of respondents. All 
respondents were contacted and given an official letter and information about the research 
before the data collection. Several respondents who had just been approached after 
snowballing sampling was conducted, were also given the same documents. Informed consent 
was explained to all respondents before the interview, and they could withdraw anytime from 
the interview if they did not feel comfortable to answer the questions.   
I obtained human ethics approval from the University of Canterbury during phase one of data 
collection and from Bina Nusantara University for the second phase. The confidentiality of 
respondents is strictly maintained by using pseudonyms such as peacebuilding activist (PA), 
local political party (LPP), or student (S) in thesis writing.  
2.11.3 Sampling  
The resources of this research consists of several groups of respondents, represented by local 
(provincial and municipality) government officers, local and national political party officers, 
peacebuilding activists from the women’s movement, media, education, community 
development and human rights, former peace agreement negotiators, lecturers, students, and 
political analysts. In phase one, 30 respondents were interviewed and 14 respondents were 
added in phase 2, making the total number of interviewees of this research 44. I used 
purposive sampling combined with snowballing in selecting the respondents.  
2.11.4 Research Sites 
The region of Aceh in Indonesia is chosen as the case study due to its peculiar trajectory of 
peace. Conflict in Aceh must be seen in the wider context of Indonesia’s emergence as a 
democratic country. Indonesia is one of the countries which experienced domestic 
insurgencies in the aftermath of World War II. Aceh is a notable case of the unrest. Along with 
several troubled areas such as Maluku, Papua, East Timor, and Kalimantan, Aceh has been 
suffering civil war for almost 30 years. The guerrilla warfare performed by Gerakan Aceh 




rights abuses, which were conducted during President Suharto’s administration, between 
1968 and 1998. 
In August 2005, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Helsinki between GAM 
and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The signing of this MoU concluded the 
thirty years of conflict between two parties. Eight years after MoU Helsinki was signed, the 
peace in Aceh remains durable. Aceh’s peace durability is based on Hartzell, Hoodie and 
Rothchild’s (2001) opinion that durable peace is reached if there is no return to war within 
five years from the peace agreement because the resumption of civil war after five years of 
peace is unlikely to happen. The pair of former combatant and youth activists won the 2006 
gubernatorial election. The political achievement of former combatants was followed in the 
legislative branch by the impressive victory of Partai Aceh (PA), a political party established 
by a former GAM member, by winning almost half the votes in the province. The political 
transformation seemed complete, with the PA taking control of the parliament while other 
former rebels, including Governor Irwandi Yusuf and his vice governor, Muhammad Nazar, 
lead the executive's branch. The result of the post-conflict peacebuilding in Aceh led to positive 
discourse over the factors contributing to the favourable post-conflict situation in this 
province.  
The favourable conditions of the post-conflict peacebuilding in Aceh regarding local 
democratic elections, the dynamics of the transformation of former combatants to politicians 
and economic reconstruction may lead to a premature conclusion that the liberal democratic 
approach has been successful in sustaining peace in the post-conflict area. It is emphasised by 
Aspinall (2009: 223) “Eventually, resolving the Aceh conflict became an agenda item in the 
international endeavour to remake Indonesia as a modern liberal democracy”. This thesis 
suggests the importance of the investigation of the peacebuilding approach which has been 
applied in Aceh together with the analysis of the implementation of the MoU. Thorough 
research on the implementation of peacebuilding in Aceh will be beneficial in enriching the 
case studies of peacebuilding in a stable, middle-income country with a working bureaucracy 
and adequate security forces and where the national government has been dominant in 
directing and regulating the peacebuilding programs.  
My research is conducted in two municipalities, Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe, and in one 
regency: Aceh Tengah (Gayo). The selections of these particular areas are based on historical, 





a. Banda Aceh: the capital of the province and the centre of bureaucracy. This area was 
severely hit by the tsunami which caused massive destruction and took 61,065 lives, 
reducing the population of Banda Aceh from 264,168 to 203,553 (Nurdin, 2006). 
Miller and Bunnel (2010) reveal the interesting finding that most writing about Aceh 
fails to notice that Banda Aceh is the capital of the province and its residents were not 
well-exposed to the conflict. It occurred because the footholds of the insurgency 
concentrated in rural Aceh such as Pidie, North Aceh, and Meulaboh. Thus the Banda 
Aceh residents were shielded from the worst part of the conflict (Miller and Bunnel, 
2010). The situation had changed since the collapse of Suharto’s New Order 
Government, which turned Aceh from the capital city that is heavily dominated by 
Jakarta’s interests to a place filled by consolidated civil society who openly opposed 
the role of central government, particularly Jakarta’s military approach to Aceh’s 
conflict (Miller and Bunnel, 2006). Banda Aceh is the location of two prominent and 
influential universities: Syiah Kuala University and Ar-Raniry Islamic University, 
which gives space for academic discourse and activism towards conflict and 
peacebuilding. Banda Aceh will give insight into the political dynamics of conflict and 
peacebuilding between central and local government, as well as between rural and 
urban areas.  
b. Lhokseumawe: a strong base of GAM. According to Schultz (2003), the number of 
GAM members in North Aceh- Lhokseumawe is 1,331, making it the place with the 
second-largest number of GAM members after Pidie. Lhokseumawe in North Aceh is 
also a site of ASEAN Aceh Fertilizer and Mobil Oil, a multinational company which has 
been operating the Arun gas field since 1968. Lhokseumawe is a sound example of 
economic deprivation and conflict. This area was rich in liquid natural gas, and it 
attracted several multinational and national companies, such as Mobil Oil (now Exxon 
Mobil), ASEAN Aceh Fertilizer, and Aceh Pulp and Paper to open and operate their 
businesses. However, the development of industrial zones in North Aceh and 
Lhokseumawe had created negative social and economic consequences such as 
environmental degradation and requisition of the land from small farmers without 
proper compensation (Kell, 1995). An only a small number of local people could be 
employed in the industry, and they usually did rudimentary jobs. Despite its plentiful 
natural resources, people in Lhokseumawe and North Aceh were economically 
marginalised, and Aceh is among the poorest provinces in Indonesia (Sukma, 2004).  
c.  Gayo: a highland area in the heart of the province and is located in the Barisan 
Mountain. According to Graf (2010), Gayo is the outlying area of the Aceh Kingdom 
with its distinct culture. They do not speak Aceh’s language that is predominantly 




and absorbed several words from the Khmer language family (Graf, 2010).  Apart from 
Gayo, the region is also inhabited by Chinese and Javanese migrants. The 
heterogeneity of Gayo has made this region more ethnically self-conscious but also 
more accommodative to Indonesian language and culture and also to migrants and 
other ethnic groups (Graf, 2010). During the conflict, the highland areas of Aceh 
experienced social fragmentation as some Javanese people or people who with 
Javanese descendants were recruited as paramilitaries to combat GAM. 
d. On the other hand, they also became victims of the conflict by being banished, 
assaulted or even murdered. Around the year 2000, a movement emerged in Aceh’s 
central highland district for the creation of a new province called ALA (Aceh Leuser 
Antara). This movement was joined several years later by a similar movement 
advocating for the creation of another new province, Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS). The 
ALA and ABAS movement caused anxiety in Aceh during the drafting of LoGA (Law of 
Governing Aceh) when the question arose whether or not the final version of the law 
would provide for the possibility of partitioning Aceh (Ehrentraut, 2010). Gayo is a 
significant area in providing the landscape of ethnic group diversity and political 
affiliation in Aceh.  
The selection of areas as mentioned earlier is expected to support effective analysis of 
economic and identity grievances as underlying factors of conflict in Aceh and how they have 
been addressed by the implementation of the peace settlement and peacebuilding approach. 
Those particular areas well represent the emergence of political-economic grievances and 
identity as a component of grievance. However, the primary objective of the selection of three 
research sites is to give a diverse range of data and opinion, but they are not treated as 
independent analysis. 
2.11.5 Time Frame 
Regarding the time frame of the study of the peacebuilding process in Aceh, this research is 
limited to the period between August 2005, when the Peace Agreement was signed, to August 
2018. During that period, Aceh has conducted several local elections, experienced the dynamic 
of local politics including the fragmentation of GAM as a political party, the transformation 
from economic reconstruction to development and peculiar trajectories in human rights, 
justice and identity aspects.  
I conducted data collection in two phases. The first data collection was conducted in 2012 and 
the second in 2018. These two stages of data collection have enabled myself to gain a more 
comprehensive insight into the dynamics of peacebuilding. During 2012 field research, Aceh 




In 2018, Aceh had another two elections that revealed the different local-national political 
landscape, a new development in institution building and civil society movement and also 
discourse towards the final stage of special autonomy fund as the peace dividend as a reflection 
of the normalisation phase.  
 
2.12 Conclusion  
A broadening interest in defining successful peace resolutions and securing lasting peace has 
developed into the study of peacebuilding. Peace-building is particularly important because 
internal conflict which dominated in the post- Cold War era has the potential to relapse. The 
alleviation of grievances is crucial to addressing the underlying factors of conflict. Due to its 
protracted nature, conflict relapses easily if the major causes are not properly addressed. This 
thesis aims at investigating the state-led peacebuilding process that leads to durable peace in 
Aceh Indonesia. Peace has been sustained for 13 years, without any significant outbreak of 
violence or major breaches of the peace agreement.  
This chapter presents the literature review, methodology and case study.  Based on the 
literature review, this thesis will employ the concept of grievance alleviations, how the 
grievance alleviations are properly addressed in a peace settlement and its subsequent 
regulations. There are four main grievances: political participation, economic settlement, 
human rights, and justice and identity, and these were chosen and used as the components of 
peacebuilding implementation. The other working concept that marks the process of state-led 
peacebuilding is the competing legitimacy between the incumbent/state insurgent during the 
conflict and its continuity in peacetime. Two concepts from liberal peace, participation and 
institution building will also be employed to give a more comprehensive analysis of the 
implementation of peacebuilding.  Given the durability of peace, this thesis will also include 
time and phase of peacebuilding in terms of transition and normalisation stage. From the 
investigation of those three working concepts, this thesis will conclude the peacebuilding 





Chapter 3: From Islamic State to Tsunami: The Framing of Grievance, 
Mobilisation, and Peace Settlement in Aceh  
 
3.1 Introduction  
Peace-building is inseparable from conflict and conflict resolution. Due to its focus on 
institution-building, coherent approaches that have dominated the study of peacebuilding 
have often detached the study from the preceding conflict and conflict resolution (Ockey, 
2019). This thesis links conflict and peacebuilding, proposing the hypothesis that peace will 
endure if the peace agreement properly addresses grievances as the underlying factors of 
conflict. Against this backdrop, chapter 3 focuses on the analysis of the multiple grievances in 
Aceh, the construction and mobilisation of grievances into collective action by GAM, and the 
elaboration of the conflict resolution and peace settlement. Grievances are chosen to explain 
the conflict in Aceh because through the lens of grievance, various types of relative deprivation 
in Aceh, in politics, the economy, identity and later, human rights, could be explained. This is 
followed by the analysis of the process of the mobilisation of grievances into a separatist 
movement. The deprivation of political centralisation, economic injustice and the dominance 
of Javanese identity are not exclusive to the case of Aceh, yet those grievances were not strong 
enough to create the same sentiment and ethno-nationalist movements in other areas in 
Indonesia. Hence, the grievances in Aceh were well-narrated, framed and utilised to create the 
separatist movement and sustain the struggle for 30 years.  This chapter concludes with the 
elaboration of conflict resolution and the peace settlement efforts in Aceh to alleviate the 
grievances and bring the conflict to an end.  
 
3.2 Aceh: History, Culture, and Society  
The Kingdom of Aceh was established in the 15th century, with Sultan Ali Mughayat Syah (1514-
1530) as the first ruler. The Sultan expanded his power by annexing the Port of Daya on the 
west coast of Sumatra, the Port of Pidie on the east coast, and finally liberated the Samudra 
Pasai Kingdom, the first Islamic Kingdom in the archipelago, from Portuguese rule (Mitrasing, 
2011). Aceh then rose as the centre of Muslim trade to replace Melaka after it was conquered 
by Portuguese in 1511. Along with two other Islamic kingdoms, the Ottoman Empire and the 
Gujarat Sultanate, Aceh formed a triangular alliance to challenge Portuguese supremacy in the 
spice trade (Ito and Reid, 2015). Islam thus became an important marker of Acehnese 
sultanates. Unlike Islam in most of Indonesia, which is imbued with Hinduism and adat 
(custom), in Aceh Islam completely supplanted Hinduism and the Sultans of Aceh integrated 





The pinnacle of Aceh’s golden age came in the seventeenth century under Sultan Iskandar 
Muda, when Aceh existed as the important military and trade power in the region.  In addition 
to establishing Aceh as a powerful and wealthy kingdom, Sultan Iskandar Muda maintained 
international relations with various European envoys from France, the Netherlands, England, 
as well as Siam and other Asian powers (Reid, 2006b). However, at the same time, the Sultan 
also resisted foreign intervention by resisting Portuguese intentions to build a bastion in the 
sultanate to prevent the infiltration of the Dutch (Pinto, 2012). 
 
One of the important occurrences in the colonisation of Aceh was the Anglo-Dutch treaty in 
1824, an agreement on the exchange of British and Dutch possessions. This treaty regulated 
the British possession of India and Singapore in return for Dutch control over British 
possessions on the island of Sumatra but with the retention of the independence of the 
Acehnese Sultanate (Hing, 2006). However, in 1871, the British broke the agreement of the 
Aceh sovereignty and granted full access to the Dutch to invade Aceh in return for trade 
concession and the acquisition of Ghana (Reid, 2006c). This breach of agreement played an 
important part in the construction of GAM’s later independent claim as di Tiro strongly 
stressed the existence of independent Aceh during the era of colonialisation. In 1873, the 
Dutch officially issued a formal declaration of war to Aceh and began to launch relentless 
efforts to conquer it. The invasion was met with endurance and strong resistance from 
Acehnese elites and society. The war ended in 1903 with the capture and exile of Sultan 
Muhammad Daud Syah, but the Dutch occupation remained challenged by continuous guerilla 
war until 1914 (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 1999).  According to Aspinall 
(2009a), these two occurrences, the golden age of the Iskandar Muda Sultanate and the strong 
resistance of Acehnese to Dutch occupation are the important great myths that will support 
the construction of the narrative of Aceh’s glorious past and heroic struggle of survival by 
GAM.  
 
The 1990 census recorded the population of Aceh as 3.4 million, while the 2010 census 
recorded the population of Aceh as 4.4 million after the massive destruction from the tsunami 
of December 2004 (Reid, 2006a). In 2016, the population increased to 5.1 million (BPS Aceh). 
More than 80 per cent of Aceh’s population is ethnically Acehnese, and they commonly speak 
Acehnese despite being educated in Indonesian as the national language (Reid, 2006a). Due 
to its strategic position in one of the busiest commercial lanes of Malacca Strait and the 
richness of agricultural products, Aceh has been a popular destination for migration. It 
attracted settlers from outside the archipelago: South Asia, East Asia, India, Europe, and from 
within the archipelago (Schroter, 2010). Most migrants have assimilated into the local 




custom, and culture (Reid, 2006a).  However, they come from a variety of different cultures, 
an important fact that places Aceh as a multicultural province in a multicultural state 
(Schroeter, 2010).  Aceh’s population consists of a majority of ethnic Acehnese, smaller groups 
of indigenous minorities such as Gayo, Alas, Singkil, Kluet, Batak, Tamiang and Aneuk Jamé, 
as well as a significant population of Javanese transmigrants (Schroter, 2010). Most Javanese 
settlers reside in Central and East Aceh, while Chinese entrepreneurs dwell in urban 
communities and maintain their identities (Schroter, 2010). 
 











Map 3-2 The Province of Aceh 
 
Understanding of Aceh’s diversity is necessary for the analysis of the conflict and peace in this 
province. The demographic landscape of ethnicity in Aceh is an important factor in 
determining the level of engagement with the rebel movement and separatism aspiration. 
People from Central Aceh with a distinct ethnicity and language, such as Gayo and Alas, tend 
to give less support to separatism. In contrast, support for GAM is dominated by people from 
the Acehnese ethnic group that resides mostly in coastal areas such as Bireun, Pidie, and North 
Lhokseumawe. Aceh’s multiculturalism is also an important aspect of second order minority 
grievances, in which the ethnic minorities in Aceh experience and perceive a relative 
deprivation in comparison to the majority group in Aceh, which in turn is similar to how the 





As has been elaborated in chapter 2, conflict in Aceh is primarily derived from grievances. 
Thus, it is necessary to elaborate on the typology and cause of grievances in Aceh. The next 
section is the elaboration of multiple grievances in Aceh that will be divided into four types: 
political, economic, identity and human rights and justice.   
 
3.3 Multiple Grievances in Aceh  
3.3.1 Political Centrality  
Political grievances are the first type of discontent that Acehnese feel towards the Government 
of Indonesia. After Indonesian independence was officially proclaimed on August 17, 1945, the 
Dutch attempted to re-establish their authority, but they never returned to Aceh. The vacuum 
of colonial power gave Aceh complete political autonomy (Sjamsudin, 1985). The Acehnese 
demonstrated significant support for the establishment of the young republic by donating two 
Dakota planes to the Indonesian Air Force. Sukarno requested Aceh’s contributions to 
purchase the first passenger aircraft in Indonesia and money collected by Acehnese was 
enough to buy two Dakota planes (Pratama, 2018). Aceh also became the site of brief 
emergency government headed by Prime Minister Sjafrudin Prawinanegara in the first half of 
1949 (Reid, 2010; Aspinall, 2009a). 
Aceh’s support for the central government was actually motivated by the aspiration for the 
acknowledgement of their distinctness and contribution, as described by May (cited in Kell, 
1995): “Aceh’s loyalty to the central government during this period was inspired precisely by 
the fact that it was free to run its own affairs without central interference, and the Acehnese 
furthermore expected that their region’s historical separateness and its contribution to the 
national revolution would be accorded due recognition in a future Indonesian state”.  
The discourse over the state’s ideology and centre-periphery discontentment characterised the 
political situation during Sukarno’s administration. Political grievances in Aceh occurred in 
1950 when the idea of federation that was promoted by Aceh was rejected by Jakarta in favour 
of a unitary state (Kell, 1995). Jakarta also dissolved Aceh Province and incorporated it into 
the province of North Sumatra (Sulaiman, 2006). Frustration began to spread in Aceh, and its 
people felt that the Acehnese contribution in the national revolution had been forgotten once 
independence had been achieved (Sjamsuddin, 1985). This gave birth to the Darul Islam 
(Abode of Islam) rebellion in 1953, the first insurgency in post-colonial Aceh. The rebellion 
was led by Daud Ber’euh and aimed to create an Islamic Indonesian State. The rebellion was 
resolved in 1962 by the replacement of non-Acehnese troops with Acehnese and “the 




designation of the special region and informal recognition of Islamic law in Aceh” (Bertrand, 
2004: 168).  
Centre-periphery antagonism also occurred in other parts of the country. The Guided 
Democracy of the Republic of Indonesia was challenged by another rebellion called PRRI 
(Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or The Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia) and Permesta (Universal People Struggle). Permesta was declared by 
military and civil leaders in East Indonesia while PRRI was a rebel movement led by officers 
of the Indonesian army in East, South and West Sumatera. According to Feith and Lev (1963), 
the major triggers of the PRRI rebellion was the over-centralisation of bureaucracy, the neglect 
of outer regions, corruption, and tolerance of communism. Permesta aspired to similar goals, 
criticising over-centralisation and demanding better development for eastern Indonesia 
(Raditya,2017). However, unlike in Aceh, these two centre-periphery antagonisms could be 
curbed during the Sukarno administration and did not re-emerge in the following years as 
demonstrated by GAM in Aceh.  In other words, Aceh had additional factors in sustaining 
grievances over political centrality compared to other regions in Indonesia. The factor is the 
presence of a leader who effectively framed the grievance around an identity component that 
will be further explained in the subsequent section.  
Nevertheless, political grievances continued after Suharto, the second president of Indonesia, 
came into power. Deprivation of political access needs took place by weakening the Acehnese 
social structure and political representation as portrayed by the diminishing role of the ulama. 
It is important to note that the ulama gained the ultimate power in post-colonial Aceh after 
eliminating the influence of uleebalang (aristocrats who are given the power to supervise 
districts and district warlords) through social revolution, known as Perang Cumbok in 1948.    
The role of the ulama as a social group with the capability to challenge the ideology of the 
central government of Indonesia was weakened by the central government (Braud&Grevi, 
2005). The member of PUSA (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh/All-Aceh Religious Scholar 
Association) was reassigned to other parts of Sumatera Island without any prior consultation 
while a non-Acehnese person was appointed in Aceh (Sulaiman, 2006). The ulama’s role was 
replaced by bureaucrats from the central government due to the implementation of Law No 5/ 
1974 (Kell, 1995). This law also granted the prerogative right to the president to appoint the 
governor. The regional parliament still took part in the selection of provincial governor but the 
final result was highly determined by the central government by using scrutiny, approval, and 





In terms of electoral politics, Suharto restructured the political party system in 1974 by cutting 
the number of political parties to only three: GOLKAR, the United Development Party (PPP), 
and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) (Sulistyo, 2002). GOLKAR was designed as an 
ideological competitor to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Later, after PKI was 
dissolved, GOLKAR served as a political machine for the New Order regime (Tomsa, 2008). 
PPP was formed by four joining Islamic parties: the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) Party, the Islamic 
Association Party of Indonesia (PSII), the Islamic Educational Movement Party (Partai 
Tarbiyah Islam Indonesia/Perti) and the Indonesian Muslim Party (Permusi), while PDI was 
comprised of former nationalist and Christian parties (Effendy, 2003).  GOLKAR rapidly grew 
as a hegemonic political party with obligatory support from the bureaucratic apparatus while 
PPP and PDI became loyal opposition satellite parties (Sulistyo, 2012). According to Sulistyo 
(2001:4), “throughout Soeharto’s 32 years in power, elections served more as a means of 
political mobilisation than participation, and as political machinery for the regime and did not 
allow for any meaningful political competition”. In Aceh, GOLKAR was in tight competition 
with PPP in winning Acehnese votes. In the first election during Suharto’s administration in 
1971, Golkar gained 49,71 % of the vote, followed by PPP, which garnered 48,89% of the vote 
(Brown, 1994). 
Interestingly, in the 1977 and 1982 elections, the vote for Golkar declined, while PPP garnered 
more electoral support (Ziegenhain, 2009). This result was surprising given the strong 
political mobilisation of GOLKAR. Although the vote for GOLKAR was recovered in the next 
elections, which was mainly due to the shift of the government strategy toward PPP, from 
coercion to cooperation (Brown, 1994), this electoral result could be a sign of early expression 
of grievances towards the political repression, centralisation and hegemony of the political 
party system in Aceh.  
The key feature of political grievance in Aceh is the discontent over diminishing political 
autonomy. Standing up proudly as the inhabitants of a region that had a glorious monarchy, 
who launched the longest resistance towards colonial power and became a backbone of the 
Indonesia nationalist struggle, Acehnese experienced continuous weakening of their political 
autonomy after Indonesian independence. The discontentment over the political 
centralisation was common during the critical time of the nation-building and state-building 
process in Indonesia. Only in a few areas, however, including Aceh, has the resistance been 
sustained in subsequent years.  
3.3.2 Economic Inequality  
The exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources had begun during the colonial era. In 19oo, a 




Brandan, North Sumatra (Sulaiman, 1999). Commercial plantations such as rubber and palm 
also developed rapidly and marked the integration of Aceh into the world economy, but mostly 
benefited capitalists from outside regions (Sulaiman, 1999).  
 
In the post-independence era, there was new hope of a more prosperous Aceh, yet, the pattern 
of natural resource exploitation and economic deprivation remained. From 1942 to 1962, 
Aceh’s economic infrastructure was severely damaged due to war and revolts (Sulaiman, 
1999). According to Sjamsudin (1985), the major economic grievance in Aceh in Sukarno’s 
administration was government negligence of agricultural and communication 
infrastructures. Acehnese is an agricultural community who predominantly cultivate sawah 
(wet paddy fields), a system that depends on a good irrigation system. The government did not 
seriously repair the abandoned irrigation system and affected farmers in Great Aceh, Pidie, 
North and Northeast Aceh, not only due to plummeting of their rice production but also 
because people in the abovementioned areas had no food substitution except coconut 
(Sjamsuddin, 1985).   
 
Other grievances were caused by the obliteration of barter trade between Aceh and the Malay 
Peninsula and the designation of Belawan in North Sumatra as the export-import port 
(Sulaiman, 1999).  During the barter trade period, Acehnese peasants could maximise their 
profits because they were able to directly sell their farming produce, especially copra or dried 
coconut, through the Port of Penang. The abolishment of barter trade by replacing it with an 
export-import system put Acehnese peasants in tight competition with Chinese, Tapanuli and 
East Sumatran traders (Sjamsuddin, 1985). The next grievance, the establishment of the Port 
of Belawan, is the impact of the incorporation of Aceh into North Sumatra province. The 
establishment of Belawan as the primary trading port in Sumatra created unemployment 
among the waterfront workers in Langsa Port, Aceh (Sjamsuddin 1985). The stronger position 
of Belawan also fed more grievances among Acehnese who are very proud of their glorious 
past as the centre of Muslim trade in the region.   
 
Regarding oil and gas, the Japanese military transferred the management of oil field in Aceh 
to TMSU (Tambang Minyak Sumatra Utara/North Sumatra State Oilfield Enterprise) that was 
headed by Tgk A. Husin Al Mujahid and had an office in Langsa (Sulaiman, 1999). In 1957, the 
central government merged several oilfield companies, including TMSU, into PERMINA 
(Perusahaan Minyak Nasional or State Oilfields Enterprise), directed by Major General Ibnu 
Sutowo and headquartered in Jakarta.  After experiencing natural resource exploitation in the 
colonial period, the post-independence era saw Aceh meet the same fate through the 




also exacerbated by neglected infrastructure and economic marginalisation. The central 
government abandoned the damaged post-war agricultural infrastructure, marginalised Aceh 
traders through the introduction of a modern export-import system and caused more 
unemployment due to the diminishing function of Langsa Port.  
 
Photo 3-1 Arun ExxonMobil site in Lhoksukon, North Aceh 
 
Source: www.acehtraffic.com  
 
 
In 1968, Suharto was sworn in as the second president of the Republic of Indonesia. Suharto 
became well known for his state-led economy in guiding Indonesian development. According 
to the first five-year development strategy plan in 1969, Aceh was to be developed as an 
agricultural region and was prepared as the “rice barn of Indonesia.” This plan was changed 
when Mobil Oil Indonesia discovered abundant sources of oil and gas in 1971. By the end of 
the 1980s, the province produced 30 per cent of the country’s oil and gas exports (“Waging a 
Dirty War in Aceh,” Asiaweek, as cited in Kell, 1995: 14).  Other important industries in Aceh 
which contributed to the country’s revenue were the ASEAN Aceh Fertilizer plant and the 










The control over the management of oil and gas was continued by PERMINA, which was 
changed into PERTAMINA in 1968. The distribution of these natural resources treated Aceh 
unfairly as only about five per cent of the profit was returned into the province and the 
remaining profit was divided between central government and foreign companies (Heiduk, 
2006) The unfair natural resource distribution was coupled by accumulated grievances toward 
non-Acehnese employees and contracts of infrastructures projects that were awarded to 
outsiders (Huber, 2004). The benefit of employment opportunities from the exploration of 
natural wealth was reaped mostly by migrants from outside Aceh, and not by local people.   
 
As well as the gas and oil sector, similar grievances also occurred in the plantation industry. 
The need for foreign exchange for supporting national development for growth encouraged 
the New Order government to invite investors to exploit the jungle of Aceh by granting them 
licenses to exploit the woods (Hak Penguasaan Hutan-HPH).  The top-down practice of 
granting HPH from the government to companies resulted in a clash of interest between HPH 
usage and local customary practices, especially in traditional felling and livestock areas 




acquisition, in which the small farmer often did not get proper compensation for their land 
(Robinson, 1998).  
 
The disparity in revenue sharing had been worsened due to the side effects of the 
industrialisation in Aceh: poverty and pollution. In mid-19991, it was reported that about 60 
per cent of traditional fishermen in Lhokseumawe lived below the poverty line due to 
decreasing catches (Waspada, June 11, 1991, as cited in Kell: 2005). Lhokseumawe is the site 
of several industries in Aceh, and the low catch was attributed to the pollution from industrial 
waste. Despite its natural wealth, Aceh ironically is among the poorest provinces in the country 
(Sukma, 2004). In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, while the rest of 
Indonesia gradually recovered from the impact of the crisis, economic conditions in Aceh 
worsened the rise of poverty from 14,8 per cent in 1999 to 29.8 per cent in 2002 (The World 
Bank, 2006).  In 2002, about 1.2 million people (on about 28.5 per cent of the population) in 
Aceh lived below the poverty line7 (World Bank, 2006: 10). In sum, most Acehnese feel that 
they were treated unequally by Jakarta in terms of abandonment of economic infrastructure, 
unequal distribution of natural resources, poverty, unemployment and the side effects of 
industrialisation, such as pollution and land expropriation.   
3.3.3 Identity 
The construction of Islam as central to Acehnese identity began in the era of Sultan Ali 
Mughayat Syah, the first sultan of Aceh and the first ruler who embraced Islam (Reid, 1999). 
Aspinall argues that “Acehnese [emphasis added) saw themselves vertically located on 
relations to social hierarchy and horizontally bound to their fellow believers through the world 
religion of Islam” (Aspinall, 2009a: 47).  This association with Islam is affirmed by Shaw 
(2008: 2) “Acehnese identity is derived from a combination of historical pride associated with 
the Acehnese Sultanate, the collective memory of the struggle against the Dutch colonisers, 
and a common and regionally specific form of Islam.” Islamic identity has been persistently 
retained throughout history and has become a centre of the identity of Acehnese.  
 
Islam was an instrumental factor in resistance during colonialism. The Dutch were considered 
to be a kafir (infidel) and the war against Dutch was called the Perang Belanda (Dutch War) 
or Perang Kafir (Infidel War) (Alfian, 1987). There was no conflicting relationship between 
Indonesia, Aceh, and Islam during the pre-independence period. Islam was in seen as uniting 
                                                        
7The poverty line represents the monetary value of the typical food basket that provides 2100 calories per capita 





factor for both Indonesia and Acehnese, as the Acehnese leaders assumed that the three 
identities were in harmony (Aspinall, 2009a). 
 
However, the perception of harmonious nexus between Islam, Aceh, and Indonesia changed 
during the early establishment of the Republic of Indonesia in the post-independence era. 
Islamic terms were excluded from drafts of the Indonesian constitution, and the newly 
established republic was designed as a unitary nationalist-secular one led by Sukarno. 
Pancasila (the five principles) as Indonesia’s state ideology put religion first as stated in its 
tenant “Belief in the one supreme God,” but does not specifically mention Islam. This decision 
caused disappointment and was particularly resented by ulama and local leaders as it would 
potentially weaken their allegiance to the central government (Kell, 1995).  The unitary system 
hampered distinct regional aspirations, including acknowledgements of official religion. This 
discontent was solved by the designation of Aceh as a special territory with informal 
recognition of Islamic law in 1959 and promulgated by the Law number 18/1965 about Local 
Government.  
 
During the New Order era under Suharto’s leadership, the major problem of identity of Aceh 
derived from the multi-communal setting of Indonesia. Indonesia is a multi-communal society 
with more than 300 ethnic groups who speak 250 different languages. However, instead of 
applying policy to accommodate that diversity, the national government under Suharto’s 
leadership used politics of assimilation to create a single national identity. The purpose of the 
creation of this single identity is to gradually diminish ethnic loyalties and primordialism and 
create new loyalties to “modern” Indonesia as a central aspect of Indonesia’s citizens (Berger: 
1997: 323). 
 
The Javanese culture heavily dominated the single Indonesian identity.  During the early years 
of independence, most Indonesians were living in Sumatera, Sulawesi and elsewhere outside 
Java, but under the official hegemony Javanese culture as Sukarno, the first Indonesian 
President was Javanese (Aspinall, 2009a). Sukarno’s authoritarianism and Suharto’s strong 
mystical-spiritual Javanese background were seen as the domination of Javanese appearance 
in Indonesian politics (Aspinall, 2009a).   In terms of regulation of local governance, Suharto’s 
administration enacted Law No 5 year 1979 that tried to adopt village administration 
throughout the country based on Javanese desa (village) with the pattern of high population 
density and hierarchically ordered society (Vatikiotis, 1993). This model does not apply to all 
villages outside Java Island, as some of them are sparsely populated. Aceh has its village 
administration that is subject to supra authorities grouping several settlements under one 




“Aceh is one of the provinces that maintain a traditional non-Javanese pattern of village 
administration, despite the imposition of the Law No 5/1974” (Vatikiotis, 1993: 110).  
Another policy that triggered identity-related grievance was transmigration. During Suharto’s 
rule, transmigration was intended to move people from the capital city of Java to periphery 
provinces to ease overpopulation. It also aimed to promote inter-ethnic social communication 
and generate a sense of belonging to Indonesia as a nation-state (Suryadinata, 2015). 
However, there is a contradictory impact: transmigration eventually strengthened ethnic 
identity (Suryadinata, 2015). For some, transmigration in Aceh entailed Javanisation, 
although it constitutes relatively small numbers compared to other provinces (Barter, 2014). 
Aceh has never been a major transmigration recipient and remained homogenous with a 
Javanese population of only 7 per cent, much lower than North Sumatra’s 33 per cent and 
Papua’s 12 per cent (Barter, 2014). The presence of Javanese in Aceh is not only the result of 
the transmigration program. Some of them inhabited Aceh over a century ago and had 
integrated with Gayo and Acehnese.  
Although only a small percentage, the Javanese population was the target of GAM attacks, 
especially during the post-Suharto era from 1999 onwards. GAM gave an ultimatum to 
Javanese communities to leave Aceh and sparked anti-Javanese violent. Sulaiman (199: 136) 
argues that “the anti-Java attitude which surrounded GAM was caused by the more political 
economy than racial/ethnic ones because national politics was dominated by the Javanese and 
the Javanese settlers of Gayo highland were employed as militias by the military.” It connects 
the identity with political-economy factors, in which identity was mainly used to heighten and 
accelerate the impact of grievances. 
The grievance over the deprivation of Islam as the important Aceh identity also presented 
during Suharto administration. The special region status granted by the central government 
to preserve Islamic values in Aceh is considered “existed in paper only and empty promise” 
(Kell, 1995). Two religious-based provincial policy initiatives in Aceh, obliging female students 
to wear jilbab (headscarves) and instituting compulsory Quran reading for primary school 
pupils were rejected by the central government (Kell, 1995). While the banning of the use of 
religious identity in public schools was applied nation-wide, Aceh demanded different 
treatment due to their special region status accorded to them in the aftermath of the Darul 
Islam rebellion.  
The primary cause of identity grievances in Aceh is related to the abolition of Islam as the state 
ideology. Indonesia as a unitary state limited the acknowledgement of the distinct identity of 
one region, including the right to implement religious law. In Suharto’s era,  identity-related 




ethnicity. The laws on local governance and transmigration programmes were perceived as 
Javanisation efforts from Javanese-dominated government.  
3.3.4 Human Right Abuse   
Unlike politics, identity or economy, human rights violations occurred in the later phase as a 
grievance among the Acehnese. During the 30 years of conflict, “life in most of part of Aceh 
was dominated by the story of appalling human rights abuses that were committed by the 
Indonesian Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia /TNI)” (Hadi, 2008: 66). Aceh Reintegration 
Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi Aceh/BRA) estimates that around 33,000 combatant and civilian 
lives were lost during the conflict (Braud and Gravi, 2005, as cited by Jeffery, 2012). The major 
casualties of conflict in Aceh were caused by several military operations as central government 
responses to the insurgencies. The first military operation launched in 1976 after GAM 
establishment was called Operasi Nenggala (Nenggala Operation). Nenggala Operation was 
performed by an estimated 30,000 members of Kopassus (Komando Pasukan 
Khusus/Indonesia Special Forces) that was tasked to separate GAM from the people, isolating 
them and destroying their military command and civilian infrastructure (Schulze, 2006). The 
second military operation was Jaring Merah Military Operation (1989 to 1998), that was 
considered to be the longest military operation in Indonesia since 1960 (Human Right Watch, 
2003). In addition to crushing GAM, Jaring Merah Operation aimed at securing vital 
industrial projects in Aceh (Sukma, 2004). According to NGO HAM Aceh (as cited in 
Candraningrum, 2008),  about 871 were killed, 387 missing people were subsequently found 
dead, there were 550 missing persons, and 102 raped victims during Jaring Merah Operation.  
In the post-Suharto period, the counterinsurgency shifted from the military option to a 
security approach, a more comprehensive strategy including political solutions (Humanitarian 
Pause, COHA/Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and Special Autonomy). This 
comprehensive approach comprised military and non-military approaches aimed at reducing 
the capacity of the insurgents and winning the hearts and minds of the people. The names of 
the military-security operations were designed to be “friendlier” such as Operasi Sadar 
Rencong, or The Operation of the Rencong (Aceh traditional weapon) Awareness and Operasi 
Cinta Meunasah, or The Operation of the Loving Mosque. Nonetheless, according to Schulze, 
“the counterinsurgency failed because there was no strategy to integrate them into broader 
political strategy” (Schulze, 2006).  The Security Recovery Operation or Operasi Pemulihan 
Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum (OKPH) launched in 2001-2002 for example, was 
primarily aimed at giving pressure to GAM to be more flexible at COHA agreement (Schulze, 
2006). However, despite the attempts to find a non-military resolution to the conflict, popular 
support for GAM increased (Robinson 1998, Weiser 2005). Robinson (1998), Sukma (1998) 




human rights violations perpetrated by prolonged military operations since the 1990s and the 
failure of later administration to reach a peace agreement.  
Photo 3-3 Indonesian military army patrolling with a gun in a school in Aceh 
 
Source: www.theage.com.au 
The atrocities and human rights violations that occurred during counter-insurgency 
operations increased the sense of grievance felt by Acehnese. Murder, abduction, and assault 
meted out by army personnel to GAM members or civilians which suspected as GAM 
supporters had been narrated across the generations. It created a deep-seated hatred among 
the Acehnese towards the Indonesian government and strengthened the image of “Indonesia-
Javanese” Government identity constructed by Hasan Tiro. 
Sukma (2004) stresses military repression and the politics of impunity as the driving force 
behind the resumption of the GAM rebellion in 1998. According to Brainwathe et al. (2010), 
“Military operations [emphasis added] had effectively crushed the insurgency at the cost of 
another generation of children imbued with hatred toward a predatory Indonesian state that 
had terrorised their parents” (Brainwathe et al., 2010: 536).  Despite the elevating anger and 
repulsion, Acehnese are also confused by the government’s inability and reluctance to try 
human rights violators from the earlier era (Sukma, 2004). 
 
Grievances in Aceh are divided into prior and post GAM rebellion. Political, economic and 
identity grievances emerged before the GAM rebellion and served as underlying factors of the 




counter-insurgency exacerbated the grievances and added more support to GAM.  Political 
grievances were mainly derived from the politic of centralisation applied by the central 
government, due to the appointment of the local and provincial leaders by the central 
government. There were only three political parties, in which Golkar was the hegemonic 
electoral power.  In the economic realm, dissatisfaction was generated by the unfair sharing of 
natural wealth. Oil and gas from Aceh’ soil and the shore were transported to Jakarta, and only 
a small amount flowed back to Aceh in terms of social welfare or infrastructure. The presence 
of multinational corporations in Aceh gave little advantage to the local population around the 
manufacture sites. Identity grievance is related to the limitation of Islamic practices and 
teachings and the economic impact of Javanese migrants.   
 
These grievances match the concept of internal colonialism, a geographically based 
subordinated pattern as emphasised by Hechter (1975) that heightened core-periphery 
interaction resulted in structural inequality between various regions. The core which is an 
ethnically different entity exploits the periphery either by concentrating the development of 
industries in the centre, transporting natural resources to the core or unfairly distributing the 
revenue between core and peripheries and thus, creating dependency of the periphery on the 
core. The convergence between political centrality, economic inequality and identity were 
compounded by rampant human rights violations from military operations, led to the creation 
of profound grievances among Acehnese towards the central government. The next section 
analyses the construction of grievances in the separatist movement further. 
 
3.4 The Rise of GAM: Mobilisation of Grievance  
Aspinall (2009a) argues that the politico-economic and cultural circumstances in Aceh were a 
normal situation in the context of Indonesia, rather than present as particular grievances. The 
marker of difference in Aceh is that it was the site of the past rebellion of Darul Islam. The 
settlement of the Darul Islam rebellion had generated “the expectation that Aceh would be 
treated more sympathetically and a tendency of local actors to interpret problems that were 
mundane in the national context as embodying uniquely malicious maltreatment” (Aspinall, 
2009a: 56).  This argument has a strong basis because, in other provinces that experienced a 
similar case of Darul Islam rebellions such as West Java, Central Java, South Sulawesi, and 
South Kalimantan, the insurgencies were brought to an end by the killing or capturing of the 
leaders without any negotiated settlement or concession.  
 
Also, Aspinall (2009a) stresses the importance of going beyond objective grievance (political 
centralisation and exploitation of Aceh natural resources) to the construction of identity in 




and perpetuated the construction of identity to mobilise the grievances into a rebel movement.  
Born as the descendant of Teuku Cik di Tiro, a prominent Acehnese hero during the Dutch 
colonialisation struggle, Tiro finished his primary-secondary education in an Islamic-based 
school in Aceh and enrolled in Islamic University in Yogyakarta (Aspinall, 2009a). When Aceh 
became the site of the emergency government of the Republic of Indonesia, Tiro was appointed 
as the personal secretary of Prime Minister Sjarifudin Prawiranegara (Reid, 2010). Tiro 
continued his education at Fordham University in New York and worked part-time as an 
information officer for the Indonesian delegation for the United Nations, United States (Reid, 
2010). These two occurrences – working as the personal secretary of Prime Minister and as an 
Indonesia representative to the United Nations – demonstrated the early attachment of Tiro 
with the government of Indonesia.  However, when the Darul Islam rebellion broke out in 
Aceh in 1953, Tiro opted to support the Daud Bere’uh movement and began to demonstrate 
his discontentment against the Indonesian government until he finally proclaimed the 
establishment of Free Aceh Movement in 1976. Most of his thoughts about using  Acehnese 
identity to narrate grievances over what he mentioned as the colonisation of Java were written 
on in his book: The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary”. Therefore, it is important to 
analyse Hasan Tiro’s narration as mentioned in some excerpts from his book.  
Photo 3-4 Hasan Tiro with GAM soldier 
 
Source: Tribun Aceh 
 
“The Javanese, nevertheless, are attempting to perpetuate colonialism which all 
the Western colonial powers had abandoned and all the world had condemned. 
During these last 30 years, the people of Aceh, Sumatra, have witnessed how our 
fatherland has been exploited and driven into ruinous conditions by the Javanese 
neo-colonialists: they have stolen our properties; they have robbed us from our 
livelihood; they have abused the education of our children; they have exiled our 
leaders; they have put our people in chains of tyranny, poverty, and neglect: the 




world's standard of 70 years, which is increasing! While Acheh, Sumatra has been 
producing revenue of over 15 billion US dollars yearly for the Javanese 
neocolonialists, which they used totally for the benefit of Java and the Javanese”  
(di Tiro, 1984: 16).  
 
There are some grievances identified in this excerpt: economic grievances (the exploitation of 
the natural resources of the land of Aceh, neglect, and poverty), quality of life (life expectancy, 
education), political centralisation (tyranny, exile of leader), and center-periphery 
discontentment (the use of revenue from Aceh to the full benefit of Javanese). Hasan Tiro 
dubbed the Javanese “neo-colonialists,” indicating that he framed the pattern as internal 
colonialism. The labelling of Javanese as “neocolonialists” is a strategy to garner broad support 
from the Acehnese. Stone (1979) argues that the leaders of nationalist [or sub-nationalist] 
movements have tried to inspire popular support for movements to promote greater 
autonomy, if not outright secession, by defining inter-regional relationships as ‘colonial.’   
 
In another passage, Tiro emphasis the identity of Acehnese, that according to him had been 
ruined by Javanese Indonesian propaganda: 
 
Our first duty is to awaken our people to their proper destiny. To counter Javanese 
“indonesian” [sic] propaganda that had gone hitherto unopposed by us, that had 
misled our people, and made so many of them gone mad, suffering acute identity 
crisis and national amnesia, a situation that had brought our nation to the brink 
of disaster ( di Tiro, 1984: 70).  
 
 
It is interesting to observe how Hasan Tiro persistently used the term Java and Javanese, 
instead of Indonesia as the culprit of the grievances felt by Acehnese. These are three possible 
explanations present here. The first is that Aceh and Indonesia have similarities, especially in 
terms of a common religion. Aceh is not a case of discrimination and oppression based on 
religion such as in Southern Thailand, Mindanao or Kashmir. Indonesia is a country with the 
largest Muslim population in the world. Government policy on the banning of jilbab 
(headscarf) at public schools was not exclusively directed at Acehnese, but a national policy. 
Thus, creating conflicting relationships between Islam, Indonesia and Aceh will not work for 
the movement.   
 
Secondly, Indonesia as a nation is an “abstract” entity just like Ben Anderson (1983) described 
as “imagined communities. Acehnese will have confusion in defining the entity of Indonesia 
as the enemy, as people in North and West Sumatra, with whom Acehnese have close 
relationships, are also Indonesian. Therefore, GAM must specify the common enemy to 
solidify the movement.  The description of Java as a colonial power and the continuation of 




Suharto took power in 1968.  During the early years of his administration, Suharto, who was 
famous for his state-led development policy, laid down the foundation of centralisation of 
politics, centralisation of the economy and the distribution of natural resources along with the 
dispersion of his Javanese personal identity. Tiro transformed abstract and vague Indonesia 
to the Javanese-Indonesia as the new common enemy to fight for, so Aceh could gain freedom 
and became an independent country.   
 
The third reason centres on the level of analysis and comparison. Indonesia is at a larger level 
than Aceh, while Java and Aceh are at the same level. Therefore, the process of establishing a 
common enemy is easier.   Bertrand (2004: 11) argues that:  
 
“Group fears and grievances are rooted in the context in which ethnic identity was 
rooted and constructed and mobilised. The fear and ensuing potential for political 
violence are direct results of a political system in which a group dominates the 
instrument of state power and uses them to deny similar access or privilege to 
other ethnic groups”.  
 
This is where the distinction between GAM in Aceh and other impoverished provinces lies; 
GAM knows how to mobilise past and current grievances into a movement. Bertrand (2004) 
has also pointed out the process of the development of stereotypes about members of other 
groups being greedy, untrustworthy, or arrogant as a hidden transcript. The possibility of 
when this subtle discontent will emerge to the surface is hard to predict, but the existence an 
elite, charismatic leader will be an important factor in orchestrating the grievance and hidden 
script (Bertrand, 2004).  In the case of Aceh, it was supported by the return of Hasan Tiro, a 
charismatic leader who utilised the political, economic, identity and human rights 
deprivations and crafted them into the narration of the Javanese internal colonialism to 
mobilise the aggrieved people in Aceh.  
 
 
3.4.1 The Three Phases of GAM Development 
3.4.1.1 GAM Phase 1  
GAM was founded by Hasan Tiro in late 1976.  As was mentioned in the previous section, 
Hasan Tiro started to demonstrate his disagreement towards the government of Indonesia 
after the Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) rebellion broke in 1953. Tiro wrote an open letter to 
Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, accusing the government of “dragging Indonesia to the 
depths of political and economic collapse impoverishment and civil war” (Aspinall, 2009: 41). 
Furthermore, “Tiro threatened to open formal diplomatic relations between the Islamic 




United Nations” (Aspinall, 2009: 41). This statement seemed like the early attempt of Tiro to 
internationalise political struggle in Aceh, which was partially supported by his diasporic 
experience. Tiro’s provocative act caused his passport to be revoked, and he was deported. 
However, in 1974, Hasan Tiro was given a visa by Syarif Thayeb, an Acehnese aristocrat who 
became the Indonesian Ambassador and enabled him to return to Aceh (Sulaiman, 2000). 
After his first public visit in 1974, Tiro made several clandestine visits to Aceh in the following 
years and established Aceh Merdeka (Aspinall, 2009). The declaration of  the establishment 
of Aceh Merdeka  was made by a small group of Tiro’s aides at Tjokkan Hill Pidie district on 4 
December 1976, a date when the Dutch shot Tengku Tjhik Maat, Hasan Tiro’s uncle (Van 
Klinken, 2001).   
 
The declaration is written in the same book, The Price of Freedom:  The Unfinished Diary of 
Tengku Hasan di Tiro :  
I have finally decided to do what I have believed all along to be my destiny in life: 
to lead my people and my country to freedom. That is my life mission. I will be a 
failure if I fail to do so. Acquisition of wealth and power has never been my goal in 
life because I have both in my country. Nor do I want to do it because I look to it 
as an achievement or a career: I have to do it as a duty, an obligation put on my 
shoulders by my ancestors on account of future generations, a duty received and a 
debt that must be paid because of the past and the future of my people. I have been 
brought up by my family to think so, and I have seen confirmation and expectation 
from my people to be so. For I have been born to the di Tiro family of Acheh, 
Sumatra, the family that had ruled my country and had provided leadership to it 
through war and peace for so many generations and for centuries in the long 
history of our country (Hasan Tiro, 1984).  
 
 
Hasan Tiro based his claim of the freedom of Aceh on the narrative of Aceh sovereignty: 
   
Our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, had always been a free and sovereign state since 
the world began. … However, when, after World War II, the Dutch East Indies was 
supposed to have been liquidated … our fatherland, Acheh, was not returned to us. 
Instead, our fatherland was turned over by the Dutch to the Javanese—their ex-
mercenaries—by hasty fiat of colonial powers. The Javanese are alien and foreign 
people to us Achehnese Sumatrans … ‘Indonesia’ was a fraud: a cloak to cover up 
Javanese colonialism. 
 
Aspinall (2009a) analysed Tiro’s historical claim of the narration of the sovereignty of Aceh 
and proposed three causes. The first is that Aceh was an independent state and a great nation 
from time immemorial. Second, the Acehnese were illegally attacked by the Dutch, and 
although they resisted heroically, this assault ultimately resulted in the theft of Aceh’s 
independence. Third, the illegal conquest by the Dutch was continued by the Javanese who 




Foreign scholars such as Gerry Van Klinken and Tim Kell considered Tiro’s claim of Aceh 
sovereignty as “inaccurate, simplistic, propagandistic” (Van Klinken, 2001: 339) and 
“inherently flawed” (Kell, 1995: 63). Tiro denied several important historical facts about the 
support of Acehnese for the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia in the post-colonial 
period, such as the donation from Acehnese merchants to buy Dakota aircraft, and the period 
when Aceh became the site of emergency government as has been mentioned in an earlier 
section. Another support was demonstrated through the following declaration by four 
respected ulama (Teungku Haji Jakfar Siddik Lamjabat, Teungku Haji Abdullah Indrapuri, 
Teungku Haji Hasan Krungkale, and Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureueh) (Ichwan, 2011): 
 
On behalf of all Acehnese ulema’, stating, among other things: All the elements of 
people who have united are standing behind the two great leaders Soekarno and 
Hatta, and are waiting for the order and duty to be done. It is our conviction that 
such a struggle is a sacred struggle called Perang Sabil [Holy War in the Path of 
God]... Do obey and comply with all commands of our leaders for the safety of our 
motherland, religion, and nation (Ichwan, 2011: 187). 
 
Aceh was also part of the Republic of Indonesia in 1950, albeit being merged with Province of 
North Sumatra, after the United States of Indonesia was dismissed and replaced with a unitary 
state system. Connor (1981) argues that there are two preconditions for the development of 
self-determination: the first being the national consciousness of people, and the second the 
popular sovereignty of people. Given the facts that even until recently many peoples still 
cannot achieve national awareness, this factor is necessary but not sufficient for the gestation 
of self-determination (Connor, 1981). Popular sovereignty thus constitutes the oher part of the 
necessary condition. However, popular sovereignty often presents as “illusionary fiction rather 
than as a reality,” and the propagation is supported by manipulative regimes or individuals 
(Connor, 1981). It is evident that the early framing of Aceh nationalism as an independent 
state and the illegal occupation by the Government of Indonesia constructed by Hasan Tiro is 
factually inaccurate and flawed. Nevertheless, as long as Tiro could lead his followers to the 
belief that the movement is nationalist through effective framing, regardless of the facts, Tiro 
could unify the goals and preferences. 
Tiro only had limited support to commence his struggle as he had been living overseas for 
quite a long time and had lost his connections and networks among Acehnese. Two major 
groups supported the establishment of GAM: the first was a small number of young 
intellectuals and professionals who were frustrated by the way Aceh had developed under the 
hegemony of Jakarta. The second group consisted of the older men involved in the Darul Islam 




remained loyal to Daud Ber’euh (Aspinall, 2009a; Sulaiman, 1999). This movement was only 
supported by direct involvement of around 200 people and suffered a lack of active support, 
foreign assistance, arms and preparation (Kell, 1995).  With many leaders captured or killed 
by the army, Hasan Tiro escaped abroad (Aspinall and Crouch, 2004). However, this initial 
revolt succeeded in spreading propaganda from its base in Pidie to North and Central Aceh 
and Aceh Besar (Kell, 1995). This short-lived rebellion marked the first emergence of GAM as 
a separatist movement.  In the first phase, GAM attempted to construct framing on internal 
colonialism in Aceh through several grievances: authoritarian government and political 
centrality, exploitation of land and unequal distribution of revenue. These grievances are 
framed around an identity component by accusing Java and Javanese as the culprits of the 
inequality and deprivation. While the political centrality and authoritarian government 
(political grievances) are the legacy from Sukarno’s administration, the economic grievances 
around the unequal share of natural resource revenue were reinforced by the discovery of the 
abundant source of gas in Northern Aceh.  
 
3.4.1.2 GAM Phase 2  
The second phase of GAM that commenced in 1989 was primarily supported by international 
exposure which was lacking during the preceding stage. The new squad in the second phase 
mostly graduated from military training in Libya from 1986 (Schulze, 2004). Libya was known 
as a country that provided training programmes for separatists and militias (foreign 
revolutionaries) from around the globe. Upon returning to Aceh, this new squad with better 
capacity and networks consolidated its command structures in rural areas of Aceh Besar 
(Greater Aceh), Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh (Barber, 2001 as cited in Schulze, 2004). In 
addition to military training assistance from Libya, GAM development in the second phase 
was also supported by the diaspora network in Malaysia. Aceh has historical ties with the 
Malay Peninsula from the colonial period and is the home of the relatively large and well-
established Acehnese population (Aspinall, 2009). The geographical proximity between Aceh 
and Malaysia also enabled fast travel and underground arms smuggling (Aspinall, 2009a) to 
support the movement. The Acehnese diaspora in Malaysia also actively spread the GAM 
campaign and organised fundraising (Aspinall, 2009a). 
Due to the stronger capacity and network, GAM began to extend their sporadic attack to wider 
targets such as Indonesian police, soldiers, bureaucrats and suspected informers (Schulze, 
2004).  They mainly launched the attacks in the mountainous areas, as GAM personnel were 
very familiar with the terrain. The national government responded to this insurgency by 
launching Red Net Military Operation and put Aceh under the Military Operation Zone 




been curbed in mid-seventies, had already grown into a fully-fledged separatist movement. 
This awareness meant the central government was never confident that they had completely 
destroyed the movement (Aspinall, 2009a), a reason that placed Aceh in a military operation 
zone for a decade, which was marred by widespread violence.  
The framing used by GAM in their second phase is not much different than what GAM 
employed during the first phase of the rebellion. Political centrality and economic inequality 
were still the dominant grievances (Aspinall, 2009a). Economic grievances were strengthened 
by the Acehnese diaspora in Malaysia who witnessed the development of infrastructure and 
the relatively better standard of living of Malaysia compared to Aceh (Aspinall, 2009aa). The 
rapid development in Malaysia is often used by GAM campaigners to highlight the 
backwardness of Aceh and the economic mistreatment of Aceh by the Indonesian government 
(Aspinall, 2009a).  
3.4.1.3 GAM Phase 3  
The third phase of GAM emerged following the Indonesian domestic political turbulence 
initiated by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Hyperinflation caused by the crisis had 
undermined the government by 1998 and helped bring about an end to Suharto’s 30 years of 
authoritarianism (Weiser, 2005). A sudden national leadership change brought instability in 
politics, security, and the economy and weakened central government power. It caused 
domestic unrest and provoked the seeds of the separatist movement around the country or in 
the case of Aceh, intensified it. During this period, GAM changed its strategy by employing an 
armed struggle and a political attempt at pushing a referendum, a demand that was inspired 
by the East Timor case. Amid the new wave of democratisation and reformation in the 
aftermath of Suharto’s power, the public dared to openly protest human rights abuses 
committed by the military, which responded with an apology from the commander in chief, 
General Wiranto (Sukma, 2004). This was followed by lifting the Military Operations Zone 
status on August 7, 1998, and a plan to withdraw non-organic8 troops from the province 
(Sukma, 2004).  
GAM heightened their attacks due to the more defensive posture of the military. One of the 
largest raids was led by Ahmad Kandang, involving hundreds of youths in Kandang, Aceh 
Utara who burned the flag and tortured two soldiers (Sukma, 2004).  The escalated attacks 
from GAM unexpectedly caused more tension and justified the deployment of more troops in 
successive military operations: Operasi Wibawa (Operation Authority), Operation Sadar 
                                                        
8 The term organic refers to soldiers permanently stationed in a particular region as troops deployed under regional 
military command (Sukma, 2004: 40). Thus, non-organic means the additional forces that were temporarily 





Rencong I, II and III (Operation Rencong Awareness) and Operasi Cinta Meunasah 
(Operation Love Mosque). Based on the statement of National Police Chief General 
Roesmanhadi, the main objective was “to hunt, arrest, and crush all members of GAM across 
Aceh” (Sukma, 2004).  Thus, instead of bringing more peace, the early post-Suharto period 
witnessed mounting violence in Aceh and more operations, although these were primarily 
conducted by police rather than the military.   
GAM constructed a different type of grievance framing in the third phase. The widespread 
human rights violations occurred during the Jaring Merah (Red Net) Operation, and the 
subsequent military operations in the post-Suharto era are framed as a new grievance on 
human rights and justice. Unlike the previous framing of grievances that stressed politics, 
economy, and identity that is regionally or nationally based, human rights and justice 
grievances contain a universal value. However, it should be noted that in addition to its 
relevance with universal value, human rights abuse in Aceh also had a direct impact on 
individuals in ways the previous grievances around politics, the economy, and identity did not. 
The violation of human rights and justice also heightened the previous grievances and 
completed the framing of the deprived and discriminated Acehnese. 
In this phase, GAM is supported by groups of student activists and NGOs such as SIRA (Sentra 
Informasi Referendum Aceh/ Aceh Referendum Information Center) and SMUR (Solidaritas 
Mahasiswa Untuk Rakyat/ Student’s Solidarity for People) to amplify the demand for self-
determination that was based on the human rights and democratic values. The three phases 
of the development of the GAM rebellion can be summarised in the table below: 
Table 3-1 The Three Phases of the GAM Rebellion 
Phase Characteristic Location Active 
Members 
























































1999-2003 Development of 
a military wing, 
armed struggle 
and supported 





within Aceh.  
5000-
15,000 
1999: 393  
2000: 1041  










Source: Nurhasim ( 2008) and Weiser (2010) 
As highlighted by Benford and Snow (2000) social movements (and political parties) employ 
collective action frames (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational) as attribution and 
articulation of the movement. In GAM’s case, Hasan Tiro laid a diagnostic framing that blames 
various grievances experienced by Acehnese on the “Javanese Indonesian Government.”  The 
major framing of grievances consists of politics, economy, and identity. Tiro then promoted 
the independence of Aceh from the Republic of Indonesia by accentuating internal colonialism 
through language such as “Aceh’s illegal occupation by Indonesia”, “neo-colonialism,” and 
“economic exploitation.” In their later phase, GAM began to employ universal motivational 





3.5 The Peace Settlement and The Alleviation of Grievances  
In the post-Suharto administration, the dynamic of conflict in Aceh was mixed between a 
defensive profile of the military and the beginning of non-armed efforts to reach a peaceful 
solution, but also further deployments of troops and the dominant role of police in Aceh rather 
than military. Until 1998, the conflict was unresolved and included harsh repression. The post-
Suharto era allowed more peaceful means, including discussions of atrocities and voicing 
aspirations for a referendum. The first positive response initiative came from President 
Abdurahman Wahid, who endorsed a referendum briefly. However, he soon dismissed it 
because the remnants from East Timor’s struggle still lingered, especially between military 
and nationalist groups (Kay, 2003). There were two initiatives for peace talks in the post-
Suharto era, which were coordinated by the Swiss-based NGO, the Henry Dunant Center. The 
first, Humanitarian Pause, was signed in the President Wahid administration and the second 
one, Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) was produced under Megawati, Wahid’s 
successor. However, neither agreement was durable. Humanitarian Pause was designed as a 
truce between GAM and the Indonesian military, and aimed to “allow for the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to the population and to promote confidence-building measures 
toward a peaceful solution to the conflict situation in Aceh.” (Aspinall and Crouch, 2003). Its 
ceasefire was violated frequently by both sides and did not stop the violence in the field.  
HDC initiated another peace effort, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in 2002. 
Like the preceding attempt, COHA prioritised confidence-building measures by designating 
specific places for the storage of GAM’s weapons the as the compromise of full disarmament 
and gradual relocation of TNI before proceeding to “all-inclusive dialogue” to address more 
substantive issues. COHA also collapsed due to persistent violence in the field and unmet 
demands between GAM and the Government regarding the subject of the local parties and 
local elections (Aspinall and Crouch, 2003). The government considered the 2004 election in 
Aceh would be conducted in the same manner as other provinces in Indonesia, while in GAM’s 
perception, the 2004 election was intended to elect the leaders of the Acehnese nation and 
would include a referendum on Aceh’s independence from Indonesia.  
In September 2004 the duo of a retired army general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and former 
Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, won the first direct presidential 
election with more than 60 per cent of the vote. Both were seen as promising leaders to bring 
a peaceful resolution to the Aceh conflict (Aspinall, 2005). President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono was the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs under Presidents 
Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid, and he was in charge of initiating the earlier efforts of 
peace negotiations (Aspinall, 2005). Vice President Jusuf Kalla was well known as the very 




peace efforts, Kalla was the architect of two peace talks which ended two inter-communal 
conflicts in Indonesia: the Maluku and Poso Declarations (ICG, 2005). With his background 
as a successful businessman before joining politics, Kalla often used an economic-business 
approach to negotiate peace between conflicting parties.  
In the middle of new efforts to broker a peace deal in Aceh, the tsunami and earthquake struck 
on December 26, 2004, that caused 200,000 deaths and left 400,000 homeless (Weiser, 
2005).  The calamitous impact of the earthquake and tsunami greatly affected the peace 
process. Both parties felt that it was “morally wrong” to resume the fighting in the middle of 
massive destruction and huge casualties. As a result, for some weeks there were “no major 
incidents,” and there was an agreement to continue the peace talks (HDC, 2005).  
On January 27, 2005, representatives of the government and GAM met again after the last 
attempt at peaceful talks in May 2003 (Kingsbury, 2006). The talks were held at Vantaa, a city 
near Helsinki, and were managed under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative 
(CMI) (Kingsbury, 2006). The Crisis Management Initiative had been approached by Finnish 
businessman Juha Christensen to act as a mediator between GAM and GoI (Kingsbury, 2006).  
The formal invitation from the CMI for GAM and the GoI to meet was issued on 24 December 
2004. Following the tsunami, this invitation was accepted. The Helsinki Negotiation was 
conducted in five rounds between January-July 2005 and concluded by the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on August 15, 2015 (Morfit, 2007).  
Photo 3-5 The Helsinki negotiation between Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia and GAM, mediated by Marti Ahtiisari 
 








Table 3-2 The Phases of Conflict Resolution in Aceh 
Administration  Conflict Resolution Policies Impact/Result 
Soeharto (1968-1998) Military approach  1. Stability in Aceh 
2. Human Rights 
Violence 
3. Breeding of GAM 
new generation 
Habibie (1998-1999)  Security operation with the 
political approach by 
endorsing 10 Habibie’s 
programs for Aceh  
Ineffective due to a short 










IV/2001 on Aceh 
Conflict Settlement 
4. Special Autonomy 
for Aceh  
1. Wahid did not follow 
up Habibie’s ten 
programs for Aceh 
2. Humanitarian Pause 
was not effective in 
terminating the 
violence 
3. COHA failed due to 
the breach of 
ceasefire by two 
conflicting sides. 
Megawati Soekarno Puteri 
(2001-2004)  
1. Special Autonomy 




VII/2001 on Aceh 
Conflict’s Settlement 
3. Continuation of 
COHA 




1. Special Autonomy 
did not prevent the 
independence 
aspiration as the 
central government 
exclusively took the 
decision on the 
autonomy without 
consultation with  
GAM 
2. Presidential 
Instruction was not 
effective without the 
conducive security 
situation  in Aceh 
Adapted from Nurhasim (2008: 104) 
The Helsinki MoU covers a wide range of issues around underlying factors of conflict in Aceh 
such as the transformation of GAM into a local political party and redistribution of Aceh 
natural wealth. However, the MoU also laid the foundation of the future of durable peace such 
as an affirmation of dropping the demand for independence followed by general amnesty for 
imprisoned GAM members and the establishment of the monitoring mission to oversee 
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). Thus, the MoU has been praised as 




The further arrangement of the provisions of the MoU was regulated the Law on Governing 
Aceh (LoGA) by the Indonesian Parliament (DPR) on 11 July 2006 to give a detailed 
framework for the operationalisation of the clauses of the MoU.  
Unlike the two preceding negotiations which primarily focused on security and cease-fire, the 
Helsinki negotiation went further to solve the problem of deprivation and did more than 
creating a truce between two conflicting parties. It was made possible by the domestic 
environment after Yudhoyono and Kalla, two supportive figures of a peaceful solution of the 
conflict in Aceh, were selected as the president and vice president in the first direct democratic 
election in Indonesia.  While not present as the primary driving force of peace settlement, the 
tsunami could be counted as a “peace enhancer” in Aceh. The tsunami brought Aceh, including 
its long-standing conflict, into the wider international community. The tsunami caused great 
loss on both sides, GAM and the Government of Indonesia, and created a conducive situation 
for another attempt to reach peace.  
 
Table 3-3 Grievances and the Alleviations in MoU Helsinki 
Grievances MoU Helsinki Provisions 
Political Grievances  1. The Establishment of the Local Political Party  
2. Free and fair local elections  
Economic Grievances  1. The rights of Aceh to raise funds with external loans, 
set interest rates beyond the rates set by the Central 
Bank of the Republic of Indonesia.  
2. The development and administration of all seaports 
and airports within the territory of Aceh. 
3. The jurisdiction of the utilisation of living natural 
resources in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh. 
4. The entitlement of 70 percent of the revenues from all 
current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other 
natural resources in the territory of Aceh, as well as in 
the territorial sea surrounding Aceh. 
5. The transparency of the collection and allocation of 
revenues between the Central Government and Aceh 
by agreeing to outside auditors to verify this activity, 
and to communicate the results to the head of the 
Aceh administration. 
6. The full participation of GAM in the BRR. 




Identity 1. The establishment of Wali Nanggroe (an indigenous       
leadership institution). 
2. Aceh will have its flag, crest, and hymn 
 
Human Rights and Justice  1. The establishment of the Human Rights Court 
2. The establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions  
 
MoU Helsinki sufficiently addressed the underlying factors of conflict in Aceh by including the 
provisions of grievances in Aceh. Politically, the MoU addressed grievances in political 
freedoms and centrality by giving special rights of the establishment of a local political party 
and independent candidate to compete in the election. These provisions lead to larger 
opportunities for former GAM members to be actively involved in Aceh’s local politics. In the 
economic realm, dissatisfaction with unfair distribution of natural resources was fixed by 
arranging new distributions of oil and gas between the central government and the Aceh 
provincial government, in which the later party obtained a 70 per cent stake.  Aceh is also 
entitled to a special autonomy fund, often referred to as a peace dividend, to be utilised for 
development in Aceh in post-conflict. Identity-related grievances were alleviated by the 
establishment of Wali Nanggroe, a customary institution to preserve Aceh’s cultural identity. 
The last grievances on human rights and justice were responded to by the establishment of the 
human rights court and Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The basic provisions of 
MoU were elaborated in subsequent laws, the Law of Governing Aceh and Qanun (bylaw). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The grievance approach is chosen to analyse conflict in Aceh as it could represent the 
multidimensional deprivation that occurred in this province.  Grievances in Aceh consist of 
politics, economy, identity, and human rights violations. Identity is unique because it serves 
as a mobilising factor rather than grievance, while the grievance over human rights violations 
came out in the later phase of the conflict due to the rapid military operation launched by the 
Indonesian Government. Political-economy grievances began to emerge during the Suharto 
administration due to the politics of centralisation. It limited political participation in electoral 
democracy by the implementation of the dominant party system.  In the economic realm, the 
distribution of Aceh natural wealth was unequal with a bigger percentage going to Jakarta or 
MNC, not to mention environmental degradation caused by the operation of the MNC. 
Political-economy grievances were mobilised by highlighting the distinct identity of Acehnese. 




(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM). In later phases of the conflict, the grievances were added to 
with human rights and justice violation caused by Indonesian military operations to curb the 
rebellion. While an initial aim of the military operation was to crush GAM, it eventually created 
new grievances and bred more support for GAM. However, the similar grievances that 
occurred in other provinces in Indonesia did not create the parallel impact of separatist 
rebellion like in Aceh. In this case, we must count the process of grievance framing constructed 
by Hasan Tiro. Tiro successfully framed the sentiment of Indonesia-Javanese Government 
neo-colonialism (or internal colonialism) over economic exploitation, and political centrality 
occurred in Aceh and was reinforced by the component of glorious history and distinct 
identity. This framing is necessary to establish and sustain the separatist movement in Aceh.  
 
The dynamic of conflict resolution in Aceh changed in the post-Suharto era from a counter-
insurgency approach to a positive gesture toward peaceful resolution and dialogue following 
the new wave of democratisation. The two negotiations facilitated by the Henry Dunant 
Center, a Swiss-based NGO, failed due to unmet demands between the Indonesian 
Government and GAM. The thirty years of conflict were finally brought to an end by the 
Helsinki negotiation that was mediated by Marti Ahtisaari from the Crisis Management 
Initiative in August 2005 in the aftermath of the disastrous tsunami which produced a peace 
agreement called MoU Helsinki. The Helsinki peace agreement successfully concluded the 
conflict because it aimed at addressing grievances as underlying factors of the conflict in Aceh 
and not only creating a truce like the two other preceding negotiations. MoU Helsinki 
stipulated political participation, economic development, identity and human rights and 
justice in its provisions.  Aceh was given more access to political participation through the 
right to establish a local political party and nominating an independent candidate to compete 
in the election. In enhancing economic development, a large special autonomy fund was 
provided as a peace dividend. Aceh also gained a fairer distribution of their natural wealth 
such as oil and gas with a 70 per cent stake. 
 
Regarding its identity, Aceh was granted the right to establish Wali Nanggroe, a customary 
institution, and have their flag and anthem. Lastly, to bring justice to the victims of human 
rights violations during the conflict, the human rights court and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission would be established in Aceh. This successful peace settlement was also highly 
supported by a national leader, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla 
who favoured peaceful resolution rather than a military operation.   
 
Throughout this chapter, it can be seen that conflict in Aceh was primarily caused by 




Acehnese perceived to be rightfully entitled to and what they had in reality.  These grievances 
were framed and mobilised by an identity aspect by Hasan Tiro to establish a separatist 
movement and were accentuated by rampant human rights violence during the military 
operations.  It took a comprehensive peace settlement that could address grievances but also 
maintain the ultimate objective of the territorial integrity of the Government of Indonesia.  
MoU Helsinki could balance these two demands by stipulating the attempt of grievance 
alleviation rightly to its provisions. The Helsinki peace agreement and MoU Helsinki form an 
example of peace solutions for separatism without employing military repression or allowing 






Chapter 4: Political Participation in Post-conflict Peace-building 
 
4.1   Introduction 
The post-conflict peacebuilding process in Aceh is marked by the provision of political 
participation as a means of alleviating political grievances. According to Aguswandi and 
Zunzer (2008), based on a statement from a GAM leader, the conflict in Aceh was not merely 
about violence, but a political conflict that required a political solution. As has been 
highlighted in chapter 3, Aceh experienced political-governance grievance in terms of 
incorporation of their province into the province of North Sumatra in the post-independence 
era. During Suharto’s New Order, most of the political positions in the government and 
bureaucracy were filled by non-Acehnese. In electoral democracy, party politics were 
dominated by Golkar, a single majority political party which was supported by compulsory 
membership of civil servants. Challenging the nation-wide domination of Golkar, most 
Acehnese voted for the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP), an 
Islamic-based national party which positioned itself as loyal opposition in the New Order era. 
While the hegemonic party system and centralism were part of the nationwide political 
landscape, only in a few provinces, including Aceh, did they create grievance and further 
mobilisation of ethno-nationalist movements. As was elaborated in chapter 3, Aceh had a 
charismatic leader, Hasan Tiro, who mobilised grievances around political centralisation 
successfully into separatism.  
 
The provisions of political participation in the Helsinki MoU and the Law on Governing Aceh 
(LoGA) were intended to widen political participation in Aceh by adopting liberal peace 
methods:  transforming the rebel movement into a political entity and conducting elections to 
allow former GAM members to have democratic contestation. In other words, political 
participation in post-conflict Aceh is predominantly channelled through electoral 
participation.  The preamble of the MoU states that the Government of Indonesia and GAM 
would create conditions for “fair and democratic government” and that direct local elections 
(Pemilihan Kepala Daerah/Pilkada) would be held shortly after the peace agreement is signed. 
It also stipulated a number of changes to the electoral system, establishing that for the first 
time in Indonesia’s history, independent candidates could contest the 2006 election (Barron, 
Clark and Palmer: 2010: 129) The LoGA allowed for local political parties to be established in 
Aceh and for their members to compete for seats in provincial and district legislatures in 2009. 
This staged approach to allowing independent candidates to run for office allowed former 
rebels to stand while GAM was still forming a political party, a process that required time 





Political participation is one of the aspects of peacebuilding that shows robust development 
and has been highly praised as a major achievement of the peace agreement. From 2005 to 
2018, Aceh has been able to conduct three provincial and district/municipality elections and 
two legislative elections that were relatively peaceful without significant electoral violence 
leading to the outbreak of new conflict. GAM leaders and sympathisers were elected as 
governor and vice governor, while a political party established by former GAM combatants has 
won most of the vote from Acehnese people. The efforts to address political grievances as one 
of the types of relative deprivations experienced by Acehnese have been ostensibly successful, 
as marked by participation in electoral democracy.  
  
This chapter takes a closer look at the development of political participation in Aceh. It begins 
with a description of the regulation of political participation in the MoU, LoGA and Qanun 
(bylaw) as an effort to alleviate political grievances in Aceh. The second section is an in-depth 
investigation of local elections in the post-conflict era, which is comprised of gubernatorial 
and legislative elections. This section will be complemented by an analysis of voter turnout, 
electoral institutions, electoral violence, representation of primary groups competing in local 
elections, women’s political participation, and the electoral relationship between national and 
local political parties. The third section focuses on the transformation of GAM from a rebel 
movement to the political institution by reviewing the dynamics of Partai Aceh and Partai 
Nasional Aceh as their political outlets. The last part summarises the contribution of political 
participation in alleviating grievances and provides analysis of the implementation of 
peacebuilding provisions on local elections and local political parties. This chapter will also 
analyse the process of participation, institution building and legitimacy during the transition 
and normalisation phases of peacebuilding.  
 
4.2   Grievance Alleviation 
4.2.1 MoU  
The aspect of political equality is paramount in the Helsinki agreement. It is demonstrated by 
the inclusion of the right to participate in elections as voters and to compete as independent 
candidates through local parties (Tornquist, 2011). The MoU mandates political participation 
through these provisions: 
1. As soon as possible and not later than one year from the signing of this MoU, GoI 
agrees to and will facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political parties that 
meet national criteria. Understanding the aspirations of Acehnese people for 
local political parties, GoI will create, within one year or at the latest 18 months 




establishment of local political parties in Aceh in consultation with Parliament. 
The timely implementation of this MoU will contribute positively to this end 
(Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia and The Free Aceh Movement Article 1.2.1)  
 
2. Upon the signature of this MoU, the people of Aceh will have the right to 
nominate candidates for the positions of all elected officials to contest the 
elections in Aceh in April 2006 and thereafter. (Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and The Free Aceh 
Movement Article 1.2.2)  
 
3. Free and fair local elections will be organised under the new Law on the 
Governing of Aceh to elect the head of the Aceh administration and other elected 
officials in April 2006 as well as the legislature of Aceh in 2009 (Memorandum 
of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and The 
Free Aceh Movement Article 1.2.3). 
 
It is important to note that the establishment of local political parties is a “compromise of 
grievance alleviation” between the central government and GAM from self-determination to 
self-government. GAM’s ultimate aim of self-determination had been negotiated in Helsinki 
and was reshaped as self-government. Political grievances of Acehnese were addressed by 
granting access to greater participation in local politics and governance through local political 
parties. At the beginning of negotiations, central government offered the concept of “Aceh 
(local) based national party” and promised to supply 1000 members of Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla 
affiliated political parties to support the establishment of a locally based national party in Aceh 
(Nurhasim, 2008). GAM negotiators refused the idea, and they kept demanding the 
establishment of a local political party without national attributes as the manifestation of self-
government. 
 
On the other hand, the GoI objected to the idea due to an existing regulation, Law No 12/2003, 
that restricts the establishment of a local political party. Both parties insisted on their 
standpoints and forced Ahtisaari to mediate this disputed provision directly. The Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia finally accepted the provision allowing local political parties but 
with the condition, “in consultation with parliament”. There was thus an authority transfer 
from central government to Aceh by granting the political right to establish local political 





4.2.2 Law of Governing Aceh (LoGA)  
The provision of elections and the establishment of local political parties were spelt out in 
national regulation, the Law of Governing Aceh (LoGA). Elections were comprehensively 
specified in article 65 to 74 with the regulations on nomination, ratification and inauguration 
of governor/deputy governor, and mayor/deputy mayor, voter’s rights and election 
supervision. The regulations on local elections were also supported by the stipulation of the 
establishment of the independent electoral commission (Komite Independen Pemilu – KIP) 
as an election organiser, and for handling dispute settlement prior and after Election Day.   
 
The provisions of local political parties are stipulated in articles 75 to 95. The regulations on 
local political parties consist of the administrative requirement of establishment, principles, 
objectives, functions, rights and obligations, finance, membership and the conditions to 
participate in a local election. The aspect of gender mainstreaming is also included in this law, 
by the mandatory affirmative action for the political party to nominate 30 per cent female 
candidates (Satriyo, 2011).  
 
As was anticipated by central government negotiators, the decision for the establishment of 
local political parties became a heated debate in the National Parliament before being 
promulgated in the LoGA. In the Indonesian political party system, a party is eligible to 
register or run in the election if it has functioning branches in at least 50 per cent of the 
provinces and 50 per cent of the districts in those provinces (Aspinall, 2009b). This regulation 
goes beyond the number or percentage, but it is about the sensitive issue of separatism and 
Indonesian unity because the establishment of political parties based on territoriality could 
provoke disintegration. Provision of independent candidacy was also perceived negatively by 
the members of the National Parliament. PDI-P, a nationalist party and the primary opponent 
of peace negotiations with GAM was supported by other parties such as Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in 
voicing disagreement with the local political party and independent candidacy in Aceh. 
Together with the State Intelligence  Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional/BIN), these parties 
perceived that a local political party and independent candidates would lead to local elections 
serving as a referendum and as an entry point for GAM to continue their separatist agenda 
(Aliabbas, 2008). After a series of revisions, lengthy debates in parliament and public, 
particularly over the possibility of disintegration brought about by local political parties, 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) on 1 
August 2006, accepting local parties and independent candidates in provincial elections 
(Stange &Patock, 2010), which became the legal basis for the 2006 local election. Yudhoyono 




the senior Golkar politician successfully managed the opposition in parliament to secure these 
provisions in the LoGA.  
 
4.2.3 Qanun (Bylaw) 
Political participation is one of the post-conflict peacebuilding provisions that has been 
frequently stipulated in the subsequent local laws (Qanun). From 2006 to 2017, the DPRA 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh/ Aceh Provincial Parliament) has produced and enacted 
numerous political-related Qanuns. All of the political-related Qanuns emphasise elections 
and local political parties, including financial assistance and the establishment of Local 
Election Commissions (Komite Pemilihan Umum Daerah/ KPUD). The number of Qanuns 
with political content is higher than other subjects like the economy, law enforcement or 
human rights. A large number of the promulgation of politics-related Qanun demonstrates the 
priority of peacebuilding in Aceh which heavily emphasises political development in the first 
years after the peace settlement.  
 
In addition to its importance in transforming armed insurgency into electoral politics, the 
political settlement in Aceh marks a model of more progressive democracy in Indonesian 
politics especially by allowing the establishment of local political parties and independent 
candidacy in local elections. Hamzah claimed Aceh was a “political, social, cultural and 
military laboratory, the results of which are often copied by other provinces, Aceh has become 
an inspiration for other regions” (Hamzah,2009:310). The provision of independent 
candidates in Aceh has created discourse over the possibility of other provinces and districts 
obtaining similar political rights. In 2007, Lalu Ranggalawe, a legislative member from 
Central Lombok West Nusa Tenggara province filed a judicial petition on the Law No 32/2004 
about Local Government to the Constitutional Court (Khafid, 2007). The court accepted it in 
2007, and the legalisation of the participation of independent candidates in local elections was 
enacted by Law No 12/2008.  However, the provision of local political parties remains 
exclusively applied to Aceh and not other provinces. Several groups in Papua demanded 
similar rights to establish local political parties like in Aceh, but the government declined the 
request based on the absence of regulations on the subject of local political parties in Papua. 
 
LoGA and the Qanun demonstrate the efforts of the central government to address political 
grievances by transferring political authority from the incumbent to insurgent. The 
establishment of local political parties and independent candidacy were the exemplary cases 
of authority transfer as a compromise of self-determination demanded by GAM to provide 
further legitimacy to the insurgent group. The initial resistance from the National Parliament, 




candidacy had exposed the challenging path of state-led peacebuilding towards the greater 
legitimacy of the former separatist group. Since the local political party was still considered a 
risk to the unitary state as they could potentially promote the idea of separatism, the 
government’s agreement on the establishment of the local party in Aceh caused apprehension 
among nationalist and military groups towards similar demands in other provinces. 
 
4.3 Political Participation in Post-conflict Peace-building  
4.3.1 Local Elections 
In post-conflict peacebuilding, elections are a primary aspect of the political solution. Reilly 
(2002a) emphasises the importance of elections in the post-conflict period due to their 
stimulation of the development of democratic politics, the formation of the government and 
the legitimacy of the new political order. Elections in the post-conflict period are a way to 
ensure inclusive participation, either by the right to vote or to run for office. However, 
accelerated elections in post-conflict areas are potentially harmful to the sustainability of the 
newly reached peace. It might raise the level of polarisation and contestation which may lead 
to conflict recurrence.  The loser may be provoked to contest results violently, while the winner 
may also be tempted to oppress other contenders. Timing of elections also matters. Early 
elections in the post-conflict period tend to expose deep social cleavages which can weaken 
rather than strengthen the peacebuilding process (Reilly, 2016). The negative impacts of 
electoral democracy in post-conflict society is one of the primary criticisms of liberal 
democratic peacebuilding as I have outlined in chapter 2. Local elections, however, were 
mandated and have successfully been conducted in Aceh. They were comprised of three 
gubernatorial elections, in 2006, 2012 and 2017 and two legislative elections in 2009 and 
2014. The first election in 2006 was conducted less than two years after the peace agreement. 
These following sections will elaborate each election with the results and their dynamics of 
participation and limitations on participation. This thesis is mainly focused on gubernatorial 
and provincial legislative elections as a representation of Aceh’s political dynamics at the 
provincial level. However, the comparison of votes between a candidate from local-national 
parties at the district level, and the result of national legislative elections will be elaborated in 
the section on the electoral landscape as well as the analysis of the results of presidential 
elections in Aceh.  
 
4.3.1.1 The First Gubernatorial and District Head Election (2006)  
The gubernatorial and district head elections (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, or Pilkada for short) 




was the first election in the post-conflict period and the test case of the provision of 
independent candidates in a local election, the new feature in the history of electoral politics 
in Indonesia. This local election in the post-conflict period was administered by Komisi 
Independent Pemilu or the Independent Election Commission of Aceh. The election was 
supervised by the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) as part of their mandate to support the 
peace process in Aceh. It aimed at electing a governor, a vice governor, and 19 heads of 
regencies (mayor and regent) across Aceh. 
 
According to a survey conducted by IFES (2006) before the election, the majority of Acehnese 
were aware of the local elections and willing to participate. Seventy-eight per cent of Acehnese 
were well informed that local elections would take place in December 2006. About 56 per cent 
of the Acehnese said that they were very likely to vote, 33 per cent were somewhat likely to 
participate, and two per cent would abstain (IFES 2006).  
 
There were 11 candidates who sought to register for the election, comprising of four pairs from 
political parties and seven pairs from the independent stream. Independent candidates must 
collect the signature of a minimum of three per cent of the Acehnese population 
(approximately 130,000 names) to be able to run for the election.9 The signatures must be 
validated by the ID card of each signatory, but it can be verified collectively in the sub-district 
or village office. Since the eligibility of the independent candidates to compete in Aceh 
elections was only announced on December 11, two weeks before the election, many of the 
candidates complained about the limited time to collect signatures (ANFREL, 2006). After 
struggling with procedural requirements, eight pairs of candidates, six from political parties 
and two from the independent stream were finally verified by the Independent Election 




                                                        





Table 4-1 The List of Candidates in the 2006 Gubernatorial Election 
No Name of Candidate  Party  Background  
1 Malek Raden (Governor)  GOLKAR Bureaucrat and Politician (former 
member of Acehnese Regional 
Representatives Council (DPD)) 
 Sayed Fuad Zakaria (Vice 
Governor) 
GOLKAR  Politician from GOLKAR 
2 Humam Hamid (Governor) PPP Academic (Doctor of Sociology and 
Lecturer at Syiah Kuala University)  
 Hasbi Abdullah (Vice Governor)  PPP Academic (Lecturer at Syiah Kuala 
University) and GAM Negotiator  
3 Irwandi Yusuf (Governor)  Independent 
Candidate  
GAM Spokesperson  





Former Student Activist, Founder of 
SIRA (Sentra Informasi Referendum 
Aceh/ Information Center for Aceh 
Referendum)  
4 Azwar Abubakar (Governor) PAN  Politician/Former Acting Governor of 
Aceh  
 Nasir Jamil (Vice Governor)  PKS  Politician/ Former member of Aceh 
Legislative Council in 1999-2000 




Star Party)  
Military/Former Military Territorial 
Commander Wirabuana (South 
Sulawesi Province) 
 Harmen Nuriqmar (Vice 
Governor)  
PBR  Politician/ Parliament member from 
PBR  






Military /First Acehnese appointed as 
Iskandar Muda Military Territorial 
Commander (Kodam Iskandar Muda, 




 Syaqas Rahmatillah (Vice 
Governor) 
PPP Academic/ Lecturer at Ar-Raniry 
Islamic State Institute 
7 Iskandar Hoesin (Governor)  
 
PBB (Star and 
Crescent Party)  
Bureaucrat / Former Government 
Officer in Provincial Office of 
Ministry of Transmigration and 
Ministry of Human Rights and 
Justice. 
 Saleh Manaf (Vice Governor)  PBB  Bureaucrat/ Former head of Bekasi 
Regency, West Java 
8 Ghazali Abbas (Governor)  Independent 
Candidate  
Artist (Poet and Singer) and Politician 
(Former Legislative Member from 
PPP) 




Professional/ Owner of Seulawah Air 
(Aceh local government-owned airline 
company. This airline was launched 
in 2002 but suspended its service in 
2003 due to mismanagement.  
Source:  IFES (2006) and ICG (2006) 
 
The list presents a range of backgrounds for candidates from politicians or former bureaucrats 
to former military, professionals, and artists. The presence of two candidates with military 
backgrounds was intriguing since the Indonesian army was seen as the principal enemy and 
perpetrator of human rights violations during the counter-insurgency.  
 
While this election included the participation of a large number of candidates (compared to 
other provinces in Indonesia, the number of candidates in local elections varies between two 
to five) from diverse backgrounds, the real competition was seemingly between two GAM 
representations. The first contenders were Human Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah, under a 
national political party, PPP, and the second candidates were  Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad 
Nazar, who ran as independent candidates.  Hamid-Abdullah represented politically active 
intellectuals and the GAM elite, while Irwandi-Nazar was representative of more grassroots 
intellectual-activists. Irwandi was the GAM spokesperson and propagandist, and Nazar was a 
former student activist who established SIRA (Central Information for Aceh Referendum). 
Nazar set up SIRA in November 1999, inspired by the East Timor referendum that eventually 
led to independence. SIRA was supported by youth and students. Both Irwandi and Nazar 
were political prisoners during the conflict era in Aceh. The results of the 2006 gubernatorial 





Table 4-2 Result of 2006 Gubernatorial Election 
No  Name of Candidates           Result (%) 
1 Irwandi Yusuf  
M. Nazar 
38.2  
2 Hasbi Abdullah 
Humam Hamid 
            16.6  
3 Malek Raden  
Sayed Fuan Zakaria) 
            13.9  
4 Azwar Abubakar 
Nasir Jamil 
            10.6  
5  Djali Yusuf and  
Syaqas Rahmatillah 
              7.8  
6 Iskandar Hoesin  
Saleh Manaf 
              5.5  
7 Tamlicha Ali  
Harmen Nuriqmar) 
              3.9  
8 Ghazali Abas  
Shalahudin Al Fatah 
              3.2  
 Voter Turnout                 85% 
Source: ICG (2006) 
 
The first post-conflict electoral competition was won by Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar 
with 38 per cent of the votes in the first ballot. This result indicated that KPA was successfully 
working as a political machine for GAM, to mobilise votes at district levels (Stange and Patock, 
2010). While KPA secured votes from GAM members, Nazar’s SIRA Network also attracted a 
significant share of the vote from students and youth. The Irwandi Yusuf-Muhammad Nazar 
team emerged as representatives of the successful transition of GAM from an insurgent 
movement to a non-violent political entity. Irwandi-Nazar also succeeded in mobilising voters, 
using centre-periphery discontentment by building an image as the candidates who 
consistently refused to cooperate with any national parties (Prasetyo, Tornquist and Birk, 
2009). 
 
The candidates from GAM backgrounds won six out of 23 districts and municipalities in 
district elections, a sound achievement, given their first participation as independent 
candidates. The non-Acehnese-dominated districts such as Central Aceh and Singkil remained 




is no single factor to explain the GAM victory, there are several factors that might contribute 
to their electoral achievement. They consist of the combination of the structure of KPA as a 
superior local mass organisation in the post-conflict period that was supported by SIRA as an 
activist and student wing organisation, the emphasis that GAM candidates were the only ones 
who could ensure lasting peace in Aceh, and scepticism with established national political 
parties (Sindre 2008, ICG 2007). The triumph of GAM candidates in the first election in the 
post-conflict period also demonstrated the initial legitimacy shift from central government to 
former insurgents.  
 
4.3.1.2 The First Provincial and District/Municipality Legislative Election 
(2009)  
While the 2006 gubernatorial election was the first local election post-Helsinki, the 2009 
elections were the first national-level elections for Aceh in peacetime (Carter Center, 2009). 
Legislative elections in Aceh were a test case where local parties could compete for the very 
first time in Indonesian electoral democracy.  Particularly for Partai Aceh, the 2009 election 
was a chance to prove its capacity as a local political party that was perceived as the 
representative of GAM, after victory in the 2006 gubernatorial election. The 2009 legislative 
election was to elect legislative members to the National Parliament (DPR), Provincial 
Parliament (DPRA), District Parliament (DPRK) and Senate (DPD). Unlike provincial and 
district level parliaments, candidates from Aceh who ran for National Parliament seats had to 
be nominated by national political parties, not by local political parties. 
 
Despite the strict regulations on party formation10, six local parties managed to meet the 
administrative criteria required to register for the 2009 elections. Local political parties 
represented diverse interest groups in Aceh, including religious communities and the urban 
middle classes, not all of whom automatically identified with GAM’s struggle. The following 
table provides a brief overview of the local political parties that registered for the 2009 
provincial and district/municipality legislative elections (Hillman, 2012; Hamzah, 2009): 
  
                                                        
10 Local political parties had to be established and formed by at least 50 (fifty) citizens of the Republic 
of Indonesia having the age of 21 (twenty-one) years old who have been permanently domiciled in Aceh 
by heeding the representation of women at least 30% (thirty percent) (LoGA article 75 clause 2). Local 
political parties must have a management of at least 50% in the District/city and 25% (twenty five 





Table 4-3 Local Political Parties in 2009 Aceh Legislative Election 
Party Name  Description of Party Logo 
Partai Aceh  The party represents the 
former Free Aceh 
Movement, founded by the 
rebels’ exiled leaders and 
some senior ex-combatants.  
Aceh Sovereignty Party 
(Partai Daulat Aceh, PDA) 
Founded by Muslim cleric 
(ulama) and graduates of 
local Islamic boarding 
schools (santri) to promote 
the implementation of 
Shariah law in Aceh. 
 
Safe and Prosperous Aceh 
Party (Partai Aceh Aman 
Sejahtera, PAAS) 
Founded by Ghazali Abbas 
Adan, former politician, 
artist (poet) and United 
Development Party 
member.   
The Independent Voice of 
the Acehnese People’s Party 
(Suara Independen Rakyat 
Aceh, SIRA) 
Founded by former pro-
referendum activists under 
the leadership of Aceh Vice 
Governor Muhamad Nazar. 
 
The Aceh People’s Party 
(Partai Rakyat Aceh, PRA) 
Founded by left-leaning 
student activists. The party 
had a critical stand on 
foreign investment in Aceh.  
The Aceh United Party 
(Partai Bersatu Aceh, PBA) 
Founded by academic and 
former National Mandate 
Party (PAN) member of the 
Indonesian House of 
Representatives. 
 
Source: Hillman (2012), Hamzah (2009)  
 
Most of the local political parties used religious or Acehnese-ness symbols as a strong message 




colours, symbols and patterns that were heavily associated with the GAM logo. Partai Daulat 
Aceh featured the Qur’an in its logo, while Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera Aceh featured the 
traditional Aceh hat, and Partai Bersatu Aceh used a map of Aceh Province in its logo. PRA 
was a compelling case as they boldly featured a yellow star on a red backdrop logo, a colour 
and symbol combination that is frequently used in communist countries. 
 
Before the legislative elections in April 2009, political tension escalated. There were concerns 
about pre-election violence and the security of the election from both sides, Partai Aceh and 
its competitors. There were cases of the killing of party activists who were affiliated with Partai 
Aceh, while in the Partai Aceh stronghold areas, there were reports of intimidation by Partai 
Aceh (Carter Center, 2009). Partai Aceh supporters also seemed to face widespread 
intimidation in multiple districts, allegedly undertaken by police and military forces (Carter 
Center, 2009). 
 
The election results showed that PA won an overwhelming victory, gaining a total of 33 seats 
out of 69 (or 48 per cent) in the DPRA followed by Partai Demokrat, a new political party 
associated with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono with 10 seats and Partai Golkar, the 
“New Order” party with eight seats. Partai Aceh also dominated 17 of 23 districts in the District 
Parliament election. PA won an absolute majority (between 52 and 75 per cent) of seats in 
their stronghold districts: Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Bireuen, Aceh Utara, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Timur, 
and Aceh Jaya, and lost in the districts where the population is more heterogeneous such as 
Gayo Lues, Aceh Tenggara (South East Aceh), Aceh Singkil, Subulussalam, Bener Meriah, and 
Central Aceh (ICG, 2009, Tornquist and Uning, 2009).  Apart from the impressive victory of 
Partai Aceh, only one other local party, Partai Daulat Aceh, obtained one seat in DPRA, while 












Table 4-4 The Result of 2009 Legislative Election 
No Political Party  Number of Seat in 
Provincial Parliament 
(DPRA) 
1 Partai Aceh  33 
2 PD  10 
3 Golkar  8 
4 PAN  5 
5 PKS  4 
6 PPP 3 
7 PBB 1 
8 PKB 1 
9 PKPI 1 
10 Partai Daulat Aceh   1 
11 Partai Patriot 1 
12 PDI-P 1 
Source: Merdeka (2009) 
 
There are several contributing factors to the victory of Partai Aceh. The first one is the party’s 
strategy. Partai Aceh sustained its strategy of influencing the broad mass of uneducated people 
in rural Aceh, claiming that they were the only party that had been mandated by MoU Helsinki 
and the sole representatives of GAM. Representatives of Partai Aceh said a primary goal would 
be the full implementation of the Helsinki MoU and full self-government in all but the six areas 
that under the agreement are the preserve of the national government: foreign affairs, external 
defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and religious freedom (LPP2, 
personal interview, September 2012). Secondly, KPA as GAM political machinery had again 
proven its effectiveness to gather votes. Regarding human resources, most of the leaders of PA 
and their supporters were ex-combatants who had been very well prepared for the competition 
and PA was the only local party that had well-functioning offices all around Aceh, heavily 
supported by the KPA structure. PA also successfully broadened its support from affiliated 
mass-based organisations among fisherfolk, farmers and religious scholars (Tornquist and 
Uning, 2009).  
 
The first legislative election had been successful in terms of the transformation of the rebel 
movement into a political entity through a local political party as well as the legitimacy shift 
from incumbent/central government to insurgent/GAM. The victory of Partai Aceh 




gubernatorial election. However, the failure of other local parties to gain a seat in the local 
parliament indicated the supremacy of one local group in Aceh. It is essential to see the 
development of local political parties in Aceh in the broader electoral participation of Aceh 
society and not only limited to GAM. The ultimate victory of Partai GAM, therefore, has 
indicated that the provision of the local political party in Aceh was beneficial initially for GAM 
only. In other words, it demonstrates the limited participation in the transitional phase of 
peacebuilding in Aceh. 
 
4.3.1.3 The Second Gubernatorial Election (2012)  
Aceh’s second general election was supposed to be held in 2011 in accordance with the five-
year cycle of the governor election but was delayed until 2012 due to political tension between 
the former combatants. Unlike the 2006 election, the number of contestants in the 2012 
gubernatorial election included only five pairs of candidates as shown in table 4.5. 
Interestingly, three out of five candidates, or 75 per cent, were running through the 
independent stream, one pair was the representatives of Partai Aceh, and another was 
nominated collectively by three national parties. The nomination with no formal party 
affiliation was still chosen as one of the means of political participation in Aceh. There are 
some contributing factors to the popularity of independent candidacy: the persistent 
antagonism to national parties among voters, and the high cost of the patronage system of 
political parties in electoral competition. While independent candidacy gives a positive impact 
on political participation, the popular option to run as an independent candidate also raises 
questions about the function of political parties, especially the local ones, in post-conflict Aceh 
as an institution to prepare candidates for public office. The background of candidates was 
also less diverse than the 2006 election with the representation of incumbent, former GAM 











Table 4-5 The List of Candidate of Governor and Vice Governor in Aceh 
Gubernatorial Election 2012 
No  Name Party  Background  




Independent Candidate  
 
Tengku Ahmad Tajudin or  Abi 
Lampisang  was the head of the 
Education Islamic boarding school Al-
Muhajirin and served as a Khadi 
(judge) in GAM 




Independent Candidate  Suriansyah is a senior politician from 
Golkar party with extensive experience 
in National Parliament. In the post-
Suharto administration, he was tasked 
to help President Abdurahman Wahid 
as an advisory council regarding Aceh 
issues. 
2 Irwandi Yusuf 
(Governor)  
 
Independent Candidate  Irwandi Yusuf is the former Governor 
of Aceh for the period 2006 to 2012, 
and during the conflict, he was a 
propagandist and spokesperson of 
GAM.  
 Muhyan Yunan  Independent Candidate  Yunan is well known as a technocrat. 
He is former chief of Bina Marga and 
Cipta Karya Directorates in Aceh, two 
state-owned enterprises on 
construction, and had handled various 
construction projects across Aceh.  
3 Prof. Dr H. Darni 
M. Daud. MA 
(Governor) 
Independent Candidate  Darni M Daud is a Rector of Syiah 
Kuala University. 
 
 Dr Tgk. Ahmad 
Fauzi. M.Ag (Vice 
Governor) 
Independent Candidate Fauzi is a lecturer at Tarbiyah Faculty, 
Ar-Raniry Islamic Institute. 
 
4 H Muhammad 
Nazar (Governor) 
 
Partai Demokrat, PPP and 
SIRA  
 
Nazar is a former student activist and 
the force behind Aceh’s attempt at a 
referendum during the Abdurahman 
Wahid presidency. He was the former 




 Ir. Nova 
Iriansyah, MT  
 
Partai Demokrat, PPP and 
SIRA  
 
Iriansyah is the former chairman of the 
Democrat Party in Aceh and served as 
a Member of the National Parliament 
(DPR RI) from 2009-2014. 




Partai Aceh  Zaini Abdullah is one of the most 
prominent figures among governor 
candidates. He is the former foreign 
minister of GAM and was involved 
actively in GAM’s diplomatic 
campaign. He is a medical doctor by 
profession,and  graduated from 
Uppsala University, Sweden. 
 Muzakir Manaf 
(Vice Governor) 
 
Partai Aceh  Manaf is the other famous figure in 
GAM. He is the former commander of 
the GAM Army wing and became head 
of the KPA after conflict.  
Source: Serambinews (2011) 
This second gubernatorial election was marred by electoral disputes and violence. The election 
was postponed from 10 October 2011 to 14 November 2011, then to 24 December 2011, 16 
February 2012, and finally to 9 April 2012 (ICG, 2012), due to the dispute over independent 
candidacy between the GAM-based PA that dominated the Aceh parliament and Irwandi, the 
incumbent.  GAM elites that dominated the Aceh parliament through PA not only declined to 
nominate Irwandi but aimed to block him from being re-elected as governor of Aceh. GAM 
used the provision in the MoU Helsinki allowing independent candidates only in the first 
election. The independent candidacy was considered a violation of law by Partai Aceh, even 
though it had already been acknowledged and enacted in national law after judicial review. 
This conflict is elaborated further in the subsequent section on the establishment of local 
political parties.  
 
As a result of this rift, violence was drastically increased with as many as 157 electoral-related 
violence cases recorded by Perludem and Bawaslu. Amidst the escalated tension, violence and 
complications the electoral commission successfully managed the process. The positive 
intervention from the national government to postpone the local election and reopen the 
registration of candidates through a Constitutional Court ruling contributed to a peaceful 
election. KIP announced the results on 17th April 2012. Voter turnout was confirmed at 75.73 
per cent of 3,244,680 registered voters (ANFREL, 2012).  The result of the second 





Table 4-6 The Result of 2012 Gubernatorial Election 
No Name of Candidates Total Vote /Percentage  
1  Dr. H. Zaini Abdullah  
Muzakir Manaf  
1,327,695 (55.78%) 
 
2 Drh. Irwandi Yusuf  
Dr. Ir. Muhyan Yunan. M.Sc 
694,515 (29.18%) 
 
3  H Muhammad Nazar   
Ir. Nova Iriansyah, MT 
182,079 (7.65%) 
 
4 Prof. Dr. H. Darni M. Daud. MA 
Dr. Tgk. Ahmad Fauzi. M.Ag 
96,767 (4.07%) 
5  Tengku H. Ahmad Tajuddin AB  
Ir. H. Teuku Suriansyah, M.Si 
79,330 (3.33%) 
 Voter Turnout 2,457,196 (75.73%)  
Source: Republika (2012) 
This election seemed to be a competition between Irwandi and Zaini Abdullah.  Fachry Ali, an 
Acehnese political scholar, commented that “the Acehnese still hold figures with GAM 
backgrounds in high regard” (Simanjuntak and Elfrida, 2012). Partai Aceh repeated its 
campaign strategy by stressing that they were the main benefactors of peace in Aceh and 
invoked the sentiment of the public towards the MoU Helsinki as the only valid document of 
peace. Partai Aceh also used the MoU to defend their rejection of Irwandi’s independent 
candidacy.  
 
While the 2006 gubernatorial and 2009 legislative elections could be considered to be the 
early learning path of local democracy, the 2012 election showed significant setbacks, with the 
return of violence and conflict. This feature is common in a transitional phase of peacebuilding 
when former combatants must undertake democratic competition. It is interesting to observe 
that Partai Aceh attempted to create a democratic image by resorting to a legal framework 
during the dispute over Irwandi candidacy. However, their behaviour in preventing one 
candidate from legally competing in the election undermined the democratic principles. 
Another appealing feature is the support of the central government for the peaceful 
competition between former combatants. While the central government had transferred 
authority by granting self-government to a local political party, Jakarta used the national 




democracy in Aceh when it came under threat of violence. This indicates one of the 
characteristics of state-led peacebuilding that keeps the substantial authority of the central 
government to safeguard the post-conflict vulnerability. The intervention from central 
government is possible due to the existing institution of the state.  
 
4.3.1.4 The Second Provincial and District/Municipality Legislative Election 
(2014)  
In 2014, only three local political parties along with national parties competed in legislative 
elections. Partai Nasional Aceh, a local political party, established by Irwandi, the former 
governor of Aceh from 2006-2012 passed the verification process to join the election. Partai 
Damai Aceh also passed verification after changing the name from Partai Daulat Aceh due to 
its inability to reach the parliamentary threshold. Partai Aceh was automatically eligible to join 
the election given to a sufficient number of seats from the 2009 election 
 
Table 4-7 The Local Political Parties in 2014 Election 
 
No Political Party  Description Symbol  
1 Partai Aceh   This party represents the 
former Free Aceh 
Movement, founded by 
the rebels’ exiled leaders 
and some senior ex-
combatants. 
 
2 Partai Nasional 
Aceh  
The new local political 
party established in 2012 
by Irwandi, Governor of 
Aceh (2006-2012). This 
party is seen as Partai 
Aceh’s rival with the 
same constituent that 






3 Partai Damai Aceh  One of the local political 
parties competed in the 
2009 election but had to 
change their name due to 
failure to meet the 
electoral threshold. The 
stakeholder and mission 
are still the same: dayah 
(Islamic boarding 
school), leaders-
disciples, and the 
implementation of sharia 
in Aceh. 
 
Source: Hillman (2012), Hamzah (2009), PNA website 
 
Contrary to the initial analysis that predicted this election to be a battle between two 
prominent local political parties of former GAM elites, the competition occurred between local 
and national parties as shown in Table 4.8. Partai Aceh still dominated the DPRA with 29 
seats.  
 
Table 4-8 The Result of 2014 Aceh Legislative Election 
No Political Party  Number of Seats in DPRA 
1 Partai Aceh  29 
2 Golkar  9 
3 Nasdem  8 
4 PD 8 
5 PAN  7 
6 PPP 6 
7 PKS  4 
8 Gerindra  3 
9 PNA  3 
10  Partai Damai Aceh  1 
11 PKB 1 
12 PBB 1 
13 PKPI  1 





The number of seats gained by Partai Aceh dropped from 33 out of 69 total seats to 29 out of 
81 total seats in DPRA, a drop from 47.8 per cent to 36 per cent.  This result is quite surprising 
given its dominant electoral machinery and allegations of fraud in the counting process (IPAC, 
2014). Prior to the election, Syaifullah, a former GAM member from Cinta Raja Village, Aceh 
Tamiang, one of the GAM stronghold areas, predicted that Partai Aceh would lose at least 40 
per cent of votes because “most of the party cadres in legislative and executive branch has 
forgotten their supporters” (Gunawan, 2014). Syaifullah also adds that Cinta Raja Village is 
now open to elect any contenders and the people currently tend to elect non-party figures 
(Gunawan, 2014). His opinion is affirmed by one of my respondents who said that after the 
2009 election, voters in Aceh started to shift their consideration from party affiliation to 
individual qualities of the candidate, particularly “the morality aspect”, followed by the 
monetary rewards promised by the candidate (Personal Interview, LPP PNA 12-B, August 
2018). 
 
To expand on one of my respondent’s opinions about the shift of voter preference from 
political parties to individual figures “who promised money”, it is important to note patronage 
and money politics in Aceh elections. Darwin (2016a) observe a significant change of Partai 
Aceh campaign methods in Bireun. While they still emphasised Acehnese ideology, they 
started to employ patronage and money politics extensively. Partai Aceh’s decline in seats 
could also be explained by the presence of PNA, a local political party with similar constituents 
that reduced Partai Aceh’s vote in their strongholds such as Bireun and North Aceh.  Another 
factor mentioned by Aryos Nivada (Serambinews, 7 May 2014) was the “incorrect political 
coalition” with a national party, Partai Gerindra. For most Acehnese, the leader of Partai 
Gerindra, Prabowo Subianto is still closely associated with military power with the memory of 

















On the other hand, PNA ,which was initially perceived as a strong competitor for Partai Aceh, 
unexpectedly performed very poorly, only winning three out of 81 seats in DPRA. IPAC (2014) 
argued that PNA failed to offer innovative development agendas, contrary to its image as a 
GAM reformist party and chose to glorify JKA/Jaminan Kesehatan Aceh (Aceh Health 
Insurance), Irwandi’s past successful populist program. PNA also did not use its limited 
budget for effective campaigning and disbursed it to minor expenses such as party uniforms 
(IPAC 2014).   
 
The 2014 election was the first legislative election that brought two GAM-based local political 
parties into democratic contestation. There were several new features of this election: 
significant electoral related violence as elaborated further in the section on electoral violence, 
a smaller number of local political parties, and the stronger grip of national parties in Aceh 
local elections. How do we interpret these features? The first possible explanation is that GAM 
has monopolised the idea of local political parties as self-government in Aceh. Even though 
there was PNA as a challenger of Partai Aceh in this election, the competition remains between 
the former combatants who showed limited participation in elections. Competition between 
former rebel groups in the democratic realm is still marred with violence that could indicate 




is an indication of growing legitimacy of the incumbent/central government by the number of 
votes gained by several national parties in the 2014 Aceh legislative election as well as the 
continuation of the coalition between Partai Aceh with Partai Gerindra.  
 
4.3.1.5 The Third Gubernatorial Election 2017 
The 2017 gubernatorial election was the first local election after peace in Aceh had lasted for 
more than ten years, a condition that could be considered to meet the timeframe of durable 
peace. This election also showed that Aceh had entered the normalisation phase after the 
transition period from conflict to peace as shown by a coalition between local and national 
parties as well as a decreasing level of electoral violence, as will be elaborated in subsequent 
sections.  
 
The independent candidacy requirement was made stricter in the 2017 election as a result of 
the amendment in National Election Commission Regulation Number 9/2015 regarding the 
Nomination of Head of Local Government. While in 2006 and 2012 election verifications 
could be done collectively in sub-districts or village offices, in the 2017 election every supporter 
had to be validated personally by signature, stamp, and thumbprint. The 2017 election seemed 
to be a competition between candidates from the independent stream and political parties, 
both local and national as shown in table 4.9. There were three candidates supported by 
coalitions of national and local parties and all-national parties, while three others ran as 
independent candidates. This election was also a race between the incumbent governor, 



















Table 4-9 The Third Gubernatorial Election 2017 
No Name of Candidate  Political Party  Background  




Gerindra, PAN, PPP 
(Djan Faridz camp) 
11PKS, PBB 
Muzakir Manaf was the vice 
governor of Aceh (2012-2017) and 
former GAM Commander. 
 Tengku Ahmad Khalid 
(Vice Governor)   
 TA Khalid is the former head of 
DPRK (district level legislative) 
Lhokseumawe (2004-2009) and 
the head of Partai Gerindra in 
Aceh. 
2 Zakaria Saman 
(Governor) 
  
Independent  Zakaria Saman is the former GAM 
Minister of Defense and a 
member of Tuha Peut (council of 
consensual decision making) in 
Partai Aceh. 
 Teuku Alaidinsyah 
(Vice Governor) 
 Teuku Alaidinsyah is a lecturer in 
the Faculty of Engineering, Syiah 
Kuala University and the Head of 
Aceh Red Cross. 





Zaini Abdullah is the former 
governor of Aceh 2012-2017. 




Nasarudin, born in Gayo, Central 
Aceh was Central Aceh Head of 
Regency for two terms, 2007-2012 
and 2012-2017. He is a member of 
Partai Golkar.  
4 Irwandi Yusuf 
(Governor) 
PNA, PD, PDI-P, 
PKB, Partai Damai 
Aceh.  
Irwandi Yusuf is the former 
governor of Aceh 2006-2012 and 
ex GAM propagandist. 
 
                                                        
11 In 2015, the United Development Party (PPP), a party that attracted many voters during the conflict 
era in Aceh, was split into two camps. Muhammad Romahurmuzy and Djan Faridz both claimed to be 
legitimate leader of the party. The central government de facto supported Romahurmuzy chairmanship. 





 Nova Iriansyah  
(Vice Governor) 
 Iriansyah is the former chairman 
of the Democrat Party in Aceh and 
served as Member of the National 
Parliament (DPR RI) from 2009-
2014. He also had extensive 
experience in construction 
companies and associations. 
 




Abdullah Puteh is the former 
Governor of Aceh 2000-2004. In 
2005, Puteh was sentenced to ten 
years in prison due to 
overcharging the state for a 
helicopter purchase,  causing state 
financial loss of IDR 6.654 billion 
(USD 445 million). 
 
 Sayed Mustafa Usab 
(Vice Governor) 
 Sayed Mustafa Usab is a former 
National Legislative Member from 




6 Tarmizi Abdul Karim 
(Governor)  
Golkar, Nasdem, PPP Tarmizi Abdul Karim is an 
experienced bureaucrat. He was 
governor ad-interim of Aceh 
(February-June 2012, during the 
heightened conflict of the 
gubernatorial election in Aceh), 
governor ad interim of South 
Kalimantan and East Kalimantan 









 Teuku Maschalmina 
Ali 
(Vice Governor)  
 Teuku Maschalmina Ali is the 
former governor’s office secretary 
in South Aceh and the head of the 
Regional Office of Manpower and 
People Mobility Department.   
Source: Serambinews (2016), Harian Aceh (2016) 
 
The Aceh 2017 election repeated the inter-GAM candidate race of 2012. After being defeated 
by Zaini Abdullah and Muzakkir Manaf in the 2012 election, Irwandi was no longer running 
as an independent candidate. He and his running mate Nova Iriansyah were nominated by a 
coalition of two local parties (Partai Nasional Aceh and Partai Daulat Aceh) and three well 
established national parties (Partai Demokrat, PDI-P and PKB). His team’s strongest rival, 
Muzakkir Manaf and Tengku Ahmad Khalid were also nominated by a coalition of local and 
national parties: Partai Aceh, Partai Gerindra, PKS and PAN. Meanwhile, Partai Golkar and 
Nasdem took their position by supporting Tarmizi Abdul Karim, an Acehnese who is also a 
senior bureaucrat at the national level. 
Soon after the election, Irwandi-Nova Iriansyah and Muzakkir-Tengku Ahmad Khalid both 
claimed victory based on their internal count. However, the final result was announced by KIP 
Aceh with the victory of Irwandi-Nova with 37.22 per cent followed by Muzakkir-Tengku 
Ahmad Khalid in second place with 31.74 per cent. Both candidates finally accepted the official 
result without any further protest or violent acts. The complete results of the 2017 election are 












Table 4-10 The Result of 2017 Gubernatorial Election 
No Name of Candidates Total Vote /Percentage  
1 Irwandi Yusuf 
Nova Iriansyah 
898,710 (37.22%) 
2 Muzakkir Manaf  
Tengku Ahmad Khalid  
766, 42 (31.74 %) 
3 Tarmizi Abdul Karim 
Teuku Maschalmina Ali 
406,865 (16.85%) 
4 Zaini Abdullah  
Nasarudin 
167,910 (6.95%) 
5 Zakaria Saman  
Teuku Alaidinsyah 
13, 981 (5.51%) 
6  Abdullah Puteh 
Sayed Mustafa Usab 
41, 908 (1.74%) 
 Voter Turnout    72.78% 
Source: Detiknews (2017) 
 
Post-conflict local elections in Aceh provide us with the dynamics of the incorporations of 
combatant and broader Acehnese society into democratic contestation as well as participation 
and legitimacy post-conflict. The provision of a local political party and independent 
candidacy has been well utilised by Acehnese as shown by the robust electoral participation. 
Candidates from GAM emphasised Aceh ideology in their campaign, as well as their claim as 
the sole legitimate benefactors of peace and the utilisation of KPA as political machinery. GAM 
has been dominant in three elections in 2006, 2009 and 2012, the time frame that could be 
categorised as a transitional phase.   
 
The trend gradually changed during the 2014 and 2017 elections when coalition-building with 
national parties become stronger and essential for winning elections. This marks the 
normalisation phase when close relations with national political parties are no longer seen as 
a negative political option or a betrayal.  The partnership with national political parties is seen 
as crucial to protect GAM’s political power as well as to secure Aceh’s interest in the national 
decision-making process. This occurs because Aceh’s interest in national legislation is the 
authority of the National Parliament, and to become a member of the National Parliament, the 
local political party must be nominated by the national party. The 2014 and 2017 elections also 




Aceh and Partai Nasional Aceh. While igniting violence, in the beginning, this division creates 
competition and prevents one-party domination, something crucial for local democracy in 
Aceh.  
 
Traditional literature on liberal democracy put elections as a crucial factor in creating a 
politically legitimate government. Elections are considered therefore to be important post-
conflict arrangements for creating political legitimacy in a highly contested environment 
among former adversaries. In state-led peacebuilding in Aceh, elections are the competition 
of legitimacy between the central government that is represented by national political parties 
or candidates nominated by national parties and the local political parties and local 
candidates. In the case of Aceh, legitimacy was gained by local candidates in gubernatorial 
elections by victory in three consecutive elections in 2006, 2012 and 2017, while in legislative 
elections, the victory of a local political party (Partai Aceh) in two elections in 2009 and 2014 
indicate that a local political party gained support from most Acehnese. However, the 
increasing vote gained by national political parties in the 2014 legislative election and the 
coalition made by local political parties with national political parties in the 2017 gubernatorial 
election could be the indication of regaining legitimacy of the central government. The 
declining number of votes for Partai Aceh in the 2014 election indicated diminishing 
legitimacy of local political parties due to their failure to achieve output legitimacy by poor 
performance in governance. 
 
Another important factor in a local election is the development of a local political party system 
in Aceh. From the beginning of peacetime until the normalisation phase, Partai Aceh remains 
the strongest local political party in Aceh. Other local parties that compete in a legislative 
election often failed to reach the parliamentary threshold. Most of the other local political 
parties dissolved or changed their names to be able to join the next election, such as Partai 
Daulat Aceh, a party that represents religious groups. There is a low level of local party 
sustainability to challenge Partai Aceh domination. The establishment of a new GAM-based 
party, Partai Nasional Aceh (PNA), was a promising start. Even though the early performance 
of PNA was disappointing, its presence contributes to the more progressive development of 
the party system in Aceh. Further analysis of Partai Nasional Aceh can be found in the 
subsequent section on local political parties. The low presence and sustainability of local 
parties also contributes to the frequent independent candidacy.  Due to the limited number of 
GAM-based parties and reluctance to be nominated by the national party, GAM-affiliated 
candidates prefer to run as independent candidates.  While opening wider access to political 
participation, the high number of independent candidates is an indication of the slow 




4.4 Voter Turnout 
Voter turnout is one of the most widely used indicators of political participation (IDEA, 2012). 
According to the Ministry of Social Development Report of New Zealand (2010), “voter 
turnout is an indicator of the confidence the population has in political institutions, the 
importance they attach to them, and the extent to which they feel their participation can make 
a difference”.  Aceh shows an interesting pattern of voter turnout as an indicator of their 
political participation. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows a comparison of voter turnout in the legislative election between national 
level and Aceh during the conflict era. According to IDEA (2002), during the New Order Era, 
analysing voter turnout rate in Indonesia is difficult, partly because the data could be deceiving 
due to mobilisation attempts by the government or military officers.  
In the 1997 Legislative Elections, voter turnout in Aceh was higher than the national average. 
Since Aceh was still a conflict area with a strong military presence, the high turnout rate could 
be a result of mobilisation. The rate plummeted drastically in 1999, in the first legislative 
election after the overthrow of Suharto. While the nationwide figure also showed a significant 
slump, a low rate of voter turnout in Aceh could be an indication of their political protest to 
the central government towards the political repression, economic inequality and military 
operation during the conflict. According to one respondent, in the 1999 election, a high 
absentee rate in Aceh was a symbol of “political strike against the central government” 
(Personal Interview, LPP PA 4-B, August 2018). 
 
In 2004, during the second legislative election after Suharto, the real number of voters was 
hard to gauge because the election occurred during the martial law period. Aceh first 
experienced martial law from May 2003 to May 2004 following the failure of the 










Figure 4-2 Comparison of Voter Turnout between National and Aceh in 
Legislative Elections in the Conflict Era 
 
 
Data summarised from IDEA (2002) and General Election Commission 
 
Figure 4.3 shows voter turnout during the presidential elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014. The 
2004 presidential election occurred before the peace settlement, and Aceh was still under civil 
emergency status (May 2004 to May 2005). Thus, the high turnout could be the result of 
mobilisation. In the 2009 presidential election, voter turnout recorded a very high rate at 87 
per cent while the national average only reached 71.7 per cent.  This result could be interpreted 
as a post-conflict positive attitude among Acehnese towards national politics. However, this 
trend changed in the 2014 presidential election as the voter turnout decreased to 63 per cent. 
The possible explanation of this significant slump is unfavourability of the two contenders: 
Prabowo Subianto and Joko Widodo. 
On one hand, Prabowo is the former general and commander of Kopassus (Indonesia Special 
Army Forces) representation of military power. On the other hand, Joko Widodo represents 
the PDI-P, the unpopular “secular national” party that is detached from Acehnese. This 
confusion is voiced by my respondent:  
“Prabowo is a bad person, he is from the military, but Jokowi is also not a good 
one, he is from the PDI-P” (Interview with PA-5-B, August 2018). 
This unfavourable view of candidates who associated with two groups that are perceived as 
hostile to Aceh led to non-voting behaviour higher than the national average. Nur Djuli (as 






















violators like Prabowo Subianto govern the country”. However, his acclamation did not 
represent most Acehnese as they opted to abstain. 
 
Figure 4-3 The Comparison of Presidential Election Voter Turnout between 
National and Aceh 
 
Source: KPU and BPS 
 
Figure 4.4 shows another appealing development in electoral politics in Aceh. In two 
legislative elections in the post-conflict era, the rate of voter turnout in Aceh was higher than 
the national average. In the 2014 elections, voter turnout reached 77.58 per cent, bigger than 
the provincial percentage required by National General Election Commission at 75 per cent. 
The higher rate of voter turnout in Aceh than at the national level might indicate the 
enthusiasm towards the establishment of a local political party that enabled Acehnese to have 
more options in electoral democracy. This result could also be signalling the effective political 

























Figure 4-4 Comparison of Legislative Election Voter Turnout between National 
and Aceh in the Post-conflict Era 
 
Source: KPU and KIP Aceh  
 
One respondent explains the overall good turnout rate in Aceh elections as a result of the high 
level of political awareness among Acehnese.  
 
“Acehnese are fond of politics; they have good political awareness. During the 
conflict era, one of the manifestations of political awareness was the efforts of 
Acehnese students to help internally displaced persons. In the aftermath of 
conflict, we have local political parties, and those who ran for office are our 
friends, we know them. Moreover, for us who are critical of political parties, we 
have independent candidates. So, this is the time for us to open a new hope for 
Aceh” (Personal Interview, LPP PA 4-B, August 2018). 
 
One respondent describes the political participation in Aceh, particularly during the 2006 
gubernatorial and 2009 General Elections, as based on “Acehnese logic” and resistance spirit 
(Interview with LPP PNA 12-B, August 2018).  They saw governor candidates from GAM and 
local political parties rooted in GAM as symbolic of Aceh resistance that encouraged them to 
vote (Interview with LPP PNA 12-B, August 2018).   
 
Unlike the increasing trend in legislative elections, figure 4.5 shows a pattern of declining voter 
turnout rate in gubernatorial elections, starting from a high rate (85 per cent) in the first 






















During the first two elections after the conflict in 2006 and 2009, people were enthusiastic 
about voting due to their hope that former combatants would transform Aceh. Their 
expectations were slowly diminished by the poor performance of the elites (Personal 
Interview, WA 13-B, August 2018).  One respondent from a women’s organisation described 
the declining vote of Partai Aceh and lower voter turnout in 2012, 2014 and 2017 elections as 
“the exhaustion of Acehnese over local political process” (Personal Interview, WA 13-B, August 
2018). Nevertheless, the growing number of non-voters especially during the presidential 
election mirrors a national trend. In gubernatorial elections, if we compare the overall turnout, 
Aceh is relatively better or on par with West Java or DKI Jakarta elections.  In three West Java 
gubernatorial elections in 2008, 2013, and 2018, the voter turnout was recorded at 67 per cent, 
63 per cent, and 73 per cent respectively. In DKI Jakarta, three gubernatorial elections in 
2007, the first round of 2012 and the second round of 2017 were scored at 65.4 per cent, 65 
per cent, 68 per cent and 77.1 per cent. The last gubernatorial elections in West Java and DKI 
Jakarta were heavily surrounded by identity politics which explained the higher turnout 
compared to previous years. 
 
In addition to becoming one of the indicators of political participation, voter turnout was also 
a manifestation of political legitimacy (Grönlund and Setälä, 2004). During the 1999 election, 
the first legislative election in the Reformation era, the significant decline in voter turnout in 
Aceh could imply the illegitimacy of central government as the organiser of elections as well 
as the illegitimacy of national political parties competing in the election. In the aftermath of 



















voter turnout in the 2009 presidential election, which surpassed the national average. This 
rate declined again during the 2014 presidential election where both candidates were seen as 
unfavourable figures among Acehnese. In the gubernatorial election, the legitimacy of the local 
election and candidates was highest during the first gubernatorial election in 2006 as shown 
by a high voter turnout. The rate gradually declined in the ensuing elections in 2012 and 2017 
when Acehnese were dissatisfied with the output/performance legitimacy of the election 
winner. Parliamentary elections, interestingly, have shown persistently increased rates of 
voter turnout in Aceh that surpassed the national average. The constant increasing trend of 
voter turnout in the legislative elections in Aceh is an appealing feature in Aceh’s local 
democracy, and it warrants further investigation. Does the persistent increasing rate of voter 
turnout in legislative elections indicate the better legitimacy of political parties over the 
individual candidates in gubernatorial elections? Alternatively, is another factor such as 
money politics responsible for this trend?  
 
4.5 Access to Participation and Representativeness 
The distinct characteristic of local elections in Aceh post-conflict is the eligibility of 
independent candidates to run for office. This regulation is initially intended to give time 
allowance to a candidate from GAM before they established local political parties and use the 
party ticket to compete. Later, independent candidacy is a means of broader participation in 
elections. The requirement to run as an independent candidate is slightly easier than the 
requirement to use the party ticket. Independent candidates are only required to collect 
support from a minimum of three per cent of the Aceh population that is validated by ID cards. 
This regulation was amended in 2015 by the National Election Commission by applying 
stricter requirements such as validation of the support by signature, stamp, and thumbprint. 
Independent candidacy is seen as a more accessible option to compete in the election 
compared to competing through the party ticket that often leads to coalition building, 
patronage and transactional politics. One example of transactional politics in using the party 
ticket occurred in the 2006 Aceh gubernatorial election when Azwar Abubakar, the incumbent 
governor from Partai Amanat National, was expected to pay IDR 5 billion (USD 333,000) to 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) to enable M Nasir Djamal to be nominated as Abubakar’s 
running mate (Prasetyo et al., 2009). 
 
The opportunity to use an independent stream to compete in the local election has been well 
utilised in Aceh. From three gubernatorial elections, seven out of 19 candidates ran as 
independent candidates, even though only Irwandi and Muhammad Nazar won the race 
successfully. At the district level, only one independent candidate, Tengku Nurdin-Tengku 




after the eligibility of independent candidates was enacted nationally in 2008.  According to 
an SSI survey, only 35 per cent of candidates in the 2015 local elections were independent, and 
only 14 per cent of them won the election.12 
 
On the one hand, a growing interest in independent candidacy is seen as the depoliticisation 
of political parties. On the other hand, it is perceived positively as broadening participation in 
electoral politics. It is especially true in developing countries undergoing democratic transition 
like in Indonesia, where competing in elections means patronage and transactional politics. 
The candidates must be able to provide a certain amount of money to political parties as the 
informal requirement of nomination (Buehler and Tan, 2007). Thus, the independent 
candidate is perceived as a relatively “clean” figure, not compromised by political interests. In 
Aceh’s case, where national political parties are still cautiously perceived as “outside power 
that has hidden the intention to ruin Aceh political autonomy” (Personal Interview, LPP PNA 
12B, August 2018) independent candidacy is a better choice than making coalitions with 
national parties.  
 
According to Clark and Palmer (2008), there were four prominent groups of Acehnese 
dominating candidacy in the 2006 election. The first is made of technocrats: bureaucrats, 
including incumbents, legislators, military officers and party leaders. This group was 
nominated by national parties rather than running as independent candidates. The second 
group was GAM affiliated candidates, running mostly as independent candidates. The third 
group was made up of the representatives of civil society groups, most notably from SIRA, that 
ran by using party tickets or through independent streams. The last group was made up of 
businesspeople or wealthy contractors. These four groups were well represented in three 
gubernatorial elections in Aceh. Ulama or religious leaders did not appear to compete in 
elections, except in the 2012 gubernatorial election, when Tengku H. Ahmad Tajuddin ran as 
an independent candidate. Tajuddin or Abi Lampisang is the head of the Education Islamic 
boarding school Al-Muhajirin. However, he is also a khadi (judge) in GAM, a fact that made 
his remains attached to the image of the former liberation movement. However, the repeated 
nomination of particular candidates such as Irwandi Yusuf, Muhammad Nazar, Zaini 
Abdullah, and Muzakkir Manaf, all from GAM, indicate the domination of specific figures in 
Aceh’s post-conflict local politics. Whereas there have been a reasonably large number of 
candidates who compete in the local elections, the real competition in the gubernatorial 
election has been a constant race between former GAM elites. 
 
                                                        





4.6 Women’s Political Participation 
Women have long played an important leadership role in Acehnese history. For example, as 
early as the sixteenth century, Sultan Al Mukammil (1585-1604) appointed Laksamana 
Keumalahayati as the first female admiral (Afrianty, 2015, cited from Reid, 1988). During 
colonisation, at least four Acehnese women took a leadership role in the fight against the 
Dutch: Tjut Nyak Dhien, Cut Mutia, Teuku Fakinah and Pocut Baren (Siapno, 2002). 
However, this prominence of women leaders in the public sphere changed during the Suharto 
era. The role of women in Aceh, which also occurred nationally, reduced due to the “ibuism” 
concept applied by the New Order government that tended to place women’s activities in 
domestic affairs. Insurgencies exacerbated the declining role of women in Aceh, primarily due 
to security constraints. GAM had a women’s wing, called Inong Balee, but their role was 
limited to logistical, medical and intelligence support (Marhaban, 2012b). Few females could 
be commander, one of them being Cut Meutia, the leader of Inong Balee who was captured in 
a raid and died in Keudah Jail during the 2004 tsunami (Marhaban, 2012b). 
 
During the conflict period, women in Aceh struggled to participate politically by organising 
Duek Pakat Inong or All Acehnese Women Congress in 2000 (Nor and Inayatillah, 2011). 
About 400 women in Aceh of all political ideologies and affiliations gathered in Banda Aceh 
to draft a resolution of their aspirations for peace and justice. Congress produced 22 
resolutions covering politics, access to the economy, social change, the achievement of peace, 
and Islamic-Customary Law that were accepted by acclamation (Bianpoen, 2000). Duek 
Pakak Inong in 2000 acknowledged this obstacle and proposed the following resolutions: 1) 
Acknowledgment of Islamic Law as the governing legal basis 2) Islam should be interpreted 
as being fair to men and women 3) The establishment of Kanun Ureung Inong Aceh, a 
Women’s: Legal Forum focusing on genuine Islamic interpretation of women in public life 4) 
Equal Rights in Adat (Customary) Institution (Bianpoen, 2000).   
 
After the 2005 Helsinki Accord brought peace in Aceh, several women's rights activists, 
members of Inong Balee and female victims of the conflict formed the Aceh Women's League 
“to accommodate the political aspirations of women in the area” (Women’s UN Report 
Network, 2006). Although motivated by political purposes, the league did not aim to become 
a local political party (Women’s UN Report Network,2006). At the national level, LoGA 
encouraged women’s participation in Aceh by stipulating the mandatory affirmative action 
quota of 30 per cent nomination of women candidates by a political party, a national policy 
adopted by the Indonesian government to support gender mainstreaming in electoral 
democracy and political participation. In the aftermath of Suharto’s administration, women’s 




of the total political party nominees (Satriyo, 2011).  Since the number of women candidates 
in parliament is determined by voters, this quota can at least encourage political parties to 
prepare and promote their women cadres. This quota was adopted in National Law No. 
31/2002 on Political Party and National Law No. 12/2003 for the 2004 General Election 
(Satriyo, 2011). Also, two Qanuns endeavoured to strengthen women’s participation at the 
local level: Qanun Number 3/2008 on Local Political Party and Qanun Number 6/2009 about 
The Empowerment and Protection of Women. Qanun Number 3/2008 is a derivative 
regulation of national affirmative action at provincial level regarding the nomination of 30 per 
cent women candidates by local political parties. Qanun Number 6/2009 sets out a broader 
aspect of women’s life such as the right to access health facilities, education institutions and 
economic resources. This qanun also assures an equal opportunity for women in employment 
or obtaining a position in government or non-government institutions.  
 
During the transition phase of peacebuilding, GAM, the leading local political actor in the post-
conflict era, grew as a male-dominated political power. Their patriarchal chain of command 
during the liberation movement has been maintained after the peace. There were only a few 
women commanders, and few women were recruited in combat squads. The patriarchal 
structure was sustained in peacetime by the lack of representation of female members in Partai 
Aceh’s organisational structure or nominated by the party in the election. This will be 
elaborated on in the following sections. 
  
4.6.1 Women’s Political Participation in the 2006 Local Election  
During the first local election in peacetime, women participated as candidates in gubernatorial 
elections, as well as in district/mayoral elections. Two female candidates ran as governor 
candidates, but both failed to pass the Qur’an recitation test. At district/city level, there were 
two female candidates for Banda Aceh mayor, two female candidates for West Aceh head of 
the district, and one female candidate in Aceh Tamiang’s head of district election (Gender 
Working Group, 2006). While none of these female candidates won the election, the 
participation of female candidates in the first local election in Aceh marked the enthusiasm 
among women in Aceh in accessing broader political opportunity in the post-conflict era. 
 
4.6.2 Women’s Political Participation in the 2009 Legislative Election  
As the only province which is granted a right to establish a local political party, Aceh has its 
own women’s rights political party: PARA (Partai Aliansi Rakyat Aceh, or the Aceh’s People 
Alliance Party). Chaired by a woman activist, Syarifah Rahmatillah, PARA was the only 




outcomes of a Grand Aceh-wide Women’s Seminar which proposed the formation of a political 
party that would serve as a political vehicle for women’s aspirations (Hamzah, 2009). With a 
composition of 70 per cent women and 30 per cent men, this party claimed to be inclusive, not 
a women-only and single-issue party (Hamzah, 2009). However, the party failed to pass the 
verification process before the 2009 election because it did not have a sufficient number of 
district committee representations (Hamzah, 2009). After the verification failure, many PARA 
members joined other parties as legislative candidates (Affiat, 2011).  
 
The urgency and awareness of local political parties to support their female cadres was not 
seen in Aceh during the 2009 legislative election. Only two out of six local parties, PAAS 
(Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera/ Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party) and PBA (Partai Bersama 
Aceh/ The Aceh United Party) met the 30 per cent quota for women legislative candidates 
(Tempo, 2009), with the main reason being that they were supported by politicians from 
national parties. PAAS was established by former members of PPP (United Development 
Party/ Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), while PBA was founded by politicians of the former 
National Mandate Party (PAN) (Hamzah, 2009). These two local parties relied on the 
networks from their former national parties to include a sufficient number of female cadres to 
be nominated as candidates.   
 
The failure to nominate 30 per cent of women candidates did not lead to sanctions of Partai 
Aceh and other local political parties in the 2009 election. According to one respondent, this 
was possible because “Aceh is considered an exceptional area in the electoral system due to 
their extended autonomy in the post-conflict era and because central government tended to 
apply legal discretion to particular electoral violations (including the lack of women 
candidates) to support the immature peace” (LR 5, confidential interview, January 2013).  
 
In 2009, the first legislative election in the post-conflict era, only four women candidates won 
DPRA seats from a total of 69 seats; three MPs were from Partai Golkar and the other  from 
PAN. Partai Aceh’s landslide victory in the 2009 legislative election did not lead to the benefit 
of women cadres as there was not a single seat in provincial level parliament held by woman 
candidates from Partai Aceh. Only in 2013, one female candidate from Partai Aceh, Mariati, 
replaced Tengku Ali Murtala as an interim legislative member (Serambi Indonesia, 6 July 
2013). At the district level (DPRK), only 45 female candidates obtained parliamentary seats 
from a total of 645 seats, of which nine seats were won by women candidates from Partai Aceh. 
 
The 2009 legislative election was the first test case of the ability and willingness of local 




disappointing. It could be understood in terms of a lack of readiness of local political parties 
to groom female candidates in a relatively short time from their establishment around 2007. 
However, the result of the low representativeness of women in Aceh’s politics must be seen in 
broader Aceh culture and the legacy of post-conflict that placed women in domestic affairs and 
marginal positions. Cultural constraints coupled with the legacy of longstanding conflict has 
meant political parties in Aceh need more time to support and prepare their female cadres into 
the electoral competition. 
 
4.6.3 Women’s Political Participation in the 2012 Head of District/ City Election  
During the second local election in peacetime, there was no female candidate in the 
gubernatorial elections. However, the number of female candidates competing in the head of 
district/mayor elections increased from five to nine, two of them replacing husbands who 
failed the verification process (Nivada, 2017). Three female candidates ran as head of 
district/mayor in North Aceh, Langsa and Bener Meriah, East Aceh and Aceh Singkil (KIP 
Aceh, 2006) Six candidates ran for the deputy head of district/mayor (KIP Aceh, 2006). Only 
one candidate, Illiza Sa’adudin Jamal, was elected successfully as Vice Mayor of Banda Aceh. 
The result of the 2012 local elections illustrated a mixed result between the number of female 
candidates and the elected ones. The number of female candidates was higher than the 2006 
election, but only one candidate got elected. This indicates the high level of participation but 
low electability. Culture, religion and gender stereotypes could be the causes of this low 
electability. Women will not necessarily vote for women candidates since their decisions in 
elections are strongly influenced by their male family members or husbands (Balai Syura 
Ureung Inong Aceh & International Republican Institute, 2017, as cited in Nivada, 2017). The 
political calculation might also explain this low electability if the women candidates compete 
in non-stronghold areas where their parties could have a slim or no chance of winning. 
4.6.4 Women’s Political Participation in the 2014 Legislative Election  
The 2014 election showed a better result with 12 seats in DPRA won by female candidates. 
Four seats went to women candidates from local parties: three from Partai Aceh and one from 
Partai Nasional Aceh. National parties secured eight seats, four seats were won by women 
candidates from Partai Golkar, two seats were won by candidates from Partai Amanat 
Nasional, one seat was won by Partai Nasdem, and another one secured by Partai Gerindra. 
In the district/city parliament, 56 out of 650 seats were secured by women candidates, and 
only five of them were won by candidates from Partai Aceh. The second legislative election in 
the post-conflict era demonstrated an improvement of women’s participation in Aceh’s local 
politics by more seats gained by a female candidate. The new GAM-based political party, Partai 




indication of positive developments in the higher number local political parties in supporting 
women’s political participation.  
 
4.6.5 Women’s Political Participation in the 2017 District/City Head Election  
During the 2017 election, the number of female candidates declined from nine to five. Three 
women participated in the mayoral election in Banda Aceh: Lhokseumawe and Langsa 
(Nivada, 2017). Two female candidates ran for deputy regent in Simeuleu and West Aceh 
(Nivada, 2017). Only one candidate, Afriadawati won the election as deputy regent in Simeuleu 
(Nivada, 2017). The religious card was played to influence voters in the Banda Aceh mayoral 
election. Illiza Sa’aduddin Djamal, an incumbent mayor, complained that in a few weeks 
before the election, there was a massive campaign using Quranic verses forbidding women’s 
leadership to prevent people in Banda Aceh from voting for her, causing her stunning losses. 
Whereas other factors such as disillusionment of people in Banda Aceh with Illiza’s policies 
and poor performance in managing public utilities also contributed to the incumbent’s defeat, 
prominent Aceh researchers such as Aryos Nivada and Saiful Bahri confirmed that religious 
issue has been significant in determining voter choice in Banda Aceh (Pikiran Merdeka, 13 
February 2017). Furthermore, Saiful Bahri (Pikiran Merdeka, 13 February 2017) mentions that 
local politics in Aceh are not entirely “local” as it is highly influenced by identity politics and 
the rise of religious conservatism. The 2017 election demonstrates a stagnant trajectory of 
women’s political participation in the executive branch that differs from the level of women’s 
participation in parliament that shows an increasing trend. Given the case of Illiza Djamal in 
the Banda Aceh mayoral election, the religious constraint is the possible answer. Qur’an verses 
that forbid female leadership become a powerful instrument to discourage pious Acehnese 
from voting for woman candidates. A different result occurs in the legislative election, as 
women who are elected as members of parliament are not considered “leaders” but more as a 
representation of people, a factor that made women electability higher in the legislative 
election than in the mayoral/regent election.  
 
Despite supported by affirmative action regulations, women are still underrepresented in Aceh 






Figure 4-6 Comparison of the Number of Aceh Women MP in District/City 
(DPRK) Parliament and Number of Women MPs from Partai Aceh 
 
Source: Serambinews (2014)  
 
Figure 4-7 Comparison of Total Number of Candidates and Women Candidates 
in Regent/Mayoral Elections 
 
Source:  KIP Aceh (2006), Aceh Cyber (2009) & Nivada (2017) 
 
Based on her research conducted in two municipalities, Bireun and West Aceh, Affiat (2011) 
found that the 30 per cent quota for women has pushed political parties to put more women 
forward as candidates, leading consequently to lower quality in selection and low political 
commitment. This is also confirmed by one respondent who stressed the importance of the 
political party nurturing women candidates to compete in legislative or executive elections, 
equipping them with basic political skills and ethics (PA1, personal interview, 8 October 2012) 
and also the self-awareness and willingness of the women to get involved actively in politics 






























One respondent from a local political party related the low representativeness with the factor 
of low electability: 
 
We have difficulties in nominating 30 per cent of a female candidate, but we tried 
hard to do it and promote our best women candidate who is intellectually capable. 
They did not get elected, partly because the women voters did not vote for them. 
They do not have chemistry with the women candidates and prefer to vote for 
men candidates. They said they [the women voters] feel more comfortable to talk 
to the man about their problem (Personal Interview, LPP PA- 10 B, August 2018). 
 
The reason for the reluctance of the political party to nominate female candidates could be a 
mix of gender stereotypes and political calculation. It happened to Sri Mulyani, who ran for 
head of her home district, Bener Meriah in 2012. Her perseverance to run for the Bupati 
election was not fully supported by her party, PRA (Partai Rakyat Aceh, Aceh People Party). 
The reasons for the party’s reluctance was mixed between gender (as accentuated by the 
statement from one of the party’s officials “she has three little kids”) and political calculation 
as the party had not been yet consolidated to support her after the loss in the 2009 election 
and the other candidate, Tagore, was a strong incumbent (Affiat, 2011: 20). 
  
The next biggest challenge is tradition. Despite its history of having heroines and female 
leaders, gender stereotyping is hampering women in Aceh to get involved in politics because 
their primary duty is seen as taking care of family and not being active in the public domain. 
The difficulties of political parties in Aceh to nominate 30 per cent women candidates due to 
religious and customary restriction is emphasised by one respondent: 
 
I think affirmative action cannot be equally implemented nation-wide. It must 
consider the characteristics of each province or area, such as local wisdom. Maybe it 
works in another province because women have already involved in politics, but in 
Aceh, it is difficult for women, especially when they got married; their husbands could 
forbid them to enter politics. It [affirmative action] became a burden to political 
parties, especially local political parties (Personal Interview, GO-3B, August 2018). 
 
The problem of woman representativeness due to family constraints was also raised by 





It [low representativeness] has always been like this. The women candidates used 
to be activists, but once they got married, they were gone, disappearing from the 
public (Personal Interview, LPP-PNA-12B, August 2018). 
 
Aside from challenges from external factors (reluctance of political parties to nominate female 
candidates) and internal factors (religious and cultural constraints), resources are asserted by 
Marhaban (2012 a) as another significant obstacle to women’s political participation in Aceh. 
According to Marhaban (2012a), the election is a competition in which most male candidates 
have the advantage due to their social connections, economic resources and social status. In 
the post-conflict era, men dominate access to networks and capital from the reconstruction 
fund, primarily through the KPA-based system; all KPA chairpersons at district level are men. 
It limits the competitiveness of women (especially in GAM stronghold areas) in electoral 
politics, as running for office in Indonesia must be supported by strong financial resources 
and solid networks as affirmed by one respondent: 
The Acehnese women are willing to join the politics, but the current situation of 
politics in Aceh is politics of “cakar-cakaran” (predatory politics) which rely 
heavily on power and money. The women in Aceh are deterred by that situation, 
because we do not have access to power and money (Personal Interview, PA 1, 
personal interview, 21 September 2012). 
 
There is also a “blaming game” about the lack of representation of women in politics between 
woman activists in NGOs and political party members. One respondent criticised “many 
women activists who claim superior knowledge [but] always refused to join politics. They 
always blame any problems to political parties, but when they are asked to be nominated, they 
declined; they do not want to walk the talk” (Personal Interview with LPP PA 4-B, August 
2018). On the other hand, NGO activists responding to the nomination of women candidates 
by political parties skeptically say, “Who are they? Who is she? We never knew their [the 
women candidates’] activities or achievements before, and they suddenly became candidates” 
(Personal Interview, WA 2-B, August 2018). 
 
The flat trajectory of women’s political participation in Aceh reveals limited participation in 
the transition phase of peacebuilding. Since the beginning of the peacebuilding process and 
the formulation of the MoU Helsinki, specific provisions regarding women had already been 
excluded in the peace agreement. Whereas LoGA supports women’s political participation in 
accordance with national level affirmative action for legislative members, women in Aceh 




political calculation of local political parties of their electability in elections, religious and 
customary constraints and limited access to resources.  
 
The low participation and electability of female candidates in politics must also be seen in a 
national context. In DPR (National Parliament), the number of seats won by female candidates 
decreased from 103 seats in the 2009 election to 87 seats in the 2014 election, or from 18.4 to 
17.3 per cent, respectively (The Indonesian Institute, 2017). For Pilkada (gubernatorial and 
mayoral/regent elections), the trend is also declining nationwide. In the 2015 election, there 
were 121 female candidates in the election, of whom 47 candidates won (38.8 per cent). The 
number decreased in the 2017 election:  only 45 female candidates ran for office, and 15 (30 
per cent) were elected (Qomariyah, Kamil & Sundari, 2016). Nevertheless, this 
underrepresentation opens a possibility of cooperation with the national parties that are 
relatively readier in preparing and supporting their woman candidates. Coalition-building 
between local and national parties will be seen as a more acceptable political option during the 
normalisation phase and also beneficial in national legislative elections as well as in 
regent/mayoral and gubernatorial elections to encourage the nomination of female 
candidates.  
 
4.7 Electoral Violence  
Electoral-related violence is the major challenge of post-conflict peacebuilding. Democratic 
contestation is an intricate transition process for former combatants who are accustomed to 
reaching victory through intimidation, terror and violence. Electoral disputes which led to the 
new outbreak of violence could potentially harm the newly gained peace. Aceh, with its long 
legacy of conflict and violence, has been undergoing a transitional phase of electoral violence 
as depicted in figure 4.8. 
Figure 4-8 The Number of Electoral-Related Violence 
 



































Figure 4-9 The Types of Electoral-Related Violence in Aceh during the 2014 
Legislative Election 
 
Source: Kontras (2014) 
 
 
Figure 4-10 Condition of the Victim of Political Violence in Aceh during January-
April 2014 (in percentage) 
 
Source: Kontras (2014) 
 
The first post-conflict election in 2006 was a promising start for peaceful elections in Aceh. 
The number of electoral-related violent incidents formed only 28 or 11 per cent of all electoral 
disputes (Clark and Palmer 2006). This figure placed Aceh in a better position than Maluku, 
another conflict-ridden province that scored 20 per cent of electoral violence (Clark and 
Palmer, 2006). However, this trend changed in the ensuing elections. The 2009 legislative 
election recorded an increase in several violent incidents. The violence was dominated by the 
killing of Partai Aceh members or sympathisers. According to Tornquist (2009), as many as 
14 casualties were from Partai Aceh. While the officials emphasised business rivalry as the 
trigger of the killing, there was a strong accusation of military involvement. The situation 
gradually improved after President Yudhoyono guaranteed that there would not be more 
violence in Aceh (Fahmi, 2016). His affirmation was followed by coalition-building with Partai 








Aceh in the 2009 election. A clear statement from Yudhoyono and his party, Partai Demokrat, 
to support Partai Aceh is the assurance of power gained by Partai Aceh at the local and national 
level. It is made possible due to the position of Partai Demokrat as one of the most influential 
national parties and a party of the incumbent president. The assurance of support and power 
from the leading party at the national level to the most powerful party in Aceh led to the 
reduction of violence. It indicates the patronage between national and local politics in the post-
conflict era to maintain peace.  
 
In the next gubernatorial election in 2012, the number of electoral-related cases of violence 
rose drastically to 167.  Escalated tension between the supporters of candidates from GAM, 
Muzakkir Manaf (Partai Aceh), and Irwandi Yusuf (Independent Candidate) intensified the 
electoral violence. There were casualties from both camps, but the most striking incident was 
the murder of Javanese workers from plantation companies and the construction industry to 
telecommunication services in various places in Aceh such as North Aceh, Lhokseumawe, 
Bireun and Aceh Besar (ICG, 2012).  Repeating the 2009 election, police announced that the 
murder was provoked by business rivalry and inter-ethnic economic jealousy (ICG,2012) 
However, according to Bantasyam (cited by Fahmi, 2016), the series of killings was a message 
to Jakarta of Aceh’s possible return to pre-peace violence unless central government took some 
decisions that favoured Partai Aceh in the 2012 election. After Jakarta decided to postpone the 
local elections to give a chance of the participation of Partai Aceh, the violence steadily 
diminished. There was also the factor of disappointment from Partai Aceh to Yudhoyono’s 
party, Partai Demokrat, which chose to support Nova Iriansyah candidacy rather than 
continuing the alliance with Partai Aceh and Muzakkir Manaf.  
 
The 2014 legislative election was another battlefield of inter GAM competition. Partai Aceh 
was not the only GAM-based local political party but would be challenged by Partai Nasional 
Aceh established by Irwandi Yusuf.  Unsurprisingly, the number of incidents was recorded at 
57 cases, a high number despite an overall trend of decline from the 2012 elections. The 
election was blemished by physical intimidation as well as verbal intimidation, as 
demonstrated by Muzakkir Manaf, chairperson of Partai Aceh who was mocking PNA as Partai 
Nasrani (Christian) Aceh (Fahmi, 2016). In a Muslim-dominated province like Aceh, being 
associated with Christianity or other religions is considered to be defamation. 80 per cent of 
incidents overall occurred in GAM stronghold districts that were heavily impacted by the 
conflict: Pidie, Aceh Utara, Bireun, Aceh Timur, Aceh Jaya, and Lhokseumawe (Burhanudin, 
2016). Amnesty International, Indonesian Human Rights Organisation, KontraS, and the 
Indonesia National Human Rights Commission emphasised their concern over the high level 




investigating and announcing the incidents. Amnesty International (2014) and KontraS 
(2014) had also specified the inter-GAM (Partai Aceh and Partai Nasional Aceh) rivalry as a 
significant trigger of the electoral violence. Another concern of the 2014 election was the 
mounting intimidation towards the female candidates, especially from Partai Nasional Aceh, 
in order to discourage them from running for the election. This would in turn disqualify PNA 
from fulfilling their obligation to nominate 30 per cent female candidates (Fahmi, 2016). This 
gender-specific intimidation led to the organisation of the Acehnese women’s long march in 
March 2014, in which five CSOs participated: ACSTF, The Aceh Institute, Forum LSM Aceh, 
LBH Banda Aceh, Mata and Solidaritas Perempuan Aceh (Zamzami, 2014a), demanding the 
political parties and government stop the violence.  
 
The 2017 gubernatorial election put Aceh in second place in the Indonesia Election 
Vulnerability Index after West Papua (BBC Indonesia, 9 February 2017). According to the 
Perludem record, there were 26 cases before and during the campaign period (Wijaya, 2016). 
Due to additional GAM inter-rivalry, this election might have led to violence like previous 
elections. Despite its high rank in the Election Vulnerability Index, the 2017 election in Aceh 
showed decreased electoral-related violence and zero casualties. The electoral dispute over the 
number of votes between Muzakkir and Irwandi camps could be peacefully resolved without 
resorting to violence. According to Aryos Nivada (Serambinews, 23 June 2018), the peaceful 
2017 local election was supported by the sound performance of police in securing the election. 
Police also cooperated with customary leaders to resolve and mediate election violence by 
employing local wisdom or traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Rusman, 2018).  
Another factor is the political maturity among Aceh politicians and communities. After several 
elections in the post-conflict era, the elites and communities of Aceh have managed to resolve 
disagreements and conflicts peacefully, without resorting to violence. In other words, peaceful 
electoral competition in Aceh is supported by the presence of institution and participation.  
 
There are several factors in analysing electoral violence in Aceh. The first one is the embedded 
culture of violence as a legacy of conflict compounded by illegal weapons possession by former 
combatants because of the unfinished disarmament process. These factors contributed 
significantly to the outbreak of electoral violence in Aceh. The second factor is the role of a 
capable and legitimate institution in managing a peaceful election. In the 2006 election, there 
was a strong presence of Indonesian military and police supported by AMM to oversee the 
election. There was also the establishment of COSA (Commission of Security Arrangement), 
as the joint institution for information sharing, trust-building and problem-solving (Clark and 
Palmer, 2008). In the ensuing elections, the presence and response from police in dealing with 




gubernatorial election. Electoral administrations such as KIP and Panwaslih are considered to 
be sluggish and biased.  
 
The last factor is the correlation between electoral violence in Aceh and the response from the 
central government. Several groups in Aceh dealt with the electoral problem by resorting to 
violent “messages” to the central government to threaten the future of peace in Aceh. In other 
words, they were still not capable of translating their grievance into non-violent 
communication and negotiation. The constant election violence could also be used to 
delegitimise elections as people are scared to cast their vote as a result of possible intimidation 
and violence. If  people are frightened to cast their vote, the turnout rate could be significantly 
decreased. If the turnover rate is still high amid the rampant violence, it might also be a sign 
of intimidation. Low turnout and intimidation are strong markers to consider an election 
illegitimate. Jakarta was very careful in managing cases in Aceh, preferring compromise to 
confrontation. This was particularly true during the Yudhoyono administration that was 
heavily supported by Partai Aceh, with a president careful to maintain his image as peace-
maker in Aceh.  
 
Nevertheless, the current development shows an improved trend of de-escalation of electoral 
violence as shown by the 2017 gubernatorial election. This election was another showcase of 
political battles between GAM candidates that could easily lead to violent contestation. 
However, the level of violence was significantly reduced, and the contenders complied with 
the decision endorsed by the election administrator. One respondent argued that the process 
of political maturity contributes to the decreasing level of electoral violence in Aceh among 
Acehnese during several elections in peacetime (Interview, LPP-PNA 11B, August 2018), a 
factor that is commonly found in the normalisation phase. Interestingly, this de-escalation of 
violence occurred at the same time as local political parties in Aceh built a stronger coalition 
with national parties. It could indicate that coalition building between national and local 
parties created a division of power that led to violent conflict reduction. The possible 
explanation is both Partai Aceh and Partai National Aceh have secured support from two 
influential parties at the national level:  PDI-P is the party of the incumbent president while 
Partai Gerindra is the leading opposition party. During the 2017 election Partai Aceh and 
Partai Nasional Aceh obtain an equally strong backing at national level. This equal national 
support was not present during the 2012 election, as Partai Demokrat backed Muzakkir Manaf 
from Partai Aceh and Irwandi as an independent candidate did not get support from the 
national party. The presence of two powerful national political forces in local contestation will 
lead to two possibilities: the elevation or reduction of violence and in the case of Aceh, it 





4.8 Electoral Institutions  
An independent and impartial electoral authority that functions transparently and 
professionally is recognised internationally as an effective means of ensuring that citizens can 
participate in a genuinely democratic election (Carter Center, 2009). The importance of a 
professional and independent electoral administration is amplified in the post-conflict area 
due to the vulnerability of post-conflict electoral competition. Electoral violence or disputes 
that are poorly managed often lead to inter-group clashes and threats to the newly gained 
peace. In a post-conflict setting, the neutrality and credibility of the election commission is 
essential to bring confidence to the electoral method as a part of the peacebuilding process. 
(Reilly, 2016). Clark and Palmer (2008) classified the electoral administration in Aceh into 
four institutions as shown in figure 4 .11:  
 
Figure 4-11 Aceh Electoral Institutions 
 
Source: Clark and Palmer (2006) 
 
Local elections in Aceh are administered by Komite Independen Pemilu (KIP) or the 
Independent Election Commission. KIP at provincial level and KIP Kota/Kabupaten at 
municipal/district level are part of already established national institutions for general 
elections (Komisi Pemilihan Umum/ KPU). At the sub-district (Kecamatan) level, election 
commissions present as Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan (PPK), and at village (Gampong) level 
as Panitia Pemilihan Gampong (PPG). Finally, the polling and counting committees (KPPS) 
were the electoral management bodies on the level of polling stations (Tempat Pemungutan 
Suara /TPS) (EU, 2006). KIP Aceh consists of seven members, as opposed to five members in 
other provinces in Indonesia (Carter Center, 2009). One distinct task performed by KIP Aceh 















Aceh is the first province in Indonesia that allowed independent candidates to compete in a 
local election.   
 
Another institution to administer a local election in Aceh is Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Aceh 
(Panwaslih) or the Election Supervisory Body. Panwaslih is the authority tasked with settling 
elections disputes, as well as supervising and monitoring governor elections. Its committees 
at district level perform a similar function for elections for regent and mayor. It is an ad hoc 
institution appointed by the national General Election Supervisory Committee PANWASLU 
(Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Umum) for the duration of the entire electoral process and 
established as a semi-independent structure (Carter Center, 2009). 
 
According to representation from KIP Aceh, the biggest challenge for election administration 
in Aceh is the changeable regulation at national and provincial level and the candidates lack 
of knowledge of election regulation (Personal Interview, GO-3B, August 2018). However, the 
conflicting parties finally accepted the final decision by Panwaslih after the KIP urged them 
persuasively to peacefully settle the dispute in Panwaslih and not resort to violence (Personal 
Interview, GO-3B, August 2018). 
 
“We asked the conflicting parties in the election to settle the dispute through 
Panwaslih (Election Supervisory Committee) and not resolve it the field 
(resorting to violence). If they do not want to follow the rule, they will be 
disqualified. Some parties have been obedient, and the conflict could be mediated 
peacefully. In some cases, we call Dandim (military) or police, and the case 
proceeds to Panwaslih court. Moreover, whatever decision made by the court, 
the parties must comply (Personal Interview, GO-3B, August 2018). 
 
Money politics is another problem in Aceh election. The election commission acknowledged 
the difficulties in resolving this issue: 
 
“We have money politics case in Aceh, such as in Bireun. In Aceh, money politics 
is relatively higher than in another province. However, we were hampered by 
regulation in dealing with money politics because we can only investigate money 
politics case that occurred 60 days before the elections. While most of money 
politics is done in D-day, dawn attack, in the morning just before the voting polls 
are opened. However, some Acehnese is opportunist; they will take money from 
all parties. Whom they will vote for, that is another story” (Personal Interview, 





The police have the primary task of overseeing security during the campaign period and on 
election day, and to investigate electoral violations related to criminal acts, rather than 
procedural or administration breaches. The result of the investigation must be passed to the 
state prosecutor’s office. Article 74 of LoGA regulates that the parties dissatisfied with an 
election result could file a case to Mahkamah Agung / Supreme Court. Only the Supreme Court 
can annul election results. In 2012, the conflict of the gubernatorial election in Aceh was 
resolved by the intervention of Mahkamah Konstitusi/ Constitutional Court that postponed 
the election and reopened the registration of candidates.  
Well-established electoral institutions are the marker of state-led peacebuilding, particularly 
in strong states with a stable government. These institutions support the legitimacy of the 
election process by organising free and fair elections and managing electoral disputes. In the 
case of Aceh, the existence of electoral institutions has helped the legitimacy of local elections, 
and because the elections are perceived as legitimate, the winner could gain legitimacy from 
most of the constituents. During the first local election in 2006 and the subsequent elections, 
KIP Aceh gained a high level of public confidence in conducting elections in a transparent 
manner and demonstrating neutrality from government influence (EU 2006, Carter Center 
2009).  
 
However, there were some allegations around the political partiality of KPI in the district, 
municipality to the smallest unit KPPS (Carter Center, 2009). The most frequent allegations 
of partiality were instructions from KPPS officers to voters to vote for particular candidates 
(mainly from local political parties). KPPS officers were forced to instruct voters due to 
intimidation from political parties (Zamzami, 2014b). Despite criticism toward the partiality 
and sluggishness of electoral institutions in Aceh, candidates still complied with the final 
decision made by the KIP Aceh. This compliance and respect that was shown to electoral 
institutions in Aceh to some extent also demonstrated the legitimacy of the central 
government, as Aceh’s electoral institutions are part of the electoral institution at the national 
level. While KIP and Panwaslih are relatively respected and appreciated in executing their 
tasks and responsibility to administer the local election, the performance of police in dealing 
with electoral violence is often criticised. Due to the context of Aceh as a post-conflict area, the 
police are expected to be more proactive in controlling violence before and during local 
elections, not only by prosecuting the executor of violence in the field, but also to reveal the 
“intellectual actors” behind the political violence in Aceh (The Aceh Institute, 2014). However, 
the police performance in securing local elections in Aceh was improved in the 2017 





4.9 Electoral Landscape between Local and National Political Parties  
Cooperation between local and national political parties in Aceh is essential because the 
candidates for the National Parliament (DPR RI) from Aceh must be nominated by the 
national party. This coalition was started in the 2009 legislative election as the election after 
the establishment of Partai Aceh, the first local political party in Aceh.  
While gubernatorial elections demonstrated persistent and ultimate support for a candidate 
from a GAM background, the result of the presidential and legislative elections have provided 
a captivating electoral landscape which represents dynamics between national and local 
electoral competition and cooperation as well as the distribution of votes in ethnically 
distinct/diverse districts. Local political parties in Aceh only gain authority at the provincial 
level, an arrangement that demands them to build cooperation with national parties for the 
presidential election and legislative election for National Parliament members from Aceh. The 
result of nationwide elections, including presidential elections in Aceh, is the illustration of 
the political choice, or on the contrary, undecidedness of Acehnese towards national political 
contestation.  
4.9.1 The 2004 Presidential Election  
The first direct presidential election in Indonesia was participated in by five pairs of 
candidates: 1) Wiranto and Solahudin Wahid (Partai Golkar), 2) Amien Rais and Siswono 
Yudohusodo (PAN and PKS),  3) Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar (PPP),  4) Megawati and 
Hasyim Muzadi (PDI-P),  and  5) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla (Partai Demokrat, 
PKPI, PBB). In the 2004 election, the majority of Acehnese voted for Amin Rais and Siswono 
Yudohusodo, as shown in figure 4.12. This was partially supported by Amin Rais’ figure as the 
head of Muhammadiyah, a large and influential Muslim organisation in Indonesia, including 
in Aceh. The member of PAN, the party that nominated this pair, is mostly dominated by 
Muhammadiyah members. Rais’s idea of transforming Indonesia into a federal state after the 
Suharto era also attracted Acehnese. The next possible factor behind Rais’ and Yudohusodo’s 
victory in the first round of the election was that two other contenders, Wiranto and Agum 
Gumelar, were representatives from the military, a group that was perceived as a human rights 
violator in Aceh. This was shown in the very low vote gained by Hamzah Haz as the 
representative from PPP, a political party that attracted Acehnese voters during Suharto’s era. 
His nomination with running mate General Agum Gumelar could provide a reasonable 
explanation of his defeat.  Megawati was also unpopular due to her and her party’s (PDI-P) 





Figure 4-12 Comparison of The Result of the First Round of 2004 Presidential 
Elections in Aceh and Nationally (In Percentages) 
 
Source: BPS  
 
Rais and Yudohusodo only gained 14.66 per cent of votes, disqualifying them from competing 
in the second round of the election. Predictably, during the second round, Acehnese voted for 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla, a more favourable candidate compared to 
Megawati Soekarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi. Yudhoyono and Kalla secured 86 per cent of 
the vote in Aceh, a higher figure than 60.62 per cent of the national average.  In addition to 
Yudhoyono’s role in supporting the Helsinki negotiations, Partai Demokrat, Yudhoyono’s 
party was seen as a new political party that detached from the New Order legacy. This result 
was eventually the beginning of the further mutual political cooperation between Yudhoyono 
and Acehnese.  
Figure 4-13 Comparison of The Result of the Second Round of 2004 Presidential 
Elections in Aceh and Nationally (In Percentages) 
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4.9.2 The 2009 Legislative Election 
In the first nation-wide election after the conflict that had participation from local political 
parties, Partai Aceh’s dominance was unchallenged in GAM strongholds. Partai Aceh swept to 
victory in the north coast (North Aceh and Lhokseumawe), west coast (Meulaboh), and the 
east coast (Pidie, Bireun). These areas are the most densely populated, the most ethnically 
homogenous and the basis of GAM struggle.  The electoral map in Aceh shows the mixture of 
the domination of Partai Aceh, the plurality of national parties and the sharing of the vote 
between Partai Aceh and national parties. 
In Aceh Besar and southeast Aceh, PA led slightly ahead of President Yudhoyono's Partai 
Demokrat (PD). In the capital city of Banda Aceh and Sabang Island, PD gained more votes 
than Partai Aceh in both sets of local elections (Barter, 2009). While Golkar was victorious in 
Bener Meriah and Central Aceh, PD also performed well in the highland districts. PD won all 
three elections in the southwest corner of the province and other ethnically-heterogenous 
areas in Aceh (Barter, 2009). The densely populated and ethnically homogenous districts in 
north, west and east coast supported PA, the southwest, central, and south of the province 
support national parties All ethnically diverse districts were either divided or supported 
Indonesian parties, and the capital-urban area slightly supported a new national party that 
was not associated with Suharto’s new order.   
In 2009 legislative election Partai Aceh built a coalition with Partai Demokrat which won 7 














Table 4-11 The Result of National Legislative Election in Aceh 2009 
No Name  Political Party  
1 H. Teuku Riefki Harsa Partai Demokrat  
2 Ir. Nova Iriansyah,MT  Partai Demokrat  
3 HM Ali Yacob  Partai Demokrat  
4 Mirwan Amir  Partai Demokrat  
5 Ir.H.Muhammad Azhari  Partai Demokrat  
6 Teuku Irwan  Partai Demokrat  
7 Muslim  Partai Demokrat  
8 H.Muhammad Nasir Djamil Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) 
9 H. Raihan Iskandar,LC Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
10 H. Sayed Fuad Zakaria  Partai Golkar  
11 Drs H.Marzuki Daud  Partai Golkar  
12 Ir H Azwar Abubakar  Partai Amanat Nasional 
13 Tgk.H.Mohd Faisal Amin  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
Source: KPU 
This result is an illustration of the strong influence of two parties at national and local level: 
Partai Demokrat and Partai Aceh. The coalition of Partai Demokrat, a party of the incumbent 
president with Partai Aceh, the most influential local political party in Aceh, led to an 
impressive number of seats in the National Parliament. The result of the 2009 legislative 
elections in Aceh demonstrated the cooperation of two powerful institutions that gained the 
majority of votes at the national and provincial level. The coalition of Partai Aceh with Partai 
Demokrat as the winner of the 2009 national legislative election could be expected to lay a 
stronger foundation of Aceh’s interest in national level.  
4.9.3 The 2009 Presidential Election 
The 2009 Presidential Election was a continuation of a strong coalition between Partai Aceh 
and Partai Demokrat. In this first presidential election in the peace era, Yudhoyono gained an 
overwhelming victory in Aceh with 93.25 per cent of the vote, much higher than the national 
average of 60.8 per cent. It could be interpreted as appreciation to Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla 





Figure 4-14 The Comparison of 2009 Presidential Election Results 
 
Source: KPU   
 
 
4.9.4 The 2014 Legislative Election 
The distribution of votes in the 2009 legislative election was repeated partially in the 2014 
election. This election also required a coalition between local and national parties for the 
nomination of a National Parliament. Partai Aceh retained its support in the north and east 
coast (Pidie and Lhokseumawe) but experienced significant losses in its traditional 
strongholds in the east and north coast (Bireun and North Aceh). Their vote was seemingly 
transferred to Partai Nasional Aceh due to their similar constituents. Partai Golkar maintained 
its strong influence in Central Aceh while Partai Demokrat lost its grip in the highland district. 
Partai Golkar shared the vote with other national parties such as Partai Nasdem, Partai 
Demokrat, PPP and PAN in the ethnically heterogeneous district in the southwest. 
 
There was an interesting result in Bener Meriah as Partai Aceh performed better and was in 
the same position as Golkar.  In the 2014 legislative election, Bener Meriah and Central Aceh 
as ethnically distinct (Gayo) districts were reconstituted into a single electoral district (Aceh 
4), while in the 2009 election, they merged with Bireun (Sulaiman, 2016). This decision 
reinforced the ethnopolitical sentiment in this area as Bireun was seen as an Acehnese 
dominated district as well as being represented by GAM. Based on his research in Bener 
Meriah, Sulaiman (2016) found that the candidates actively mobilised ethnic sentiment for 
electoral interest in addition to patronage politics through vote buying, a donation to 
community associations and places of worship and promises of pork barrel for a particular 























garnered three seats, as did Partai Golkar, Partai Gerindra and Partai Hanura. If the 
ethnopolitical sentiment campaign was successful, Partai Aceh that was associated with GAM 
and Aceh ethnic groups would not have gained a similar number of seats as the national party 
counterparts. In other words, the mobilisation of ethnic sentiment was not entirely successful 
in defeating Partai Aceh in an ethnically distinct district like Bener Meriah.  
 
Table 4.12 reveals the significant change in the proportion of National Parliament members 
from Aceh. While Partai Demokrat dominated the seats in the 2009 election as a result of a 
coalition with Partai Aceh, the 2014 election showed a more balanced allocation of seats 
among national parties in Aceh. Partai Nasdem, Partai Demokrat, Partai Gerindra and Partai 
Golkar each secured two seats while Partai Amanat Nasional, PDI-P, PKS, PPP and PKB 
shared one seat. As Partai Aceh’s new coalition partner, Gerindra could only gain two seats. 
Gerindra was not able to repeat Partai Demokrat’s domination in 2009 when building a 
coalition with Partai Aceh in the national legislative election. 
Table 4-12 The Result of 2014 National Legislative Election in Aceh 
No  Name  Political Party  
1 Prof.Dr.Bachtiar Aly, MA  Partai Nasdem  
2 Zulfan Linden  Partai Nasdem  
3 Muslim  Partai Demokrat  
4 H. Teuku Riefki Harsya Partai Demokrat  
5 Tgk Khaidir Abdurrahman  Partai Gerindra  
6 Fadhlullah  Partai Gerindra  
7 H. Firmandez  Partai Golkar  
8 H.M Salim Fakhry  Partai Golkar  
9 H. Muslim Ayub  Partai Amanat Nasional  
10 Tagore Abubakar  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan  
11 H. Anwar Idris  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan  
12 H.Irmawan  Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
13 H.Muhammad Nasir Djamil  Partai Keadilan Sejahtera  





The result of the 2014 election reveals an appealing fact about the distribution of national 
power in Aceh. Partai Demokrat, Yudhoyono’s party, experienced a significant decline in the 
aftermath of the 2009 legislative and presidential election. In the 2014 election, Partai 
Demokrat’s domination was replaced by the PDI-P at the national level. The PDI-P is the 
unfavourable choice for Acehnese. Thus, Partai Aceh under Muzakkir Manaf leadership opted 
to continue its coalition in the 2012 gubernatorial election with Partai Gerindra. However, the 
image of the Partai Gerindra chairperson, Prabowo Subianto as the former Indonesia Special 
Forces commander prevented an ultimate victory, as had happened with the coalition between 
Partai Aceh and Partai Demokrat in the 2009 election. Partai Nasdem, a party of the Acehnese 
media tycoon, became an alternative to already established national parties such as Partai 
Golkar and PAN. This led to the distribution of votes among national parties without any single 
dominant power. This result might impact the reduction of the attainment of Aceh’s interest 
in national legislation as PDI-P dominates the National Parliament.  In 2014, the presidential 
election with two less favourable candidates for Acehnese was won by Prabowo Subianto and 
Hatta Rajasa, a result different from the national average which was a victory of Joko Widodo 
and Jusuf Kalla. 
 
 
Figure 4-15 Comparison of 2014 Presidential Election Results 
 
Source: KPU  
The support from Muzakkir Manaf of Partai Aceh to the Prabowo camp could explain the 
victory of Prabowo-Hatta. Muzakkir Manaf openly declared his support to the Prabowo camp 
by becoming his campaign team before the election. This coalition was started in the 2012 
gubernatorial election in which Gerindra, Prabowo’s party supported Zaini Abdullah and 
Muzakkir Manaf’s nomination. However, in the 2014 election Partai Aceh was no longer solid 



















completion of the remaining MoU Helsinki goals by the national government (Serambinews, 
5 Juni 2014).  He emphasised the important role of Jusuf Kalla, Joko Widodo’s running mate 
as a key figure to deal with Aceh affairs at the national level without mentioning the role of 
Joko Widodo. However, the presence of Jusuf Kalla as an important figure of the peace process 
in Aceh could not help the pair win.  Muzakkir Manaf had again proved the discipline and 
effectiveness of KPA to mobilise voters. Most regents and mayors from Partai Aceh were also 
instructed to vote forrabowo-Hatta and led to their triumph in Aceh. 
This coalition pattern reoccurred in the Aceh 2017 gubernatorial election. A group of national 
parties behind the Prabowo camp; Partai Gerindra, PKS and PAN nominated Muzakkir-
Tengku Ahmad Khalid along with Partai Aceh. Meanwhile, Irwandi-Nova Iriansyah was 
nominated by a coalition of national parties of Jokowi supporters in the National Parliament: 
PDI-P, PKB and Partai Demokrat. The support of national parties behind Irwandi and 
Muzakkir reflects polarisation in national politics between parties that support President Joko 
Widodo and the opposition parties. It is one of the features of the normalisation process in 
Aceh that integrates Aceh local politics into Jakarta’s politics. 
The emergence of Partai Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem) is an appealing feature in the 
normalisation phase. Partai Nasdem was established by Surya Paloh, an Acehnese media 
tycoon in 2011. This party successfully garnered nine seats in DPRA and came close in the race 
with older political parties such as Partai Demokrat, Golkar and PPP in several districts, an 
impressive achievement for a new political party that has no direct connection with the former 
president or incumbent. Partai Nasdem is seen as a progressive party as 60 per cent of its 
constituents in Aceh were young people. 13 However, it also attracts a significant number of 
people in Aceh who were dissatisfied with Partai Aceh but reluctant to support PNA, which 
was seen as a similar party under GAM but with limited funds and power (IPAC 2014). The 
figure of Surya Paloh as Acehnese has added the advantage of a local element of Partai Nasdem 
in Aceh. In Aceh, the party smartly launched a slogan of “Time for Aceh to Lead Indonesia”, to 
appeal to local identity and embrace a unitary state at the same time (IPAC 2014). In the 2017 
election, Partai Nasdem, together with Partai Golkar, chose to nominate Tarmizi Karim 
instead of supporting candidates from a local political party. While on one hand it prevented 
them from making political gains from the gubernatorial election, it was also a move to keep a 
distance with direct competition with local political parties and maintain its political-electoral 
niche as a national party with strong Acehnese-ness.  
This electoral landscape between local and national political parties has brought both 
cooperation and competition. Cooperation is most likely to happen during presidential 





elections since the local political parties in Aceh must endorse their support for a candidate 
from national parties. The other possible cooperation between local and national political 
parties can also occur in building coalitions for candidacy in local elections. In areas where the 
presence of GAM is strong, the non-PA local political parties can build a coalition to compete 
with PA to create a balance of power. These dynamics to some extent illustrate the legitimacy 
that was regained by central government through national parties. In several areas, such as in 
central districts, GAM-based political parties never gained political legitimacy through the 
elections. This was because GAM gained hardly any identity-based legitimacy as a group that 
represents ethnic minorities in Aceh.  
What could the process of local elections in post-conflict Aceh tell us about state-led 
peacebuilding in Indonesia?  The first conclusion is that local elections contribute positively 
to political participation and legitimacy among Acehnese, as shown by high voter turnout in 
the legislative and gubernatorial elections. After decades of voter mobilisation and scepticism 
towards national general elections, the politically conscious Acehnese found an avenue to 
channel their political aspirations through local elections. It is important to note that the 
enthusiasm was prompted by the participation of candidates that are perceived to struggle for 
Aceh interest, especially from ex-combatants. Broader participation made possible by the 
provision for independent candidates to run in the election. Apart from paving the way for 
candidates who are not willing to be nominated by a national party, this provision opened 
opportunities for more candidates to compete without being involved in patronage and 
transactional politics of political parties that normally occurs in Indonesia’s elections. Election 
and voter turnout are also good indicators of the dynamics of legitimacy gained by GAM or 
central government, in which the dissatisfaction over input or output/performance legitimacy 
could be indicated by the defeat of the candidate, declining votes or a lower rate of voter 
turnout.  
 
The second conclusion, institution-building and legitimacy, is prevalent in the presence of the 
Aceh Independent Election Commission and Election Supervisory Body as election 
administrator and supervisor, complemented by the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court 
to deal with electoral disputes. Aceh took advantage of the state-led peacebuilding in which 
the organisation of elections has been well established by the national government and gained 
legitimacy from the people in Aceh.    
 
The organisation of local elections during 2006-2017 with the supporting institutions marked 
the transition phase of peacebuilding in Aceh which was indicated by the participation of new 
groups (ex-combatant and non-combatant) in electoral politics, voluntary participation in the 




post-conflict areas. However, signs of the normalisation phase are prevalent, such as a 
decreasing pattern of voter turnout that replicated a nationwide trend, less electoral violence 
in current elections and a stronger coalition between local and national political parties. The 
coalition between local and national parties is essential to represent Aceh interest in national 
legislation. A similar coalition is also crucial during the gubernatorial election because the 
national party behind the nomination of the candidate of the governor will be expected to 
support the policy of the elected governor at the national level.  
 
4.10 Local Political Party  
4.10.1 The Establishment of Partai Aceh (Aceh Party)  
Another primary step to enhance political participation in post-conflict Aceh is facilitating the 
major actor of the insurgency, GAM, to enter democratic politics. Thus, the establishment of 
Partai Aceh (PA) is a critical milestone in consolidating peace by building political institutions. 
In the aftermath of the peace agreement, GAM created two bodies in preparation for the 
transformation process from a rebel movement to political entity: the Majelis Nasional 
(National Council) and the Komite Peralihan Aceh (Aceh Transitional Committee/KPA) (ICG, 
2006). 
 
Practically, Majelis Nasional as the highest authority is designed for the GAM elites and is 
tasked with determining GAM political strategy, and KPA is created to manage the transitional 
process of the foot soldiers (ICG, 2006).  The establishment of Majelis Nasional is aimed at 
uniting GAM under one structural command after being dispersed in several countries such 
as Sweden, Malaysia and southern Thailand and led by Teungku Muhammad Usman Lampoh, 
one of the ministers in Hasan Tiro’s cabinet (ICG, 2007). While Majelis Nasional is the 
coordinating body for GAM elites, the former combatants are mostly absorbed by KPA, the 
transformation of  TNA (Tentara Nasional Aceh/ Aceh National Army, GAM’s military wing. 
While it has a high resemblance to its predecessor, KPA is intended as an unarmed civil 
organisation, and operates openly throughout the province (ICG, 2006) KPA retains its 
military structure, with a strong hierarchical chain of command down to the provincial level 





Figure 4-16 KPA Hierarchical Structure 
 
 (source: Aspinall, 2009 b). 
 
MoU Helsinki stipulated that local elections should be followed by the establishment of local 
political parties. This arrangement is different from the common sequence of political 
development in post-conflict peacebuilding elsewhere that is usually based on the 
transformation of rebel movements into political parties, followed by their participation in 
elections. The reason behind it was to give quick political legitimation of new local 
governments in Aceh in the post-conflict era because of the peace process and also to 
synchronise with the nationwide direct local elections. Indonesia held its first direct local 
elections in 2005 based on Law Number 32/2004 about Local Government. Before 2005, the 
heads of local government (governor and vice governor, the mayor and vice mayor) were 
elected by the local parliament. Owing to the complexities of transforming rebel movement 
into a political party, an independent candidate was allowed to participate in the first direct 
local election in Aceh. This was is intended to allow the former rebels to run for office without 
building a coalition with the national party. This timeframe aimed to give sufficient time for 
Acehnese people, both GAM or non-GAM members, to prepare and consolidate their material 
and human resources to establish a local political party.  
 
The first local election in Aceh was won by a GAM-affiliated candidate who competed through 
the independent stream and defeated the other candidates from GAM that joined the election 
Senior Commander
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Territorial Commader 
(District Level)  
Regional Commander  
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under the banner of a national political party. The first attempt from GAM to establish a local 
political party resulted from this political loss. After being defeated by Irwandi’s group in the 
2006 election, Malik Mahmud, a member of the GAM elite, tried to make a political 
manoeuvre by establishing the GAM Party in July 2007 (ICG, 2008). The central government 
objected to the name, although GAM defended it by saying that GAM stood for Gerakan Aceh 
Mandiri (Autonomous Aceh Movement) and not Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh 
Movement). However, after lengthy internal and public disputes, in April 2008 GAM removed 
the star and crescent from its party logo and changed the name of the party from GAM Party 
to Partai Aceh (Aceh Party/PA) (Serambi Indonesia, April 2008). The use of GAM symbols by 
a political party was criticised by the Irwandi camp as undermining the essence of struggle 
since the political party is the smaller unit of GAM (Nurhasim, 2012).   
Irwandi Yusuf joined the Party lukewarmly as his group had aspired to establish their political 
party, namely Partai Independen Aceh (Independent Aceh Party) (ICG, 2008). This plan was 
cancelled, and Irwandi decided to join Malik’s party to avoid the widening gap between groups 
of GAM which could be harmful to the newly gained peace, but he refused to be in the party 
organisational structure (ICG, 2008). Partai Aceh leadership is dominated by Malik Mahmud 
loyalists, but at the local level, it is controlled by KPA members close to Irwandi, as they are 
more likely follow the lead of their former commanders and not the party elite (Stange and 
Patock, 2010). 
 
Regarding membership, not all of Partai Aceh’s candidates were GAM members and vice versa, 
while most GAM members are supportive of Partai Aceh, although membership in Partai Aceh 
was not compulsory (ICG, 2008). PA attempted public recruitment for non-GAM members 
with better education to make up for the lack of higher education among many of the KPA rank 
and file (Stange and Patock, 2010). Darwin (2016b) analysed this membership recruitment 
method as a pragmatic approach, not an indication of the transformation of the party into an 
entirely open political outlet. Partai Aceh requires plenty of competent human resources to 
improve the quality of the party.  
 
Partai Aceh well utilises strong organisation, decentralisation and discipline of KPA to grip 
power throughout the province, especially in rural areas (Hillman, 2012). According to ICG 
(2008), the party “claimed a total membership of 300,000 people, with the number still 
growing, which is a clear sign of how much PA was able to benefit from the territorial structure 
of KPA”. Partai Aceh’s election campaign was based on a simple platform which included full 
implementation of the Helsinki MoU, by which it was meant that the Party would focus on 
optimising special autonomy powers for Aceh (Hillman, 2012). Party campaign posters, for 




might resume if the Aceh Party lost. According to Darwin (2016b), this narrative is a form of 
reification of Partai Aceh that divided the public image into positive and negative. Positive 
image manifested in the Acehnese identity and the promise of prosperity this party will bring 
to Aceh people. The negative image is reflected in messages that emphasise Partai Aceh as the 
only benefactor of peace in Aceh, and if the party lost, peace will be in peril and conflict is most 
likely to erupt again (Darwin, 2016b), a campaign tactic that emphasised past-performance 
legitimacy of GAM. Partai Aceh adopts closed and undemocratic decision-making processes. 
In 2008 the Partai Aceh chairperson and secretary were directly appointed by GAM Elites and 
in the subsequent elections in 2013 and 2018 Muzakkir Manaf was elected by acclamation 
(Serambinew, 14 February 2018) that indicates strong patron-client relations between 
Muzakkir Manaf as KPA commander and his members.  
 
A peaceful outcome and transition of power following the 2009 legislative election and the 
further success of the Partai Aceh candidate at the 2012 gubernatorial election and 2014 
legislative election has demonstrated its continued organisational strength and popular 
support. According to Darwin (2016b), “Partai Aceh is weak in [democratic] 
institutionalisation but strong in the consolidation of political authority”. However, it also 
suffers from several shortcomings regarding internal capacity and organisational coherence, 
as described below.   
 
4.10.1.1 Political Skill  
The Aceh Party did face several challenges common to political parties emerging from armed 
struggles. The most obvious problem was the lack of essential political skills. The transitional 
period from military structure to a political party could be long and difficult. The rebel leader 
is often unfamiliar with peacetime politics and government issues such as dealing with donors, 
budgets, or public administration (Von Hehn, 2011: 244). 
 
In preparing its participation in the 2009 legislative election, Partai Aceh selected a range of 
candidates to compete for elections including several non-combatants. The majority of 
candidates were dominated by KPA members with limited education and experience in the 
governance system. Partai Aceh-dominated parliament struggled to produce legislation and 
passed no laws in the first year of the five-year parliamentary term (Hillman, 2012). One 
respondent confirmed this weakness. 
 
“The people in parliament do not know how to produce legislation and to 
translate MoU provision into “real law” (subsequent regulation). How can we 




take a very long period, the learning process will take a long time, the investment 
is actually on the capacity building, but this was abandoned by the donor 
institution, they just wanted to see a quick result” (Personal Interview, PA1, 21 
September 2012). 
 
It took six months into the financial year before the parliament managed to approve the 
provincial government’s budget due to the lack of understanding of government budget papers 
(Hillman, 2o12). This incapability had also impacted the reintegration program for former 
combatants. According to the former staff of BRA, due to the major delay of the submission of 
RAPBA (provincial budget plan) to the national government, the process of the reintegration 
fund was also delayed for several months. The BRA top officials and their staff had to lobby 
National Members of Parliament personally to accelerate the disbursement process of funds 
(Personal Interview, PA5, 21 September 2012). 
 
The challenge of transformation from a rebel movement to politicians and legislators is 
attested by my respondent:  
 
There is a difference between war with weapon and war with the brain. In Aceh, 
it is still difficult to erase the image of war with weapons and replaced by war with 
brains. It is about good human resources. Your position as commander during 
wartime is not important in parliament. As former commanders, they were well 
performed, but as legislative members, they barely say something (Personal 
Interview, LPP 10B, August 2018). 
 
Partai Aceh realised this shortcoming and applied a policy to limit former combatants running 
for DPRA seats to 20 per cent (Darwin, 2016b). This policy is aimed at giving more 
opportunities to its professional and academics to balance DPRA members from national 
parties who have more experience and knowledge in politics and legislation.  
 
However, the insufficient skills of former combatants in political parties or parliament is seen 
as acceptable due to the transitional period and learning process. One respondent expressed 
her trust in the local political parties because they know their constituency much better than 
the national parties and they deserve a longer time to increase their capacity in governing Aceh 
(Personal Interview, PA-2, September 2012). One respondent from a local political party 
emphasised that the party pays serious attention to the capacity building of the former 
combatants by conducting two months mandatory training on budgeting and drafting 





This trend, however, is not unique to Aceh, and it is mostly caused by the clash between 
immediate need to integrate former combatants into political institutions and the requirement 
to empower them with skills and knowledge about politics and government. It is also essential 
to change the attitude of former combatants, especially intimidation practice, in the legislation 
process.  The delayed integration of former combatants into politics in Aceh could also be seen 
from the disparity between educated GAM elite and foot soldiers, in which the later must try 
harder to adapt themselves to the political realm. The capacity of former combatants to 
execute government or parliamentary jobs is necessary to gain performance legitimacy in 
peacebuilding. Once they hold political power in government, the public will start to expect 
professionalism rather than merely depend on past performance legitimacy or identity-based 
legitimacy. The prolonged failure to provide performance or output legitimacy will potentially 
create new grievances among the community, and a demand for change.  
 
4.10.1.2 Internal Friction  
The political concessions that were granted to GAM through the MoU Helsinki embedded 
economic incentives and power. Through the new political Aceh Party, many former rebels 
have occupied prestigious and strategic political positions and have been active players in 
post-conflict reconstruction by securing contracts or winning tenders as suppliers of building 
materials (Anshori, 2012). While GAM could maintain its cohesiveness during the three 
decades of struggle, economic incentives and power distribution have given rise to internal 
friction and social antagonism (Anshori 2012). The conflict occurred among GAM elites as well 
as between high-rank and low-level GAM members. This internal conflict was a test of whether 
GAM will remain united during peacetime when the challenge has changed, and they no longer 





Figure 4-17 GAM Internal Conflict 
  
 
The graph depicts the pattern of GAM internal conflict in the post-conflict era. The strong 
cohesion during wartime has gradually loosened especially between the elite and the rank and 
file members. The inter-elite competition is generally centred on the power struggle. The rift 
occurs between high and low-rank GAM members regarding the distribution of economic 
resources, reintegration funds and construction works.  
 
4.10.1.3 Political Competition 
As the peace beneficiaries who occupied the highest positions, GAM elites immediately 
competed over political positions, privileges, facilities, business activities, and contracts with 
major state-owned enterprises (Anshori, 2009). The first internal rift emerged and was 
exposed to the public in a few months after the peace agreement regarding the decision around 
the candidate to be nominated for the 2006 election, often dubbed as a conflict between “GAM 
old camp and Young Turks” (ICG, 2006). The GAM elite comprises former members of the 
government in exile in Sweden, including Hasbi Abdullah and a younger brother of Zaini 
Abdullah (Stange and Patock, 2010). This decision raised criticism over the decision making 
in Majelis Nasional (Stange and Patock, 2010). Another split occurred due to the decision to 
nominate GAM candidates under the umbrella of a national party. Initially, based on a 
decision made in April 2006, GAM agreed that it would not establish any coalition with a 
national party (ICG, 2006). However, the decision was altered as Majelis Nasional was 
interested in nominating Human Hamid, a sociologist and social and environmental activist 
from PPP (United Development Party), as the vice governor (ICG, 2006). This eventually led 
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On the other hand, a large majority of KPA members supported the independent candidacy of 
Irwandi Yusuf, a former GAM spokesperson (Stange and Patock, 2010).  Irwandi then ran for 
the election with Mohammad Nazar, the leader of Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh (SIRA). 
Muhammad Nazar is an activist from an organisation that lobbied for a referendum on 
independence (Stange and Patock, 2010). This rift was a reflection of elite versus “grassroots” 
GAM or between Majelis Nasional, whose membership is dominated by the former exiled 
government in Sweden, and KPA which is an organisation for former combatants.  
  
The second fragmentation happened in the 2012 gubernatorial election. This factionalism is a 
legacy from the dispute of the 2006 election which was seemingly difficult to reconcile. Before 
the second gubernatorial election which was scheduled in 2011, PA openly announced that it 
would not nominate former independent candidate Irwandi Yusuf as the candidate from PA 
and chose Zaini Abdullah instead (ANFREL,2012). This decision was challenged by several 
KPA leaders who are loyal to Irwandi (ICG, 2012). This dissent met resistance from the elites 
of Partai Aceh who fired most of the signatories (ICG, 2012). Being removed from a KPA 
leadership position in GAM strongholds affects their benefits in politics and the economy, and 
they would possibly lose contracts for construction and other public projects (ICG, 2012). 
These consequences have successfully deterred further dissent from KPA leaders, as they have 
been benefiting from the peace dividend since the peace agreement.  
 
Due to the disapproval from Partai Aceh, Irwandi had to again run as an independent 
candidate in the election. As the primary purpose was to stop Irwandi from being re-elected 
as governor, PA persistently attempted to stop Irwandi’s nomination by using legal opinion 
that Article 256 of the 2006 Law on Governing Aceh allowed non-party candidates only for the 
first election following the law’s enactment (ICG, 2012). Since the Constitutional Court had 
approved the independent candidate in July 2007, consequently it had to annul the provision 
related to the prohibition of an independent candidate. Partai Aceh challenged the ruling as a 
violation of Aceh’s autonomy, arguing that the central government of Indonesia had no right 
to interfere in electoral issues (ANFREL, 2012). 
 
Due to the prolonged dispute between PA and Irwandi’s camp over his independent candidacy, 
Partai Aceh kept delaying its registration in the gubernatorial election and made them miss 
the deadline (ANFREL, 2012).  This resulted in mounting violence in Aceh and caused the 
Central Government in Jakarta to undertake a political intervention. The government via the 
Ministry of Home Affairs was calling for postponing the election and open registration for PA 




decision to reopen registration and decided that the election should be delayed accordingly, 
but no later than 9 April 2012, which was immediately agreed by PA (ICG, 2012). 
During the 2017 gubernatorial election, rivalry among the old actors re-emerged. The tight 
competition in the political realm prevailed between the “old camp versus Young Turks” 
during the 2006 and 2012 elections, followed by the inter-elite former GAM in 2017. The 
political competition was still dominated by GAM elites such as Zaini Abdullah, Muzakkir 
Manaf and Irwandi Yusuf. Running as pair in the 2012 election, in 2017 Zaini Abdullah and 
Muzakkir Manaf were split. Zaini Abdullah ran as an independent candidate and Muzakkir 
Manaf was still nominated by Partai Aceh. Irwandi was nominated by Partai Nasional Aceh, a 
new GAM-based party and became a winner of the 2017 gubernatorial election. Compared to 
the 2012 gubernatorial election, the 2017 election was relatively more peaceful. While the 
common goal of Aceh independence successfully united all GAM elites in Aceh and overseas 
during the conflict era, in peace-time, the cohesion is challenged by the political power they 
gained as a result of the peace agreement.  In the early peacebuilding phase, the competition 
for power largely led to violence and intimidation until it was resolved by intervention from 
central government. The trend has been gradually improving in the subsequent electoral 
competitions with more peaceful elections.  
4.10.1.4 Conflict between rank-and-file combatants and the GAM elites 
The second conflict pattern involves the emergence of resentment between former GAM 
soldiers and the movement’s elite. According to Anshori (20012: 45), “the conflict is generally 
produced by the inequitable distribution of the rewards between the elites and the rank-and-
file combatants in the post-Helsinki period”. A limited peace dividend in terms of political 
concession, economic access and development was not equally distributed among the entire 
group of GAM. According to Nurhasim (2012), in the post-conflict era, there are only two 
available options for the transformation of GAM: politically through Partai Aceh and 
economically by becoming a small-scale contractor or entrepreneur.  It is difficult for ex-GAM 
members to find employment in the public sector due to their limited education. On the other 
hand, Partai Aceh’s structure cannot accommodate all their combatant and non-combatant 
supporters and is only able to employ GAM elites and Sagoe (Sub-district) Commanders in 
Partai Aceh organisational structure (Nurhasim, 2012). 
During my field research, along the road between Pidie and Bireun, some grand houses were 
built in the middle of paddy fields or traditional village houses. Based on information from my 
research assistant, those houses are owned by GAM elites who hold political power at the 




some of their former comrades were quickly grasping power and wealth, most rank and file 
combatants were unemployed and poor. Since the only thing they could do for years was 
fighting for independence, the peace left them in limbo without skills or economic assets.  
This inequality led to criminal acts. Some former low-ranking GAM soldiers, who were still 
keeping their weapons illegally, resorted to violence and criminal acts such as abduction, 
intimidation of foreign workers, and theft. In addition to monetary rewards such as ransoms, 
they committed these criminal acts to attract elite attention and damage the GAM elite’s public 
image and reputation (Anshori, 2012). During the conflict with the Indonesian government, 
solidarity among GAM members was maintained through mutual support. Once the conflict 
ended, however, solidarity among the elites and ordinary combatants somewhat weakened 
due to the loss of a “common enemy” (Anshori, 2012).  
Throughout this section, we could see the dynamics of participation, institutionalisation and 
legitimacy within Partai Aceh in the transition phase of peacebuilding in Aceh. Established as 
a political participation channel for former GAM members and the wider Acehnese 
community, Partai Aceh grew to be a strong and dominant political institution. Partai Aceh 
relied heavily on its past performance legitimacy as the sole benefactor of peace in Aceh but 
largely failed to achieve output legitimacy in executing government or legislative jobs. It 
tended to limit if not block political competition between GAM elites during the 2012 election. 
Elites in Partai Aceh also gradually lost legitimacy among the rank and file combatants due to 
the unfair distribution of the post-conflict economic benefits. The diminishing legitimacy of 
Partai Aceh led to the establishment of the new GAM-based political party that will be further 
explained in the following section.  
4.10.2 The Establishment of Partai Nasional Aceh: Option or Fragmentation? 
In analysing the establishment of PNA, it is important to review the original concept of local 
political parties rooted in GAM. The initial project was to socialise the model of a local political 
party that can be replicated in all provinces in Indonesia (Personal Interview, LPP-PNA 11-B, 
August 2018). GAM will be the umbrella of several political parties that adopt the single 
ideology of Acehnese-ness (Personal Interview, LPP-PNA 11-B, August 2018). This objective 
was relatively achieved during the 2009 legislative election because in addition to  Partai Aceh, 
there were Partai SIRA and PARA that were established by GAM members or GAM 
sympathisers. However, the unchallenged domination of one local political party, Partai Aceh 
has been eroding that idea slowly. The concept of GAM as an umbrella has been exploited 
mainly by Partai Aceh with its firm campaign as a sole benefactor of GAM and peace in Aceh. 
It led to the limitation of the political movement of other GAM-based groups. This 




in Aceh as a means of broader political participation in Aceh and to alleviate the grievance of 
political centralisation during the New Order Era.  
In 2012, following his defeat in the gubernatorial election, Irwandi and his loyalists, including 
Munawar Liza and Nur Djuli, established Partai Nasional Aceh, a new GAM-based local 
political party. Irwandi aspirations to establish a local political party could be traced back to 
2006 when he planned to form Partai Independen Aceh (Aceh Independent Party). He later 
declined the plan to avoid friction with senior GAM elites and support the establishment of 
Partai Aceh instead. The establishment of PNA was suspiciously seen by Partai Aceh but 
positively welcomed by national parties such as Partai Amanat Nasional, Partai Golkar and 
Partai Demokrat. 
The opinions toward the factionalisation of GAM local political parties vary, several 
respondents see it as a serious split and thus urged for reconciliation (Personal Interview, LPP 
PA-10B, August 2018), including one respondent from PNA that regretted the friction between 
local political parties in Aceh (Personal Interview, LPP PNA 11B, August 2018). Other 
respondents perceived that it would generate a positive impact on the healthy local democracy 
in Aceh (Personal Interview, LPP PA-4B, August 2018). One respondent gives an interesting 
opinion “For democratic politics, this is positive because people in Aceh have more choice of 
local political parties and the political parties must turn inward and evaluate themselves, but 
this is negative for Aceh’s affairs, especially in monitoring the progress in the context of peace 
in Aceh (Personal Interview, LPP PNA 11B, August 2018). 
In addition to gaining support from several former GAM commanders such as Sofyan Dawood 
(former GAM spokesperson), Tengku Muksalmina (former GAM spokesperson in Aceh Besar) 
and Saiful aka Cagee (former GAM commander in Bireun), PNA also recruited some Aceh 
activists. The figures such as Lukman Age (former director of The Aceh Institute), Asiah Uzia 
(former coordinator of KontraS Aceh) and Tarmizi (Director of Aceh People Forum) joined 
PNA (Fahmi, 2016). One respondent describes that one of the objectives of the establishment 
of PNA is to provide a place for Irwandi loyalist ex-combatants: “we must manage these people 
wisely, or they could be manipulated by irresponsible people to trigger new conflict” (Personal 
Interview, LPP PNA 11B, August 2018). Other respondents highlighted PNA as the place to 
accommodate “moderate ex-combatants” who “at least passed secondary education” (Personal 
Interview, LPP PNA 15-B, August 2018). The emphasis on education is used to differentiate 
from Partai Aceh ex-combatants who are perceived as groups with low education, mostly 
graduated from secondary education. 
Aside from differing opinions toward the establishment of PNA as an “alternative GAM based 




consolidation perspective. Hague and Harrop (2013: 55) argue that democracy is prevalent 
“when the new institutions provide an accepted framework for political competition”. In the 
case of Aceh democracy, the institution of a local political party has opened a pathway for 
competition from the presence of PNA to challenge the domination of Partai Aceh. The 
democratic competition between former rebel groups post-conflict is problematic due to the 
legacy of a culture of violence. Immediate intra-combatant democratic contestation is prone 
to new outbreaks of violent conflict. Aceh seems to follow the incremental path of Indonesia’s 
democratic consolidation through the establishment of PNA (followed by its participation in 
the local election), seven years after the establishment of Partai Aceh and nine years after the 
peace agreement. The period of seven years has been “unofficially granted” to Partai Aceh to 
dominate local politics, in order to incorporate them into post-conflict peacebuilding, and as 
a confidence-building mechanism for former combatants to gradually adjust to democratic 
principles. While the first competition between Partai Aceh and PNA in the 2014 legislative 
election was marred by electoral violence as elaborated in the previous section on electoral 
violence, this must be understood in the context of the transitional phase. During the 2017 
gubernatorial election that brought the former combatants together with their political parties 
into the democratic competition once more, the result was remarkably positive with a 
significant decline in electoral violence. The different vote results between two contenders 
could also be peacefully resolved by complying with electoral institution decisions. 
On the one hand, it marks the normalisation phase, but on the other hand, the aspiration of 
the “united political units to struggle for Aceh interest” is also worth pondering. It indicates 
the sustainability of Aceh ethnonationalism ideology in the normalisation phase.  Thus, we 
could expect to see the interplay between acceptance of democratic competition (and 
factionalisation) and the efforts to unite GAM to maintain the interest of Aceh ideology 
continues in the future normalisation phase in Aceh. 
The establishment of local political parties and their dynamics is another form of political 
participation in peacebuilding in Aceh. Barron et al. (2010) described the development of the 
post-2006 election in Aceh as the dilemma between incorporation and institution building. 
The first local elections in 2006 (and the subsequent elections) have successfully incorporated 
GAM as a rebel group into the peaceful political process. However, it created a patronage 
system in party politics in post-conflict Aceh which is related to the distribution of economic 
wealth and political power. Aside from the patronage system, the inequality of the distribution 
of power and wealth among combatants led to friction between elites and rank-and-file 
combatants. The conflict among them varies from violence-criminal acts to electoral disputes 
that required intervention from the national government to maintain the conducive 




shows the process into consolidated democratic peace by the establishment of PNA, a new-
GAM based political party that gives more options for Acehnese in electoral competition. The 
establishment of the new GAM-based political party is a sign of competition for legitimacy 
among GAM members. The growing domination of certain groups within GAM monopolising 
power and resources weakened the legitimacy of GAM elites led by Muzakkir Manaf as the 
claimant of the sole benefactor of peace in Aceh. Another group within GAM, led by Irwandi 
Yusuf challenged the legitimacy of Muzakir Manaf camp by establishing a new political party 
as an alternative political outlet. The establishment of a new GAM-based political party 
resulted in competition and participation, two crucial aspects of democracy. It created more 
competition for former GAM members and opened access to Acehnese to participate in local 
politics with more options of political parties.  
 
4.11 Conclusion 
As it has been mentioned earlier in this section, conflict in Aceh is not merely a violent conflict 
but a conflict that needs a political solution. Although ethnicity, kinship and religion have been 
used for mobilisation, they have been secondary to the prime focus on territorial and political 
control (Reid 2006a, Sulaiman 2006; and Aspinall 2009a). More specifically, ethnicity and 
religion in Aceh serve as factors to mobilise grievances, unless the main grievance in political 
participation has been addressed, the peaceful resolution would be difficult to achieve. This 
premise seems to be used as a foundation of the Helsinki negotiation. By prioritising the 
endorsement of independent candidates (which was intended to give a chance to a candidate 
from GAM to compete in the election without being nominated by national political party), 
local elections and the establishment of local political parties, the conflict was converted into 
democratic contestation. 
GAM and the KPA transformed the military structure into the PA to contest in the political 
arena and to shape local politics. Former combatants and activists won the 2006 gubernatorial 
and local political executive elections. This was followed by another victory of candidates from 
GAM in the second and third gubernatorial election in 2012 and 2017. In the 2009 legislative 
election, Partai Aceh (PA), the political party formed by former rebels, won nearly half the 
votes in the province as a whole, soaring to another victory in 2014. Despite the postponement 
of the gubernatorial election from 2011 to 2012, low scale violence and electoral disputes, five 
local elections have been successfully conducted in Aceh with a high level of voter turnout. The 
transition from the bullet to the ballot has been generally successful.  
 
Several findings in chapter 4 support my hypotheses in chapter 2. The first finding is about 




Helsinki puts a strong emphasis on the establishment of local political parties as the form of 
self-governance in Aceh. It supports hypothesis 1 that proposes “A peace agreement which 
addresses grievances will contribute to the durable peacebuilding process in middle-income 
countries with a relatively strong government like Indonesia”. Political participation has been 
well stipulated in the Law of Governing of Aceh (LoGA) and supported by Qanuns on the 
establishment of a local political party and local election. This finding supports my hypothesis 
2 that proposes “In order to secure sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding, the peace 
agreement should be enacted in subsequent regulation in national and local level”.  The 
enactment of three levels of regulations, MoU, LoGA and Qanun demonstrate the attempt of 
central government to transfer the authority of political power to GAM that could be used by 
GAM to gain greater legitimacy from Acehnese.  
 
The second finding is related to the level of participation and institution building and 
legitimacy in political participation in post-conflict Aceh. Broader participation has been 
demonstrated through high local election voter turnout, and independent candidacy that 
enables more candidates from various backgrounds compete in Aceh local elections. The 
establishment of the local political party also opens political access to Acehnese, both former 
combatants and non-combatants to actively engage in electoral politics. When the Partai Aceh 
was a highly patronised political party but weak in institutionalisation and a limited 
democratic decision-making process, there was a new local political party established by 
another group of GAM elites. Limited participation has led to another chance of participation 
for Acehnese to engage in electoral politics. These findings support my hypothesis 3 that 
“participation aspect in peacebuilding will contribute to unification, recognition of identity 
and legitimacy to address the underlying grievance”, mainly because most voters are still 
associated with local parties and independent candidates with Acehnese identity.  In contrast 
to the opinions that link the fragmentation of former combatants in post-conflict with the 
emergence of a new conflict, in Aceh, the division within former GAM elites created 
competition and participation by providing Acehnese more options from local political parties. 
 
However, women in Aceh face considerable challenges in political participation that are 
derived from the inter-party calculation, religious-customary and resources. Legitimacy is 
gained by local candidates and local political parties as shown by persistent victory in a series 
of local elections from 2006 to 2017. However, there is an indication of diminishing legitimacy 
of GAM that is demonstrated by lower vote or voter turnout from the first local gubernatorial 
and legislative election to the subsequent ones. It could indicate the dissatisfaction of 
Acehnese to GAM because they perceived GAM’s unsuccessfulness in fulfilling input 




performance in local governance. We can also see that the central government regained their 
legitimacy by the coalition of local political parties with national parties especially during the 
nomination of the members of National Parliament from Aceh and in the presidential election. 
The central government regained its legitimacy because Aceh needs the support from Jakarta 
to materialise the peace agreement, securing Aceh interest and building a political coalition at 
the national level.  
 
Regarding institution building, despite the relatively successful organisation of local elections 
and the establishment of political parties, there have been significant shortcomings in 
elections and local political parties as institution building mechanisms. The problems are 
related to the incorporation of former combatants into democratic competition only a short 
period after the peace agreement. In the transition period of peacebuilding, the option to 
accelerate local elections and the transformation of rebel movements into the political party 
has been a popular option because it could grant quick legitimation to former rebel groups 
into the political realm. This option seemed like an even more viable option in Indonesia, due 
to its relatively strong state institution and bureaucracy that has been gradually developed and 
improved after the Suharto era. The legitimacy of local elections in Aceh has been supported 
by the presence of the Aceh Independent Election Commission as a part of the National 
Election Commission. Thus, the incorporation of the rebel movement into politics could be 
secured by the existing state structure and bureaucracy. These findings support my hypothesis 
4 that proposes institution building will increase legitimacy, secure resources and stabilise the 
conditions for lasting peace. The combination of participation in electoral democracy and 
institution building is in line with my hypothesis 5 that proposes “In a country where the 
bureaucracy, state institution and national identity have been relatively strong and settled like 
Indonesia, state-led peacebuilding that combines participation and institution building 
contributes to a durable post-conflict peacebuilding process”.  
 
This non-sequential peacebuilding timing by the rapid incorporation of rebel groups into local 
politics has created a patronage system in party politics and local elections in Aceh. However, 
patronage in local politics in Aceh must have been seen as part of a broader trend at the 
national level: patronage in post-conflict peacebuilding as well as stronger consolidation with 
national political parties marked the normalisation phase in Aceh. There is also an indication 
of the lessening of Aceh identity in the coalition building between the national and political 
parties.  It is demonstrated by the continuous cooperation of Partai Aceh with Partai Gerindra, 
a national party led by former Indonesian Special Forces Commander and coalition of Partai 
Nasional Aceh with PDI-P, a nationalist party and strong opposition of separatism. The 




seems to contradict with their identity, political struggle and ideological history but it becomes 
normal to gain political concession at the national level. Political pragmatism has gradually 
replaced identity and ideology in Aceh local politics during the normalisation phase. 
 
What we can see from the current development in Aceh local politics, especially in the 2014 
legislative election and the 2017 gubernatorial election is the normalisation phase of 
peacebuilding in Aceh, when peace is no longer built, but consolidated and integrated into a 
broader scale: Indonesia. In the 2017 gubernatorial election, closer alliances with national 
parties became a pragmatic choice for ex-GAM elites that competed in the election – a less 
desirable political option in one decade ago or when peace had just been attained. Voter 
turnout in gubernatorial elections also shows a steadily declining pattern as well as in 





Chapter 5: Economic Settlement in Post Conflict Peacebuilding 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Perceived inequality is one of the primary causes of conflict in Aceh. The narrative around 
economic exploitation and unequal sharing of natural resources between the central 
government and the province of Aceh has fuelled grievances over the years. Therefore, post-
conflict peacebuilding in Aceh is directed towards addressing these grievances by 
redistributing the revenue from natural resources through a national budget that aims to 
enhance Aceh’s economic independence, supporting economic growth and social welfare.  
 
Economic settlement in post-conflict Aceh, however, has followed a different path due to the 
massive scale of destruction wrought by the tsunami. It created a “reconstruction economy” in 
Aceh, based on creating longer-term economic development in order to address grievances. 
Nearly 8 billion USD of aid from the Indonesian government and international donors flowed 
to finance reconstruction activity. This fund was eventually also utilised for post-conflict needs 
since it exceeded USD 1.9 billion from the estimated damage and material loss from the 
tsunami that reached at around USD 6.1 billion (Barron, 2008, Thorburn, 2009).  
 
Another distinction of peacebuilding in Aceh is related to the continuity of post-conflict 
funding. The withdrawal of international support does not necessarily mean a shortage of 
funds because a characteristic of state-led peacebuilding in Aceh is the budget provided by the 
central government to finance post-conflict development. Aceh has received additional 
resources from the national government after being given special autonomous status in 2001. 
This fund significantly increased after the implementation of the Peace Agreement, which 
granted Aceh 70 per cent of all current and future hydrocarbon deposits. The Indonesian 
Government has also allocated a vast amount of money for the reintegration of former 
combatants, especially for their economic welfare. The fund, amounting to IDR 600 billion (or 
USD 600 million) was channelled through the Ministry of Social Welfare to be disbursed to 
the beneficiaries through the Aceh Integration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh/BRA).  
 
In the aftermath of conflict, the economic conditions in Aceh have gradually improved as 
shown in figure 5.1. From the conflict period in 2004-2005 to peacetime in 2006-2007, 
economic growth in Aceh rocketed from 1.8 and 1.2 per cent to 7.7 and 7.4 per cent, 
respectively. Negative growth in 2008 and 2009 indicated the impact of the depleting oil 
reserves in Aceh coupled with the diminishing construction and rehabilitation sectors (Bank 




discontinuation of the operation of the Arun Gas Company that produced condensate and 
liquid natural gas (Medan Bisnis Daily, 6 February 2016).  
 
Table 5-1 Aceh Economic Growth 2004-2017 
Year  With Oil and Gas  Without Oil and Gas  
2004  -9.6  1.8 
2005 -10.1 1,2 
2006 1.6 7.7 
2007 -2.5 7.4 
2008 -8,3 1.9 
2009 -3.82 3.78 
2010 2.79 5.49 
2011 5.02 5.89 
2012 5.21 6.09 
2013 4.82 5.45 
2014 2.71 4.02 
2015 -0.72 4.34 
2016 3.31 4.31 
2017 4.19 4.14  
Source: BPS (Indonesia Statistical Bureau) 
 
Table 5-2 Aceh GDP Per Capita 2007-2017 
Year  With Oil and Gas  
(In USD)  
Without Oil and Gas  
(In USD) 
2007 1.684,90 1.178,31 
2008 1.705,60 1.601,07 
2009 1.633,66 1.336,84 
2010 1.760,97 1.468,62 
2011 1.914,05 1.599,36 
2012 2.034,72 1.714,83 
2013 2.012,00 1.714.00 
2014 2.193,63 1.971,61 
2015 1.927,16 1.852,34 
2016 2.024,33 1.961,90 
2017 2.112,15 2.043,57 





Table 5.2 shows the Gross Domestic Product per capita in Aceh more than one decade after 
the peace settlement that reached approximately USD 2100 per year with oil and gas and USD 
2000 without oil and gas in 2017. Before peace, GDP per capita in Aceh was recorded at USD 
1090 with oil and gas in 2004 (World Bank, 2006). While Aceh’s GDP is catching up due to 
the growth, in the same year in 2007 Aceh was one of the poorest Indonesian provinces ranked 
at sixth lowest among 33 provinces with 16,89% of those in Aceh living below the poverty line 
of US$ 34/ month (BPS).  
 
In light of the information about the post-conflict economic conditions in Aceh as mentioned 
above, this chapter reviews the implementation of economic settlement in supporting 
peacebuilding efforts. The first section describes peace settlement provisions and its 
subsequent regulations to alleviate grievances.  This thesis will focus on three aspects out of 
various economic settlements in the peace agreement and LoGA:  the Aceh Reconstruction 
and Rehabilitation Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh / BRR), the Aceh 
Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh/BRA), and The Special Autonomy Fund.  The 
BRR is considered as the primary economic actor in the early peacebuilding phase. After the 
analysis of BRR, the next section of this chapter will focus on the Aceh Reintegration Agency 
(Badan Reintegrasi Aceh) and the process of incorporation of former combatants in the 
reintegration programme. It will be followed by the elaboration of the role of The Special 
Autonomy Fund as a peace dividend in Aceh and the management of the fund in the 
peacebuilding process. The last part summaries the process of legitimacy, participation and 
institutionalisation of economic settlements during the transition and normalisation phase of 
peacebuilding in Aceh.   
 
5.2 Grievance Alleviation 
This section includes two major provisions for grievance alleviation in the economic sector. 
The first is the economic settlement in a peace agreement that is comprised of the set of 
authorities to Aceh (fundraising, setting interest rates and taxes, developing and 
administering seaports and airports) and the allocation of funds (additional revenue-sharing 
from oil and gas). The MoU includes one provision for BRR as an acknowledgement of its role 
in the economic settlement. This thesis also includes reintegration programmes as a way to 
address economic grievances. The reason for this inclusion is that the primary purposes of the 
reintegration program are directed towards the economic empowerment and improvement of 
the livelihoods of the former combatants. Below are the economics-related provisions in the 





5.2.1 MoU  
The efforts to alleviate economic grievances in the MoU span from the subject of taxation and 
the redistribution of national resources to the administration of seaports and airports. The 
MoU also includes one provision for BRR as an acknowledgement of its role in economic 
settlement as stipulated below: 
1. Aceh has the right to raise funds with external loans. Aceh has the right to set interest 
rates beyond that set by the Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia.  
2. Aceh has the right to set and raise taxes to fund official internal activities. Aceh has 
the right to conduct trade and business internally and internationally and to seek 
foreign direct investment and tourism. 
3. Aceh will have jurisdiction over living natural resources in the territorial sea 
surrounding Aceh. 
4. Aceh is entitled to retain seventy per cent of the revenue from all current and future 
hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in the territory of Aceh, as well as in 
the territorial sea surrounding Aceh. 
5. Aceh conducts the development and administration of all seaports and airports 
within the territory of Aceh.  
6. Aceh will enjoy free trade with all other parts of the Republic of Indonesia 
unhindered by taxes, tariffs or other restrictions.  
7. Aceh will enjoy direct and unhindered access to foreign countries, by sea and air. 
8. GoI commits to the transparency of the collection and allocation of revenues 
between the Central Government and Aceh by agreeing to outside auditors to verify 
this activity and to communicate the results to the head of the Aceh administration. 
9. GAM will nominate representatives to participate fully at all levels in the commission   
established to conduct the post-tsunami reconstruction (BRR).  
Most of the provisions of economic settlement in the MoU indicate the intention to transfer 
authority from the central government to GAM. The central government handed over 
authority in the areas of finance, fiscal, and management of strategic assets such as airports 
and seaports to Aceh. The economic provisions were also strengthened by the principle of 
transparency and accessibility between the central government and Aceh around managing 




is compensated for by a larger allocated share of hydrocarbon deposits to Aceh. In other words, 
the process or at least intention of authority transfers from the incumbent to insurgent to 
address perceived economic deprivation is seen in the MoU. BRR, the ad hoc agency to 
coordinate post-tsunami reconstruction is included in the section on economic provision. 
Even though this agency is not part of the conflict and peace settlement, in later phases it 
contributed to the integration of former combatants in the post-conflict era as will be further 
elaborated in the section on BRR in this chapter.  
 
While reintegration is specified in a separate section in the MoU and is not the part of the 
economic settlement, the provisions of reintegration do concern the economic empowerment 
of former combatants, political prisoners and affected civilians as depicted in the following 
subjects:  
1. GoI and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have 
participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into the civil society.   
These measures include economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned 
political prisoners and affected civilians. A Reintegration Fund under the 
administration of the authorities of Aceh will be established. 
2. GoI will allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed 
or damaged as a consequence of the conflict to be administered by the authorities of   
Aceh. 
3. GoI will allocate suitable farming land as well as funds to the authorities of Aceh to 
facilitate the reintegration to society of the former combatants and the compensation 
for political prisoners and affected civilians. The authorities of Aceh will use the land 
and funds as follows: 
a) All former combatants will receive an allocation of suitable farming land, 
employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the 
authorities of Aceh. 
b) All pardoned political prisoners will receive an allocation of suitable farming land, 
employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the 
authorities of Aceh. 
c) All civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss due to the conflict will receive an 
allocation of suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, 




The provisions for the reintegration of former combatants as well as for political prisoners and 
affected civilians are predominantly focused on improving livelihoods and on empowering the 
economy. Combatants are the primary group that challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent 
and central government by waging war and being at the forefront of the struggle in the field. 
They often lost their homes, employment or were seriously injured. For the younger 
generation of combatants, most of them are undereducated, and their “primary job” was to 
struggle against the Indonesian military. Consequently, the most important attempt to 
improve central government legitimacy and sustain peace is by reintegrating them into society 
and rehabilitating their economic conditions and livelihood, including preparing them for 
employment. The affected civilians are another important group that is often overlooked in 
reintegration programs. They are not part of the combatants but are significantly impacted by 
the conflict. Some of the civilians might be victims of GAM, and not the Indonesia military, a 
fact that makes the process of the transfer of authority and dynamics of legitimacy in the 
reintegration program impossible to see through a single lens.  
 
5.2.2 LoGA  
Stipulations on economic settlements are covered more comprehensively in LoGA but mostly 
regulate long-term economic development. BRR or other reconstruction subjects and 
reintegration are not mentioned in LoGA. The economic sector is covered in articles 154 to 
173, ranging from more detailed regulation of the management of natural resources and 
seaport-airports, trade and investment, infrastructure and development of Sabang Free Port. 
Acehnese perceive the revitalisation of Sabang Free Port to be essential to enhancing economic 
development in Aceh. Due to its strategic location, they believe that Sabang will be the 
alternative seaport and could replace the busy port of Belawan in North Sumatera, or even 
overtake Singapore. LoGAalso further regulates the utilisation of the Special Autonomy Fund 
and Additional Revenue Sharing from Oil and Gas for District/City Government in Aceh in 
articles 179 to 183.  
 
One of the most noticeable changes from the MoU to LoGA is the involvement or presence of 
central government in several subjects that were previously transferred to Aceh from the MoU. 
In subjects such as the utilisation of oil and gas, the development of seaports and the airport 
and the revitalisation of the port of Sabang, there is a clause devoted to the “The Government 
together with the Aceh Government”. Particularly on the subject of seaports and the airport, 
LoGA clearly emphasises the role of State-Owned Enterprises in cooperation with Aceh’s local 
government. It demonstrates the effort from central government to limit the authority that 
has been handed over to Aceh in the MoU. Several economic-related provisions like a seaport, 




the economic gain, seaports and the airport are vital assets for national security. Oil and gas, 
albeit depleting, remain important economic resources for Indonesia. While the central 
government seems to give full authority to Aceh on the subject of fund allocation (the Special 
Autonomy Fund and Additional Revenue from Oil and Gas), the handover of strategic assets 
is regulated more carefully.  
 
5.2.3 Qanun 
In contrast with comprehensive regulations of economic settlement in LoGA, economic sectors 
seem to move at a slower pace in local law or Qanun. Qanun that contain economic provisions 
are Qanun No 4/2013 about investment, Qanun No 8/2014 about the basic principles of the 
implementation of sharia in Aceh that regulates sharia economic laws in Aceh, Qanun No 
12/2016 about Corporate Social Responsibility, and Qanun No 11/2017 about the distribution 
of tax in Aceh. The utilisation of the Special Autonomy Fund in Aceh is regulated in Qanun No 
2/2008 about the allocation of the Special Autonomy Fund and Additional Revenue Sharing 
from Oil and Gas for District/City Government in Aceh. 
 
The small number of economy-related Qanun could indicate an insufficient capacity of Aceh’s 
local members of parliament to draft local regulations. However, it could also be the result of 
the involvement of the central government as stated in LoGA. The presence of the central 
government in several subjects such as the management of seaports, the airport, and oil and 
gas requires further consultation that might cause a delay in local regulation.  
 
From the three levels of regulations to address economic grievances, we can see the reduction 
of the authority transfer. While the MoU seems to transfer nearly full authority to the Aceh 
government in managing the local economy, LoGA, the subsequent regulation at national 
level, appears to give back greater authority to the central government. Due to the strategic 
nature of some economic components such as seaports, airports, free ports and hydrocarbon 
deposits, the central government appears to limit the authority over the management of those 
strategic assets to Aceh’s local government. As a replacement, the central government prefers 
to transfer an ample amount of the Special Autonomy fund as compensation for the gap in 
economic development during the conflict period in Aceh.  
  
5.3 BRR and Reconstruction Economy  
The disastrous earthquake and tsunami left Aceh with devastating damage and casualties. The 




The magnitude impact of this disaster was reported by the Consultative Group on Indonesia 
(2005): 
 
 The total damage and loss from this disaster were USD 3.9 billion. The sectors 
most  impacted were primarily private-sector dominated assets and activities 
that relate directly to the personal livelihoods of the affected urban and rural 
communities:  housing, commerce, agriculture and fisheries, and transport 
vehicles and services ($2.8  billion, or 63% of total damage and losses), by 
public sector damages; infrastructure, the social sectors, and government 
administration ($1.1 billion, or 25% of total damage and losses). 14 
 
To help rebuild Aceh in the aftermath of the tsunami, a massive influx of funding came from 
a variety of sources: foreign governments, donors, NGOs, and individuals. The Indonesian 
government created a Multi-Donor Trust Fund to coordinate the incoming funds. These 
countries and donor organisations are listed in table 5.3 below: 
Table 5-3 List of Donor Countries in Multi-Donor Trust Fund in Aceh 
 




                                                        
14Indonesia : Preliminary Damage and Lost Assessment, The December 26,2004 Natural Disaster, The Consultative Group on 




The purpose of the establishment of the MDF is explained below: 
 The main goal of this fund [MDF] was to attract and pool bilateral and other 
resources to ensure a coordinated approach to the support of rehabilitation 
activities in Aceh and Nias. Contributions were also expected from the private 
sector, foundations, and NGOs” (MDF, as cited by Jayasuriya and McCawley 
(2010: 86).  
The fund supported new projects or new components of existing projects and assistance for a 
government program which were part of the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts 
(Jayasuriya and McCawley, 2010). While the data of individual contributors is difficult to 
gauge, there were 435 NGOs recorded in Aceh during the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
project, 326 of them were international NGOs, while the rest were national NGOs (Masyrafah 
and McKeon 2008). 
Table 5-4 Actors in Aceh Reconstruction Project 
  
Source: Masyrafah and McKeon (2008)  
 
In 16 April 2005, the Government established the Agency for the Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation of Aceh and Nias or Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi (BRR) Aceh-Nias, 
with the goal “of restoring livelihoods and strengthening communities in Aceh and Nias by 
overseeing a coordinated, community-driven reconstruction and development program” 
(Nazara and Resosudarmo, 2007: 10). Funding for the BRR from 2005 to 2009 is shown in 
table 5.5 below:  
 
Table 5-5 BRR Source of Fund 
Source  Amount  
D0mestic (Government Budget)  3 Billion USD  
Foreign Government  3,6 Billion USD 
Private Sector and NGOs 2,5 Billion USD  
TOTAL of 9,1 Billion USD  





Even though BRR was established before the peace agreement, it is an integral part of the post-
conflict peacebuilding process in Aceh. While most BRR projects were targeted to tsunami 
victims, the chain of construction work has created economic opportunities for former GAM 
members with the entangled effect of benefit and shortcomings for keeping the peace on track. 
The former GAM members were absorbed into this post-disaster industry by being employed 
in transport, logistics and construction (Myrttinen, 2012). The significant role of this 
reconstruction fund in creating peace is mentioned by one respondent from the university:  
 
 
I think the fund for reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the tsunami is an 
indirect peace dividend for most Acehnese. To some extent, it created peace more 
than the real peace dividend from the peace agreement (LR3, personal interview, 
22 September 2012). 
 
Aceh demonstrated the distinctive case of the post-conflict peacebuilding fund. Due to the 
disastrous tsunami, Aceh received a large influx of funds for reconstruction and rehabilitation 
programmes that were derived from national and international contributions. The total 
quantity of funds exceeded the budget for reconstruction that could be utilised for post-conflict 
programmes in the aftermath of the peace agreement. The reconstruction program also led to 
the incorporation of former combatants and non-GAM Acehnese to the reconstruction 
economy as will be explained in the next section. The reconstruction and rehabilitation fund 
thus turned into an unofficial peace dividend and laid a foundation and contribution for the 
subsequent phase of peacebuilding.  
 
5.3.1 Combatants Become Contractors  
The construction sector forms a large part of Aceh’s post-conflict economy. Figure 5   
demonstrates the data of damage and losses from the tsunami, of which housing got the 
hardest hit. Unsurprisingly, housing reconstruction projects are at the top of the list of the 





Figure 5-1 Damage and Losses due to Aceh Tsunami 
 
Source: Masyrafah and McKeon (2008)  
 
 
Figure 5-2 Reconstruction Allocation 
 
 
Source: Masyrafah and McKeon (2008)  
 
The enormous impact of reconstruction projects in Aceh’s post-conflict economy was 
confirmed by the head of the Aceh branch of the Institute for the Development of Construction 
Services (Lembaga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi, LPJK), Nova Iriansyah (Aspinall, 2009), 
who was later elected as a vice governor of Aceh in 2017. According to Iriansyah, during 2007, 
the circulated money in Aceh from the national budget, provincial budget and BRR was 
approximately IDR thirty trillion, of which about twelve trillion (approximately USD 1.1 





Table 5.6 shows us the trend of Aceh Economic Growth from 2004 to 2008. The most notable 
feature is the enormous contribution of the construction sector to Aceh’s GDP, reaching 48.4% 
in 2006. When the construction sector wound down from 13.9 % in 2007 to minus 0.9%, GDP 
(without oil and gas) also fell from 7 per cent in 2007 to 1.9 per cent in 2008 or from -2.5% in 
2007  to -8.3% in 2008 (with oil and gas).  
 
Table 5-6 Aceh Economic Growth 2004-2008 
 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
 
The construction regime that mainly carried out by BRR has been a part of the infamous 
practice of collusion between business and politics in Indonesia in the construction sector. 
Construction was a part of Indonesia’s planned economy since the beginning of Suharto’s New 
Order. The Indonesian development strategy under the Suharto administration was 
structured into gradual phases of five-year plans, called Repelita (Five Year Development 
Plan). The first five-year plan was launched in 1969 by concentrating on agriculture and 
infrastructure (Ricklefs, 2001). The development of infrastructure had created the 
construction industry throughout the country. Due to the lucrative nature of the construction 
business, it eventually led to collusive practices, predatory behaviour and heavily political 
interference (Aspinall, 2009b). According to Collier and Hoffler (2005), infrastructure and the 
construction sector are prone to corruption because the capital must be designed specifically 
for installation and related to the “nature of network” of construction activity that requires 





Contractors or people that are responsible for construction projects often play a dual role in 
business and politics. They can be awarded the construction project due to close relations with 
a politician, or they are actually politicians who own a construction company. The non-
technical aspect of being a kontraktor in Indonesia is further explained by Myrttinen (2012): 
   
“Being a kontraktor, as Indonesians term, it does not necessarily mean one or 
one’s company carry out reconstruction efforts or provides real services, but 
rather that one is in a position to facilitate deals and receive commissions” 
(Myrttinen, 2012: 234)  
 
The major infrastructure projects post-tsunami were mainly carried out by state-owned civil 
engineering companies such as PT Wijaya Karya, PT PP, PT Waskita Karya, PT Adhi Karya, 
PT Istaka Karya, PT Hutama Karya and PT Nindya Karya (Prasetyo and Aditjondro, 
2009:198). These companies are managed by the umbrella of the Department of Public Works. 
However, several private-local enterprises also took part in this lucrative business such as H. 
T. Alaidinsyah (Haji Tito), an Acehnese contractor with the ownership of heavy equipment for 
road and bridge construction (Prasetyo and Aditjondro, 2009).  
 
 Another group that enjoyed a large share of this construction business was former GAM 
members. They entered the business as materials supplier or construction contractors through 
the structure of KPA (Komite Peralihan Aceh/Aceh Transitional Committee) as GAM’s civil 
combatant organization (Stange and Patock, 2010). After winning seats in Aceh’s politics, 
GAM expanded their influences in the construction business as contractors through the KPA 
network. Since KPA is a civil organisation, its members cannot be banned from joining in bids 
for construction works15. However, due to the close connection with GAM elites in government 
sectors, contractors from KPA knew how to place the right bid and also often won the contract 
(Aspinall 2009b). It was helped by the presence of GAM elite in BRR, such as Teuku 
Kamaruzzaman, the former GAM negotiator and the head of BRR’s executive agency (Aspinall, 
2009b).  The leaders of KPA were usually awarded the major contract by the provincial 
government, the BRR and national government. Two examples were the national government 
project of a major bridge in Lhokseumawe and the BRR project of the construction of metal 
frames for tsunami houses in Calang (Aceh West Coast), both are valued at approximately US$ 
2.2 million and were won by Pulo Gadeng Company owned by Muzakkir Manaf (Aspinall, 
2009b).  
                                                        
15Based on Government Regulation Number 6/1974, certain categories of government officer/civil servant and 




In addition to close-knit connections with GAM representatives in BRR, the former GAM 
contractors were facilitated by the opportunity given by foreign donors. In order to provide 
better chances to former rebels to participate in the post-conflict economy, international aid 
agencies such as USAID hired several of them as subcontractors to supply materials or do 
minor construction works (Gelling, 2009). However, the foreign agencies must face the 
problem of extortion or sabotage, such as roadblocks if they do not want to accept the marked-
up material (Gelling, 2009). The poor quality of the construction work done by former GAM 
contractors has also become a concern, as expressed by one respondent:  
The former combatants who are doing construction work and who establish a 
company for reconstruction do not have skills, or just very modest skills (PA 1, 
personal interview, 18 September 2012). 
There is also concern about coercive and intimidating practices used by GAM for securing 
contracts. The existence of KPA which was previously intended as a civil organisation for 
helping to transform GAM has grown into a politically powerful institution. Their roles vary 
from bidding for construction contracts, collecting funds for Partai Aceh, gathering votes at 
election time, and providing security at the local level (Barron, Rahmant & Nugroho: 2013) 
The connection between the construction business and politics is not exclusive to Aceh. The 
Global Corruption Report with Special Focus on Corruption in Construction and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction (Transparency International, 2005) provides global case studies of the nexus 
between politics and business in the construction industry from Asia and Africa including 
India, The Philippines, Lesotho, Iraq and in Europe, Italy and Germany.  However, the cases 
in post-conflict areas like Aceh are more extreme because of the legacy of violent conflict (Van 
Klinken and Aspinall: 2011). GAM members quickly turned into construction contracts, 
relying on influence, patronage, and coercion to influence business. Apart from construction 
industries, former combatants were also economically dominant in other business sectors, 
such as sand mining and plantations (PA4, personal interview, 18 September 2012).  The 
involvement of GAM members in construction sectors has made them major beneficiaries of 
the peace dividend. Illicit practices of former combatants in the aftermath of the peace 
agreement are not exclusive to Indonesia. It might be necessary to buy spoilers and to keep 
the durable peace. In the long run, this collusive practice might threaten the foundation of 
peace, as it gradually undermines trust from the public and widening of the income gap 
between the wealthy and poor former combatants. The conflict might arise from the 
dissatisfied rank and file combatants who did not enjoy the fair share of the reconstruction 
fund. Civilians were also disappointed by the monopoly of GAM in the reconstruction sector 





Throughout the section on BRR and post-conflict economic reconstruction, it can be seen that 
post-conflict economic development in Aceh is consolidated by establishing an institution with 
limited participation in the first phase. BRR was set up in the immediate aftermath of the 
tsunami and peace agreement to manage the enormous funds of the reconstruction and 
reintegration programs. The establishment of BRR has eventually created GAM participation 
in post-conflict economic development. It integrated the former combatants to maintain the 
peace by extending them a large share of the fund as “indirect peace dividend” either by the 
participation in BRR structure or by becoming the contractors of reconstruction work. 
However, this participation only occurred within the GAM elite and did not create a spillover 
effect to rank and file soldiers, the reality that marked this first phase of post-conflict economic 
development in Aceh as a patron-client economic imperative.    
5.4 BRA: The Institutionalisation of Reintegration  
Although the DDR (Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration) provision is not part of 
the economic section in the MoU Helsinki, the reintegration of combatants is one of the crucial 
components of the social-economic settlement in Aceh. The United Nations Integrated 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) offers the following 
definition: 
 
Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and 
gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social 
and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in 
communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country 
and national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance 
(Specht, 2010: 2)  
 
Reintegration is among the first programmes in the peacebuilding phase that could be used to 
restore the eroding legitimacy of state (Barron, 2009). It occurs because reintegration involves 
combatants, a group in the insurgency movement who stood at the front line during open fire 
with the government army and experienced direct human rights violations. The integration of 
former combatants into society, equipped with sufficient funds and suitable jobs is crucial to 
prevent conflict from resuming (Barron et al. 2013). It can be explained if we look at the 
composition of ex-combatants. As soldiers, it is not surprising that 75% are between 18-35 
years old (Frodin, 2008). Many were school leavers and unemployed, the most common 
demographics features for recruitment into insurgency (Brainwathe et al., 2012). A high level 




and Heffler, 2002).  Thus, a well-planned and well-executed reintegration program is 
beneficial in strengthening the legitimacy of central government post-conflict.  
 
5.4.1 Reintegration Beneficiaries and Assistance  
The peace agreement regulates the transformation from soldier to civilian through the 
provisions of reintegration aid, pardoned political prisoners, former combatants and other 
groups, and rehabilitation of damaged property during conflict. The MoU stipulates an 
allocation of housing, farmland, employment or social security to support their livelihood. The 
MoU also regulates that the responsibility for such programmes rested with the Indonesian 
and Aceh governments, not international donors. Nevertheless, international agencies played 
an initial substantial role by conducting a community-based peace dividend program (not 
individually based) and livelihood improvement programmes (Barron et al.: 2013, UNDP, 
2010). Table 5.7 shows the distribution of the reintegration funds from the national and 
provincial budgets. It could be seen that the contribution to the reintegration program from 
the provincial budget started in 2008, the first year of the allocation of the Special Autonomy 
Fund to Aceh.  
 
Table 5-7 Source of Aceh Reintegration Funds 
 
Source: Avonious (2012)  
 
Based on MoU’s provision, a special provincial agency was established in February 2006 to 
manage the reintegration process, namely the Board for the Reintegration into Society of 
Former GAM Members, later shortened to the Aceh-Peace Reintegration Board or BRA. The 
tasks of BRA covered the implementation and monitoring of reintegration programs as well 






Generally, the type of assistance of the reintegration program in Aceh could be classified into 
three major categories. The first is cash allowances in the form of diyat (individual cash 
disbursement to former combatant households that had lost family members). The second 
category is the economic empowerment fund through the livelihood program assistance. The 
last is in-kind assistance that comprises of housing settlement and farming land. Diyat was 
not the original stipulation of reintegration assistance but the idea from acting governor Azwar 
Abubakar. The detail of the type of beneficiaries and the amount of funds is depicted in table 
5.8, shown below: 
 
Table 5-8 The Type of BRA Beneficiaries and Assistance 
Category  Planned Number of 
Beneficiaries  
Form of Assistance  Amount (US$)  
GAM Combatants 3,000 Cash  2,500/person  
GAM Non-
Combatants  
6,200  Cash  1,000/person  
Political Prisoners  2,035 Cash  1000/person  
Indonesia Pro-
Militia 
5,000 Cash  1000/person  
GAM who 
surrendered before 
the MoU (and 
usually joined the 
militia 
groups) 
3,204 Cash  500/person  
Individual victims of 
conflict (mid to 
late 2007) 
1.059  Cash  1000/person 
Households that had 
lost a family 
member (diyat) 
33.424  Cash  300/person/year 
Households with 
damaged housing 
31,187  Cash Allocation  3,500/house  
Physically-disabled 
persons 
14,932  Cash  1,000/person  
(Source: Barron, et al., 2013)  
 
Table 5.8 shows that a variety of beneficiaries were well accommodated, including two 
conflicting parties, GAM and the militia. Assistance was also given to physically disabled 
persons and the widows and families that lost a family member. Hence, the application in the 




programmes experienced difficulties caused by the lack of a mechanism to verify claims and 
monitor the process (Barron et al., 2013). On the other hand, Marhaban (2012b) criticised the 
overly bureaucratic procedures of individual accounting verification required by the central 
government. It led to frequently delayed fund transfers and suspicions of fraud (Marhaban, 
2012b). Marhaban’s opinion is affirmed by one respondent from a civil society organisation 
who criticised the role of the central government in reintegration efforts in Aceh. 
 
There was no intention from the central government to treat policies on Aceh in 
the framework of the extraordinary case because Aceh is at a post-conflict stage. 
Aceh is considered the same as other provinces in Indonesia. In the reintegration 
programme, the requirements to verify beneficiaries were complicated. The 
people in BRA had to work hard on verifying data. It led to incomplete 
reintegration programme because BRA always has a problem with the data of 
beneficiaries. Because GAM only gave 3400 number of their member to get 
reintegration programme in the peace agreement. However, the number is much 
higher. After the conflict, ex GAM transformed as a civil organisation called KPA; 
their number is around 2 million (Personal Interview, CSO 9-B. August 2018). 
 
In order to distribute economic empowerment assistance, the government needed a list of 
3,000 combatants that was based on the list of demobilised combatants in the MoU to be given 
reintegration funds (Barron et al., 2013). It is only a “political number” given by GAM since 
the number exceeds 3000 as in 2008. The total number of ex-combatants, active supporters 
and associated dependants was estimated to be 25000 (Frodin, 2008). In order to be eligible 
to receive the economic empowerment fund, the beneficiaries must submit proposals on their 
future livelihood programmes. BRA could not handle a large number of applications for 
reintegration assistance. Some 40,000-50,000 applications for funding were submitted to 
BRA, leaving the fledgling organisation overwhelmed and incapacitated (Niemi, 2010).  
 
The next BRA programme devoted to housing settlements is seen as necessary not only from 
the physical function but also in terms of sociological meaning. For the beneficiaries of BRA, 
living in someone else house’s is considered “shameful”, showing how important it was for 
beneficiaries to have their own housing (Niemi, 2010). Housing settlement programmes also 
met several problems and shortcomings, particularly on the verification of eligible 
beneficiaries and the involvement of powerful brokers that demanded up to ten per cent of 






Table 5-9 Number of houses and funds disbursed by BRA 
 
Source: Avonious (2012)  
 
The last programme, farming, was delayed until 2018 due to complications surrounding 
overlapping ownership and claiming procedures. In 2017, Fakhrurrazi, the head of BRA, 
lobbied Governor Irwandi to hand over 13,000 hectares of land that did not obtain the renewal 
of cultivation rights under the reintegration program (Kba One, 28 November 2017).  
However, the finding by The World Bank about farming land assistance is worth pondering. 
According to the research, 27% of ex-combatants are reluctant to return as farmers and wanted 
to find other work. It is a reasonable aspiration, as only 30% of ex-combatants and 43% of 
political prisoners had been farmers before the conflict (Niemi, 2010). The allocation of 
farming land thus requires further analysis on its full advantage to the beneficiaries of the 
reintegration programme. 
 
Reintegration in Aceh on a legal basis is stipulated in the MoU and governor decrees. Only in 
2015 was the legal basis strengthened by the promulgation of Qanun No 6/2015, about the 
Aceh Reintegration Body. It is an indication that reintegration is intended to be a short-term 
and ad hoc program. The indication of reinsertion was asserted by Nur Djuli, a former 
chairperson of BRA: 
 
What has happened about integration in Aceh is merely reinsertion, in which 
former combatants were given some money upon coming out so they could 
survive for a while before being enrolled in training programs to learn new skills 
(Nur Djuli, The Jakarta Post, 2014). 
 
The description of “reinsertion” of former combatants by Nur Djuli reflects partial 
reintegration, a condition where a former combatant can integrate with society, albeit only 
partially, where they can live their new life in peaceful times independently with sufficient 




allowances and housing settlement, which followed general practice by international 
peacebuilders elsewhere.  
 
5.4.2 BRA Institutional Trajectory  
Structurally, BRA is a provincial agency with its activities supervised by the governor but 
primarily controlled by the central government. Members of BRA are selected by the governor 
and consist of representatives of the provincial government, former members of GAM, 
intellectuals, religious leaders, NGO activists and members of some pro-government militias 
(Mangkusubroto, Sugiarto, 2007: 35). BRA was expanded into the district by the instruction 
from the Governor to establish district level BRA offices. During the early phase from its 
establishment in February 2006, BRA was led by Usman Hasan, the former Indonesian 
Ambassador for Mexico, and Prof Yusni Sabi, a respected academic from Syiah Kuala 
University.  
 
In 2007, after Irwandi had been elected as governor, he appointed Nur Djuli, a former GAM 
member and peace negotiator to direct the BRA (Brainwathe et al., 2010). Nur Djuli 
discontinued cooperation with the World Bank due to dissatisfaction towards community-
based assistance and opted to develop programs that focused on individual beneficiaries 
(Avonious, 2011). The preference of individual cash disbursement indicates the patron-client 
relationship in the reintegration programme, as personal loyalty is easier to guarantee than 
through community-based loyalty. During Nur Djuli’s leadership, BRA started to work more 
systematically and professionally (Avonious, 2012). In 2010 Nur Djuli was replaced by T. M. 
Nazar. TM Nazar performed poorly with unrealistic plans and passivity (Brainwathe et al., 
2010).  Due to disgruntlement with TM Nazar leadership, the governor appointed Dr Haniff 
Asmara, the former secretary of BRA, as a new head of this reintegration institution. Governor 
Irwandi seemed to have little interest in the long-term establishment of BRA and decided to 
close the agency in 2012.  
 
In 2013, during Zaini Abdullah’s governorship, there was an attempt to maintain the existence 
in a reintegration institution through the establishment of BP2A (Badan Penguatan 
Perdamaian Aceh/Aceh Peace Strengthening Board). The advocates of the establishment of 
BP2A based their argument on the unfinished reintegration programs such as farmland 
allocation, housing and cash allowances and was urged by the mandate of the reintegration 
process in the MoU Helsinki. However, others opposed the establishment of BP2A or any other 
ad hoc reintegration institution, instead preferring to hand over the reintegration process to 
the related SKPA (Satuan Kerja Pelaksana Aceh/Aceh Government Work Unit) for efficiency 




national ministries. For example, the disbursement of cash allowances for conflict victims 
could be channelled through the regional office of social services and the allocation of 
farmland could be coordinated under the regional land agency.  
 
Despite the criticism that is specifically voiced by good governance and anti-corruption civil 
society organisations, the process of re-establishing reintegration institutions proceeded as 
planned.  BP2A was formed under Governor Decree No 2/2013 and led by Mirza Ismail, 
former Pidie regent and former head of the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Pidie from GAM. 
Mirza Ismail resigned in 2014 and replaced by Maimun Ramli. In 2015, BP2A was renamed 
back as BRA. The existence of this reintegration institution was strengthened and consolidated 
by the promulgation of Qanun No 6/2015. Before 2015, the establishment of the first phase 
BRA and BP2A were only supported by Government Decrees. From 2015 to 2018, BRA phase 
2 has been led by three chairpersons: Bukhari Abdul Gani, Fakhrurrazi and M Yunus. In 
addition to criticism from civil society organisations, BRA phase 2 was also protested by 
Forkab (Forum Komunikasi Anak Bangsa/ Communication Forum for the Sons of Nations), 
group of combatants who surrendered to the Indonesian Military before the peace agreement. 
For most people in Aceh, Forkab is associated closely with the anti-separatist and pro-
government movement. Forkab protested article 4 clause 1 Qanun 6/2015, which stipulates 
that “the appointment and removal and of head of BRA is conducted by Governor based on 
written suggestion from the head of provincial KPA”, and clause 4, which states that “the 
appointment and removal of the head of BRA task force (Satpel BRA) in district/city level is 
conducted by the governor under the recommendation from regent/mayor that considering 
written suggestion from head of district KPA” (Aceh Satu, 18 January 2018). Forkab rejected 
the clauses and criticised the suggestion from KPA as the effort to reduce governor authority 
and the violation of Law No 11/2006 on The Governing of Aceh (Aceh Satu, 18 January 2018). 
Forkab’s objection about KPA involvement in BRA leadership is based on the concern that 
BRA would be heavily controlled by GAM interest.  
 
BRA as an ad hoc institution is prone to exploitation by the ruling government as their political 
vehicle, especially in a political setting where the former combatants won the election and hold 
the political power. The reintegration fund for their fellow former combatants is easily 
manipulated or mismanaged to gain more control or political support as a cash disbursement 
program is a lucrative aspect in political competition.  
 
According to research conducted by Crisis Management Center Finland, the issues connected 
with the functioning of BRA constitute a major problem in reintegration (Niemi, 2010). It is 




seen as a bureaucratic organisation with inadequate capacity in delivering services for the 
reintegration program (Niemi, 2010). Muhammad Nazar, Vice Governor of Aceh, expressed 
his disappointment over the poor performance of BRA: 
 
The situation in BRA is complicated; they have this commander, that 
commander, unclear programs and recommendations. An integration body like 
BRA cannot only support one group or interest. Their program should be 
inclusive and targeted to both GAM and non-GAM. They should incorporate 
programmes that increase productivity, not only focus on cash distribution 
(Nazar, Kompas, 5 January 2011).  
 
The complaint about the partiality of the reintegration program is voiced by one respondent 
from a women’s organisation: 
 
Among the groups of women that we assisted, they aware of the existence of BRA. 
They acknowledged the role of BRA, but they think BRA has not been entirely 
beneficial for them. Why? Because the major beneficiary is ex-combatant. How 
about civilian who had been killed? The civilian who also became casualties of 
conflict? BRA did not pay sufficient attention to them (Personal Interview, WA-
14B, August 2018). 
 
The development of BRA as an reintegration institution in Aceh portrays the peculiarity of 
state-led peacebuilding. In most peacebuilding processes elsewhere, DDR is primarily 
undertaken by external actors, either the United Nations or regional organisations, but in 
Aceh, there were only a few NGOs or inadequate international involvement in the 
reintegration process due to its highly political circumstances surrounding reintegration 
issues.  They have tended to avoid political issues, which happened to be the core of the 
problem in Aceh and the driving factor of the peace process (Frodin, 2008). It causes less 
monitoring systems and advice from the various stakeholders of peacebuilding to improve the 
process of reintegration. The complex and multi-dimensional task of BRA is therefore 
primarily borne by a local institution with inadequate capacity coupled with little coordination 
and assistance from the national government. 
 
BRA is the illustration of the institutionalisation of post-conflict ad hoc agency. The continued 
establishment of the reintegration agency is indeed pivotal in ensuring a comprehensive 
reintegration program. However, the intention to build an institution is not followed by proper 




government appeared to transfer legitimacy to Aceh’s local government to manage the 
reintegration programme, but some Acehnese perceived it was done halfheartedly. It was not 
the limitation of funds or regulations which impeded the establishment of the agency – it was 
proven by the smooth process and minimum intervention from the central government 
towards the re-establishment of BRA – but through complex procedures and consultation. 
On the other hand, BRA is utilised by GAM to fulfil its short-term legitimacy by establishing a 
patron-client network with the former combatant as their important stakeholder. Since 
reconstruction businesses were unable to absorb all GAM combatants into the post-conflict 
economy, the reintegration programme was another opportunity to build patron-client 
networks between GAM elite and GAM foot soldiers through the direct cash disbursement 
program and in-kind assistance. While GAM has been successfully holding a grip over this 
reintegration program, it comes at the expense of affected civilians as non-GAM victims. This 
group is often neglected due to the strong domination of GAM in the reintegration program.  
 
In the matter of timing, BRA is undergoing a distinct trajectory of transition. According to 
Usman Al-Farlaky, a member of the legislation committee that is responsible for preparing 
Qanun on Reintegration, BRA is designed as an ad hoc institution until the entire reintegration 
process in Aceh is completed (Serambinews, 31 Agustus 2015). He emphasises that 
reintegration is part of peace consolidation, a sustainable and systematic process that aims to 
build a sense of security and welfare. He does not specify how BRA could reach that objective 
and how to determine the completion of the reintegration process (Serambinews, 31 Agustus 
2015). Reintegration in Aceh is the example of “frameless transition; both in terms of (not) 
having a specified timeframe (and thus milestones), real or imagined, and (not) having defined 
and mutually agreed on aims and objectives” (Tornquist, 2009: 375). 
 
 
5.5 The Special Autonomy Fund as Peace Dividend in Aceh 
One of the most important instruments to alleviate economic grievances in Aceh is the peace 
dividend which takes the form of the extended Special Autonomy Fund.  It is one of the 
essential characteristics of state-led peacebuilding in Aceh, as the national government 
oversaw most of the programmes of peacebuilding and supported it with ample funds. The 
imbalance of the past unfair distribution of Aceh’s natural wealth is being alleviated by 
granting a large peace fund which is expected to accelerate economic development in Aceh and 
can bring welfare to the Acehnese people.  
 
Aceh has received the Special Autonomy Fund since 2001, but the amount was increased as a 




Revenue Sharing Fund (Dana Bagi Hasil Sumberdaya Alam/DBH SDA), in which Aceh gains 
a bigger percentage (70 per cent) of oil and gas compared to other provinces. This fund is also 
called the “Additional Oil and Gas Profit Sharing Fund” in article 182 of LoGA. This provision 
is an effort to redress the grievance about the imbalance of the profit sharing from oil and gas 
which has been perceived by the majority of Acehnese as centre-periphery economic 
exploitation. 
 
Figure 5-3 Allocation of Additional Revenue Sharing from Oil and Gas for 
District/City Government in Aceh 
 
Source: World Bank (2008)  
 
Figure 5.3 describes how LoGA regulates the utilisation of the Natural Resources Revenue 
Sharing Fund, with Aceh’s government obtaining 55% from oil and 40% from gas. Thirty per 
cent of this fund must be allocated to education, and 70 per cent is granted to 
intergovernmental sharing (Islahudin, 2010:4)  
 
The other component of the peace dividend is the additional two per cent share of the General 
Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum/DAU) for 15 years. It will then continue at one more 
per cent for five more years until 2027, as shown in figure 5.3.  DAU is the new system of 
Indonesia’s inter-governmental transfer as defined in Law No 25/1999 on decentralisation 
(Resusudarmo, Barr, Dermawan and McCarthy, 2006: 65). According to Article 1, Law No 
22/1999 about decentralisation, “this fund is allocated from the national government budget 




regions to fund their respective expenditure within the context of implementing 
decentralisation”.16 The additional 2 per cent share is an effort to redress the imbalance of 
previous decades of the distribution natural resources, as the oil and gas in Aceh is already in 
decline. To avoid a confusing word swap, these two schemes of peace dividend are called the 
Special Autonomy Fund (Dana Otonomi Khusus-Dana Otsus).  
 
Figure 5-4 Allocation of Special Autonomy Fund into City/District 
 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
 
The utilisation of the Special Autonomy Fund is regulated in the Law of Governing Aceh 
(LoGA). It is aimed to finance the following development programmes: 
 
1. Development and maintenance of infrastructure 
2. Economic empowerment of people 
3. Eradicating poverty 
4. Education 
5. Social 
6. Health (Law of Governing Aceh, article 183). 
 
The allocation of the Peace Dividend in Aceh is channelled to infrastructure, education and 
health care, following the arrangement stipulated in LoGA. This planning adopts Hartwick’s 
Rule, “a rule that requires a nation to invest all rent earned from exhaustible resources 
currently extracted” (Kumar, Managi, 2009: 31). Furthermore, Sinnot, Nash, De La Torre 
(2010; 62) assert that “if a country aims to maintain future welfare, the income from currently 
                                                        




extracted natural resources must be invested to create human and physical capital”. It is 
affirmed in article 158 of LoGA “The Government and Aceh, district/city Governments develop 
a populist economy, education and balanced health as the compensation for the exploitation 
of non-renewable natural resources” (Law of Governing of Aceh, article 158). Human capital 
can be cultivated by promoting the education and health sector, while physical capitals refer 
to infrastructure. 
 
Figure 5-5 Aceh Provincial and District Revenue 1999-2008 
 
Source: World Bank (2008)  
 
 From Figure 5.4, we can see that the Special Autonomy Fund had contributed significantly to 
Aceh’s provincial and district revenue. Aceh provincial and district revenue started to escalate 
and reached a peak in 2008 after the allocation of the Special Autonomy Fund. Under 
Governor Irwandi’s administration, the committee was established to decide how to allocate 
the oil Special Autonomy Fund. The allocation was articulated in the Government of Aceh Mid-
Term Development Plan period 2007-2011 and set out as follows:  
(1) Strengthening of governance, political processes and the law 
(2) Economic empowerment, employment opportunities and poverty reduction 
(3) Development and maintenance of investments in infrastructure 
(4) Development of education that is of high quality and accessible 
(5) Increase in quality of health care services 
(6) Development of religion, society and culture 





Among the five priorities, education and health were the priorities of Governor Irwandi. 
During the election campaign, Irwandi promised to allocate a large proportion of the fund to 
these two sectors (Hillman, 2011). Irwandi’s policy echoes Collier’s (2006) argument about 
the importance of inclusive social expenditures such as expansion in primary health care and 
education for growth in post-conflict settings that are often deteriorating during the prolonged 
conflict. In other words, there is a need to put greater emphasis on social inclusion and hold 
macroeconomic and long-term policy (Von Hehn, 2011: 294). The items in the planning were 
based on the stipulation in LoGA with some additions on disaster risk and governance, two 
important subjects for the development of Aceh post-conflict. This section will focus on the 
disbursement of Aceh Special Autonomy Fund in infrastructure, health, and education. 
 
Between 2008 and 2010, the realisation of the Special Autonomy Fund can be seen from the 
table below: 
 










Source: Asrizal Luthfi, Impact of Aceh’s Additional Budget from Special Autonomy and Oil-Gas 
Revenue Sharing Fund to Poverty Reduction in Aceh, paper presented in ICAIOS Seminar, 2011. Data 
from Aceh Development Planning Agency  
 
From the table, it can be concluded that infrastructure acquires the highest proportion of 
funds, followed by economic development, education, and health. The discrepancy between 
the target and realisation of each expenditure item is quite significant, indicating a mismatch 
between planning and implementation. It resulted from the lack of fiscal competence of Aceh’s 
local bureaucrats in legislative and executive branches, and the poor communication between 
those involved in executing the development projects. 
 
Infrastructure is allotted the most significant share of the fund, with stark disparities in 
spending compared to other sectors such as economic development, education and health. 
According to the LoGA, infrastructure is one of the priorities to be financed by the Special 
Autonomy Fund. Between 2008 and 2010, infrastructure always received the biggest share of 
the fund. Most of the fund for infrastructure, 58%, is spent on road and bridge construction 
and maintenance. Allocation for irrigation is 11%, river conservation and flood control 9.8%, 
village infrastructure 8.7%, and housing 6.6% (World Bank, 2011).  
 
However, from the survey conducted by the World Bank (World Bank, 2011) the level of 
satisfaction with infrastructure development is low compared to other sectors. The 
dissatisfaction occurred due to the poor quality of the construction and unfinished projects. 
Another shortcoming of the infrastructure in Aceh is that most of the fund is allocated to small 
scale projects below IDR 200 million (approximately USD 20,000)17. Based on Presidential 
Decree No 70/2012, the procurement of goods/construction works/others are set at the 
                                                        
17Interview with Syardani Muhammad Syarif, former GAM spokeperson. He is currently a staff in Aceh Human 
Resources Development Committee (LembagaPengembanganSumberDayaManusia-LPSDM), cited from article on 





maximum of IDR 200,000,000.00 (two hundred million rupiahs) that are implemented 
through direct appointment.  This regulation gives an opportunity to newly established and 
small contractor companies which only have low skills to win projects, often through collusive 
practices such as having been presented in previous sections on BRR and post-conflict 
reconstruction.  
 
Small-scale projects such as building paving blocks or fences will not have a significant impact 
on the broader community.  Borrowing the term used by Muhammad Syarif (Transfer Besar 
Kawalan Longgar, Jawa Pos, n.d) development in Aceh is interest-based, not need-based. It is 
built to cater to political interests by creating patron-client networks rather than focusing on 
a long-term development strategy to create welfare and stimulate economic growth.  
 
5.5.1 Education  
The importance of education in post-conflict development in Aceh is manifested in the 30% 
allocation for education in Additional Revenue Sharing from Oil and Gas and one of the sectors 
financed by the Special Autonomy Fund. Until 2027, when the Special Autonomy Fund is 
phased out, Aceh will receive IDR 34, 7 trillion (USD 23 million) in education funding. One of 
the indicators of the progress of education is by measuring the Human Development Index 
(HDI). Aceh’s Human Development Index (HDI) was quite good in the past. Based on official 
statistics, in 1996 Aceh’s HDI was 69.4 with it ranking 9th out of 26 Indonesian provinces 
while during the 2004-2010 period, Aceh’s HDI gave the province a rank of 17-18th of 33 
provinces (Barron et al., 2013). In 2016, Aceh ‘s HDI was steadily progressing and in the 
relatively same level with the national index (CMI, 2017).  
Figure 5-6 Aceh Human Development Index 2010-2017 
 





However, the vast amount for education in Aceh has not been properly and strategically 
allocated for increasing the quality of education. As shown by Figure 5.7, the biggest 
proportion of the Special Autonomy Fund for the education sector was allocated to building 
classrooms and school fences, expenses that do not significantly contribute to Aceh’s 
educational excellence. As mentioned earlier, such minor construction projects are normally 
valued below IDR 200 million. Because government regulation does not require a tender 
process for low-value projects, the local government can employ direct appointment, a practice 
that is prone to patron-client network. 
 
Figure 5-7 Utilisation of Special Autonomy Fund in Education Sector based on 
the type of expenses 2012 (In Percentage) 
 
 Source: ACDP (2014) 
 
Figure 5-8 The Utilisation of Special Autonomy Fund in the Education Sector in 
Aceh Based on the Value of the Project 2013 (In Percentage) 
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Another landmark of the utilisation of the Special Autonomy Fund in Aceh is by the 
establishment of the Aceh Scholarship Commission, an ambitious tertiary education program 
that sends Acehnese to study in prominent universities in Indonesia or overseas. From its 
commencement in 2009 to 2013, this programme has spent a total of IDR 609 Billion, sending 
6031 scholarship recipients to pursue domestic or international postgraduate education 
(ACDP, 2014). This program is not free of problems. Lack of strategic analysis of scholarships 
has caused unemployability of the scholarship awardees upon their return in Aceh (Putri, 
2018). Most recipients aspired to work in the public sector, partly due to the stagnation of the 
Aceh economy and lack of investment that leads to limited work opportunities. There is also a 
problem of misuse of scholarship funds by the recipient, which they spend on non-educational 
expenses.  
 
5.5.2 Health  
As one of the priority sectors in the allocation of the Special Autonomy Fund, health is an 
exemplary case in the utilisation of peace dividends in Aceh. In 2010, Governor Irwandi 
launched Aceh Health Insurance (Jaminan Kesehatan Aceh/JKA)18, a provincial-level health 
insurance scheme for Acehnese. This populist programme has been praised as one of the 
achievements of Aceh’s local government post-conflict. This insurance offers a simple process 
for people to access health service and facility. Unlike national health insurance that is often 
criticised of its layered referral system, BPJS (Badan Pengelola Jaminan Kesehatan/National 
Health Insurance or JKN/Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional/National Health Insurance 
Programme), JKA beneficiaries are only required to show their ID card to access the health 
service in all hospitals in Aceh.  In 2010, JKA had spent IDR 241 Billion or 15 per cent of the 
Special Autonomy Fund. In 2011, it used 9.5 per cent of the Special Autonomy Fund, and by 
2017, IDR 773 Billion of the Special Autonomy Fund had been disbursed to finance JKA (Putri, 
2018). 
 
Despite the compliment as one of a successful programs of local government in Aceh, JKA 
under Irwandi administration was severely criticised for its lack of means-testing. All 
Acehnese, regardless of their economic status and income bracket, are eligible to access free 
health services through JKA (Cahyono, 2016). During Zaini Abdullah’s governorship, JKA was 
under BPK’s (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan/ State Audit Agency) scrutiny due to IDR 63 Billion 
potential loss. This occurred because the Aceh local government paid IDR 63 Billion to JKA 
beneficiaries who failed to validate their ID card (Putri, 2018). 
                                                        






In sum, from the three sectors of the allocated Special Autonomy Fund, infrastructure, 
education and health, the fund is primarily disbursed to finance small scale projects and 
populist programmes. Infrastructure is dominated by low quality and small projects that are 
centred around GAM elite and contractors, while health and education are mostly invested in 
directing assistance in the form of health insurance and scholarship. This pattern of fund 
disbursement could be understood from the necessity of former combatants to create 
legitimacy and maintain loyalty and trust from their beneficiaries through the patron-client 
network. However, as will be further elaborated in the next section, it leads to difficulty in 
generating performance legitimacy of the insurgents in post-conflict long term development.  
 
5.5.3 Post Conflict Economic Challenges: Inequality, Poverty and Lack of 
Development Planning  
Poverty alleviation and equal economic development among all districts and municipalities 
are paramount in post-conflict-economic settlements, as the perceived inequality is the major 
contributing factor to the rebellion. However, ten years after its first disbursement, SAF has 
yet to significantly contribute to poverty alleviation in Aceh as demonstrated in the following 
figures. 
 
Figure 5-9 Comparison of Poverty Rate in Aceh and National 
 



















Figure 5-10 Comparison of Poverty Rate in Aceh and National in Post Conflict 
Period (2006-2018) 
 
Source: BPS (Indonesia Statistical Bureau)  
 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 tell us about poverty, conflict and its aftermath. Interestingly, in 2000 
the national poverty rate was higher than might be caused by the residual impact of the Asian 
Financial Crisis experienced by Indonesia. Poverty in Aceh increased significantly in 2002 
after Indonesia stepped into the post-authoritarian era but placed Aceh in security turmoil due 
to martial and civil emergency law. After the 2004 Tsunami and the peace agreement, poverty 
rates in Aceh began to demonstrate a decreasing pattern even though the rate has been higher 
compared to steadily declining pattern in the national average. However, if Aceh is compared 
to other provinces in Indonesia, its poverty rate has placed Aceh as the sixth poorest province 
in Indonesia in 2017, after the Special Autonomy Fund has been allocated for ten years since 
2008 as shown by following figure 5.11.  
Figure 5-11 Ten Provinces with Highest Poverty Rate in Indonesia 2017 
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Table 5.11 shows us a contradictory fact between the amount of provincial budget (Anggaran 
Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah / APBD or APBA in Aceh) and the poverty level. With the 
highest provincial budget derived primarily from the Special Autonomy Fund, Aceh scored as 
the poorest province on the island of Sumatra.  
 
Table 5-11 Provincial Budget and Poverty Rates 
No Province  Provincial Budget  Poverty Rate  
1 Aceh  IDR 14,76 Billion  16,89 % 
2 Bengkulu IDR   3,18 Billion  16,45 % 
3 Lampung IDR   6,80 Billion  13,69% 
4 Sumatera Selatan IDR   7,89 Billion  13,19 %  
5 Sumatera Utara IDR  13,03 Billion 10,22% 
6 Jambi IDR   4,34 Billion   8,19% 
7 Riau  IDR   10.45 Billion   7,78% 
8 Sumatera Barat  IDR     6,24 Billion  6,87% 
9  Riau Islands IDR    3,36 Billion   6.06% 
10 Bangka Belitung  IDR   2,66 Billion 5,20% 
Source: IDeAs (2017)  
 
 
One respondent from a civil society organisation affirmed the condition of inequality in Aceh: 
 
Economic development in Aceh has not reached the ideal condition. After the 
peace agreement, people were more economically confident. There also has been 
some economic stimulus. We can see more shops are opening or other small 
medium enterprises are emerging. However, it is not equal; there are areas, such 
as in Pidie, where people still live below the poverty line. They can meet the basic 
needs but are still far from creating a productive economy (PA2, personal 
interview, 12 September 2012). 
 
One respondent perceives economic inequality as the trigger of the ALA-ABAS partition 
movement. ALA and ABAS are the movements which aspired to create separate provinces 
based on Law No 22/1999 about Decentralisation that authorises the creation of new districts, 
often referred to as pemekaran (blossoming). ALA consists of Aceh central highlands, the 
district of Aceh Tengah, Aceh Tenggara and Aceh Singkil; while ABAS is covering areas along 




Selatan.  One respondent mentioned the nexus between the economic inequality and the 
partition movement within the Aceh province:  
 
Regarding Aceh’s economy, do not only look at Banda Aceh, Pidie and Bireun as 
examples. Please also give attention to Central Aceh or Southeast Aceh. The ALA 
and ABAS partition re-emerged due to the economic inequality in the post-
tsunami period. This issue faded away from 2010 onwards, not because of 
economic satisfaction of the people in those areas, but because people are already 
tired of voicing this aspiration and the political actors behind this issue are no 
longer active (LR3, personal interview, 22 September 2012). 
 
Table 5.12 displays the poverty rate among district and city in Aceh from 2014-2015. The top 
six districts with the relatively persistent rate of 20 per cent are Gayo Lues, Aceh Singkil, Bener 
Meriah, Pidie, Pidie Jaya and West Aceh. The places with the lowest poverty level are all urban 
areas with Banda Aceh being the only area with a single-digit poverty rate and reaching above 
the poverty line.  The data, however, does not entirely confirm the major perception of regional 
inequality Aceh, in which the ethnically distinct (Gayo) central highland is disfranchised 
compared to Acehnese dominated areas. Two highland districts, Bener Meriah and Gayo Lues, 
have indeed constantly been the poorest districts in Aceh for four years. Therefore, Pidie and 
Pidie Jaya GAM strongholds and ethnically homogenous districts are not in a better position. 
While Bener Meriah and Gayo Lues are located in highland areas that represent regional 
development inequality, the position of Pidie and Pidie Jaya indicates the problem is a lack of 
development planning. Pidie is quite special because in addition to being a GAM important 
stronghold it is also the birthplace of Hasan Tiro, the founder of GAM. The Pidie economy 
relies on agriculture and fishing. According to Syarbaini, the head of the Pidie Statistical 
Bureau, the poverty in Pidie is caused by the lack of home industry to process agricultural 
products and modern machinery for rice processing (Serambinews, 1 January 2016). Raw rice 
from Pidie is sold and transported to Medan, North Sumatera for IDR 7 thousand (50 cent 
USD) per kilo. After being processed in Medan, the consumable rice is sold back to Pidie at 
IDR 14 thousand (1 USD) per kilo. The extra cost of rice processing could be reduced by 
purchasing modern machinery to enhance the agricultural sector in Pidie and lowering 
poverty levels.  In other words, economic inequality is not always correlated with local power 
politics but appears also be caused by the lack of development planning in the disbursement 





Table 5-12 Poverty Rate in Districts and Cities in Aceh 2014-2017 
District/City  2014 2015 2016 2017 
Gayo Lues  21,43 21,95 21.86 21,97 
Aceh Singkil 17,77  21,72 21,60 22,11 
Bener Meriah  22,45 21,55 21,43 21,14 
Pidie Jaya  21,78 21,40 21,18 21,82 
Pidie  20,29 21,18 21,15 21,43 
Aceh Barat  22,97 21,46 20,38 20,18 
Simeulue 19.92 20,43 19,93 20,20 
Subussalam  19.72 20,39 19,57 19,71 
Nagan Raya 20.85 20,13 19,25 19,34 
North Aceh  19,58 19,20 19,46 19,78 
Southwest Aceh  17.99 18,25 18,03 18,31 
Sabang  17.02 17,69 17,33 17,66 
Central Aceh   16,99 17,51 16,64 16,84 
Bireun 16,94 16,94 15,95 15,87 
Aceh Jaya  16,52 15,93 15,01 14,85 
Aceh Besar  16,13 15,93 15,55 15,41 
East Aceh 15,88 15,85 15,06 15,25 
Southeast Aceh  13,75 14,91 14,46  14,86 
Aceh Tamiang  14,58 14,57 14,51 14,69 
South Aceh  12,79 13,24 13,48 14,07 
Lhokseumawe  11,93 12,16 11,98 12,32 
Langsa 12,08 11,62 11,09 11,24 
Banda Aceh   7,78    7,72   7,41 7,44 
Source: IDeAS (2017)  
 
Aceh will only repeat history if the economic inequality that is a legacy from the conflict period 
is sustained during peacetime. It would duplicate the internal colonialism that was 
experienced by Acehnese during the conflict era. During the conflict period, Acehnese 
perceived that they were being colonialised by the central government due to economic 
marginalisation and the exploitation of natural resources; in peace, the pattern has re-
emerged. The GAM-dominated government could be seen as new “internal colonialism” 
especially by people from ethnically distinct areas that are politically disadvantaged and 





The management of the Special Autonomy Fund in Aceh is a challenge in post-conflict 
peacebuilding development in Aceh. Unlike reconstruction or reintegration funds that are 
designed to be short term and managed by ad hoc institutions, the Special Autonomy Fund is 
a long-term peace dividend and engine of local economic development. Three major problems 
are identified here: changeable regulations, the disproportion of fund allocations and lack of 
strategic planning. During 2008 to 2015, there have been several changes in the regulation of 
the Special Autonomy Fund. In the early years, Aceh relied on LoGA as the guidance for SAF 
allocation and to RPJP (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang / Long Term Development 
Planning) and Action Planning in provincial and district level for the planning of the programs. 
The provincial government managed the entire fund. In 2010, based on Qanun No 2/2008, 
the allocation and planning of the programs were based on RPJP and Action Planning in 
provincial and district level (Bappeda Aceh, 2015). The percentage of SAF between province 
and district is 40% and 60%, but the management of the fund is determined by the provincial 
government by applying a ceiling fund. The current SAF management is based on Qanun No 
2/2013, in which the allocation between province and district is 60% -40%, but the provincial 
government will disburse the fund through direct transfer to district/city. The allocation and 
program planning are guided by RPJP and RPJM in provincial and district level. In addition 
to provincial and district level planning, there is Musrenbang Otsus (Community Consultation 
on Development Planning for Special Autonomy Fund) at a provincial level that is mainly 
tasked to overview the district/city and provincial planning of the utilisation of SAF (Bappeda 
Aceh, 2015). 
 
The most striking challenge in managing the Special Autonomy Fund in Aceh is the 
disproportionate use of funds. The problem of a massive percentage of small value projects in 
infrastructure and education that is mentioned in the previous section is depicted in provincial 
and district/city data of the all priority sectors of the Special Autonomy Fund as shown in 










Figure 5-13 The Utilisation of SAF based on Value of the Project at District/City 
Level 2014 
 
Source: Bappeda Aceh (2015) 
 
Small-value projects have been creating a problem for monitoring and evaluation programs. 
These projects are mostly implemented by direct appointment and could be executed without 
undergoing supervision and the monitoring system by LKPP (Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan 
Barang Jasa Pemerintah/ National Public Procurement Agency). Due to the domination of 
GAM in local government as a result of their victory in local elections, these small projects 
could easily be awarded to fellow GAM contractors. Thus, the patron-client based economy 
that had been initiated in post-tsunami reconstruction is sustained in peacetime by utilising 
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While there is confusion and dissatisfaction towards the regulation and management of SAF 
at provincial and district level, the primary challenge of SAF is the absence of the Aceh 
Regional Development Master Plan of Aceh Development. Bappeda or the Aceh Regional 
Planning Agency still prepared the plan in 2015 in order to lay a stronger foundation for SAF 
utilisation in its last phase (Bappeda Aceh, 2015). The absence of a master plan, changeable 
rules and lack of competent human resources in development planning, budgeting and 
execution marred by post-conflict patronage politics have made Acehnese almost lose the 
potential peace dividend that aims to redress prominent grievances post-conflict. In the long 
run, the government of Aceh must be able to conceptualise a macroeconomic strategy in 
utilising the Special Autonomy Fund. One respondent stresses the importance of investment 
in Aceh:  
 
The economy in Aceh is driven by the huge amount of funds from reconstruction 
and special autonomy, but it will not be sufficient in the long run. The economic 
condition will be difficult without investment and a clear development strategy. 
Aceh must adopt an outward-looking economic policy (Personal Interview LR4, 
January 2013). 
 
Another concern is the question over the involvement of the national government to determine 
the allocation of Special Autonomy Fund and monitoring process. There is stronger pressure 
on the improvement of the monitoring system in the Special Autonomy Fund by the central 
government. This demand was responded to by Soni Sumarsono, senior officer for 
decentralisation affairs in the Ministry of Home Affairs through his statement:  
 
The central government has conducted a monitoring system for the Special 
Autonomy Fund through the State Audit Agency, the Provincial Parliament and 
the Regional Inspectorate. We (the Ministry of Home Affairs) also receive three 
monthly reports of Special Autonomy Fund utilisation. All mechanisms are 
based on the national system on regional budget monitoring procedures (Putri, 
2018). 
 
However, respondents from civil society organisations urge more significant involvement and 
monitoring systems from the central government to oversee the Special Autonomy Fund. One 
respondent suggests collaboration between the central government and officials from Aceh to 
discuss the planning of the Special Autonomy Fund as a part of central government 




Another respondent even criticised the central government, particularly the Ministry of Home 
affairs as neglecting the problem of the Special Autonomy Fund in Aceh for ten years: 
 
Why did the Ministry of Home Affairs not mention the expected specific impacts 
of the Special Autonomy Fund since the beginning? Let us say that the Special 
Autonomy Fund can only be disbursed for infrastructure projects. When it [the 
Special Autonomy Fund) will be used for other expenses, the system will “lock”; 
the fund cannot be accessed. However, the central government neglect it, and then 
the fund was spent by little kings [local apparatuses] in the district like what they 
did to regular budget items. They built a fence, the bought chairs. Something that 
is not right for us (Personal Interview, CSO 9B, August 2018).  
 
A respondent from a local political party suggested the “Otsus (Special Autonomy Fund) Desk” 
as the representation of central government presence in supervising special autonomy in Aceh. 
 
The Otsus (Special Autonomy) Desk must be based here, in Aceh. It could be 
represented by professionals from Bappenas (Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan/National Planning Board). Without the presence of the central 
government, the Special Autonomy Fund is like the money to be given to our own 
family; there is no strict monitoring. DPR (national parliament) has Dana Otsus 
(Special Autonomy Fund) Monitoring Team, but they just come and talk. What we 
meant is the presence of the national government. Therefore, the central government 
contribute to the failure of Aceh in utilising the Special Autonomy Fund due to their 
absence in supervising the fund (Personal Interview, LPP-11B, August 2018).  
 
When asked about the domination of central government in Aceh local politics if they regulate 
the Special Autonomy Fund, a peace dividend specifically granted for Acehnese, two 
respondents refused that perception and emphasised the duty of the national government in 
supervising the allocation of the national budget which is channelled to local government 
(CDO 6B and CSO 9B, personal interview, August 2018). These opinions indicate the demand 
for a more significant role from the central government to oversee the Special Autonomy Fund. 
The central government has been transferring authority in the form of the Special Autonomy 
Fund to Aceh as an attempt to redress the economic grievances. This fund allows the GAM-
dominated local government to gain legitimacy from the people of Aceh over the regional 
development. However, when the performance of the GAM dominated government in 
disbursing the fund to bring welfare to Aceh seemed disappointing, the legitimacy of the 




government. This leads to a situation where the central government appears to regain 
legitimacy from GAM.  
 
The Special Autonomy Fund has been utilised by the GAM-dominated Aceh local government 
to sustain patron-client networks beginning with the post-disaster reconstruction program. It 
was made easier by the allocation of small-scale development projects from the GAM elite in 
local government to their client contractors. The Aceh local government also invested the 
Special Autonomy Fund in populist development programmes in education and health that 
are targeted at the broader Acehnese community to strengthen legitimacy. They thus secured 
short-term legitimacy as the sole benefactor of peace and through use of the peace dividend. 
However, the Special Autonomy Fund has not been well utilised to accelerate Aceh’s economic 
development and social welfare. It occurred due to the lack of capacity in the Aceh local 
bureaucracy in development planning, including budget drafting. GAM has gained short term 
legitimacy by lessening economic grievance but is seemingly finding difficulty in gaining 
similar achievements on performance legitimacy to enhance welfare in peacetime, due to their 
failure to create strong institutions to deliver services. 
 
Aceh local government’s capacity deficiency is also magnified by the disparity of economic 
development between urban areas such as Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe and other areas such 
as the highland districts, Pidie and Pidie Jaya. Special attention must be given to persistent 
poverty in an ethnically distinct district like Bener Meriah. The growing domination of 
institutions with discriminatory practices towards different groups (ethnicity, race or religion) 
could lead to a new form of internal colonialism. While in the conflict era, the central 
government was seen as an internal colonial power, in peacetime the hegemonic group in Aceh 
entitled with power, exploits resources and creates grievances among the deprived minority 
communities and possibly repeats the pattern of internal colonialism.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
Economic factors were the major grievances that triggered a rebellion in Aceh. Grievances over 
the inequalities in distribution of natural resources have been a powerful narrative in 
mobilising discontent during GAM insurgencies. The conditions have been worsened by the 
armed conflict, leaving Aceh as one of poorest provinces in Indonesia with low investment and 
high economic costs caused by illegal taxes by GAM and poor infrastructure due to the 
damaging impact of the conflict. The MoU and its subsequent regulations at the national and 
local level are attempts to correct this grievance by allocating a vast amount of money in terms 
of the reintegration fund and Special Autonomy Fund. While the reintegration program is 




prisoners, the Special Autonomy Fund is targeting the wider Aceh community and is intended 
to stimulate economic growth in the future. Aceh has also received a massive flux of 
reconstruction funds for tsunami rehabilitation under the auspices of BRR.  
 
This chapter shows that the economic empowerment was first stimulated by the establishment 
of BRR and BRA to manage reconstruction and reintegration programmes. These institutions 
had incorporated former combatants in the lucrative post-war economy. Thus, the former 
combatants see peace as beneficial to secure wealth and as a foundation to gain political power. 
BRR and BRA created a basis for GAM elite participation in the post-conflict economy in Aceh. 
A highly developed patronage network characterised the participation among GAM elites and 
intimidatory practices to win the contracts. In other words, the post-conflict economy in Aceh 
reflects the nexus between political power and economic imperative.  
 
The primary effort to alleviate economic grievances in Aceh was established in a late phase of 
peacebuilding. In 2008, the central government allocated a Special Autonomy Fund as a 
development fund. The government of Aceh channelled the fund according to the provisions 
in LoGA which gives the biggest share for infrastructure, education and health. Infrastructure 
has been criticised for its low quality, the lengthy process, and the focus on small projects that 
gives insignificant impact on people’s welfare and economic development. The inequality of 
economic development within districts and municipalities in Aceh is also becoming a concern. 
To some extent, infrastructure, health and education programs contributed to the short-term 
legitimacy of GAM due to populism and the patron-client network. Particularly in the small-
scale projects, these practices indicate the continuation and maintenance of patron-client 
economic networks among the GAM circle that were initiated in the post-tsunami 
reconstruction industry.  
 
Aceh’s first post-conflict administration demonstrated an ability to identify policy targets of 
the disbursement of the Special Autonomy Fund but not an ability to formulate concrete 
strategies designed to meet those targets and a lack of capacity in implementation. Another 
shortcoming is state capacity in translating development plans into comprehensive programs. 
They lack the long-term vision to channel the peace dividend into inclusive growth and 
investment projects which can stimulate future economic welfare and justice. It partially 
resulted from a lack of capacity building of the Aceh local bureaucrats dominated by former 
GAM members. Various kinds of peace dividends in Aceh had successfully integrated former 
combatants into post-conflict economic development and peacebuilding at large, but the 
participation and integration will not be sufficient to maintain peace: there is also an urgent 





The current development of post-conflict economic settlement in Aceh has created anxiety 
toward the future of the peace dividend of the Special Autonomy Fund and the reemergence 
of ad-hoc institutions based on the patronage system as shown in the reestablishment of BRA. 
It has been ten years since the first disbursement of the Special Autonomy Fund, yet most 
Acehnese are unable to witness or reap significant improvements in the local economy.  There 
have been various responses to the inadequacy of the Special Autonomy Fund to contribute to 
the alleviation of grievances in Aceh economic development. On the one hand, it raises 
awareness about the shortcoming of Aceh local bureaucrats in managing the fund. On the 
other hand, there is also criticism towards the negligence of the central government to 
supervise and monitor the utilisation of the fund and the urgency of stronger central 
government presence in supervising the fund.  
 
Some patterns could be drawn from the economic settlement in post-conflict Aceh. Regarding 
participation and institutional building, the three components of the post-conflict economy – 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and the Special Autonomy Fund – are creating limited 
participation in the form of patron-client networks within GAM. The reconstruction 
programme led to “indirect” legitimacy from BRR/central government to GAM by the 
incorporation of former combatants to the reconstruction industry. The reintegration program 
that is managed by BRA demonstrated the pattern of the transfer of authority from the central 
government to Aceh. Rather than enhancing the legitimacy of the central government, the 
reintegration fund was thus utilised to strengthen the legitimacy of the GAM-dominated Aceh 
local government to former combatants as their major stakeholder. An interesting 
development emerged in the utilisation and management of the Special Autonomy Fund as 
the “real” peace dividend. The allocation of huge funds to finance Aceh post-conflict 
development indicated the process of authority transfer from the central government to Aceh. 
The profound grievance of centre-periphery economic disparity was restored by the larger 
authority of Aceh to manage their development fund. However, the unsatisfactory 
performance from insurgents/GAM in bringing welfare to Aceh has created disappointments 
among people in Aceh that surprisingly led to their demand for a greater role of the central 
government to oversee the utilisation of the fund. It appears to indicate a process of 
“transferring back” the legitimacy from insurgent to incumbent once their performance in 
exercising the authority is not as good as expected. While the short-term underlying legitimacy 
of insurgents as the sole benefactors of peace in Aceh had been secured by maintaining patron-
client networks among GAM circles, the wider Aceh society demands output/performance 





These developments mark the normalisation process in Aceh, in which Aceh has been 
integrated into the nation-wide problem of good governance at the local level. Generally, the 
findings in Chapter 5 support hypothesis 1, that “a peace agreement which addresses 
grievances will contribute to the durable peacebuilding process in middle-income countries 
with a relatively strong government like Indonesia”. The MoU Helsinki put specific provisions 
to correct economic grievances, particularly in the redistribution of the larger share of 
hydrocarbon deposits to Aceh, as well as the transfer of the management of strategic assets 
such as seaports, the free port and the airport. However, regarding hypothesis 2 that proposes 
“in order to secure sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding, the peace agreement should be 
enacted in national and local law”, there are some indications on how the process of 
transferring the authority from local government in Aceh back to central government will 
affect national law. It appears particularly on the subject of the management of strategic assets 
by emphasising the presence of central government, along with Aceh’s local government. This 
chapter also confirms hypothesis 4: “institution building will increase legitimacy, secure 
resources and stabilise the conditions for a lasting peace”. Institution building that took place 
in the establishment of BRR and BRA has secured resources and stabilised the conditions for 
lasting peace. The economic settlement in post-conflict peacebuilding in Aceh is characterised 
heavily by the establishment of an institution with patronage practices and limited 
participation in economic development. Given the fact that grievance over economic 
inequality has been the main driver of insurgency in Aceh, the incompetence of the new 
government in delivering services, stimulating inclusive growth and equal development 









Conflict in Aceh resulted primarily from grievances based on needs deprivation, in terms of 
political needs, security needs, and acceptance needs. While deprivations in politics and access 
to economic resources explained in chapter 4 and 5 share a similar pattern, the deprivation of 
identity is a peculiar case.  Rather than presenting as the main grievance, identity serves as a 
mobilising factor for the existing grievances to be manifested in a separatist movement. 
Bowman (2005) argues that identity as “other” was embraced and utilised by GAM to highlight 
the socio-economic and political grievances, promote their separatist agenda and achieve their 
political agenda. This chapter focuses on the efforts to address the problem with identity in 
Aceh as part of a peacebuilding programme to create durable peace. Identity is divided into 
two primary segments: religious identity (Islam) and Aceh’s cultural identity, with additional 
analysis of second order ethnic minorities in Aceh and their position in Aceh identity discourse 
in peacetime.  
 
6.2 Grievance Alleviation 
6.2.1 MoU  
Identity is not stated in a particular section of the MoU but is inherent in the segment of 
governance that could indicate an attempt to merge identity factors with governance or 
institution building. Unlike the provisions of political participation, identity-related 
provisions did not lead to heated debate or lengthy discussion during the negotiations in 
Helsinki. Generally, the provision of identity was manifested in the right to create and use 
Acehnese identities as outlined in the following items:  
 
4. Aceh has the right to use regional symbols including a flag, a crest and a hymn 
(Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia and The Free Aceh Movement Article 1.1.5). 
5. Kanun Aceh will be re-established for Aceh respecting the historical traditions 
and customs of the people of Aceh and reflecting contemporary legal 
requirements of Aceh. (Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement Article 
1.1.6). 
6. The institution of Wali Nanggroe with all its ceremonial attributes and 
entitlements will be established. (Memorandum of Understanding between the 






Wali Nanggroe, as stated in the article 1.1.7 of MoU is defined as “an indigenous leadership 
institution as the uniting instrument of the community and the preserving instrument of 
indigenous life of customs and culture” (Law of Governing Aceh, 2006, article 1.17).  
 
6.2.2 LoGA 
Provisions of identity are broadly regulated in LoGA, consisting of Wali Nanggroe, Indigenous 
Institutions and Islamic Sharia. Wali Nanggroe is designed as an indigenous leadership 
institution without the entitlement of governance or political rights. The right to establish Wali 
Nanggroe had already been stipulated in the previous Law No 18/2001 about Aceh’s Special 
Autonomy, that was repealed due to the promulgation of LoGA, based on the principle of lex 
posterior derogate lex priori or the later law repeals the earlier law. The indigenous institution 
is then further delineated in the subsequent chapters of LoGA that consist of a wide range of 
institutions from the imam (leader) of the mosque to head of the village (keuchik).  
 
The inclusion of Sharia in LoGA is an interesting case because this subject was not part of the 
MoU Helsinki but did emerge as a point of discussion in the negotiations (Marhaban, 2012a). 
However, the provision of sharia has been stipulated in two older laws: Law No 22/1999 on 
The Implementation of the Special Status of the Special Region of Aceh and Law No 18 /2001 
on Aceh Special Autonomy.  The central government seemed to sustain this speciality into 
peacetime by the insertion of the more comprehensive stipulation of Sharia in LoGA. The 
arrangement of Sharia is also complemented by the establishment of the Sharia Court and an 
Ulama (Islamic Scholar) Consultative Assembly.  
 
6.2.3 Qanun 
The provisions on identity are regulated further by several qanuns. Wali Nanggroe is regulated 
by Qanun No 8/2012, replaced by Qanun No 9/2013 due to objection towards the inclusion of 
political rights to wali nanggroe. The Flag and Crest of Aceh are regulated by Qanun No 
2/2013. This qanun is still disputed between the Aceh local government and central 
government. The central government disagreed with the symbol of the Aceh flag as proposed 
in the Qanun that resembles a GAM symbol. Sharia is regulated with various qanun, and the 
latest ones (that annulled the old law) are Qanun No 6/2014 about Jinayah or Islamic Criminal 
Law, and Qanun No 8/2014, on the Main Principles of Sharia that regulate wide aspects, 
including sharia economics and Islamic banking.  
 
This section demonstrates the attempts to alleviate grievance on identity in three levels of 
regulation: MoU, national law (LoGA) and qanun. While perceived by Bowman (2015) as a 




MoU Helsinki and subsequent regulations shows the high consideration of identity in 
fostering peace in Aceh. At the national level, there is an indication of the strong influence of 
the central government in incorporating sharia as a part of the alleviation of identity grievance. 
It is shown by the attempt of the central government to include sharia in several provisions in 
national law (LoGA), something rejected by GAM and not mentioned in the MoU. While in the 
subject of customary identity, the dynamics between Jakarta and Banda Aceh occurred in the 
subject of wali nanggroe and Flag of Aceh. The objection from central government on Wali 
Nanggroe was accommodated by the revision of the particular qanun, but for the Qanun on 
the Flag of Aceh, the Aceh local government rejected the objection from central government 
to annul it, and the two sides agreed to find a solution for this problem. Until 2018, this subject 
has not been resolved yet. Central government demonstrated its power to halt the authority 
that was previously given to the Aceh provincial government when the subsequent law 
breached the higher law as appeared in the wali nanggroe case, but in the subject of the Flag 
of Aceh, central government’s objection was met with resistance from the GAM-dominated 
local government.  
 
6.3 Building Institutions, Acknowledging Identity, Alleviating Grievance?  
This chapter classifies the efforts to address the problem of identity in Aceh into two 
categories: cultural and religious. The first part of this section focuses on the attempt to 
alleviate cultural grievances in Aceh by the establishment of Wali Nanggroe, an institution that 
aims to preserve Aceh customs and culture. The establishment of Wali Nanggroe is intended 
as a corrective policy to address grievances over the domination of Javanese culture during 
Suharto’s New Order as well as give a greater acknowledgement of Aceh customary 
institutions. It is followed by the section of the position of ethnic minorities in Aceh during 
peacetime to give an understanding of the diversity of ethnicity and culture in Aceh. The next 
section is the analysis of the establishment of sharia regimes to alleviate grievances. The 
provision of sharia in Aceh is perhaps intended to address the grievances over shortcomings 
in the realisation of autonomy for the subject of religion and custom in the aftermath of the 
Darul Islam rebellion. During the conflict era, those special rights were criticised as “existing 
on paper only” because the central government declined several local initiatives such as the 
obligation for elementary school pupils to recite the Quran and for the female students to wear 
headscarfs. This provision also illustrates the attempt of the central government to strengthen 








6.3.1 Wali Nanggroe: Customary Institution  
One attempt to address identity-related deprivation in Aceh is through granting “cultural 
protection”. It is translated into the establishment of the institution of Wali Nanggroe as “an 
indigenous leadership institution as the uniting instrument of the community and the 
preserving instrument of indigenous life of customs and culture” (Law of Governing Aceh, 
2006, article 1.17). It provides a traditional symbolic head of Aceh with no political or 
governmental power, serving mainly as a guardian of culture. According to Stange and 
Missbach (2011), there are no reports of the existence of Wali Nanggroe institutions from 
colonial scholars or travellers who visited Aceh before the twentieth century. However, Andaya 
(2001, as cited in Rahman and Abdullah, 2017), mentioned that the origin of Wali Nanggroe 
could be tracked from Qanun Meukuta Alam Al-Asy’ i that described the structure of power 
of the Aceh Sultanate. Power was divided into three institutions: the Sultan of Aceh, Malikkul 
Adil, the customary leader, and the Aceh Sultanate Parliament, as the highest body. When the 
Sultan Muhammad Syah, the last king of Aceh, was abducted and exiled by the Dutch, he 
handed over the sultanate’s authority to Malikkul Adil, Teungku Chik Di Tiro Muhammad 
Saman (Rahman and Abdullah, 2017). Teungku Chik Di Tiro then acted as Wali Nanggroe, 
since Muhammad Syah’s son, Sultan Muhammad Daud Syah was only 11 years old when the 
monarchy in Aceh ended (Sri Mulyani, 2010 as cited in Rahman and Abdullah, 2017). As the 
maternal grandson of Teungku Chik Di Tiro, Teungku Hasan Tiro, GAM leader, claimed that 
the title of Wali Neugara (Tiro used the term “Neugara” or state, rather than “Nanggroe” or 
land) passed automatically to the Di Tiro clan permanently due to the extinction of the 
monarchy in Aceh (Stange and Missbach, 2011). After Teungku Cik Di Tiro, the first Wali, 
passed away, he was replaced by Teungku Muhammad as second Wali, and followed by 
Teungku Abdussalam, Teungku Sulaiman, Teungku Ubaidillah, Teungku Mahyiddin, and 
Teungku Mu’az as the third to sixth Walis, and succeeded by Teungku Hasan Tiro (Rahman 
and Abdullah, 2017).  
 
The establishment of Wali Nanggroe as the leader of the customary institution had been 
stipulated previously in Article 10 Law Number 18/2001 on Aceh Special Autonomy. It was an 
indication of an initial effort to address identity grievance in Aceh by the central government 
during President Abdurahman Wahid’s administration by acknowledging customary 
institutions and as an “offer to Hasan Tiro for a dignified return to Aceh in evet of peace” 
(Stange and Missbach, 2017). However, it was only after the Helsinki Peace Agreement, that 
this provision came into effect, after being promulgated in LoGA and Qanun.  
 
Structurally, customary institutions are led by Wali Nanggoe, and consist of a High Council, a 




structures are elected every five years (Qanun Number 9/2013 about Wali Nanggroe). The 
position of Wali Nanggroe was given to Hasan Tiro, but his deteriorating health made it 
difficult for him to run the task. He made a short visit to Aceh in 2008 and was enthusiastically 
greeted by the people of Aceh who mostly see him as a “returning hero”. Hasan Tiro passed 
away in 2010 and was replaced by Malik Mahmud Al-Haytar (The Jakarta Post, 13 December 
2013). Mahmud is a Singaporean-born Acehnese who was actively involved in the GAM 
struggle as “prime minister” of GAM’s government in exile and was also the head of the GAM 
delegation to the Helsinki negotiations (Ali, 2013).   
 
The establishment of the institution of Wali Nanggroe was marred by controversy and 
discontent. Regarding the legal basis, the earliest version of the Qanun on Wali Nanggroe was 
drafted by the Aceh provincial parliament in 2009 but rejected by Governor Irwandi Yusuf 
and was never enacted. In 2010, a second Raqan (Rancangan Qanun/ Qanun Draft) was 
proposed by the Aceh parliament that was dominated by Partai Aceh Members as a result of 
the 2009 Legislative Election. The draft was politicised and significantly different from the 
initial purpose of Wali Nanggroe, to preserve Aceh’s culture and traditions. Some of the more 
controversial provisions are the authority of Wali Nanggroe to dissolve the provincial 
parliament; dismiss the governor from office; sign business contracts with foreign companies; 
open Acehnese consulates abroad; and declare states of emergency (Stange and Missbach, 
2011; Haikal, 2016). In addition to being highly politicised, the provisions potentially clashed 
with the role of existing executive institutions at the provincial and national level. The Wali 
Nanggroe was also granted religious power to give a final decision on a fatwa (Islamic legal 
pronouncement), a provision that overlapped with the authority of the ulama council. 
Undemocratic principles were also prevalent in the absence of an election council, and the 
Wali Nanggroe would be appointed for life (Stange and Missbach, 2011). The central 
government rejected this draft due to disapproval over Wali Nanggroe’s extended authority.  
 
The Aceh Provincial Parliament redrafted the legal basis for Wali Nanggroe and endorsed 
Qanun No 8/2102 with the omission of the criticised points of the previous draft. However, 
the Qanun still included the political aspect of Wali Nanggroe as well as the procedure of direct 
appointment of Wali Nanggroe. It led to the objection of the central government to 21 items of 
the new Qanun.  Qanun No 8/2012 had to be again revised as Qanun No 9/2013.  
  
The disagreement was not only voiced by the central government but also by civil society. 
Following the announcement of the first controversial draft of Wali Nanggroe, in December 
2010, several civil society organisations in Aceh organised a workshop to criticise the executive 




undemocratic election of Malik Mahmud as Wali Nanggroe without a consultative process. 
(Stange and Missbach, 2011).  One Banda Aceh resident, Abdul Haris said “I do not understand 
the need to have a Wali Nanggroe institution and a Wali Nanggroe position for the interests of 
Aceh people. Not only is the position not clear, but its contribution is also questionable” 
(Simanjuntak, 2013). Elements of civil society also protested the enormous funds for Wali 
Naggroe as shown by budget to build a Wali Nanggroe Meligoe (Palace) that cost IDR 100 
Billion or USD 6,7 million (Serambinews, 8 December 2015).   
 
Culturally distinct communities in Central Aceh expressed dissatisfaction with Wali Nanggroe. 
They criticised the fluency in Acehnese language and the category of Aceh ethnic group as the 
main requirements for a member of Wali Nanggroe (Serambi Indonesia, 3 November 2012).  
As a member of an ethnic group with different culture and language, some people in Gayo, 
Central Aceh considered Wali Nanggroe to be a culturally discriminative institution because it 
bestowed exclusive rights to the Aceh ethnic group.   
 
Photo 6-1 Demonstration protesting Wali Nanggroe in Banda Aceh, held by 
students of Syiah Kuala University 
 
Source: Tribun News 
 
According to the Qanun No 9/2013, the Wali Nanggroe length of service is five years, and 
members can be re-elected. Approaching the end of the Wali Nanggroe term in December 
2018, there has been a debate within Acehnese society about the existence of Wali Nanggroe. 
The sharp opinion voiced by Ghazali Abbas Adan, DPD (Senator) member from Aceh, was that 
Wali Nanggroe was no longer relevant in Aceh. Adan argued that Wali Nanggroe is entitled to 
Hasan Tiro as “the spiritual tribute granted to him as the continuation of Tiro’s dedication to 




institution lost its relevance, coupled with the fact that Wali Nanggroe “has not been beneficial 
to Aceh and Acehnese, wasting much money and is unaccountable” (Adan, Serambinews, 13 
November 2018). Mawardi Ismail, Law Scholar from Syiah Kuala University emphasised the 
disappointment felt by Acehnese over the performance of Wali Nanggroe over the last five 
years. “During the inauguration of Wali Nanggroe, the public in Aceh had high expectations 
that Wali Nanggroe could function as a unifier and mediate conflict when it could not be 
resolved through formal institutions. However, Wali Nanggroe has been incapable and even 
showed its one-sidedness during the gubernatorial election” (Ismail, Serambinews, 13 
November 2018).  
 
Nevertheless, other groups, mostly from Partai Aceh defended Wali Nanggroe. Muzakkir 
Manaf, the Partai Aceh chairperson, criticised Ghazali Abbas Adan for “sowing the winds”. He 
would “reap the storm” for his derogatory statements about the unimportance of Wali 
Nanggroe (Modus Aceh, 17 November 2018). Manaf regretted Adan’s statement as a senior 
politician and as a person who understood the spirit and process of peace in Aceh and accused 
Adan of being “sensational and seeking for a free political stage” (Modus Aceh, 17 November 
2018). Senator from Aceh, Fakhrul Razi also defended Wali Nanggroe and Malik Mahmud, 
stressed Mahmud’s role in national politics to lobby central government endorsing Peraturan 
Pemerintah (Government Decree) as the subsequent regulations of LoGA (Serambinews, 14 
November 2018). Mahmud actively lobbied central government to win Aceh’s bid as a host of 
PON (Pekan Olahraga Nasional/National Sport Week) 2024. Malik Mahmud was also seen as 
a high-profile figure who gained respect from the national elite (Serambinews, 14 November 
2018).  Nur Djuli, one of the GAM negotiators in Helsinki, urged Adan to pull his statement 
about Wali Nanggroe. Djuli corrected Adan’s perspective that saw Hasan Tiro as the sole 
eligible Wali Nanggroe by stating that “Hasan Tiro was Wali Neugara (guardian of the state) 
of Free Aceh and would not be downgraded to a Wali Nanggroe (Guardian of the Land)” (Juli, 
Acehtrend, 15 November 2018). Furthermore, Nur Djuli explained that the establishment of 
Wali Nanggroe was a result of the last round of the Helsinki Negotiation to establish the 
unifying figure who holds the highest moral authority in Aceh without political attributes (Juli, 
Acehtrend, 15 November 2018). 
 
Support for the Wali Nanggroe Institution was also voiced by the leader of Forkab Aceh 
(Forum Komunikasi Anak Bangsa/Communication Forum of The Sons of Soil), an 
organisation considered as pro-government. Head of Forkab Aceh, Polem Muda Ahmad Yani 
stressed That Wali Nanggroe was the result of GAM’s long struggle (Dialeksis, 15 November 
2018). Yani acknowledged the shortcomings of the current Wali Nanggroe but suggested an 




Malik Mahmud was reappointed with the direct appointment and inaugurated during a 
Special Plenary Assembly of DPRA (Aceh Provincial Parliament) for the next five years (2018-
2023). The nexus between politics and identity in the establishment of Wali Nanggroe is 
explained by one respondent who represented a customary institution “Customary Council 
had existed before Wali Nanggroe, Wali Nanggroe is a political product, it is person, not 
institution, but can have staff, it’s highly political” (Personal Interview, CC 8-B, August 2018).  
 
The discourse over the existence of the Wali Nanggroe could be seen from the perspective of 
institution-building and determination of the identity of Aceh in the post-conflict era 
(Missbach and Stonge, 2011).  It also marks the beginning of open disagreement over collective 
identity in Aceh, which had been suppressed during the conflict years, when most Acehnese 
put aside their diversity for the sake of independence. In the first place, Wali Naggroe is 
designed to support the transfer of the authority of central government to Aceh in a subject of 
identity. As elaborated in chapter 3, identity is always present in any Aceh discontentment 
over the policy of assimilation and centralisation of the Indonesian Government. The central 
government thus granted Aceh special customary institutions that are based on individuals to 
preserve and advance Aceh’s cultural traditions. Wali Nanggroe developed as a highly 
institutionalised customary arrangement but with limited participation, in terms of granting 
an exclusive right to the Aceh ethnic group and a direct appointment procedure. Albeit non-
political, Wali Nanggroe is claimed by GAM groups as their representative through the 
appointment of Malik Mahmud as Wali Nanggroe. GAM also supported Malik Mahmud to get 
a second term as Wali Nanggroe without democratic procedures. Wali Nanggroe is criticised 
for poor performance in terms of Aceh’s cultural preservation and being a unifier for Aceh 
people, and as only functioning as a symbol. Wali Nanggroe has fulfilled the short-term 
legitimacy need as a symbol to safeguard Aceh identity but its performance legitimacy, at least 
from the first term, is far from satisfying.  
 
6.3.1.2 Minority Groups in Aceh and Their Position in Peacetime 
Protest from the Gayo Ethnic Groups over the establishment of Wali Nanggroe is only one 
expression from the long series of inter-ethnic discontentment in Aceh.  Another example of 
dissatisfaction enunciated by ethnic minorities in Aceh over the hegemony of Aceh ethnic 
groups occurred in the subject of the flag and hymn of Aceh. A flag and hymn are part of the 
provisions of MoU Helsinki that granted Aceh the use of regional symbols such as a flag, crest 
and hymn (Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia and The Free Aceh Movement Article 1.1.7). This provision for an Aceh flag, crest 








(1)Bendera Merah Putih (Red and White Flag) shall be the national flag of the Unitary State 
of the Republic of Indonesia, based on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. 
 
(2) In addition to the Bendera Merah Putih referred to in paragraph (1), the Aceh Government 
may determine and affirm a regional flag of Aceh as a symbol of its specialness and uniqueness. 
 
(3) The regional flag of Aceh as a symbol, as referred to in paragraph (2), shall not constitute 
a symbol of sovereignty and shall not be treated as a flag of sovereignty in Aceh. 
 
(4) Further provisions related to the form of the flag as a symbol as referred to in paragraph 
(2) shall be governed by Aceh Qanun in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations. 
 
Article 247 
(1) The Aceh Government may establish a coat of arms as a symbol of specialness and 
uniqueness. 
 
(2) Further provisions related to the coat of arms as a symbol as referred to in paragraph (1) 
shall be governed by Aceh Qanun. 
 
Article 248  
(1) Indonesia Raya shall be the national anthem of the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
 
(2) The Aceh Government may establish an Aceh hymn as a reflection of its specialness and  
uniqueness. 
 
(3) Further provisions related to the Aceh hymn as referred to in paragraph (2) shall be 
governed by Aceh Qanun. 
 
On March 2013, the Provincial Government of Aceh promulgated Qanun Number 3/2013 
about Aceh’s Flag. The design of the flag resembles that of the old GAM banner. The central 
government expressed their objections to the flag, considering it a violation of a Government 
Decree Number 77/2007 that prohibits the use of regional symbols that fully or partially 
resemble the symbols of forbidden organisations or separatist groups (Arabiyani, 2018). While 
the objection from Jakarta was primarily based on political reasons, another disagreement 
from ethnic minorities in Aceh was related to identity. A representative from Gayo Merdeka 
(Free Gayo Movement), Waladan Yoga refused the use of the GAM symbol and said that 
“raising this flag is prohibited in Gayo land, or we will take it down” (Umar, 2013). Another 
representative from the Gayo community, Jawahir Putra criticised the use of the GAM banner 
as a “selfish act and ignored the aspiration of other ethnic groups in Aceh such as Gayo, Alas, 
Singkil and Klue” (Tempo, 23 Maret 2013). The rejection resulted from the fact that GAM only 
attracted minor support within the Gayo highland area and in some areas populated by other 
ethnic minorities. GAM strongholds are mostly located on the coast and inhabited by ethnic 




Photo 6-2 Comparison of Aceh Provincial Flag and GAM Symbol 
Aceh Flag Based on Qanun  
Number 3/2013 
GAM Banner/Symbol  
  
Source: VoA Indonesia (2013) and Merdeka (2013) 
 
In 2017 there was a new protest, this time from ethnic minorities in Aceh, over the subject of 
the Aceh hymn. Aceh’s provincial government ran a competition for a new hymn for Aceh, 
with the use of the Acehnese language as one of the requirements of the competition. This 
requirement was protested by the Gayo communities and demanded the Aceh provincial 
government as the organising committee of this competition to amend the requirement of 
Acehnese language in the hymn to accommodate the diversity of ethnic groups in Aceh (Fajri, 
2017). The competition continued with the disputed requirement of language and was won by 
Mahrisal Rubin with his song entitled “Aceh Mulia” (Aceh the Noble), that predictably used 
the Acehnese language (Radar, 2017). The coalition of Gayo Serumpun (Alliance of Gayo) 
rejected Aceh Mulia as Aceh’s Provincial Hymn and urged “all districts government in Gayo 
area to endorse the regulation that bans Aceh Mulia, a racist and anti-diversity song, to be 
sung in entire Gayo region” (Lintas Gayo, 11 December 2017). The disapproval was not only 
voiced by Gayo communities. Arabiyani, the members of Partai Aceh who originated from 
Bireun, one of GAM stronghold areas, also rejected the hymn and considered it as “exclusive 
and discriminative and non-participatory” (Lintas Gayo, 24 December 2017).  
 
There are various reactions to these rejections. Teuku Kemal Fasya, a lecturer from University 
Malikussaleh, Lhokseumawe described the hymn that uses dominant language as “a practice 
of ethnic chauvinism against multiculturalism in Aceh” (Pikiran Merdeka, 9 November 2017). 
Another lecturer from University of Syiah Kuala University, Husaini Ibrahim, acknowledged 
the diversity of Aceh but considered that “the use of Acehnese language as an official language 
is normal because the Acehnese are the majority” (Pikiran Merdeka, 9 November 2017). While 
the chairperson of Aceh Customary Council, Badruzzaman emphasised that “the Acehnese 




of Acehnese language” advising people in Aceh to maintain inter-ethnic solidarity in Aceh, 
avoid disintegration, and prioritise unity to develop the region” (Pikiran Merdeka, 9 
November 2017). The last statement reminds us of the frequent mantra of the New Order 
government motto to put aside difference and prioritise the harmony or Bhinneka Tunggal Ika 
(unity in diversity).  
 
The protests from minority groups in Aceh over the hegemonic culture (ethnicity and 
language) to represent Aceh’s identity lead us to see Aceh as not a place of homogenous ethnic 
identity, both in conflict and peacetime. While ethnic Acehnese make up most of the 
population (80 per cent), several other minority ethnic groups inhabit Aceh, such as Javanese, 
Gayo, Malay, and Alas. Singkil, Kluet and Aneuk Jamee (Barter, 2015, Ehrentraut, 2010). 
Table 7.1 provides a composition of ethnic minorities in Aceh: 
 
Table 6-1 Ethnic Minorities in Aceh 
Ethnic Groups  Origin  Area Note 
Gayo  Indigenous  Central Highland  Originally from the 
Northern Coast but 
pushed to the 
interior by the ruler 
due to the needs for 
slave 
Alas  Indigenous  Southeast Aceh  Share clan affiliation 
with Muslim Batak 
Karo in North 
Sumatra  
Aneuk Jamee West Sumatra South Aceh, 
Southwest Aceh, 
Nagan Raya  
 
 
Tamiang  East Sumatra  Aceh Tamiang   
Kluet  Malay Indigenous West Coast  







Javanese  Java  East Aceh, Central 
Aceh, West Aceh, 
Singkil  
The first migration 
of Javanese occurred 
in 1905 by the 
transmigration 




West Coast of 
Sumatra (Nias, 
Enggano, Mentawai) 
Simelue Island   
Source: Barter (2015), Kluetraya News (2016) 
 
In 1999, following the promulgation of the Indonesian Law of Decentralisation, these distinct 
ethnic groups began to campaign for the establishment of ALA (Aceh Leuser Antara Province) 
that consisted of Aceh Tengah, Aceh Tenggara (Southeast Aceh) and Aceh Singkil (Hanafi, 
2013). Law No 22/1999 on Local Governance allowed districts, cities and provinces to merge 
or detach as autonomous units (rather than separation, this process is called “pemekaran” or 
“blossoming”). This movement was started by a small group called GALAKSI (acronym for 
Gayo, Alas, Kluet, Singkil) that consisted of ulama (Islamic scholar), district leaders, students 
and civil society representatives (Ehrentraut, 2010). This movement joined another group 
with the parallel aspiration to establish separate provinces from Aceh, called ABAS (Aceh 
Barat Selatan/West-South Aceh) covering Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Nagan Raya, Aceh Barat 
Daya, Simelue and Aceh Selatan in 2003. Similar to ALAS, ABAS areas are also inhabited by 
large a proportion of non-Aceh ethnic groups such as Aneuk Jamee, Kluet and Devayan, 
Sigulai and Haloban where the root of the languages are close to Minangkabau (West 





Map 6-1 Map of Ethnic Majority of District in Aceh 
 
Source: Ehrentaut (2010) 
 
This issue started to gain more serious attention within national and Aceh local politics when 
the advocates of the ALA-ABAS provinces blossoming project held a rally in Jakarta on 4 
December 2005, to declare their demands. It caused anxiety over the drafting process of LoGA 
in the post-peace agreement. According to MoU Helsinki, the territorial boundary of Aceh was 
based on “the borders of Aceh corresponding to the borders as of 1 July 1956” (Memorandum 
of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and The Free Aceh 
Movement Article 1.1.4), a provision that closed the window for the establishment of a separate 
entity in Aceh. The choice of 4 December, the date of GAM’s Anniversary, sent a strong 
message of the resentment of GAM from this group. In 2006, LoGA further affirmed the slim 
chance of the division of the province by highlighting the borders of Aceh as follows: 
 
a. Towards the north is bordered by Malacca Strait, 
b. Towards the south is bordered by North Sumatra Province 
c. Towards the east is bordered by Malacca Strait, and 






However, in article 5, LoGA ambiguously mentioned the possibility of the formation, 
elimination, and amalgamation of the region as long as it was conducted according to the legal 
regulations. On several occasions, the Yudhoyono administration emphasised that dividing 
Aceh was not government policy (ICG, 2006). Conversely, several nationalist parties such as 
Golkar and PDI P were initially sympathetic towards this idea (Ehrentraut, 2010). One of the 
high-profile figures in national politics, former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, chairperson 
of PDI-P, warmly welcomed the idea of ALA ABAS province by referring to the experience of 
West Papua province that blossomed from Papua (Kompas, 24 July 2008).  Miller (2009) and  
Gale (2008, as cited in Ehrentraut, 2010) analysed PDI-P support for ALA ABAS to show their 
gesture as “defender of the unity of the country” after their strong objection towards any 
political deal with GAM was declined by the MoU Helsinki. As the unpopular political party in 
Aceh, PDI-P also expected to gain considerable votes in the ALA ABAS area for the next 
election in 2009 by supporting the idea of blossoming.  The controversy around the ALA ABAS 
province sparked further tension when the draft of the blossoming project was introduced to 
the national parliament. Despite the failure to be included into national parliament’s 2008 
agenda, this move had ignited an emotional reaction from the elites in Aceh. Irwandi strongly 
condemned this idea by stating “Aceh has existed for 700 years…it is not going to be broken 
up on my watch….” (ICG, 2008: 7). Among Aceh local elites, the idea of ALA ABAS province 
was a conspiracy between the national government and opportunistic local leaders to ruin 
Aceh’s fragile peace and a retaliation for the loss in the 2006 election (Ehrentraut, 2010).  The 
Map in Figure 7.3 shows the simulation of the division of Aceh if ALA and ABAS were 
eventually established as an autonomous province. Aceh would be divided into three major 






Map 6-2 Map of Aceh if ALA and ABAS were established 
 
Source: Ehrentraut (2010)  
 
While the aspiration for ALA ABAS province seems unlikely to happen, the movement for this 
partition project never ceased. They have been particularly active before local or national 
elections, which often leads to suspicion and cynicism about the primary motivation of this 
movement. Ehrentraut (2010) noted the differing reactions between elite, community leaders 
and villagers in ALA areas over the partition plan. While most of the elite and some community 
leaders strongly support the idea, most villagers seem reluctant to give responses to the 
partition subjects (Grayman, 2008 as cited Ehrentraut, 2010). Those who voiced their opinion 
expressed conditionality: the partition project must address development needs in highland 
areas, and if the purpose is achievable within the framework of Aceh Province, then the 
partition was no longer required (Ehrentraut, 2010). The emphasis of the top-down approach 
in the ALA establishment indeed warrants consideration concerning the deceptive impression 
of widespread support for the partition project. However, as elaborated in chapter 4, we should 
also look at the electoral result in a highland area that showed consistent support for national 
parties, not GAM-based political parties. One respondent mentioned the discrimination 
towards Gayo people in provincial government service “When we deal with bureaucracy in 




Interview, S-CA-2 October 2012). My other respondent criticised the “claim of Saman Dance 
as a traditional dance from Aceh, while in fact, it is originated from Gayo” (Personal Interview, 
S-CA-3 October 2012). The ALA ABAS partition might be an elite-based political movement, 
but the grievances felt and expressed by ethnic minorities towards the “domination” of GAM 
and Acehnese ethnic groups is evidence of the cyclical pattern of secessionism and internal 
colonialism.  
 
The most prominent factor of the resistance of ethnic minorities to the GAM secessionism is 
the “virulent ethnonationalism” (Barter, 2015: 159). GAM ethnonationalism attempted to 
ignore and assimilate Gayo, viewed Malays as outsiders and treated Javanese as migrants 
(Barter, 2015). For some extent, this is evident in the process of the establishment of Wali 
Nanggroe that requires fluency in the Acehnese language, coupled with the obligation to use 
the Acehnese language in Aceh’s provincial hymn and the use of the GAM symbol in the design 
of Aceh’s Flag. It overtly refers to the greater privilege of Acehnese as the majority ethnic 
group.  
 
The possible repetition pattern of internal colonialism is prevalent in the case of ethnic 
minorities in Aceh. While the competing legitimacy between incumbent (central government) 
and insurgent (GAM) has been largely resolved by the transfer of authorities through a peace 
agreement and ensuing regulations, there is a subsequent competition of legitimacy between 
GAM and ethnic minorities, particularly in interior districts. Whereas during the conflict era 
the central government was seen as the internal colonial power with forced assimilation, 
centralisation and exploitation, in peacetime, the regional government repeated the pattern.  
Citing Barter’s argument, “as state efforts to build nations foster rebellion among national 
minorities, rebel efforts to naturalise secessionism also entail nation-building and thus 
resistance among second-order minorities” (Barter, 2015: 162). This secondary legitimacy 
competition occurs because of the factor of representativeness and participation in the 
separatist movement. While the cohesiveness of GAM as a rebel movement greatly contributed 
to smoother conflict resolution, compared to similar cases in Southern Philippines in which 
insurgent groups are heavily factionalised it also led to the perception of a single 
representation. GAM is seen as the only eligible group to represent Acehnese, while the reality 
of Aceh as an ethnically heterogeneous province does not support this perception.   
 
6.3.2 Sharia as a Religious Institution  
Sharia has long been seen as the primary attempt to alleviate tension in Aceh. The enactment 
of Sharia that covers most aspects of life, including custom and education, and enhancing the 




There has been a perception that conflict in Aceh was a religious challenge to Suharto’s policy 
of secular nationalism. The process of the inclusion of sharia in the peace process in Aceh 
started during President Habibie’s administration when he signed Law No 22/1999 on The 
Implementation of the Special Status of the Special Region of Aceh, which enabled partial 
implementation of Sharia (Aspinall, 200a7).  It was followed two years later by President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri signing law No 18/2001 on Extensive Autonomy for the Special 
Province of Aceh as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which included full regulations for 
establishing Sharia courts and Sharia bylaws (qanun). Between President Habibie and 
President Megawati, there was the important role of President Abdurrahman Wahid who 
introduced and offered the idea of the implementation of Sharia in Aceh.  Given Wahid’s 
pluralist character, his decision to introduce Sharia to Aceh was at odds with his standpoint. 
One respondent representing women’s activist groups gives an interesting opinion about the 
role of Wahid’s in Aceh Sharia: 
 
I think Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) forgot that Aceh is not Java. In Java, 
Islam is heterogeneous; it is easily assimilated with the local culture. However, 
Aceh is different, in Aceh, Sharia uncontrollably converts to religious 
conservatism and fundamentalism” (PA-Personal Interview, September 2012).  
 
However, Lies Marcoes, a women activist, argues that Gus Dur did not calculate that the 
downside of sharia in Aceh was its use as a political tool in Aceh, as GAM barely advocated 
religion as the basis of their liberation struggle (Hidayat, 2017). 
 
GAM elites had been aware that the inclusion of Sharia in Aceh is prone to distort GAM’s 
liberation struggle into a religious fundamentalist movement, something that would not gain 
international support. Also, the ideology of GAM is more ethnic-nationalism than Islamism. 
According to Aspinall (2007a), Islam could not justify separatism in Aceh because unlike 
places such as Kashmir, the Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand where Islam is 
practised by minority groups, Islam was not an indicator of difference but a point of 
commonality with Indonesia, where Muslims make up a majority of the population. Islam 
rather stands as a source of moral inspiration and only counts as one aspect of Acehnese 
national identity (Aspinall, 2007a).  
 
Consequently, sharia was not a primary subject in peace negotiations, and the MoU did not 
include sharia as part of its provisions. However, it is stipulated in LoGA with quite extensive 




previously stipulated in Law No 18/2001 of Aceh Extended Autonomy, LoGA adds the 
authority of the sharia regime to endorse qanun on criminal and commercial law.  
 
Structurally, the regime of sharia in Aceh comprises three institutions: Dinas Syariah (Sharia 
Bureau), Wilayatul Hisbah (Sharia Police) and Mahkamah Syariah (Sharia Court) (Aspinall, 
2007).  Dinas Syariah (Sharia Bureau) which is established at provincial and district level, is a 
primary institution to monitor and coordinate the implementation of Sharia (Aspinall, 2007a).  
Wilayatul Hisbah is the special police tasked with monitoring compliance with Islamic Law, 
ensuring that sharia codes are enforced (Aspinall, 2007a). In practice, Wilayatul Hisbah is the 
police force that raid hotels or houses, prosecutes couples who commit adultery, and arrests 
women who wear tight clothes or jeans. Mahkamah Sharia is a court designated to try cases 
and administer punishment of sharia violations (ICG 2006). Aceh’s Sharia regime is also 
complemented by MPU/Majelis Permusyawatan Ulama (Ulama Consultative Assembly) and 
Baitul Mal (Treasury House) to manage Zakat (Islamic tithe) and other religious assets. These 
institutions transform Sharia in Aceh into a modern religious bureaucracy that has grown 
extensively and demands more funds from the provincial budget (ICG, 2006; Aspinall, 
2007a). The efforts to institute sharia in local governance is seen clearly in Article 17, clause 2 
of LoGA as follows:  
 
Other mandatory affairs which become the special authorities of District/city 
Government are the implementation of Aceh’s special characteristics which 
among others cover: 
a. The administering of religious life in the form of implementing Islamic syari’at 
for its worshippers in 
Aceh by maintaining inter-religious community harmony of life; 
b. The administering of indigenous life based on Islam; 
c. The administering of good quality education as well as increasing local content 
subject matter in accordance with Islamic syari’at; and 
d. The role of ulama in the stipulation of District/city policy (The Law on the 
Governing of Aceh, Article 17 clause 2 
 
As mentioned earlier, GAM had never promoted sharia during their struggle for 
independence. GAM consistently reiterated their standpoint towards the implementation of 
Sharia. One of the most profound statements delivered by the official spokesperson in 2002 
was: “We encourage people to be good Muslims, but we do not think it is something for the 
state to decide.” (Shaw, 2008: 8). GAM accused the central government of being manipulated 
sharia to divide Aceh community and based on Zaini Abdullah opinion, “to undercut support 
for GAM currently being in a superior position towards the Indonesian Government” (Hidayat, 




emergence in LoGA indicated the willingness of central government to include a religious 
aspect in the post-conflict arrangement.  
 
At the provincial level, the major supporters of the enforcement of sharia in Aceh are the ulama 
(Islamic Scholars) and non-GAM local elites (Aspinall, 2007a). From the trajectory of the 
conflict, it can be seen that ulama and local elites were not major proponents of GAM’s 
independence struggle. The ulama had lost its influence in Aceh’s politics after the demise of 
Darul Islam and during the Suharto era (and GAM struggle) when they were incorporated into 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia Ulama Council), a corporatist body controlled by the 
government (Bustamam-Ahmad, 2007). Thus, the post-Suharto era was seen as an 
opportunity to regain power and influence. The second group that supported sharia was the 
local (provincial and municipal) elites (Aspinall, 2007a). During the conflict, they were mostly 
co-opted by the central government and did not show significant support to GAM. In the post-
conflict period, they enthusiastically supported the sharia because sharia is seen as the only 
concrete program they could offer (Aspinall, 2007a).  
 
GAM’s position on the implementation of sharia is rather ambiguous. They neither opposed 
nor supported it, as they calculated that allowing the implementation of sharia in Aceh was 
better than suppressing or criticising it, as long as they were still in power in Aceh (Aspinall, 
2007a). GAM realises that Islam is an integral part of Acehnese life and the damage it will 
create if they declare Aceh secular (Shaw, 2008). It is also related to the low capability of local 
government apparatus from GAM to plan and execute development programs as has been 
elaborated in chapter 4. Supporting a sharia-based policy is seen as a pragmatic choice for 
GAM, given their low capacity in governance aspects. It provides strategic political advantages 
for local and religious affairs bureaucrats who want to regain influence and achieve a quick, 
tangible program. Particularly for former GAM’s leaders, their poor skill and knowledge of 
good governance could be concealed by regulating morality through the implementation of 
sharia and related qanun. It is an easier and simpler task compared to performing more 
essential programs such as poverty eradication, job creation or enhancing the quality of 
education. 
 
Later, GAM demonstrated considerable support for the implementation of sharia in Aceh. 
Teuku Kemal Fasya explained the tactical factor from GAM leaders to support sharia in Aceh: 
 
Regarding Sharia in Aceh, GAM made a pragmatic concession by channelling 
fund to religious groups and dayah (Aceh Traditional Islamic Boarding School). 




adequate framework to understand the application of sharia. They did not 
educate in dayah and spent a long time in Europe. They do not even understand 
the code of cultural Islam in Aceh (Fasya, as cited from Affan, BBC Indonesia, 18 
August 2015). 
 
The nexus between sharia and local politics is affirmed by Nur Djuli, a former GAM negotiator 
in Helsinki: 
The situation now is that if we try to say something (criticise) about sharia, we 
will be labelled as anti-Islam. Islam has become a tool to win an election. When 
you do not support sharia, you will lose in local elections (Djuli, as cited from 
Affan BBC Indonesia, 18 August 2017).  
 
In a different strain, Otto Syamsudin Ishak interprets this change as the incapability of GAM 
to resist fundamentalist Islam that has been growing very strong in Aceh and not because GAM 
gains an advantage from the implementation of sharia (Affan, BBC Indonesia, 18 August 
2015). Ishak’s opinion is contextual as the rise of Islamic conservatism also occurs at the 
national level, marked by the stronger grip of fundamentalist Islamic groups such as FPI 
(Front Pembela Islam/Islamic Defender Front) in politics, and the use of blasphemy laws to 
expel Basuki Thahaja Purnama from Jakarta’s governorship. It is also coupled by the massive 
promulgation of Perda (Peraturan Daerah/Local Law) Sharia in various provinces in 
Indonesia.  
 
The implementation of sharia in post-conflict Aceh demonstrates the result of authority 
transfers in the dynamics of legitimacy among key actors in Aceh’s local politics. The central 
government transfers the authority to Aceh’s local government to exercise sharia as a means 
to restore central government’s legitimacy on the subject of religious identity. However, in 
practice, the authority to exercise sharia is held by ulama group rather than by GAM. It creates 
the distribution of power where the authority over religious affairs is allocated to ulama 
groups, and GAM occupies local government power. While sharia is not the ultimate goal of 
GAM’s struggle as an ethno-nationalist movement, GAM lets sharia grow in Aceh and shares 
the local power with the ulama groups. By supporting sharia, GAM could gain legitimacy from 
the Islamic group. While for the central government, it could be a way to avoid power 
concentration to GAM by dividing it to ulama as an influential group in Aceh. The central 
government could also obtain stronger legitimacy among Islamic groups in Aceh by granting 





In addition to the construction and dynamics of authority and legitimacy among the central 
government, ulama groups and GAM-dominated Aceh local government in the post-conflict 
era, sharia begets new grievances in Aceh, especially among ordinary people and women in 
particular. Sharia in post-conflict Aceh has been growing and has intensified exponentially. In 
2014, the DPRA (Aceh Provincial Government) promulgated Qanun No 4/2014 about Jinayah 
or Islamic Criminal Code. This qanun had been proposed in 2009 but rejected by Governor 
Irwandi. It was reintroduced during Zaini Abdullah governorship and got considerable 
support. The offences under this qanun include alcohol consumption, production and 
distribution, gambling, adultery, khalwat (extra-marital intimacy), rape, and homosexuality. 
The punishment consists of fines, imprisonment, and caning.  This qanun, as well as another 
element of sharia regime in Aceh, invited widespread criticism, one of which is voiced by 
Shadia Marbahan, the only female negotiator in Helsinki. Marhaban (2012a) found sharia to 
be confusing regulations rather than finding it a source of solace for a people recovering from 
the trauma of conflict and natural disaster.   
 
The law is seen as discriminative because it mostly punishes ordinary people. It applies to 
people playing cards for a few thousand rupiah, but not police who protected the gambling 
place or corruptor (Marhaban, 2012a). A report published by Human Right in 2010 cited 
several opinions from Acehnese that considered Wilayatul Hisbah only raid the “places of 
ordinary people”. They do not touch places like cafés or restaurants which are visited mainly 
by the rich (HRW, November 30, 2010).  
 
Discriminatory practices toward women occur in the domain of sexual offences. A woman who 
confessed that she was forced to commit non-consensual sexual intercourse could accuse the 
man of rape (ICG, 2006). The offender could face 200 lashes based on sharia law or being 
fined or imprisonment as a substitute (ICG, 2006). However, the situation can turn the woman 
from victim to the accused if she fails to present four male witnesses to prove the claim. This 
requirement is derived from the Hudud Ordinance in Sharia, aimed to avoid false accusation 
(Abu Bakr, 2011). However, the requirement to bring four witnesses is almost impossible, 
especially in a province where patriarchal culture is very dominant, coupled with the 
inadequate judiciary. In May 2014, there was a case when a woman faced public canning due 
to an adultery case while she was also raped and beaten by seven vigilantes who raided the 
woman’s house (The Jakarta Globe, May 7, 2014). The other case occurred back in 2010 when 
a woman was raped by the member of Wilayatul Hisbah who accused her of khalwat (excessive 
closeness between a man and woman who are not a legally married couple, but not involving 





Sharia also inspires discriminatory rules in districts and cities that regulate female clothing 
and public behaviour. In West Aceh, Bupati (District Head)) Ramli Mansur, introduced a 
regulation banning women from wearing jeans and another kind of “tight trousers” – women 
who violate this rule will be asked to change their pants for a long skirt provided by the district 
government (Kompas, 29 October 2009). This law seems inspired by Arabic culture and not 
derived from traditional Acehnese culture; women’s traditional clothing in Aceh consists of 
trousers and blouses (Marhaban, 2012a). This law was officially promulgated in 2010. In 2018, 
there are reports that every female visitor who came to West Aceh’s head of district office and 
other local governments dealing with public services in West Aceh are not allowed to wear 
trousers (Abonita, 2018). In Lhokseumawe, Mayor Suaidi Yahya circulated a letter in the 
Lhokseumawe community, ordering women to sit sideways on motorcycles, with their legs 
dangling off to one side (Saragih & Simanjuntak, 2013). This regulation was based on the 
consideration that women straddling motorcycles is “against the Islamic culture in Aceh” (BBC 
Indonesia, 3 January 2013). This regulation was heavily criticised by several woman activists. 
Lawmaker Eva Kusuma Sundari said that the rule is the form of discrimination against women 
and could leave female riders more prone to accidents (Tempo, 3 January 2013). The 
chairperson of The National Commission on Violence against Women Yuniyanti Chuzaifah 
strongly criticised the qanun and demanded the local government focus on protecting women 
who experienced domestic violence rather than producing “unimportant regulations” (Fimela, 
7 January 2013).  
 
 
Photo 6-3 The Public Service Announcement in Lhokseumawe, Aceh, forbidding 
Women in Aceh from straddling motorcycles 
 





The 231 Monitoring Network, a network of women’s advocacy organisations in Aceh, reported 
that the implementation of sharia contributes to several cases of violations against women in 
Aceh (BBC Indonesia, 5 June 2013). Roslina Rasyid from LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum/ 
Legal Aid) Apik emphasised that “rather than protecting women, sharia qanun ironically 
becomes one of the causes of sexual harassment experienced by women in Aceh” (BBC 
Indonesia, 5 June 2013). It occurs because women who are accused of committing khalwat or 
adultery are often sexually harassed by law enforcers or vigilantes.  
 
Sharia in post-conflict Aceh has grown into a powerful institution without sufficient 
monitoring mechanisms and lack of participation aspects, but “agreed” on by almost all parties 
in Aceh. Sharia derivative qanun that regulates women in Aceh is not consultative. Based on 
their observations in five regions in Aceh, Solidaritas Perempuan (Women Solidarity) reported 
that 97 per cent of women in Aceh do not get the information about the qanun jinayat (Adi, 
2017). While according to the chairperson of Koalisi Nasional Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (National 
Coalition of Unity in Diversity), Nia Sarifudin, there was only minor involvement of civil 
society in preparing the qanun, in addition to the lack of supporting research and socialisation 
(Fachrudin, Kompas, 23 October 2017). The position of Islam as the central aspect of life in 
Aceh has made sharia implementation an indisputable subject. Emerging as an attempt to 
relieve tension and address grievances of religious identity, the sharia regime has grown as an 
authoritative institution that creates new grievances.  
 
Interestingly, the central government seems reluctant to address, even ignoring, the objections 
directed to the sharia-derivative qanun, especially Qanun Jinayah No 6/2016. The Minister of 
Religious Affairs, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin asked the coalition of civil society to file for 
judicial review to the Supreme Court if they think the qanun is conflicting with national 
legislation (DW, Qanun Jinayah Harm Women?”, n.d). The Minister of Home Affairs also 
stated that government could not use executive reviews concerning Qanun Jinayah because 
according to LoGA Article 235 any sharia-derivative qanun could only be annulled by the 
Supreme Court through the judicial review (Hukum Online, 9 February 2015). It demonstrates 
the reluctance of central government to change the distribution of local power in Aceh, in this 
case, the full authority of exercising sharia that was held by ulama groups and let the sharia 
regime become a dominant power in Aceh local politics.  
 
Islam has also surpassed tradition and culture in the domain of education. Based on LoGA, 






“ Education organized in Aceh is one unity with  the education system adjusted 
with the characteristic, potential and the needs of the local community” (Law on 
the Governing of Aceh, Article 215, clause 1)  
 
“All the citizens of Aceh have the right to quality and Islamic education in line 
with the development of science and technology that is implemented based on 
the principles of democracy, justice, and in high respect of human rights, Islamic 
values, culture and pluralism”.  (Law on the Governing of Aceh, Article 216, clause 
1-2). 
 
This regulation implies that education in Aceh must be based on the national education system 
but allowing the accommodation of Islamic values and Aceh traditional culture. Given the 
strong ethnonationalism ideology of GAM, intensified by their perception of Aceh’s glorious 
historical past, it is crucial to disseminate and internalise Acehnese identity through local 
education. Nevertheless, the development of post-conflict local education in Aceh 
demonstrated the supremacy of Islam over culture and tradition. Based on her research in 
Banda Aceh and Bireun, Fitriah (2016) found noticeable changes in the curriculum in the area 
of Islamic education. However, a similar change in the area of Acehnese language and history, 
two subjects that represent tradition and culture, appear not to be evident.  One teacher in 
Banda Aceh expressed concern towards the sidelining of Aceh’s history and language in the 
local curriculum, stating “Please improve the curriculum and include Acehnese history and 
language. It is very sad that there only one page about the history of Aceh in the current history 
curriculum” (Loh Angen, Portal Satu, 11 May 2017). A number of GAM elites such as Governor 
Zaini Abdullah suggested the insertion into the MoU Helsinki and LoGA of history as a subject 
(RRI, 20 March 2016), while Usman Al-Farlaky, the chairperson of Partai Aceh in DPRA 
(provincial parliament) urged the introduction of local culture and language in Aceh’s local 
curriculum (Media Aceh, 16 June 2017). 
 
Despite the aspiration and concern towards the marginalisation of culture and language in 
Aceh’s local curriculum, the Aceh Provincial Education Office formally endorsed Aceh’s 
Curriculum in September 2018. The new curriculum is entitled the Aceh Islamic Curriculum. 
Affirming Fitriah’s (2016) findings, Aceh’s new curriculum is laden with an Islamic component 
by adding five subjects: aqidah-akhlak (Islamic Faith and Morality), Al Qur’an and Hadith, 
Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), Arabic Language and Islamic History (Maharani, Republika, 23 
January 2018). Rather than developing Aceh history and language, this new curriculum 





Fitriah (2016) suspects the lack of attention from the local government as a possible 
explanation of the shortcomings of language and history in the Aceh provincial curriculum. 
There was only limited financial support from the local government in delivering teaching 
materials and supplying teachers with relevant qualification to teach history and language 
(Fitriah, 2016).  Despite the priority of education in the Special Autonomy Fund, the GAM 
dominated local government seemed reluctant to invest funds into the development of history 
and language as a medium to teach ethnonationalism in Aceh. GAM appears to choose 
coalescing Aceh national identity with Islam in the education realm. The possible explanation 
of the convergence between education and religion is because in the post-conflict era sharia 
has become increasingly powerful and politically influential in Aceh. Since education is one of 
the popular programs in local development, GAM will gain political advantage by the 
amalgamation of education, Aceh identity and Islam.  
   
Throughout the entire section on the implementation of sharia in peacetime, there are several 
features to consider. The first apparent factor is the crucial influence of the central government 
in integrating sharia into autonomous Aceh and in the post-conflict arrangement. The attempt 
of the central government to integrate sharia in times of peace seems like an effort to address 
a (perceived) major grievance of the marginalisation of Islam from local politics and the public 
domain in Aceh, even though this reason only fits with the narration of the Darul Islam 
rebellion, not GAM. The central government has been transferring the authority of the 
implementation of sharia as a perceived grievance to the Aceh local government, even before 
the peace agreement in 2005. Over time, the central government appears to grant full 
authority of sharia to the Aceh local government, even when its implementation invited 
rampant criticism towards its discriminatory practices. The discrimination frequently occurs, 
particularly after Qanun Jinayat (Islamic Criminal Code) was promulgated in 2014. Later, the 
establishment of a sharia regime works to distribute power in Aceh local politics where the 
authority over religious affairs is held by ulama groups, and local government is dominated by 
GAM.  
 
Secondly, as sharia developed into a powerful institution with limited participation, it 
eventually bred new grievances, especially among ordinary people and women specifically. 
The sharia police tend to avoid raiding luxurious hotels or upscale cafés and restaurants and 
focus instead on beaches or public places normally visited by ordinary people. If high-level 
figures are suspected of violating sharia, their cases mostly will not be processed. The 
implementation of sharia also contributes to the number of sexual harassment and other cases 




legitimate institution enforcing morality, rather than religious-spiritual consolation for people 
who just recovered from conflict and disaster.  
 
6.4 Conclusion  
Unlike politics and the economy, identity was seen as a mobilising factor of the separatist 
movement in Aceh, not a primary grievance. Nevertheless, the persistent narration over the 
identity of Aceh and its mobilising effects had made identity gain significant attention in the 
peace agreement. The attempt to address identity grievance in Aceh was shown by the 
establishment of Wali Nanggroe, as well as the right to have a provincial flag, hymn, and crest. 
Sharia as the representation of Islamic identity that is fundamental in Aceh society is 
accommodated in LoGA, not in the MoU. It indicates a significant role of the central 
government in integrating Islam into post-conflict arrangements in Aceh. Through the 
provisions of Wali Nanggroe, the flag, crest, hymn, and sharia, the central government aimed 
to transfer the authority of the identity subjects to the Aceh local government. By exercising 
its authority to implement the provisions of Wali Nanggroe, the flag, crest, hymn, and sharia, 
the GAM-dominated Aceh local government expected to gain legitimacy from Aceh society in 
the post-conflict era.  
 
The implementation of the provisions of identity in peacebuilding has been marked by the 
supremacy of institution building over participation in the development of Wali Nanggroe and 
sharia regimes as powerful institutions. In other words, there has been a process of the 
institutionalisation of identity in Aceh. While Wali Nanggroe and sharia regimes are not 
granted political rights, they tend to be political: Wali Nanggroe represents GAM (and Aceh 
ethnic groups) while the sharia regime provides the ulama with power in Aceh local politics.  
 
Both Wali Nanggroe and sharia have created new grievances among some components in Aceh 
society. The requirement of belonging to an Acehnese ethnic group and being fluent in the 
Acehnese language prevent the ethnic minorities in Aceh from being a part of the Wali 
Nanggroe institution. The Acehnese language also became a requirement of the composition 
of Aceh hymns. This privilege to Acehnese ethnic group ignited widespread protest among the 
ethnic minorities, especially from Gayo communities. It appears that there is significant 
discontent within ethnic minorities in Aceh concerning the domination of Acehnese ethnic 
groups that led to the aspiration of the establishment of separate provinces or blossoming 
projects. The domination of one ethnic group over another in ethnic separatist movements 
could repeat the pattern of internal colonialism. During the conflict period, the central 
government is seen as an internal colonial power in the context of centre-periphery discontent. 




pattern of domination and discrimination to the ethnic minorities. It is difficult for GAM and 
Acehnese ethnic groups to gain legitimacy in the regions that were inhabited by ethnic 
minorities as demonstrated by a low number of seats gained by Partai Aceh in interior and 
highland regions. It leads to the competition of “secondary legitimacy” that like internal 
colonialism, is a repetition of conflict-era in Aceh.  
 
In addition to growing as an authoritative institution, sharia creates several new grievances. 
The first is discrimination (personal grievance) due to its selective legal process to the high-
level figures and mainly deals with the cases involving ordinary people. The next grievances 
are gender-based. Sharia appears to contribute to the number of sexual harassment cases 
among women in Aceh. Also, sharia-derivative regulations in districts/cities level limit the 
freedom of women in terms of clothing, and riding motorcycles as a passenger.  As gender is a 
part of identity, this is the example of how the attempts to alleviate grievance in identity 
(religious identity) have led to creating another grievance (gender-based grievance). The 
strong presence of Sharia regimes in Aceh has been accentuating religion as the primary 
identity in Aceh, surpassing the aspect of customs, history and language that attributes with 
GAM Aceh ethnonationalism. It has been evident in the absence of the component of history, 
customs and language in Aceh’s local curriculum, which is predominantly laden with Islamic 
content.  
 
Generally, this chapter affirms hypothesis 1: “a peace agreement which addresses grievances 
will contribute to the durable peacebuilding process in middle-income countries with a 
relatively strong government like Indonesia” by the inclusion of provisions for Wali Nanggroe, 
and a flag, hymn and crest for Aceh in the MoU Helsinki. The provisions of identity in the MoU 
have been contributing to the maintenance of durable peace in Aceh by granting GAM-
dominated local government authority in establishing the customary institutions and creating 
Aceh provincial attributes. However, the authority to establish the customary institutions and 
create Aceh provincial attributes is largely influenced by the major ethnic group and dominant 
group, Acehnese and GAM, and marginalise aspiration from the minority groups. Hypothesis 
2, which proposes: “to secure sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding, the peace agreement 
should be enacted in national and local law” is also supported even though there has been a 
strong influence from central government to include sharia in the national legislation despite 
its absence in the peace agreement. Hypothesis 4 that mentions “institution building will 
increase legitimacy, secure resources and stabilise the conditions for a lasting peace” is only 
proven partially. In this case, Wali Nanggroe and sharia indeed provide GAM elites and ulama 
groups with essential power and resources. However, although Wali Nanggroe and sharia 




Particularly for Wali Nanggroe, it cannot even achieve underlying and identity-based 
legitimacy among ethnic minorities in Aceh. This conclusion is debatable, especially for sharia, 
as some Acehnese might think that the process of Islamisation of Aceh, even with prevalent 
discriminatory practices, is the realisation of performance legitimacy of a religious institution.  
During the normalisation phase, there has been a tendency towards stronger 
institutionalisation of identity in the customary institutions and sharia regime. Malik Mahmud 
had been directly appointed as Wali Nanggroe for the second term without democratic 
mechanisms. Criticism from civil society on the performance and benefit of Wali Nanggroe for 
Aceh people was mostly ignored. The sharia regime has also been growing stronger after the 
promulgation of Qanun Jinayat (Islamic Criminal Law) in 2014, which led to more corporal 
punishment in public. The participation aspect in identity subjects in the post-conflict era in 
Aceh is limited. Criticism and protests concerning the downside of the implementation of 
sharia were also mostly voiced by the element of civil society from outside Aceh rather than by 
the Aceh community. It possibly occurs due to the “moral obligation” of Acehnese who are 





Chapter 7: Addressing Human Rights Grievances through Transitional 
Justice in Post-conflict Peace-building  
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The armed conflict in Aceh is characterised by widespread human rights violation conducted 
by the Indonesian military in the forms of extrajudicial killings, abduction or physical abuse, 
especially during the Military Operations Zone Era. As has been mentioned in chapter 3, the 
government of Indonesia responded to the GAM rebellion by launching a series of counter-
insurgency actions. The military operations performed from 1989 to 1998 resulted in human 
rights violations in the form of a substantial death toll, disappearances, and torture and loss 
of property. The enormous numbers of casualties and intensity of human rights abuse are 
described by Hadi (2008):  
 
According to data from BRA (Badan Reintegration Aceh/Aceh Reintegration 
Agency) in 2007, 33,000 people had been killed over three decades of conflict. 
Data gathered in 17 districts of Aceh by a joint International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) and Harvard Medical School survey showed that 35 per cent of 
informants had reported having to flee burning buildings, 24 per cent had 
experienced forced labour and 40 per cent had experienced the expropriation or 
destruction of property (Hadi, 2008: 68). 
 
Rampant human rights violations bred new grievances among Acehnese. This occurred 
particularly where family members were victims of counter-insurgency operations. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that both sides committed violent abuse. GAM fighters 
tried to expel Javanese from the province and punish the traitors who betrayed GAM’s cause 
of independence (Aspinall and Zain, 2014).  This two-sided atrocity has disturbed the social 
fabric among communities in Aceh. 
 
Consequently, addressing human rights violations through a mechanism of transitional justice 
is seen as an important element for successful peacebuilding. The significance of including 
justice in peace agreements is emphasised by Lambourne (2004:2): “justice and reconciliation 
are fundamentally significant goals that need to be addressed in the design of successful post-
conflict peacebuilding processes and mechanisms”. The MoU Helsinki and its subsequent 
regulations aimed to address human rights violations through transitional justice. According 






 The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts 
 come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
 accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation (UNHCR, 2009: 1). 
 
Transitional justice initiatives have become components of the wider United Nations rule of 
law framework and integrative elements of post-conflict strategic planning (UN Security 
Council, 2011). In the post-Cold War era, the implementation of transitional justice concepts 
has shifted primarily to the implementation of criminal justice focused on the promotion of 
human rights and establishment of democratic government, or nation-building, which 
reached the realm of internal conflict (Yusran, 2007: 12). 
 
In Aceh, grievances over human rights abuses began to intensify during the turbulent times of 
Indonesian democracy following Suharto’s resignation in 1998. As soon as the status of 
Military Operation Zone was lifted form Aceh, groups of student activist and NGOs such as 
SIRA (Sentra Informasi Referendum Aceh/Aceh Referendum Information Center) and SMUR 
(Solidaritas Mahasiswa Untuk Rakyat/Student’s Solidarity for People) demanded a 
referendum for Aceh. Unlike the older generation of GAM who based their demands for 
independence on identity, historical incompatibility with the Republic of Indonesia and 
central-periphery economic inequality, the aspiration of self-determination in the post-
Suharto era was motivated primarily by disagreement on human rights abuse. In other words, 
while GAM’s older generation’s demands of an independent Aceh were constructed on ethnic 
nationalism, the younger generation of GAM, NGO and student activists in Aceh based their 
demands for self-determination on the universal value of human rights.  
 
This chapter focuses on the efforts to address human rights violations as part of a 
peacebuilding programme to create sustainable peace in Aceh. These are important factors to 
uphold durable peace since the human rights violations strengthened the grievances during 
the conflict period. The experience or the story which is told across generations in Aceh is 
feeding the hatred and making durable peace difficult to maintain.  
 
7.2 Grievance Alleviation 
7.2.1 MoU  
Due to the importance of addressing past atrocities, the subjects of human rights and justice 
were included during peace negotiations in Helsinki. Despite being a key Acehnese grievance 




“secondary agenda of the Helsinki peace negotiation (Jiwon, 2015, Aspinall, 2008b). The 
subject of human rights and justice were overshadowed by politics and economic aspects, such 
as self-government and local political parties. According to Awaludin (2009), in the first round 
of negotiation, GAM raised the issue of the referendum, and when it was declined by GoI, GAM 
started to address the subject of human rights violations and demanded that the perpetrator 
must be brought to an international tribunal. However, during the next round of the 
negotiations about the establishment of local political parties, the subject of human rights and 
justice were no longer discussed either by GAM or GoI.  The GoI standpoint of human rights 
and justice was based on principles of “reconciliation through amnesty coupled with economic 
integration” (Jiwon, 2015: 103). GAM members and political prisoners would be given 
amnesty and economic concessions by the central government. Nevertheless, despite being “a 
secondary issue”, MoU Helsinki finally adopted the provisions of justice and reconciliation 
like other post-conflict arrangements elsewhere as stipulated below:   
 
1. A Human Rights Court will be established for Aceh (Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement 
Article 2.1). 
2. A Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for Aceh by the 
Indonesian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation with the task of formulating 
and determining reconciliation measures. (Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement Article 2.2). 
 
The process of authority transfers from incumbent/central government to insurgent/GAM 
does not appear in the subject of human rights and justice. What is depicted in the MoU is the 
attempt of the central government to alleviate grievances caused by human rights violations 
in the framework of the national institution through the “Indonesian Commission of Truth 
and Reconciliation” and domestic human rights court. In state-led peacebuilding, judicial 
institutions are well established, contributing to the strong control of the incumbent/central 
government over the domain of human rights and justice.  
 
7.2.2 LoGA 
The subject of human rights and justice in post-conflict Aceh was adopted in national law/ 




(1) The Human Right Court in Aceh is formed to examine, try, decide and settle 





(2) The decision of Human Rights Court in Aceh as meant in clause (1) contains 
among others the giving of compensation, restitution and/or rehabilitation for the 
victim of human rights violation. 
Article 229 
 
(1) This Law forms the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Aceh to seek 
for the truth and make reconciliation. 
 
(2) The Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Aceh as meant in clause (1) is 
an inseparable part of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.  
 
(3) The Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Aceh works based on the 
stipulation of law. 
 
(4) In settling human rights violation cases in Aceh, the Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation in Aceh may consider the indigenous principles that are used in the 
community. 
 
The subject of transitional justice experienced significant amendment in national legislation 
due to the adoption of retrospective principles for human rights courts in Aceh. It means that 
the human rights court in Aceh could only try human rights violations after the promulgation 
of LoGA. Jiwon (2014) refers the process of human rights and justice in post-conflict Aceh as 
“pre-emptive transitional justice” or “policies adopted by the reluctant transitional leader in 
the face of worst alternative without the intention to fully implement the adopted policies” 
(Jiwon, 2014: 98). At the beginning of the peace process in the Helsinki negotiations, the 
delegation of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia agreed to include the provision of 
transitional justice. However, in the aftermath of the Helsinki Peace Process, the central 
government amended the provision of the human rights court, reluctant to support the 
establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as the non-judicial 
mechanism of transitional justice. Jiwon (2014) argues that the acceptance demonstrated by 
central government towards the transitional justice provisions during the Helsinki 
negotiations was based on the presence of international actors that promoted universal values 
of human rights and justice. Due to the inconsistency of external actors to monitor the progress 
of transitional justice, the central government often adjusts the previously committed 
intention to address past human rights violations and secure them under the domain of the 
national judicial system.  
 
The retrospective principle of human rights courts in Aceh indicates the bargaining process at 
national level over this sensitive subject. In the aftermath of Timor Leste’s independence from 
Indonesia, the central government, particularly military groups and nationalist parties, were 
very reluctant to cooperate in human rights investigations. The inclusion of the transitional 




law, was strongly resisted by the nationalist groups under PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-
Perjuangan/ Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle) and the military groups (Shofwan, 
2006). This rejection occurred because the establishment of a human rights court will 
potentially charge many military officers that violated human rights during military 
operations in Aceh.  Thus, the retrospective principle of law that could only try the human 
rights violation cases after the promulgation of LoGA in 2006 enables military officers to avoid 
trial. GAM did not oppose this amendment significantly. There are two possible explanations 
of the GAM stance on human rights and justice issues. Firstly, GAM had shown little interest 
in the subject of transitional justice and used it as “bargaining power” towards the 
accomplishment of self-government and local political party during the Helsinki negotiations. 
Secondly, according to Aspinall and Zain “It [GAM] see[s] little to be gained from antagonising 
their most fearsome former rivals – and the most potentially dangerous peace spoilers – in 
the military, when there is so much to be gained politically and economically from securing 
the peace” (Aspinall and Zein, 2014: 123).  
 
7.2.3 Qanun  
Because of the minimum, or even the absence of the implementation of human rights and 
justice in the peacebuilding phase in Aceh, there was no qanun promulgated until 2013. Qanun 
No 17/2013 about the establishment of the Aceh Truth and Reconciliation Commission is the 
only qanun that regulates the subject of human rights and justice post-conflict. 
 
The alleviation of human rights grievances was initially proposed in the MoU Helsinki through 
the establishment of a human rights court and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. These 
ideas were however significantly amended in subsequent national regulations. In LoGA, the 
human rights court adopted retrospective principles that could only try the human rights 
violations in the post-promulgation of LoGA. It means past human rights violations during the 
conflict era in Aceh could not be processed by the courts. At the local level, Aceh promulgated 
a Qanun about the Aceh Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a local jurisdiction 
under provincial legislation after the annulment of the national TRC. The development of 
regulation of transitional justice to alleviate grievance in post-conflict Aceh indicates the 
domination of central government. There is no clear process of the transfer of authority from 
the incumbent/central government to insurgent/GAM in the subject of human rights and 
justice in post-conflict Aceh. Only in later phases did the local government try to build its 







7. 3 Human Rights Courts and the TRC: The Failure of Institutionalisation of 
Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Aceh  
Transitional justice can be divided into three major efforts: truth recovery, criminal trials and 
public inquiry as portrayed by figure 7.1 below: 
 
Figure 7-1 Transitional Justice Mechanism 
 
Source: Brankovic and Van der Merwe (2014) 
 
 
Criminal trials are a judicial mechanism while the two others, truth recovery and public 
inquiries, are non-judicial. Brankovic and Van der Merwe (2014) elaborate judicial and non-
judicial mechanisms as follows:  
 
1. A judicial mechanism is executed by establishing Human Rights Courts at the 
national level, by prosecuting the perpetrators to international criminal court 
(Rwanda and Yugoslavia), or to hybrid court (international and domestic). 
2. A Truth Commission is a mechanism to seek authoritative record about the past 
violation of human rights. It is conducted in various ways such as public or closed 
hearings, and subpoenas There are a variety of opinions about the necessity and 
effectiveness of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in a post-conflict 
setting. Schlunck (1997) identifies the advantages and disadvantages of the 
establishment of TRC as a part of a peace settlement. Among the benefits of the 
















as well as its instant establishment and low-cost consideration. TRC can serve 
purposes which could not be performed by human rights court or judicial 
mechanism such as giving an account, providing explanation and offer 
recommendation for a better future. However, TRC also contains several 
limitations. Schlunck (1997) emphasizes the political will of the elites, divergent 
interest and limited budget as the major constraints of the TRC.  The other 
disadvantage of TRC could be seen from the individual perspective.  The victims 
who testify before the commission may have to go through the agony of their 
traumatizing experience without any further relieve or tangible compensation.  
3. Reparations for victims in both material and symbolic compensation. Material 
compensation takes the form of the cash payment and building schools or 
community centres), while symbolic reparations could be done by delivering a 
formal apology and building memorial places. 
4. Adopting traditional /customary mechanisms to resolve conflict or to heal 
trauma caused by grave violations.  
5. Vetting and restoration of the credibility of public officials who were involved in 
past abuses.  
 
In Indonesia, transitional justice has been embedded in the trajectory of transition to 
democracy in the era following Suharto’s New Order, consisting of judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms. Various forms of human rights abuse were common during the New Order era 
to maintain national security and protect development projects. Any protest or disagreement 
towards certain development projects that sacrificed people’s land was curbed by security 
apparatuses. The military approach was also used to curb separatism in Aceh, Papua, and East 
Timor. After Suharto stepped down in 1998, several initiatives were undertaken, and 
institutions set up to deal with past human rights abuses and to ensure that they would not be 
repeated in the future.  Regarding judicial mechanisms, Indonesia enacted National Law No. 
26/2000 on Human Rights Courts to establish human rights courts. Non-judicial mechanisms 
of transitional justice were made possible by the stipulation of Law No 27/2004 about the 
establishment of a national Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
 
Although being supported by laws, the process of transitional justice in Indonesia has been 
sluggish and ineffective. Only three ad hoc human rights courts were established successfully: 
the human rights court to deal with the violations committed during the UN-supervised poll 
in East Timor in 1999, the mass shooting in Tanjung Priok Jakarta in 1984, and the torture 
and killing of civilians in Abepura, Papua in 2000 (CNN Indonesia, 11 December 2018). 




Timor case were released on appeal to the Supreme Court (Aspinall, 2008b).  Two alleged 
military officers responsible for the Abepura case were released by the Makassar Human 
Rights Court (Detiknews, 9 September 2005) while the decision of the human rights court to 
punish military officers in the Tanjung Priok incident was annulled by the Supreme Court 
(Bhawono, 2017). The non-judicial mechanism experienced the same fate when they were 
annulled by the Constitutional Court in 2006. There have been several intertwined factors in 
the failure of transitional justice in Indonesia: the remaining strong influence of Indonesian 
military in domestic politics and structural problems such as judicial corruption, 
ineffectiveness and lack of political will (ICTJ, 2011).  The next sections elaborate the efforts 
to alleviate human rights grievances in post-conflict Aceh through transitional justice by 




7.3.1 The Human Rights Court  
In 2006, a year after the Helsinki Peace Agreement, the House of People’s Representatives 
enacted the Law on Governing Aceh which provided the legal basis for the establishment of 
the Human Rights Court for Aceh. The Law, however, interpreted the provision for the Human 
Rights Court in the Peace Agreement by using retrospective principles that could only process 
(investigate, prosecute and resolve) the cases which occurred after the enactment of the law. 
In other words, as stipulated in the Law of Governing Aceh article 228, the court could not try 
human rights violations that occurred during the conflict (Law of the Governing of Aceh, 
2006). The decision of adopting retrospective principles reflected the complexities of human 
rights settlement post-conflict. There is a need to balance the fulfilment of justice and keeping 
the durability of peace. In most cases, the perpetrators are key figures in the government or 
top ranked military officers.  It occurred in Aceh’s case, as several military officers during the 
conflict, such as General Ryamizard Ryacudu, were influential figures in the Indonesian 
military and became one of the strongest opponents of peaceful negotiations with GAM. The 
provision of human rights and justice must be compromised to protect the honour of a military 
group and to minimise their opposition.  
 
Although it is almost impossible to bring the perpetrators of human rights violations before 
2005 to court, two other legal bases could be utilised instead. Firstly, before the Helsinki Peace 
Agreement, The Law No 26/2000 on Human Rights provides several opportunities to ensure 
justice for the victims of human rights abuse in Aceh. The Law on Human Rights regulates the 
establishment of a Human Rights Court in Medan to deal with human rights violations in Aceh 




court to process cases before 2000 (Amnesty International, 2013). Nevertheless, the courts 
only have jurisdiction over gross human rights violations that consist of genocide and crimes 
against humanity and exclude any case of war crimes, torture, extra-judicial killings and 
enforced disappearances (Amnesty International, 2013). The Medan Human Rights Court has 
never ruled on any cases related to human rights violations in Aceh and ad hoc human rights 
courts have never been set up to try similar cases.  
  
Secondly, following Law No.26/2000 on Human Rights Courts, National Commission of 
Human Rights (Komnas HAM) was granted the power to conduct pro-justicia inquiries 
into genocide and crimes against humanity.  Article 5 (1) Law Number 26/2000 about 
Human Rights Court defines a pro justicia inquiry as follows:  
 
“A series of action taken by enquirer [Komnas HAM] to look for or find the 
existence or otherwise of an event assumed as gross violation of human rights to 
be followed up by the investigation of Attorney General Office in the accordance 
with the provisions set forth in this law (Herbert, 2008: 467). 
 
If Komnas HAM considers that there is sufficient evidence that gross abuse of human rights 
has occurred, a summary of the findings shall be submitted to the Attorney General’s Office 
for investigation (Amnesty International, 2013).  
 
Based on this right to conduct a pro justicia inquiry, in 2013 the Komnas HAM plenary decided 
to establish inquiries into five cases of past abuses in Aceh. They consist of various human 
rights violations in Rumoh Geudong, Pidie; mass killings in Simpang KKA, North Aceh; 
accidents in Bumi Flora, East Aceh; forced disappearances and mass graves in Bener Meriah, 
Central Aceh; and mass killings in Jambo Keupok, South Aceh (Hukum Online, 1 Agustus, 
2013). Among those five cases, three of them – Rumoh Geudong, Simpang KKA, and Bumi 
Flora – had been previously investigated by Komnas HAM without any further response from 
the office of the attorney general. Komnas HAM declared that the military operation in Aceh, 
which lasted from 1989 until a peace deal was signed in 2005, could be categorised as a gross 
human rights violation and that the Indonesian Military (TNI) was responsible for the killing 
(Aritonang, 2013). However, as happened in the past inquiries, the result was not followed up 
by the office of Attorney General, an indication that bringing perpetrators of human rights 
crimes to justice has not been the priority of the central government for peacebuilding in Aceh. 
It was caused by inadequate regulations, lack of political will and high resistance from the 
suspected perpetrators. In 2018, Komnas HAM submitted another inquiry to investigate the 






The response from Acehnese communities toward the urgency of addressing human rights 
violations differs. The indirect rejection of the formal process of the prosecution was mainly 
voiced by government officials and both national and local political party officers: 
 
“I think it is now time to close the book. Let us end the old story and maintain the 
peace” (GO personal interview, September 2012). 
 
“Investigation of the violation of human rights will only open the old wound. It will 
threaten peace” (LPP 2, personal interview, September 2012). 
 
A pessimistic opinion is also voiced by Marzuki Darusman, a legislator from Partai Golkar, 
who opined that the judicial resolution of human rights violations in Aceh will not be smooth 
because “the number of cases is too large, and it will not be possible to process them in normal 
trials” (Shofwan, 2006).  
 
Despite the support of regulations, albeit weak, the future of justice for the victims of human 
rights violations in Aceh during conflict seems discouraging. This problem is exacerbated by 
the absence or half-hearted support from government officials and political parties to follow 
up on the investigation of human rights violence during the conflict in Aceh. The situation of 
almost complete impunity for human rights violations in the post-conflict era is common in 
many other countries (Amnesty International, 2013). Justice is side-lined by political 
participation and economic development because they are seen as more constructive efforts 
for peacebuilding, while human rights and justice, on the contrary, could harm the newly 
obtained peace. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the strong and already established institutions in state-led 
peacebuilding do not give a positive contribution to the fulfilment of the judicial mechanism 
of transitional justice in post-conflict Aceh. Indonesian judicial institutions have been hesitant 
to process human rights violations, especially when they involved high-rank military officers. 
The continuous efforts from Komnas HAM (Indonesian Commission of Human Rights) to 
investigate human rights violations in Aceh by submitting pro justicia inquiry have always 
been gridlocked by the Office of Attorney General as a part of Indonesia’s judicial institution 
system. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in judicial mechanisms of transitional 
justice in Aceh between the transition and normalisation phases of peacebuilding. Both phases 
are constantly characterised by the reluctance of the central government to take further steps 
to bring justice to victims of conflict in Aceh through human rights courts.  It reflects the 




era. Usman Hamid, the Director of Human Rights Watch Indonesia, argues that despite 
granting Indonesians with more civil liberties and political participation, the Reformation era 
had failed human rights and justice, because the former police and military generals involved 
in past human rights abuse have been continuing to hold power in the past 20 years (Hamid, 
2018). The transfer of authority from the incumbents to insurgents to address this grievance 
is also not possible since the Human Rights Court is a part of Indonesia’s judicial system. Thus, 
it becomes one of the central government authorities which could not be managed or 
administered separately by Aceh’s government. 
 
 
7.3.2 Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
Just one year before a peace agreement was reached in Aceh, Indonesia added another aspect 
of transitional justice by enacting a law to establish a national Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in 2004 (Law No. 27/2004). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
Indonesia was established with powers to receive complaints of the violation of human rights, 
investigating past human rights abuse and making recommendations for compensation and 
or rehabilitation for the victims (Amnesty International, 2013). The establishment of TRC was 
stipulated in the MoU Helsinki and LoGA, and it followed the pattern of peacebuilding in other 
post-conflict countries to include TRC as the non-judicial mechanism. 
 
However, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Aceh’s case was short lived. In 2006, 
a group of victims of human rights violations and representatives of the Human Rights CSO 
in Indonesia filed a material review to the Constitutional Court on three clauses in the Law on 
a National Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. The first criticised article is article 1 
number 9: “Amnesty is a pardon granted to the perpetrators of gross human rights violations 
by the President of the Republic of Indonesia based on the consideration of National 
Parliament”. The second criticised article is article 27: “Amnesty is granted to perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations before victims can receive compensation and rehabilitation”. 
The third criticised article is article 44: “Gross human rights violations cases that have been 
resolved by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission cannot be brought again to the human 
rights court” (Hukum Online, 11 December 2006). It was considered a violation of the sense 
of justice because the perpetrators can avoid responsibility to the victim as well as eliminating 
the right of the victim to seek justice through the judicial mechanism.  The decision from 
Constitutional Court was rather unexpected because it was not only revoked the three 
criticised articles but also annulled the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission due to the reasoning that the law is unconstitutional. There is an indication that 




from Jimly Asshiddiqie, the chairperson of the Constitutional Court: “reconciliation is not 
necessarily conducted through legal mechanism, it could also use political mechanism such as 
compensating GAM members with the allocation of land” (Detiknews, 7 December 2006). 
Following the annulment, there was an attempt to re-establish the commission by submitting 
a new draft with the exclusion of amnesty. The reviewing process of the draft proceeds very 
slowly, hampering the progress of TRC in Aceh accordingly. 
 
7.3.2.1 The Establishment of a Local TRC in Aceh  
The failure of the judicial system and slow progress of non-judicial effort for advocating 
human rights and justice in Aceh had encouraged civil society to organise and take an 
alternative approach. The victims of conflict set up an organisation called Kagundah 
(Association of Acehnese Families of Missing Persons) and submitted a petition to demand 
compensation and the establishment of a TRC to the Aceh local government and parliament 
(Amnesty International, 2013). The attempt to establish a local TRC was initiated by several 
NGO coalitions, such as the Aceh Coalition of Truth, the Aceh Judicial Monitoring Institution, 
and Woman Volunteers for Humanity (Clarke, Wandita and Samsidar, 2008). They worked 
collaboratively to develop a model of a TRC in Aceh together with community leaders and 
victims’ groups. They presented a concept paper of TRC Aceh to local government and local 
parliament (DPRA) to be followed up as a Qanun (Clarke et al., 2008).   
 
The initiative to establish a local TRC is problematic as LoGA regulates that the formation of 
a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Aceh is an inseparable part of the [National] 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Law of the Governing on Aceh, Article 229). On 
other words, Aceh TRC could not be established before the new law on National TRC is re-
promulgated. However, the establishment of Aceh TRC could refer to another legal basis in 
LoGA. Article 7 of LoGA stipulates that Aceh government and district/city government are 
authorised to manage and administer governmental affairs except for national affairs, foreign 
affairs politics, defence, security, judicial, monetary, and national fiscal and certain affairs in 
the religious sector (Law of the Governing of Aceh Article 7). TRC as a non-judicial mechanism 
of transitional justice is therefore excluded from the sole authorities of the central government. 
The utilisation of LoGA as a legal basis of local TRC was also strengthened by KontraS (Komisi 
Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Kekerasan/Commission for Disappeared and Victims of 
Violence) by stressing the principles of the ex specialis derogate generali, or specific laws 
prevailing over general laws (Saraswati, 2017).  
 
The effort to establish local TRC was intensified after the election of Zaini Abdullah, the second 




legitimacy from marginalised conflict victims, Zaini was seen as the more supportive figure to 
the effort of establishing truth and justice post-conflict. DPRA decided to process the draft of 
Aceh qanun even though the Constitutional Court cancelled the law (Simanjuntak, 2013a). In 
late 2013, despite the controversies surrounding the establishment of a local TRC, DPRA 
passed Qanun No 17/2013 about the establishment of a Local TRC in Aceh. This legal initiative 
received an initial objection from the central government based on the predicted reason: Aceh 
TRC is a part of national TRC. Thus, its establishment must be delayed until the new law of 
the national TRC is enacted. While the central government did not seem happy with this local 
initiative, there have been no further efforts from Jakarta to halt the establishment of Aceh 
TRC. The development of Aceh TRC itself has been very slow, taking three years from the 
promulgation of the qanun to the official inauguration of Aceh’s TRC commissioners by 
Governor Zaini in 2016.  The Aceh TRC also suffered organisational deficiencies as it was 
established under the Provincial Office of Social Affairs and received only IDR 4.5 billion (USD 
300,000) annual operational fee from the provincial government (Usman, 2018). However, 
despite all the shortcomings and slow pace, Aceh TRC has been persistently conducting its 
task as the agency to deal with transitional justice in Aceh. In August 2018, Aceh TRC began 
to hear the victim’s testimony and recorded the 500 testimonies from five regencies in Aceh 
to their database (Sanjaya, 2018).  
 
The initiative of the establishment of TRC at the local level was a positive development in non-
judicial mechanisms in Indonesia. The Coordinator of KontraS Aceh, Gilang Destika 
appreciated the formation of Aceh TRC and expected that the institution could break the cycle 
of violence in Aceh “… [Aceh TRC] is important to prevent the recurrence of the conflict in the 
future … to enable our children and grandchildren to know the truth about the atrocities 
experienced by our family and relatives that must not be repeated” (BBC Indonesia, 27 
December 2013). The similar expression of the necessity of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was also voiced by my respondents, especially from academics and civil society 
organisations: 
 
“Human Rights and Justice in Aceh should be based on the principle of forgiveness 
but not forgotten. Truth-seeking is important, and it must be driven by civil society, 








“The enforcement of human rights in Aceh in the post-conflict period is very poor; 
this is partially caused by the former combatant who is now in power and does not 
have any sense of urgency to follow up the human rights problem. Truth and 
Reconciliation in Aceh is still necessary” (PA 3, confidential interview, September 
2012) 
 
Aceh TRC is not the first case of the “adjustment” of transitional justice in post-conflict 
Indonesia. The Government of Indonesia had modified the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission for the East Timor case into the Commission of Truth and Friendship (Komisi 
Kebenaran dan Persahabatan/CTF). The CTF was established under the agreement between 
Xanana Gusmao, East Timor President and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the 
Republic of Indonesia in 2005 to review the various reports about the violations of human 
rights during the 1999 referendum. The result of the commission is the acknowledgement of 
violations of human rights, albeit without a formal apology or further recommendations for 
the judicial process regarding the perpetrators. The two leaders agreed to “close” the past. This 
decision was supported by the East Timorese leader as a political compromise.  
 
The delayed establishment of TRC in Aceh is another case of the sluggish transitional justice 
in Indonesia.  Even though TRC is a non-judicial mechanism, its establishment in Indonesia’s 
transitional justice structure was responded to half-heartedly. After the Law No 27/2004 
about Indonesia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was annulled, there has been no 
significant attempt to re-enact this law. Again, a strong institution in state-led peacebuilding, 
that is represented by national parliamentis reluctant to support transitional justice in a post-
conflict setting.  In 2017, the Coordinator Minister of Politics and Security who is also a high 
ranking military officer, Army General (retired) Wiranto, announced the proposed 
establishment of the Council of National Harmony (Dewan Kerukunan Nasional) to resolve 
past human rights abuses (including gross human rights violations) between the victims and 
perpetrators by using compromise and consensus (Asian Human Rights Commissions, n.d). 
The authority of the council to tackle gross human rights violations through non-judicial 
mechanisms was heavily criticised by Human Rights CSO due to the possibility of immunity 
given to the perpetrators. This widespread protest caused Wiranto to correct his early 
statement and stressed that the council is tasked to suggest the resolution of vertical conflict 
(between government and society) and horizontal conflict (conflict between societies) by using 
consensus and compromise (Andwika, 2017). Wiranto also acknowledged that the Council 





In the middle of the gesture of “political compromise” on the subject of transitional justice at 
the national level, it is indeed interesting to observe the persistent development of TRC as a 
non-judicial mechanism in post-conflict Aceh. The absence of a legal basis for the 
establishment of a national TRC was filled by an initiative from civil society groups to establish 
a local TRC in Aceh. Despite the lack of support from central government, this initiative has 
been appreciated as the alternative transitional justice mechanism. While the primary 
proponents of a local TRC are civil society groups, to mark the participation aspect in this field, 
its establishment was supported by the provincial government. Despite slow progress and 
institutional-financial deficiency, the formation of a local TRC in Aceh indicates the process of 
“authority take over” performed by local government when there is an absence of regulation 
at national level, instead of “authority transfer” from central government to Aceh local 
government in the subject of transitional justice. The support from GAM-dominated local 
government, albeit slow and lukewarm, is quite surprising because the process of truth and 
reconciliation if conducted correctly, must also involve GAM personnel as the atrocities were 
committed by two parties, GAM and the Indonesian military. It could also be an indication of 
an attempt from GAM to gain legitimacy from Acehnese society, especially from the victims of 
conflicts.  
 
If we follow the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the TRC as explained by 
Schlunk (1997) there are some distinct features on the strength and weakness of TRC in Aceh. 
In the countries with a strong presence and influence of military groups that impede the 
process of trials in the human right court such as in Indonesia, TRC provides the opportunities 
for the communities or non-elite groups to reap the benefits of peace, since other post-conflict 
benefits such as political power and economic resources could only be enjoyed by a few elite. 
In Aceh, the local TRC is the evidence of the successful collaboration between civil society 
organisations, communities and the families of the conflict victims to bring justice to the 
victims of the longstanding conflict in Aceh, when a similar institution at the national level is 
absent. This local initiative, surprisingly, gained considerable support from the local 
government. And lastly, while the effectiveness of the Aceh local TRC is questioned due to its 
inability to bring Indonesian military officers, the TRC could be utilised as the internal 
reconciliation forum between different ethnic groups such as in Gayo, where the past conflict 
often involved two different ethnic groups. However, Aceh TRC also contains several 
weaknesses. The most profound weakness is the resistance from the military and nationalist 
group over the establishment of the TRC. While there was no direct challenge from the military 
and nationalist groups to the Aceh TRC, the political initiative at the national level does not 
favour the transitional justice initiative as accentuated by General Wiranto. Wiranto prefers 




Commission. Other weakness of Aceh TRC that affirms Schlunk’s notion is the limitation of 
the budget provided by the local government as well as the institutional deficiencies. Lastly, 
given its territorial jurisdiction that only covers the area of Aceh Province, the Aceh TRC will 
not be able to compel testimony or enforce the restitution to the perpetrators who no longer 
reside in Aceh.  
 
7.4 Reconciliation from Below 
In addition to the effort undertaken by civil society organisations to establish a local TRC in 
Aceh, there are also other local initiatives with similar mechanisms that seek truth and 
reconciliation. In Aceh, the incorporation of local cultural traditions is acknowledged by the 
article 229 of LoGA that stipulates: “In settling human rights violation cases in Aceh, the 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Aceh may take into the consideration custom 
principles that use in society”. One of the most widely used cultural ceremonies for conflict 
resolution in Aceh is peusijeuk. As described by Kimura, peusijuek is “a ritual performed to 
show that harmony and peace have been restored to a community after a disruptive incident 
by extending apology and compensation to the victims” (Kimura, 2015: 85).  The ceremony is 
done by pouring sacred water, yellow rice, or powder as a symbol of forgiveness and 
reconciliation (Kimura, 2015). Peusijeuk was common during the early post-conflict years 
when former GAM soldiers returned to their hometowns and were welcomed back by the 
communities (Brainwathe et al. 2010). However, this traditional mechanism of reconciliation 
is focusing on implicit forgiveness based on the intention to move on to the future and does 
not consist of truth-telling (Aspinall and Zain, 2014). This customary mechanism of 
reconciliation is often criticised because it could be manipulated by the perpetrators of human 
rights violations to escape from accountability (Kimura, 2015). It is further seen as the co-





Photo 7-1 Peusijeuk Ceremony 
 
Source: Website of National Radio of Indonesia (RRI)  
 
Another example of a civil society attempting reconciliation is by transforming the memory of 
conflict into cooperation. This conflict transformation initiative was organised by KontraS 
Aceh and the Peace-Loving Women’s Group (Kelompok Perempuan Cinta Damai/ KPCD) 
(ICTJ and KontraS, 2011). It takes place in Bener Meriah, a central highland district with a 
multi-ethnic composition; Acehnese, Gayo, and Javanese. Due to its heterogeneity, Bener 
Meriah faced high-intensity inter-communal conflict beside separatist conflict between GAM 
and the Indonesian military (Aspinal and Zain, 2014). In coastal areas of Aceh, TNI 
(Indonesian Army) directly confronted GAM, thus making a distinction between friends and 
enemy easier. On the contrary in coastal areas such as Gayo, ethnic plurality and presence of 
militia groups made the situation more complicated because violence could be done by the 
various groups and the perpetrators were difficult to identify. This situation led to the 
diminishing social fabric among the communities in Gayo.  
 
Women were the first beneficiaries of this project for two reasons. Firstly, there were lower 
levels of violence used among women when they encountered dispute or conflict. Secondly, 
women are expected to socialise and nurture the culture of peace for their family members, 
particularly their children, to stop the spiral of violence (Lintas Gayo, 22 December 2010, 
Christanty, 2011). Later, this programme was expanded into the other community groups and 
ordinary villagers in the interior areas of Aceh (Aspinall and Zain, 2014).  The reconciliation 




livelihood programmes such as vegetable plantations, fish-farming and handicraft (Aspinall 
and Zain, 2014). The participants in the programme engaged in a discussion about transitional 
justice, training on peace and reconciliation, establishing cooperation and setting up peace 
villages, the multi-ethnic villages in the post-conflict era (Christanty, 2011). According to 
Aspinall and Zain (2014), this programme seemed to reach a significant outcome as shown by 
the collaboration between the former adversaries, the ex-GAM combatants and ex-PETA 
(government militias) in the same caucus of district parliament that was enhanced by the 
interaction in this reconciliation programme.  The participants also noted substantial changes 
in inter-racial relations as expressed by Maimunah “Previously the different ethnic groups 
often insult each other, but after joining this group we feel being united as one ethnic group, 
no more difference” (Lintas Gayo, 22 December 2010). The 16 peace villages were also 
established to foster peace in the Gayo area. This reconciliation effort is considered important 
as accentuated by Wiwin from KontraS “Despite its reduced intensity, inter-ethnic segregation 
is still rampant in Central Aceh, and it potentially could be used to create another conflict” 
(Arif & Muhammad, 2011).  
 
Notwithstanding its potential as an alternative approach to fulfil the need for justice and 
reconciliation in the post-conflict period, Avonious (2009) stresses that peusijeuk or other 
grassroots reconciliation methods are not sufficient for maintaining the durability of peace.  
Reconciliation in Aceh takes more than just local dispute settlement. It is also important to 
find long term solutions that are based on a thorough understanding of human rights and 
justice. It is affirmed by one respondent that expressed her concern towards the delay of 
transitional justice in Aceh, stressing the point that peace will not be complete without justice 
and fair dealing with past atrocities (PA 1, confidential interview, September 2012).  
 
7.5 Memorialisation in Transitional Justice  
While the future of the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of human rights abuses 
during the conflict in Aceh seems discouraging, a group of human rights activists in Aceh 
established various memorial places as a reminder and lesson learned of the history of conflict.  
Barsaloe and Baxter define memorialisation as “a process that satisfies the desire to honour 
those who suffered or died during the conflict and as a means to examine the past and address 
contemporary issues” (Barsaloe and Baxter, 2007: 1). Memorialisation could occur in every 
conflict cycle, taking different forms and in a highly politicised process that is shaped by those 
in power (Barsaloe and Baxter, 2007). Public memorialisation is considered to be an 
important element of transitional justice due to its power to grip with the past. They also 
become a primary ground of the different constituencies to address the challenging and 





In Indonesia, memorialisation through museums, monuments, books and film was used 
largely as state propaganda, especially under Suharto. It echoes Kappler’s (2017) argument 
about the political aspect of memorialisation projects involving the reproduction and 
transformation of power relations. The most famous one is the memorialisation of the 
communist rebellion in 1965 that is widely used as an anti-communist campaign. In a smaller 
scale, several civil society organisations offer an alternative narration of the “government 
version” of history by documenting human rights violations cases that occurred during 1965-
1998 (Impunity Watch, 2015). There is also “Munir Museum” in Malang to commemorate 
Munir, one of the most prominent Indonesian human rights activists who was murdered 
during his Jakarta-Amsterdam flight in 2004. In Aceh, memorialisation has developed as the 
alternative transitional justice mechanism to the stalled human rights courts and TRC.  
 
7.5.1 The Human Rights Museum 
The establishment of a human rights museum in Aceh was initiated in 2011 by four human 
rights organisations: Tikar Pandan, LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum/ Legal Aid Foundation) 
Aceh, KontraS, and Aceh Human Rights NGO Coalition (Aspinall and Zain, 2014). Initially, 
human rights activists in Aceh expected the government to establish a memorial to remember 
past human rights violations. However, after five years passed without any follow-up, they 
took the initiative to establish this museum (Tempo, 24 March 2011). This consortium of 
human rights NGOs brought together artists and activists to establish the museum to record 
human rights violations during the conflict. Due to small funding, Komunitas Tikar Pandan 
dedicated one room of their office in Ulee Kareng, Banda Aceh to house the museum 
(Christanty, 2011).  It displays photographs of disappeared victims, a documentary film on 
school burnings and a record of tragedies such as the murder of Tengku Bantaqiah, a well-
known religious cleric who has been accused of possession of illegal firearms, together with 
his students on July 23, 1999, in West Aceh (Jakarta Globe, 26 March 2011). The management 
of this museum does not exhibit graphic pictures of those tragedies for ethical reasons and to 
avoid reopening old wounds (Jakarta Globe, 26 March 2011). The museum is also used as a 
place to conduct various activities such as screenings, readings, lectures and discussions 












Photo 7-2 A visitor of the Human Rights Museum Aceh reading displays of a 
violent accident 
 
Source: Tempo Online 
 
 
Photo 7-3 A visitor of the Human Rights Museum observes pictures of victims of 
conflict in Aceh 
 
Aceh. Source: Tempo Online  
 
According to the initiator of the Human Rights Museum, Reza Idria, the establishment of the 
museum was inspired by the Holocaust Museum in Berlin. Furthermore, Idria explains that 







While we wait for the establishment of the Truth of Reconciliation that takes a 
long time…. we have limited memory. Then it will be good if we can have space to 
enable people to put stuff or picture to remind us about the human rights 
violation in Aceh” (Christanty, 2011).  
 
The concept of a Human Rights Museum was initially rejected both by GAM and the military, 
so as “not to open old wounds” (Christanty, 2011, Amnesty International, 2013). 
 
Photo 7-4 Human Rights School conducted in Aceh Human Rights Museum 
 
Source: Website of the Aceh Human Rights Museum 
 
The fate of the Human Rights Museum stands in contrast to the Tsunami Museum, another 
memorialisation project in peace-time. The Tsunami Museum is a 2,500 square metre, four-
storey building designed by Ridwan Kamil, Indonesian architect and built for USD 6.7 Million 
(Herlily, 2010, Williamson, 2009). This memorial place is designed both as a tribute to the 
230,000 Acehnese killed by tsunami and as a place for reflection (Herlily, 2010).  The museum 





Photo 7-5 Tsunami Museum in Banda Aceh 
 
Source: Website of Aceh Provincial Government 
 
Until 2018, the Tsunami Museum was one of the popular tourist destinations in Banda Aceh 
for both national and international visitors and frequently featured on tourism websites. On 
the other hand, the Human Rights Museum “seemed to have disappeared from the digital and 
physical landscape” (Grayman and Bronnimann, 2018: 112).  It illustrates the case where two 
memorialisation projects experienced different trajectories. Kent (2016) argues that the 
perilous relations between the GAM-dominated Aceh local government and the central 
government with a strong military presence impedes efforts to commemorate conflict victims 
publicly and collectively. The existence of the Human Rights Museum that refuses to forget 
past atrocities does not seem fit with the narrative of an Aceh settled peacefully within the 
state of Indonesia (Grayman and Bronnimann, 2018).  
 
7.5.2 Simpang KKA Monument 
The Simpang KKA (Kertas Kraft Aceh/ Aceh Kraft Paper) monument is a memorial to the mass 
shooting in North Aceh district, the Dewantara Massacre. It occurred on 3 May 1999 when 
martial law was declared in Aceh. This incident was preceded by the search for an alleged 
missing soldier in Cut Murong Village, Dewantara Sub-District by the Guided Missile Unit of 
Military Resort Command Lilawangsa. During the searching process, the soldiers attacked 20 
villagers. Following that violent accident, the community and military held a meeting and 
came up with the agreement to prohibit soldiers from entering the village again, and the 
searching process of the missing soldiers would be carried out by community leaders (Rini, 
2002). However, the military broke the agreement and led to the mobilisation of the hundreds 
of people to protest the accident. The protest that initially went peacefully turned chaotic and 




least 49 people, including seven children, wounding 156, with ten people reported missing 
(Muslimah, Detiknews, 22 June 2016).   
 
In the middle of prolonged absence of Truth of Reconciliation Commission, the victims of the 
Simpang KKA massacre organised themselves into K2HAU (Komunitas Korban Pelanggaran 
HAM Aceh Utara, or the Community of the Victims of Human Rights Violation in North Aceh). 
Several human rights CSOs conducted a public hearing during the 11th commemoration of 
Simpang KKA by adopting the model of the Aceh Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Junge, 2010). Testimony by one victim strongly stressed the urgency to establish a human 
rights court and TRC for the perpetrators: 
 
…A bullet had hit my head, and I had to be operated on several times…There are 
still bullet splinters in my head, but I cannot afford the necessary treatment…I 
hope that this violence will not be repeated. The government has to pay attention 
to the victims. There has to be a court to try the perpetrators and a truth 
commission. If the perpetrators are not tried, they will feel encouraged to repeat 
what they have done, maybe to do even worse”.19 
 
The public hearing was followed by a ceremony to lay the foundation stone for a monument to 
commemorate the victims of this massacre by the representative of the North Aceh Regency 
and local parliament (Junge, 2010). In 2011, the monument was completed and inaugurated 
(Amnesty International, 2013). 
 
                                                        
19 Cited from Fabian Junge, “Public Commemoration for Victims of Aceh Conflict” Watch Indonesia! 





Photo 7-6 Simpang KKA Monument in North Aceh Regency 
 
 
Source: Website of Aceh Provincial Government 
  
The agreement from local government to erect the monument that permanently 
commemorates the conflict victims is a result of intensive lobbying from K2HAU. The 
establishment of this memorialisation project indicates the possibility of the opening up of 
public recognition of past human rights abuses by the state even though only at local level 
(Junge, 2010).  
 
 
7.5.3 Rumoh Geudong Monument 
 
Another memorialisation initiative of human rights violations in Aceh was the construction of 
a monument of Rumoh Geudong. Rumoh Geudong is located in Bili Aron Village, Glumpang 
Tiga Sub-district, Pidie regency and was used as an Indonesian military post during 1989-1998 
when Aceh was declared as a military operation zone. There were numerous cases of crimes 
against humanity, including abduction, torture, rape, and extrajudicial executions at Rumoh 
Geudong (Amnesty International, 2013). In 1998, when the status of Aceh as Military 
Operation Zone was lifted, Rumoh Geudong was burned by the people living in surrounding 
areas (Tirto, 11 April 2017). While the investigation of human rights abuses in Rumoh Geudong 
has been carried out repeatedly by Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi 
Manusia/Indonesia National Commission of Human Rights) without any significant results, 




and Rights) KontraS and PASKA Aceh – initiated this memorialisation project as a support to 
victims of crimes of humanity of Rumoh Geudong (AJAR, 26 July 2018). The inauguration of 
the Rumoh Geudong monument was attended by Pidie Regent, Head of the Aceh Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, representatives from Komnas HAM, survivors, and hundreds of 
people from Pidie and the Pidie Jaya area (Zulkarnaini, 2018). The presence of the Head of 
the District of Pidie during the inauguration of this memorialisation project demonstrated a 
certain level of support from the central government while the central government was 
represented by Komnas HAM.  
 
Photo 7-7 Rumoh Geudong Monument 
 
Source:      Amnesty International website 
 
Photo 7-8 Pidie Regent, Choirul Anam (Komnas HAM) and Farida Haryani 
(Paska Aceh) attended the inauguration of Rumoh Geudong Monument 
 





Memorialisation in the form of the establishment of museums and monuments emerges as 
one of the non-judicial mechanisms of transitional justice in peacebuilding in Aceh. The 
participation from civil society has been prevalent in these memorialisation initiatives. There 
has been a strong network among regional, national and local human rights organisations such 
as AJAR (Asia Justice and Right), national (KontraS), and local (PASKA Aceh, RPUK/Relawan 
Perempuan Untuk Kemanusiaan/Woman Volunteers for Humanity) persistently voicing the 
subject of human rights and justice in post-conflict Aceh when judicial mechanisms and TRC 
has been halted or progressing very slowly.  
 
There are several points worth pondering regarding memorialisation as one of the forms of 
transitional justice in Aceh. The first point is the strong presence of civil society organisations 
at the local, national and regional levels to initiate the memorialisation projects that appear in 
the establishment of the Human Rights Museum, the Simpang KKA Monument and the 
Rumoh Geudong Monument. The civil society that organised itself under the coalition of 
victims (K2HAU) has also shown considerable efforts to accomplish their goal of the 
establishment of the monument. It demonstrates robust participation of human rights and 
justice in the post-conflict era in Aceh.  
 
The second notable point is the level of support from the government regarding the 
establishment of memorialisation projects in Aceh. The central government has shown only 
little interest in the memorialisation projects. The presence of Khoirul Anam, as a member of 
Komnas HAM during the inauguration of the Rumoh Geudong Monument, could be 
interpreted as attention from central government. However, it might be seen sceptically since 
Komnas HAM is the state institution that carries out assessment, research, education, 
monitoring and mediation of human rights. In other words, Komnas HAM is only performing 
its official task, not showing particular support. In contrast, support was illustrated in the 
establishment of the Tsunami Museum, another memorialisation project that was well funded 
and officially opened by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The Tsunami Museum is a 
memorial to commemorate victims of natural disasters. Therefore, no party could be blamed 
as the perpetrator, unlike the Museum of Human Rights, the Rumoh Geudong Monument and 
the Simpang KKA Monument, which point fingers at the Indonesian military. 
 
A different gesture is demonstrated by the local government, in this case, the district 
government of North Aceh and local parliament that support the erection of the Simpang KKA 
monument. The district government of Pidie also showed some level of support by attending 




legitimacy from society, especially conflict victims. Another possible reason for support from 
the local government is that they were not the perpetrators of human rights abuse in the 
Simpang KKA or Rumoh Geudong. Hence, they consider the support is safe because the 
monuments are erected to remember the atrocities of their past enemy, the Indonesian 
military.  
 
The last point about the memorialisation projects is their purposes as a reminder to future 
generations in Aceh about past human rights violations as a source of support for the victims. 
In the middle of the absence of the establishment of human rights court and slow progress of 
the truth commission, museums and monuments are the symbols of collective memory. It is 
particularly true when the demand for justice in the normalisation phase of peacebuilding is 
diminishing due to collective forgetting. Memorialisation projects are essential to remind the 
future generations of lessons learnt, not as a medium to sustain hatred or revenge.  
 
7.6 Conclusion  
Transitional justice in post-conflict Aceh is characterised by the reluctance of strong and 
already established judicial institutions in Indonesia to support the alleviation of human rights 
grievances through legal mechanisms. The stakeholders of the peacebuilding process tend to 
halt or delay the process of justice to maintain the fragile peace that has just been attained. It 
occurs particularly due to the presence of former human rights perpetrators from the military 
or high-ranking police holders of government office, coupled with inadequate and ambiguous 
regulations such as the annulment of Law Number 27/ 2004 about the National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, and the retrospective principles of the Human Rights Court.  
There was an absence of authority transferred from central government to local government 
to support the efforts of human rights and justice in post-conflict Aceh. However, there is a 
notable authority takeover, instead of an authority transfer, through support from the local 
government towards the establishment of Aceh TRC. This “authority take over” occurred in 
the middle of the absence of a national legal basis for the establishment of TRC. The absence 
of a human rights court and national Truth and Reconciliation Commission followed by 
establishment of a provincial TRC could decrease the legitimacy of the national government 
while increasing the legitimacy of GAM-dominated local government in Aceh.  
 
On the other side, there have been promising developments in participation in civil society to 
break the stagnation of the transitional justice process. The participation flourished through 
the local initiative to establish Aceh TRC, grassroots conflict transformation and the 




such as PASKA Aceh, RPUK and KontraS continue to raise this issue. Others have opted to 
employ grassroots mechanisms. Civil society participation in the subject of transitional justice 
has been encompassing institutions in state-led peacebuilding in Aceh.  More than ten years 
after the MoU Helsinki, peace in Aceh is still durable without being supported by significant 
efforts in addressing the human rights abuse and promoting justice for the victims. However, 
the aspiration of the fair dealing with past abuse is also persistently voiced by some 
components of civil society and victims. It indicates the need to keep the subject of human 
rights and justice as part of the peacebuilding process in Aceh, despite being overshadowed by 
vibrant participation in politics or robust economic reconstruction, two aspects that are seen 
as more beneficial to maintain the durability of peace. 
 
As the last grievance during the conflict in Aceh, human rights and justice are undergoing a 
stagnant trajectory with participation coming from below. The findings in this chapter 
partially affirm hypothesis 1, namely that “a peace agreement which addresses grievances will 
contribute to the durable peacebuilding process in strong middle-income countries like 
Indonesia”. Human rights and justice provisions are indeed accommodated in the MoU 
Helsinki, but they were not implemented as proposed. The Human Rights Court was never set 
up, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was annulled. While the lack of 
capacity or the deficiency of strong institutions might be the primary causes of the absence of 
transitional justice in fragile states, how do we explain the same absence of post-conflict 
transitional justice in a strong middle-income country like Indonesia? The first possible 
explanation relates to the existence of a strong government/institution in state-led 
peacebuilding. Indonesia has strong military institutions that will protect their members who 
might otherwise be prosecuted for human rights violations. There is also a presence of 
nationalist political parties which traditionally oppose peaceful resolution with separatist 
groups, including the efforts to deal with human rights abuse in the aftermath of conflict. Also, 
we should not forget that GAM, which is later growing as a strong political institution in post-
conflict Aceh, committed human rights abuses as well. They have reasons not to support the 
establishment of transitional justice. 
 
To sum up, the strong institution of two former adversaries, central government and GAM 
contributes to the absence of transitional justice in post-conflict Aceh. Factually, during the 
transition phase, the durability of peace in Aceh is helped somewhat by the absence of 
transitional justice because it prevents instability that might be triggered by the justice 
process. While the lack of the institution characterises transitional justice in the transition 





Hypothesis 2, that “in order to secure sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding, the peace 
agreement should be enacted in national and local law”, is also partly proven as there is a 
significant alteration to the realisation of a human rights court in LoGA by adopting 
retrospective principles that could only process the cases after the promulgation of LoGA. The 
establishment of the Truth of Reconciliation Commission is halted due to the annulment of 
the respective law. However, the barrier in national regulation is surpassed at the local level 
by the promulgation of Qanun No 17/2013 about the establishment of Aceh Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Aceh demonstrated an exceptional case of state-led 
peacebuilding by the establishment of local TRC under provincial legislation without any 
involvement from the central government. The local government and local parliament, which 
are mostly dominated by former GAM members have built a foundation for the creation of 
local transitional justice and assume authority from central government over this subject. 
Given the fact that some of the human rights perpetrators during conflict might come from 
GAM, this development is remarkable.  
 
The robust civil participation and the limited level of support from local government in the 
human rights and justice realms confirm hypothesis 3 about the contribution of participation 
in peacebuilding to unification, recognition of identity and legitimacy to address underlying 
grievances. The establishment of local TRC, as well as the memorialisation project and grass 
root peacebuilding, are supported by a strong coalition of community and civil society 
organisations. These coalitions persistently proposed the establishment of local TRC and 
initiated the memorialisation project and finally gained support from local government. The 
complete absence of central government, support from local government and participation 
from community and civil society organisations will lead to the stronger legitimacy of local 
government over the subject of human rights and justice. In the normalisation phase of 
peacebuilding, the failure of national transitional justice and absence of strong national 
institutions are gradually replaced by local initiatives which are primarily based on 
participation. 
 
To conclude, human rights and justice as the last grievances, have also been least addressed 
during the peacebuilding phase in Aceh. One side of grievances, especially the ones that were 
experienced by civil society have not been fully resolved yet. The lack of alleviation of these 
grievances appears to help sustain peace during the transition phase, but it remains to be seen 
if peace will keep intact without fair dealing with past human rights abuse or it will create 





Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This thesis is motivated by the consideration of the durability of peace in Aceh, Indonesia. 
Thirteen years on from the signing of a peace agreement in Helsinki in August 2005, peace 
remains intact with relatively low levels of violence and the integration of former combatants 
into local politics. Post-conflict Aceh represents a case of peacebuilding in which the dominant 
role is carried out by the national government. While many cases of peacebuilding occur in 
fragile states with extensive intervention from foreign countries or international agencies, 
state-led peacebuilding in strong middle-income countries and consolidated democracies 
warrants more attention due to its high frequency, rampant casualties and impact on 
development. Building on the previous chapters, this concluding chapter presents the findings 
and conceptualises them into the framework developed for a specific type of case study of 
state-led peacebuilding. This research seeks to explore the questions around the 
implementation of peacebuilding in a strong middle-income country. What is the nexus 
between grievance and conflict? How is grievance alleviation accommodated in peace 
settlement? How is peacebuilding conducted in a strong-middle income country?  
  
8.2 Grievance Alleviation  
Before presenting the findings, this chapter will elaborate on the underlying factor of conflict 
in Aceh as an integral aspect of the peace settlement and peacebuilding.  In analysing the 
underlying factors of conflict in Aceh, this thesis employs a grievance approach and theory of 
internal colonialism which were elaborated in chapter 2. It is an important aspect in state-led 
peacebuilding as the underlying factors are often caused by the legacy of the unfinished 
process of nation-building or the failure of a development programme. The intricate process 
of nation-building in newly democratic countries might result in the supremacy of one ethnic 
group over another. The domination of one ethnic group is then exacerbated by the 
centralisation of development, a process which eventually widens the gap between the region 
and central government as well as among regions.  
 
The grievance is widely used as a tool of conflict analysis. It is based on the principle of relative 
deprivation, which is defined by Gurr (1970: 13) as “a perceived discrepancy between men’s 
value expectation and their value capabilities”. Gurr further defines value expectations as “the 
goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled while value 
capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or 




approach is supported by the theory of internal colonialism, a framework that views the nexus 
between centre-periphery inequality and ethnicity. Hechter (1975) emphasises that 
heightened core-periphery interaction resulted in structural inequality between various 
regions. The superordinate group in the core attempts to stabilise and maintain its advantages 
through policies of the institutionalisation of the existing stratification system and denying 
access to the less advanced groups based on cultural distinctions (Hechter, 1975). 
 
Economic inequality and limited political access are among the primary grievances 
experienced by Acehnese.  Economic grievances have been experienced by Acehnese since the 
colonial era by the exploitation of their oil by Dutch companies. Natural resources exploitation 
continued after independence, shifting from the Dutch colonial government to the Indonesian 
central government. It only left a small amount of the profit for Aceh’s local development, 
making Aceh one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia. This uneven distribution of the profit 
share of natural resources is the major cause of internal colonialism as explained by Hechter 
because Aceh is a region inhabited by Acehnese while the Javanese maintained nationwide 
hegemony.  Political grievances were derived from the development of Indonesia as a new 
nation state in the post-colonial period. Aceh, which had been actively struggling for national 
independence, felt politically betrayed when the national government decided to merge it into 
the province of North Sumatra. The elimination of the obligation to observe sharia (Islamic 
Law) for Muslim people from the Indonesian constitution exacerbated these grievances among 
Acehnese who adhered strictly to Islam. These early grievances gave birth to the rebellion of 
Darul Islam, the first religious dissent in Aceh in post-colonial times.  This rebellion was 
brought to an end by the replacement of non-Acehnese troops with Acehnese and the 
alleviation of political and religious grievances by granting Aceh special region status and 
informal recognition of Islamic law in Aceh.  
8.2.1 Politics  
During Suharto’s New Order administration, political grievances were continued as a result of 
political centralisation, the hegemony of a single political party and direct appointment of local 
leaders (governor and regent/mayor) by the central government. By adopting state-led 
development, Suharto felt the urge to safeguard economic development by ensuring national 
stability through centralisation of politics in Jakarta. Stable domestic politics was deemed 
necessary to attract investors and guarantee a favourable investment climate to spur growth. 
Through Law Number 5/1974 on Regional Government, the central government elected the 
local leaders. Although they must be endorsed by the provincial legislature, the final decision 
was the entitlement of the central government. The politics of centralisation were extended 




destabilising aspect of domestic politics, the number of political parties was consolidated into 
three parties: PPP (United Development Party/Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), the result of 
the enforced merger of Islamic parties; PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party/Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia), a coalition of Christian and Nationalist political parties; and Golkar (Golongan 
Karya), a political machine of the New Order regime. Golkar became the hegemonic party due 
to the compulsory membership of all bureaucrats. During the domination of Golkar in 
electoral politics, Aceh was the only province in Indonesia that demonstrated significant 
support for the PPP over Golkar.  
 
8.2.2. Economy  
The economic sector during the New Order era was highly centralised, especially because the 
practice of centralisation was “constitutionally legitimised”. Based on Article 33 sections 2 and 
3 of the Indonesian Constitution, natural wealth and vital production sectors were controlled 
fully by the state:  “Production sectors that are vital to the state and that affect the livelihood 
of a considerable part of the population are to be controlled by the state” and “The land and 
the waters, as well as the natural riches therein, are to be controlled by the state to be exploited 
to the greatest benefit of the people”. Aceh’s natural wealth, especially its oil and gas, has been 
exploited since the colonial era and the practice was continued after independence. Although 
Aceh was planned originally to be Indonesia’s rice barn, the discovery of oil and gas made Aceh 
a major contributor to oil and gas revenue. However, only a small percentage of the profit went 
back to Aceh in terms of social welfare and economic development. Exploitation also occurred 
in the forestry sector due to excessive logging. As well as unfair distribution, the exploitation 




The identity-based grievance is not as simple as political or economic deprivation, because 
identity is a heavily constructed concept. Deprivation of identity in Aceh was mainly derived 
from the strategy of assimilation adopted by the central government. The nature of Indonesia 
as a multi-communal nation contrasts with the strategy of assimilation based on the unity of 
diversity, in which the Javanese became the hegemonic culture. The transmigration 
programme that relocated people from Java to Aceh and other provinces was perceived as an 
attempt to spread Javanese culture and take over land and jobs from local people. The 
implementation of Law No 5/1974 about local government administration that adopted the 
Javanese village system for nationwide use was also seen as a part of an assimilation strategy 




the Acehnese but also by people from outside Java. There were a few mobilised movements 
responding to these grievances like in Aceh. The key factor behind the accomplished ethno-
nationalist movement in Aceh is the role of leaders who could narrate the grievance and 
transform it into mobilisation. Hasan Tiro, the grandson of an Aceh national hero, mobilised 
the grievances by highlighting Aceh’s glorious past and contrasting it with the political and 
economic deprivation after Aceh became a part of the Republic of Indonesia. Owing to 
Javanese culture enforcement during Suharto’s era, Tiro also exploited the sentiment of 
identity and created a new common enemy for the movement: the Government the of the 
Republic of Indonesia, a de facto Javanese empire. By utilising history and identity, Tiro 
mobilised grievances successfully into a separatist movement. 
 
8.2.4 Human Rights and Justice 
Grievances over human rights and justice were the latest deprivation felt by the Acehnese. 
These grievances originated from the military operation as the response from the government 
to combat the insurgency. Several counter-insurgency efforts were launched, such as Operasi 
Jaring Merah (Red Net Operation) which involved the Indonesian Army Special Forces. These 
military operations resulted in rampant human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings, 
torture, and abduction. After Suharto stepped down, the government sought a peaceful 
resolution by initiating negotiations. Unfortunately, the first two negotiations failed, and the 
government returned to military operations to deal with GAM. The human rights violations 
resulting from military operations have exacerbated the existing grievances, benefiting GAM 
with more support. Grievances on human rights and justice differ from the three other 
grievances on politics, the economy, and identity. It emerged late in the rebellion and serves 
as amplification for past grievances. The violations of human rights also give GAM the new 
universal value of human rights to support its independence cause, completing the framing of 
the deprived and discriminated Acehnese. 
Chapter 3 investigated grievances as the underlying factor of the conflict, and the following 
discussion is about approaches to peacebuilding in Aceh. Peace-building has been growing 
rapidly as an international practice to help post-conflict countries avoid a relapse. As the 
concept was developed by the UN, it has been standardised internationally. Peace-building is 
influenced highly by the liberal democratic principle which believes that democracies will not 
wage war, a widespread tenet during the third wave of democracy. From democratisation, this 
principle further influenced peacebuilding. The advocates of a liberal democratic peace believe 
that free and fair elections, liberalisation of the market, freedom of speech and the 




war/internal conflict (Paris, 2001, Newman, 2009). However, the increasing number of 
conflict relapses, especially between previous rival parties, has been a concern.  
 
The peacebuilding process in Aceh is intriguing given its durability and that the primary 
stakeholder is the national government. Aceh represents a peculiar case, where the peace 
settlement was mediated by a third party, assisted by a short-term peacekeeping mission 
(Aceh Monitoring Mission), planned and supervised by a national government and executed 
through the collaboration between national and local government. Thus, this research 
endeavours to investigate two primary questions: how grievances are addressed in a peace 
process and subsequent regulations, and how peacebuilding in Aceh is conducted to reach 
durability throughout the transition and normalisation phase. Through the combination of 
field research and document study, this research has reached several findings. The elaboration 
is divided based on the types of grievance (politics, the economy, identity and human rights-
justice) and the peacebuilding methods employed to address those grievances, either through 
encouraging participation or building strong institutions.  
 
Participation, due to its broad meaning, is limited to the peacebuilding realm and understood 
as “the active involvement of the people in the conflict setting in the peacebuilding” 
(Nascimento, Jacobs and Keeler, n.d., 6). Participation in this thesis is defined as electoral 
participation as well as general public participation, including women’s political participation 
in decision-making processes. Institution-building refers to the approach of liberal 
peacebuilding that is driven by the belief that the principal “problem” with conflict-prone and 
post-conflict states is the absence of effective state institutions that could be solved by (re) 
building a viable institution and often based on generic western model (Futamura, Newman 
& Tadjbakhsh, 2010). Given the state-led characteristic of peacebuilding in Aceh, where the 
primary institutions in governance, legislative, judicial and security have been long 
established, relatively strong and not installed by external actors, it is indeed appealing to 
observe how the institution-building works in the case of Aceh.  
 
The subsequent sections of this chapter will validate hypotheses, summarise key findings, as 







8.3 Hypotheses Explanation  
Hypothesis 1:  A peace agreement which addresses grievances will contribute to 
the durable peacebuilding process in stronger-middle-income countries like 
Indonesia. 
Hypothesis 1 is proposed due to the failure of preceding peace settlements in Aceh, Cessation 
of Hostilities (COHA) and Humanitarian Pause. The failure of COHA and Humanitarian Pause 
were primarily instigated by the unmet demand between central government and GAM around 
the political arrangement in Aceh. GAM insisted on a referendum or independence while the 
central government refused to tolerate any disputation of territorial integrity. These two 
settlements were also too focused on security to give confident building measures for both 
conflicting parties, GAM and the Indonesian military. Unfortunately, the truces were 
frequently breached, and the level of violence in the field remained high.  Therefore, there is a 
need for a peace agreement that comprehensively addresses the grievances to create durable 
peace in Aceh. 
 
Table 8-1 Grievances Alleviations in MoU Helsinki 
Grievances MoU Helsinki Provisions 
Political Grievances  3. The Establishment of the Local Political Party  
4. Free and fair local elections  
Economic Grievances  8. The rights of Aceh to raise funds with external loans 
and set interest rate beyond the rates set by the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia  
9. The development and administration of all seaports 
and airports within the territory of Aceh. 
10. The jurisdiction over living natural resources in the 
territorial sea surrounding Aceh. 
11. The entitlement of seventy (70) per cent of the 
revenues from all current and future hydrocarbon 
deposits and other natural resources in the territory of 
Aceh, as well as in the territorial sea surrounding 
Aceh. 
12. The transparency of the collection and allocation of 
revenues between the Central Government and Aceh 
by agreeing to outside auditors to verify this activity, 
and to communicate the results to the head of the 
Aceh administration. 
13. The full participation at all levels in the commission 
established to conduct the post-tsunami 
reconstruction (BRR). 
14. Reintegration of former combatant into the society 
Identity 3. The establishment of Wali Nanggroe (an indigenous       
leadership institution). 
4. Aceh will have its flag, crest and hymn. 
Human Rights and Justice  3. The establishment of the Human Rights Court. 






From table 8.1 we can see that MoU Helsinki accommodates the primary grievances in Aceh: 
political centralisation, economic inequality, identity and the violations of human rights and 
justice in its provisions. Politics was the most complicated subject during the negotiation and 
resolved by the establishment of a local political party as a compromise between self-
determination and self-governance. The two most important provisions of political 
participation are local elections and the establishment of a local political party.  
In the economic realm, the major grievance is addressed through the provisions of 
redistribution of Aceh’s natural wealth. Aceh gained a larger percentage of oil and gas for 
future distribution and received a Special Autonomy Fund to redress the previous imbalance 
of the distribution of natural resources. In addition to the Special Autonomy Fund, Aceh’s 
post-conflict development was also supported by a massive fund for tsunami reconstruction. 
Although the target of this fund is tsunami victims, not the conflict victims, it eventually 
delivered a peculiar peace dividend to former rebels in the form of access to the construction 
business. This fund was managed by BRR or the Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 
for Nias and Aceh.  The other source of large funds is the reintegration assistance for the 
former GAM members under the supervision of BRA or the Aceh Reintegration Agency, while 
the utilisation of the Special Autonomy Fund is under the authority of local government. 
Regarding the peacebuilding programme which is related to identity, the MoU stipulated that 
the office of Wali Nanggroe with all its ceremonial attributes and entitlements will be 
established” (MoU Helsinki, 2005). The Law of Governing Aceh specifies the attributes of Wali 
Nanggroe as a customary leadership body whose duty was to unite the people. It is also 
authorised to “oversee cultural life and ceremonies and confer traditional titles” (Simanjuntak, 
2013). Aceh is also granted a right to have its provincial flag, crest and hymn to accentuate 
Acehnese identity. Human rights violations are settled by the provision of transitional justice: 
the establishment of human rights courts and a truth and reconciliation commission. 
In sum, the primary grievance in Aceh in the subjects of politics, economy, identity and human 
rights and justice has been comprehensively addressed in the MoU Helsinki. The full 
acknowledgement of grievances in the peace settlement has successfully laid a strong 
foundation of the next process of peacebuilding to reach the durability of peace. The 
accommodation of grievances in peace settlement occurs during the transition phase, while 
the process of translation of peace agreement into ensuing national and local regulations as 
well as the implementation of peacebuilding programmes provisions occur in both the 




Hypothesis 2: In order to secure sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding, the 
peace agreement should be enacted in national and local law. 
The objective of hypothesis 2 is to analyse how the grievances are addressed by the peace 
process and its subsequent regulations. It is an important subject in state-led peacebuilding 
since in the aftermath of mediated peace negotiation, the central government will be the 
primary actor in determining the process of peacebuilding. Thus, it is important to observe 
whether the provisions of the peace agreement are well translated into the subsequent 
regulations, including national law and local law. In the case of Aceh, the provisions related to 
peacebuilding are promulgated in National Law Number 11/2006 on the Law on the 
Governing of Aceh (LoGA). The ensuing laws are promulgated in Qanun (bylaws) at the 
provincial level. 
 
Table 8-2 Grievance Alleviation through Regulations 
Grievance  Regulation Level  
Politics  Local Political Party  
 
Local Elections  
 
 
Independent Candidate  
MoU (International), LoGA 
(National) and Qanun (Local) 
 
MoU (International), LoGA 
(National) and Qanun (Local) 
 
LoGA (National)  
Economy Aceh Reconstruction and 





Special Autonomy Fund 
(partially funded from the 




MoU (International) and Qanun 
(Local)  
 




Identity  Wali Nanggroe 
 
 
The Flag, Crest and Hymn of 
Aceh 
MoU (International), LoGA 






Sharia  MoU (International), LoGA 
(National) and Qanun (Local) 
 
 
LoGA (National) and Local 
(Qanun) 
Human Rights and Justice  Human Rights Court 
 
 
Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission  
MoU (International) and LoGA 
(National)  
 
MoU (International), LoGA 
(National) and Qanun (Local)  
 
Table 8.2 demonstrates the translation of the peace agreement into national and local laws. 
Most of MoU provisions have been accommodated in LoGA and qanun. However, we can see 
several new provisions in national law that were not derived from the MoU. In the political 
realm, LoGA adds the subject of independent candidates to run in Aceh’s local elections. This 
provision was made to give opportunities to former GAM members to compete in the first local 
election without being nominated by the national party. During the 2006 gubernatorial 
election, the first election in the post-conflict era, local political parties had not been 
established. Thus, independent candidacy enables former GAM members who are reluctant to 
cooperate with national parties to participate actively in elections. Another new provision is 
sharia. Although it is not mentioned in the MoU, sharia has long been perceived by the central 
government as the remedy to cure conflict in Aceh in the post-Suharto era. Therefore, the 
implementation of Sharia is regulated in LoGA and supported by various qanuns at the 
provincial level.  
 
Besides the addition of peacebuilding provisions in LoGA that were not previously stipulated 
in the MoU, there are also some alterations of MoU provisions in LoGA.  It particularly occurs 
in the subject of economy and human rights and justice.  In several economic provisions that 
regulate the management of strategic assets (airport, seaport, natural resources), there is the 
insertion of the role of central government together with the Aceh government. Human rights 
and justice experienced the most significant change by the retrospective principle of the 
human rights court that could only process (investigate, prosecute and resolve) the cases 
which occurred after the enactment of the law. Another major alteration in a subject of 
transitional justice in post-conflict Aceh is the annulment of the Law on the National Truth 




cancellation of the National TRC Law halted the process of non-judicial transitional justice in 
Aceh due to the absence of the legal basis at national level.  
 
While most of the translation of the MoU to LoGA and qanun occurred mainly during the 
transition phase, there is an interesting development during the normalisation phase by the 
promulgation of Qanun of Aceh TRC. The decision from the central government to annul the 
law on the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission had stalled transitional justice in 
post-conflict Aceh. In the middle of the absence of national regulations to support transitional 
justice, there was an initiative from civil society that was supported by provincial parliament 
to promulgate Qanun No 17/2003 on Aceh Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The qanun 
was an important legal basis for the establishment of Aceh local TRC. The promulgation of the 
Qanun of Aceh TRC demonstrates the possibility of bottom-up participation at local level to 
propose local law on transitional justice. It occurred when the national government appeared 
hesitant to make further attempts to alleviate grievances in the subject of human rights and 
justice through national regulation. It indicates that despite being stipulated in the peace 
agreement, grievances on human rights and justice are not alleviated in the subsequent 
national law.  
 
From the research and literature review, I found that the peace agreement has been well 
translated into national (LoGA) and local (qanun) law. However, there are several additions 
or alterations of the provisions, especially in the national level regulation. This gives us 
evidence about the strong role of the central government as the primary actor in state-led 
peacebuilding to determine the direction of peace in Aceh. Nevertheless, this thesis also 
reveals the initiative from civil society and local government to compose and promulgate local 
law of TRC to fill the absence of national regulation of transitional justice.  The lack of national 
regulation in the subject of transitional justice is seemingly intended to keep the durability of 
peace to avoid resistance from the military group. However, the long absence of efforts on 
transitional justice that left human rights and justice grievances unattended will potentially 
harm the peace. The support from the local parliament (that is dominated by Partai Aceh, 
GAM-based political party members) to the promulgation of local law to establish the TRC at 
provincial level could be considered an unusual feature in peacebuilding in Aceh. It is quite 
surprising because the process of truth and reconciliation if conducted correctly, must also 
involve GAM personnel as the atrocities were committed by two parties, GAM and Indonesia’s 
military. 
 
The second part of the thesis is an attempt to answer the research question about the approach 




is peacebuilding implemented in a middle economy, a newly democratic country with a 
working bureaucracy and limited intervention from foreign countries or international 
institutions? How does the national government conduct the peacebuilding efforts in the 
aftermath of a successful negotiation with the separatist group? The analysis of the 




Hypothesis 3:  The participation aspect in peacebuilding will contribute to 
unification, recognition of identity and legitimacy to address the underlying 
grievance. 
 
As was revealed in chapter 4, public participation is seen in the local elections. Five local 
elections generated reasonably good voter turnout between 75-88 per cent and the elites and 
public also responded positively to the opportunity to compete in the gubernatorial and 
legislative elections. The contenders of three gubernatorial elections come from different 
backgrounds as well as local political parties. Gubernatorial elections accommodate 
candidates from various backgrounds, from academics, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, artists 
and religious leaders. Furthermore, the possibility of independent candidates competing in 
the election was provided in the MoU Helsinki, something that can be considered as a 
breakthrough in Indonesian electoral history.   
 
Limited participation prevailed in the establishment of local political parties by the 
establishment of Partai Aceh.  GAM has been transforming itself from an insurgent movement 
into a political entity within the Republic of Indonesia by establishing the Aceh Party (Partai 
Aceh/PA). Local political parties also become an avenue for political participation among 
combatants, albeit limited to the GAM elites and Sagoe (sub-districts) commanders. Some 
former rank-and-file combatants become members of KPA (Komite Peralihan Aceh, or the 
Aceh Transitional Committee) and they are largely incorporated into Aceh’s local politics and 
economy through patron-client networks in the reconstruction industry. Given the strong 
connection between politics and the reconstruction industry in Aceh, GAM members turned 
quickly to construction contracts, relying on influence, patronage, and coercion to influence 
business. The patronage started in post-tsunami reconstruction and continued by using the 
Special Autonomy Fund. This patron-client network creates limited participation in post-
conflict Aceh. 
 
Women’s political participation remains low in the post-conflict peacebuilding. Partai Aceh 
only nominated a small number of woman candidates for legislative elections, and only a few 




in GAM during the conflict era where the women were largely marginalised in the structure of 
the rebel movement, and only a few of them were assigned as commanders. Women’s 
participation in politics is still limited and hampered by cultural barriers and reluctance of 
their male counterparts to promote women candidates as well as a lack of access to money and 
networks that is very significant in patronage and “predatory” politics. The chairpersons of 
political parties are often unsupportive of the nomination of female candidates due to low 
electability and gender bias. Female candidates are seen to bear responsibility for children, 
supposedly hampering their ability to be actively involved in politics. Entering an electoral 
competition also means providing large amounts of money for campaign materials and 
sometimes for buying votes. Financial access is dominated by male candidates as the 
prominent players in the lucrative post-tsunami construction business. To sum up, the factors 
of religion, the culture of patriarchy, and predatory politics hamper the participation of women 
in post-conflict politics.  
 
Bottom-up participation has been a significant feature in human rights and justice in post-
conflict Aceh. The analysis in chapter 7 revealed that there has been an absence of strong 
institutions to address this grievance. Inadequate laws, resistance, and lack of political will 
from the national and local government to prosecute human rights violators and bring justice 
to the victims have encouraged civil society to develop a grassroots movement. The 
establishment of a Human Rights Court to conduct trials for human rights violators never 
came into being. The retroactive principle and lack of political will hamper it. A similar case 
occurs for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission. The national legal basis 
for the creation of the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was abolished by 
the annulment of Law Number 27/2004 on the Indonesian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. However, participation from society in the field of human rights and justice has 
been flourishing to replace the lukewarm response from the elite and government. Some civil 
society organisations set up a Human Rights Museum independently as a public place to 
commemorate the victims of conflict in Aceh and as a reminder to avoid future violence. This 
bottom-up initiative to raise awareness about human rights issues indicates the constant 
movement of civil society groups in the peacebuilding phase. Despite its low impact and being 
sidelined by local political economy contestation, human rights organisations in Aceh are an 
important aspect in peacebuilding as a pressure group to keep reminding people of the human 
rights violations during the conflict. They also aim to prevent one of the grievances from 
reoccurring, particularly after GAM became the hegemonic group in local politics and prone 
to abuse their new power to oppress other groups. There is also a grassroots reconciliation 
initiative using cultural mechanisms such as peusijeuk and bottom-up advocacy to establish 




institutions at the national level which is allowed by LoGA. Although slow and institutionally 
weak, Aceh local TRC has shown significant progress by conducting its first testimony of the 
victims.  
 
During the normalisation phase, one of the most prominent features of participation in Aceh 
is the division within GAM that was led to the establishment of Partai Nasional Aceh (PNA), a 
new GAM-based local political party. The participation of PNA in the 2014 legislative election 
marked the first inter-GAM party competition in a local election that was marred by political 
violence. PNA also performed very poorly without an innovative platform. However, another 
inter-GAM competition in the 2017 gubernatorial election between a candidate from Partai 
Aceh and PNA demonstrated a lower level of political violence and better performance of PNA, 
an indication of the maturity of local democracy in Aceh. The competition within GAM as the 
primary actor in Aceh’s local politics is necessary to build local democracy especially in the 
normalisation phase of peacebuilding. The factionalism of the former rebel movement has 
created intra-GAM participation and more options of local political parties for an Acehnese 
vote in the local election. However, GAM internal political participation is not followed by 
women’s political participation which still experiences stagnancy in both executive and 
legislative representation. Women in Aceh must face multiple challenges: religious, custom, 
access to political funds, low electability and political calculation to fully participate in local 
politics.   
 
In the economic realm, the patron-client network between GAM elites and their contractor 
counterparts as a form of limited participation remains widespread in the normalisation 
phase. While during the transition phase this patron-client network was centred on the usage 
of post-tsunami reconstruction funds, during the normalisation phase this practice is 
sustained by the utilisation of the Special Autonomy Fund. The Special Autonomy Fund as a 
peace dividend is mostly allocated to finance small-scale projects with a direct appointment. 
In addition to limited participation in the form of patron-client relations, bottom-up 
participation has also emerged. Participation from below is demonstrated by the promulgation 
of Qanun on the Aceh Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the establishment of 
Aceh TRC as a result of persistent attempts from the community and supported by various 








Hypothesis 4. Institution-building will increase legitimacy, secure resources, 
and stabilise the conditions for lasting peace. 
 
Institution-building has been dominant in the economic sector of peacebuilding by the 
establishment of BRR (Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi Aceh dan Nias/ Reconstruction 
and Rehabilitation Agency for Aceh and Nias) and BRA (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh/ Aceh 
Reintegration Agency). The establishment of BRR to manage the reconstruction fund and BRA 
for the reintegration fund was necessary to “buy” peace. When a reconstruction fund was 
disbursed for helping tsunami victims rebuild their damaged houses and infrastructure, it 
opened a channel for former combatants to get involved in construction. They might be 
awarded contracts, becoming sub-contractors or supplying materials for construction work. 
Some of them were granted contracts without official procedure and even used intimidation 
to be selected as suppliers. A similar case occurred in the BRA, a strategic institution for the 
former GAM elite to gather support from their former subordinates which in the long run will 
be beneficial to secure their political positions. BRA is also handicapped by the strategy of 
reintegration that was primarily focusing on individual assistance and not on integrated 
community development. These two institutions grew as powerful and elitist entities. The 
decision-making process is determined by the elites, and the key positions were dominated by 
new elites in Aceh. Consequently, there is only limited participation in these institutions. 
 
In the identity sector, the presence of institutions is strong. If we refer to the explanation of 
grievance in Aceh, identity serves as a mobilising factor for ethno-nationalist movements and 
not primarily deprivation. Identity is often used by elites to breed ethno-nationalist sentiment; 
in other words, it is narrated by the elite. Sharia has been growing as an influential institution 
with courts and a formal legal system. The implementation of sharia is merely for “policing 
morality”, enforced by wilayatul hisbah (sharia police). Cases that went to court are 
dominated by adultery, khalwat (pre-marital physical displays of affection), gambling or 
alcohol selling or consumption. There has been mounting criticism toward sharia, particularly 
the increasing amount of corporal punishment in the aftermath of  the promulgation of qanun 
jinayah (Islamic criminal law). Sharia also appears to contribute to the growing number of 
cases of violence against women and the practices toward the limitation of expression for 
women such as “modest clothing” regulations. Criticism is also directed to the discriminatory 
practices towards the enforcement of sharia law. Some cases are also dismissed after paying 
briberies to the sharia police. Sharia has been emerging as a strong institution with wide 
acceptance and limited criticism, not because most people agree with it, but because it is 
“morally wrong and politically incorrect” if Acehnese takes a stand against Islamic Law, 





The other identity-related peacebuilding provision goes in the same fashion. Wali Nanggroe, 
a customary institution has been characterised by the desire of acquiring unlimited customary 
power that is illustrated in the early draft of qanun that regulates this institution. While the 
qanun has been revised twice to rule out the political rights of Wali Nanggroe, this customary 
institution is still criticised by non-Acehnese ethnic groups as a culturally discriminative 
institution because it requires fluency of Acehnese language and only the Aceh ethnic group is 
eligible for membership.  
 
The attempt to re-establish institutions and the tendency to build stronger ones are the major 
features during the normalisation phase in Aceh. It could be understood regarding the 
relations between institution-building, resources and legitimacy in post-conflict Aceh. It is 
demonstrated by the attempt to revitalise BRA as an ad hoc reintegration institution in Aceh. 
Despite the criticism from civil society towards BRA for its poor performance in delivering 
reintegration programmes, coupled by the demand from several civil society organisations to 
hand over the task of BRA to existing local government agencies, the attempt to re-establish 
this reintegration institution is persistently carried out by a legislative member from Partai 
Aceh. The possible explanation of the revitalisation of BRA is that it is an important institution 
for GAM in maintaining a patron-client network with former combatants as well as to gain 
resources. In the subject of identity, Wali Nanggroe and the sharia regime have grown as 
strong institutions with undemocratic practices such as direct appointment and the hegemony 
of one ethnic group. Both Wali Nanggroe and the sharia regime are financed by the provincial 
budget. In 2018, the proposed budget for Wali Nanggroe was IDR 32 Billion (USD 215 
Million). Based on Qanun No 12/2014, sharia obtains 5 per cent allocation of the annual 
provincial budget, lower than the education sector (20 per cent) and health (10 per cent) but 
still higher than the allocation for other sectors such as the environment (1 per cent). Wali 
Nanggroe is a customary institution that is important for the advancement of Acehnese ethnic 
groups, and indirectly, it will also be beneficial for GAM as most of its members are from 
Acehnese ethnic groups. The sharia regime is advantageous to the legitimacy of ulama groups 
among Acehnese society.  
 
On the other hand, we also see a particular feature of institution-building in state-led 
peacebuilding during the normalisation phase. There has been a strong presence of existing 
national institutions such as the police force and the election commission as a marker of state-
led peacebuilding. The strong and respected police force and election commission are 
beneficial to the management of peaceful local elections in Aceh. To sum up, several local 




hegemonic to secure resources and legitimacy, while the strong state institutions help to 
maintain peace in Aceh.   
 
Hypothesis 5: In a country where the bureaucracy, state institutions and national 
identity have been relatively strong and settled like Indonesia, state-led 
peacebuilding that combines participation and institution-building contributes 
to a durable post-conflict peacebuilding process. 
 
Public participation is prevalent in the peacebuilding process in Aceh. Participation was 
created by and involved elements of GAM in electoral politics and has the indicators of high 
voter turnout and high interest in the electoral competition. Inclusive participation is still 
lacking, especially if we look at the opportunities for women to get involved in politics. The 
position of women in GAM has been relatively stagnant since the period of their struggle for 
independence. While GAM had a women’s wing called Inong Balee, their role in the armed 
struggle never reached the strategic leadership level as commanders. This situation persists 
after GAM has transformed from a guerilla organisation to a political entity.  
 
Women’s representation from Partai Aceh is low both in parliament and in local government.  
The low participation is caused by internal and external factors, such as social, cultural and 
religious pressure upon the priority of the domestic role of women rather than being actively 
involved in the public sphere. This factor is also supported by the reluctance of the leaders of 
political parties to nominate and promote women candidates due to electability and lack of 
networks and capital to compete in elections.  During the armed struggle, GAM women’s wings 
were dominated by the widows of GAM soldiers. They joined GAM’s military wing as a protest 
of their marginalisation and aimed for better conditions from what they experienced during 
the conflict. However, the process of marginalisation remains in the peacebuilding phase. It is 
exacerbated by the implementation of sharia, a policy that aimed to appease political tension 
in Aceh. However, unfortunately, sharia is narrowly interpreted as symbolic regulation 
targeted at women, prolonging the process of marginalisation and discrimination in the 
peacebuilding period. Participation has emerged in the election and human rights and justice, 
where intervention from the government was absent. 
 
The establishment of institutions in the economy, politics and identity has been an important 
aspect in post-conflict Aceh, particularly to secure resources and integrate the elite, especially 
from GAM, into the peacebuilding phase. Thus, patronage politics and patrimonialism appear 
to be inevitable to “buy” and maintain newly gained peace. It is particularly important to 
consolidate peace by making it beneficial for former combatants. Patronage politics is usually 
prolonged in the peacebuilding era to make the former adversaries stick to it. However, in the 




are the simultaneous efforts of capacity building. Transformational institutions rooted in 
GAM, such as PA or the local government (both executive and legislative branch) could grow 
too strong and lead to authoritarian behaviour. 
 
Institution-building in the post-conflict economy in Aceh is largely supported by the enormous 
peace dividend, either indirectly through the reconstruction fund or direct through formal 
peace dividends from the special autonomy fund. Its early impact is positive about 
maintaining peace. Enormous funds, a lucrative construction business and a generous special 
autonomy fund, are attractive incentives for the former rebels to see peace as beneficial for 
their future. However, heavy reliance on the peace fund will harm the future of peace. Aceh is 
a distinct case of peacebuilding since it is supported by a strong national peace fund on top of 
the funds from international donors or foreign countries. It enables the sequence from the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation phase to the peacebuilding effort which focuses on 
developing the economy, enhancing political participation and strengthening social justice. 
Therefore, the appropriate use of the peace dividend to bring welfare and social justice is 
paramount to the durability of peace. Thus far, the utilisation of the peace dividend in Aceh 
has not been optimally utilised to minimise grievance. Several programmes such as education 
and health are indeed beneficial for the public. The biggest proportion of the peace dividend 
is channelled to small scale infrastructure programmes that repeat the pattern of the post-
tsunami economy that was heavily concentrated on the construction industry. This kind of 
business sector will only be economically beneficial for some groups of the Acehnese 
community, particularly those who are in the power circle and have strong capital. This type 
of group is mainly dominated by former GAM elite that hold various positions in Partai Aceh 
(PA) or government offices. The other groups such as women, former foot soldiers of GAM or 
conflict victims are left out from post-conflict economy.   
 
Another concern of institution-building is the problem of capacity building. Reintegration 
institutions such as the BRA were weakened by a lack of skilled human resources and a clear 
reintegration strategy. Partai Aceh (PA) experienced similar institutional shortfalls. Most of 
the former GAM members who became members of PA have never been trained as politicians 
in leadership, organising a political party, budget drafting or other necessary skills. Therefore, 
it is not surprising to hear about the long delay in the submission of the Aceh provincial budget 
to the national government as well as the intimidation by PA members of their counterparts 
in local parliaments. Sharia suffers the same problem of capacity building, especially regarding 
the performance of Wilayatul Hisbah (Sharia Police). Most Wilayatul Hisbah officers do not 
obtain sufficient knowledge of sharia which has led them to be the enforcers of morality rather 




application of Islamic teaching. Institution-building without capacity building will not be 
sufficient for peacebuilding. Institution-building might incorporate former insurgents and 
other groups in Aceh such as religious groups into the newly gained peace and securing them 
with plenty of resources. However, in the long run, the public will demand performance from 
the institutions. The lack of capacity building and consequent poor performance will 
potentially create other grievances among Acehnese society towards the new rulers.  
 
It can be concluded that the durable peace in Aceh has been reached due to the interplay 
between participation and institution-building. Given the characteristic of peacebuilding in 
Aceh as state-led, the role of the existing national institutions is essential to the durability of 
peacebuilding. Indonesia has strong bureaucracy, adequate funding, financial institutions and 
a judicial system that to some extent, are supporting the implementation of peace efforts in 
Aceh. However, the institution-building process has also emerged locally during peacetime 
and together with participation, creates the dynamics of peacebuilding in Aceh.  
 
8.4 Summary of Key Findings  
8.4.1 Legitimacy  
In addition to participation and institution-building, legitimacy is another important aspect 
of peacebuilding in Aceh. While during the conflict era there was a competition for legitimacy 
between the central government and GAM as an insurgent, in peacetime we can expect to see 
the process of the dynamics of legitimacy among the central government, former insurgents 
and the Aceh community. The interplay of legitimacy in peacetime is started by the transfer of 
authority from the central government to Aceh through the provisions in the MoU and LoGA. 
In the subject of politics, the authority given by the central government to Aceh to establish 
local political parties has been fully utilised by GAM to establish Partai Aceh as their political 
outlet. The constant victory of Partai Aceh over the national political parties or candidates 
nominated by national parties both in legislative and gubernatorial elections indicates 
legitimacy gained by GAM among people in Aceh. Partai Aceh frequently employs their past 
performance legitimacy as the sole benefactor of peace in Aceh to win the election. In the early 
phase, the strategy to glorify past performance legitimacy for election campaigns might work. 
However, in the later phase, the excessive use of GAM past-performance legitimacy as the 
campaign platform of Partai Aceh becomes gradually obsolete as the people of Aceh begin to 
demand performance or output legitimacy from this party. In the normalisation phase, the 
legitimacy of a national party is also increasing due to the need for a local-national party 
coalition for the nomination of national parliament members from Aceh as well as the 




In the economic realm, the establishment of BRA, a reintegration agency, is one provision in 
thr MoU that also increased GAM legitimacy among the former combatants. BRA created and 
sustained patron-client relations between GAM elite and former rank-and-file combatants by 
the disbursement of reintegration funds. However, a different case occurs in the case of special 
the autonomy fund as a “real peace dividend”. The authority to manage the special autonomy 
fund to create inclusive economic development and bring welfare to Aceh people is not well 
utilised by the GAM-dominated local government. The poor capacity of local government to 
manage the fund has made their legitimacy decline, and people in Aceh began to turn to the 
central government. In other words, when GAM could not deliver performance/output 
legitimacy, there is a possibility of the shift of legitimacy from former insurgent (GAM) or 
incumbent (central government. Sometimes GAM’s legitimacy increases, and the 
government’s legitimacy decreases but at other times, the legitimacy of these two former 
adversaries could go up together. Another variation of the dynamics of legitimacy is the partial 
legitimacy of GAM. Especially in the subject of identity, the preference of one group over the 
others meant GAM only gained legitimacy from the privileged ethnic group but 
discontentment from the marginalised ones.  
 
8.4.2 New Grievances and Repetition of Internal Colonialism  
Another interesting finding is related to the concept of internal colonialism from Hechter. This 
concept is employed together with a grievance to explain the underlying factors of conflict in 
Aceh. Internal colonialism could explain the core-periphery antagonism between Jakarta and 
Aceh and the birth of the ethno-nationalist movement with identity as the mobilising factor.  
Furthermore, as it is revealed by the case of Aceh, internal colonialism could be repeated by 
the growing domination of the local elite in Aceh. During the conflict period, the central 
government was perceived as the “colonial power” given to the politics of centralisation that 
neglected the periphery and extracted most of its natural resources. While the early grievances 
led to the birth of insurgency, the practice of internal colonialism has eventually been 
reproduced by the Aceh local government after the conflict. In the post-conflict period, Aceh 
was granted special rights in several aspects of politics, law, economics and culture which were 
meant to alleviate grievances. All those aspects appeased Aceh from the perceived 
“colonialism” that was conducted by the Indonesian central government during the conflict 
period. Aceh has a right to establish local political parties, customary institutions, conduct 






In cultural affairs, the establishment of the Wali Nanggroe institution is used to benefit 
Acehnese as the hegemonic ethnic group. The Acehnese ethnic group is very dominant in this 
customary institution, despite the protest of some non-Acehnese groups that could not 
participate due to ethnic and language differences. There is also a constant economic 
deprivation in ethnic minority areas such as Bener Meriah. The feeling of cultural deprivation 
in identity coupled with economic inequality has inspired some groups from Central Aceh and 
Southwest Aceh to separate from Aceh and demand a new province.  
 
After the conflict between centre and periphery is resolved, there will be the possibility of the 
rise of a hegemonic power in the periphery. It is possible because the periphery itself is not a 
homogenous entity. It consists of different ethnic and religious groups. The majority of ethnic 
groups in the periphery will tend to dominate inter-ethnic relations in terms of the distribution 
of wealth, the concentration of development projects and customary institutions. Thus, 
internal colonialism will be continued in the periphery, between the dominant group and 
minority group.  It is inevitable at the beginning of peacetime and in some way, it is needed to 
keep a commitment from the former combatants to stick to a peace agreement. Enforcing 
equal political rights and economic distribution along regional or ethnic lines will take some 
time. However, the prolonged domination of one ethnic group over another will harm peace 
as it will create another grievance and cyclical process of internal colonialism.  
 
8.4.3 Peace-building in Aceh: From Transition to Normalisation 
I had the opportunity to conduct two phases of field research in Aceh, in 2012 and 2018. The 
time between the two phases of research allowed me to observe the trajectory of peacebuilding 
in Aceh during the transition and normalisation phases. Citing the Annex of Normalisation 
from the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro between the Government of Philippines 
and MILF, normalisation is broadly defined as:  
A process whereby communities can achieve their desired quality of life which 
includes sustainable livelihood and political participation within a peaceful 
deliberative society. Normalisation aims to ensure human security. It helps build 
security that is committed to basic human rights where individuals are free from 
fear of violence and crime and where long-held traditions and values continued 
to be honoured.20 
                                                        





In the normalisation phase of peacebuilding, we could expect broader political participation, 
reduction of violence, equal distribution of welfare, acknowledgement of inclusive identity and 
stronger law enforcement. We could also expect less acceptance of flexibility in regulations or 
ad-hoc institutions as society demands more stability. During the normalisation phase, peace 
is not only built but also consolidated among all elements in society. The major features of the 
peacebuilding process in Aceh during the transition and the normalisation phase is portrayed 
in Table 8.3 : 
 
Table 8-3 Peace-building in Aceh during the Transition and Normalisation 
Phases 
Subject Transition  Normalisation  
Politics  • Single domination of 
local political party of 
former combatant 
• Landslide electoral 
victory of former 
combatant in local 
elections  
 
• The establishment of the 
alternative local political 
party of former 
combatant and 
competition between two 




between local and 
national political party 




• Patron-client in 
reintegration fund  
• Institutionalisation of 
reintegration 
• The patron-client 
economy in the utilisation 
of Special Autonomy 
Fund as Peace Dividend 
• The demand for greater 
involvement of the 
central government in 
monitoring the Special 
Autonomy Fund 
Identity • Institution-building of 
cultural affairs (Elite-
based) 
• Institution-building of 
Sharia 
• Stronger customary 
institution  
• Stronger sharia regime  
Human Rights and 
Justice  
• The absence of judicial 
and non-judicial 
transitional justice  
• Participation from 
civil society and civil 
society organisations 
• The establishment of 
local TRC 
• Participation from CS 
and CSOs  
 
What we can see from these two phases is a mix between stagnation and change in every aspect 
of grievance addressed by peacebuilding efforts. In the political realm, the domination of 




presence of Partai Nasional Aceh. While the contestation between these two GAMS-based local 
political parties is a positive development for the local democracy in Aceh, it also indicates the 
marginalisation of non-GAM local political entities. The next appealing development in Aceh 
local politics during the normalisation phase of peacebuilding is the stronger coalition between 
local and national parties. While GAM has been growing as a significant force in Aceh’s local 
politics, it must cooperate with national parties to represent Aceh’s interests at the national 
level. The cooperation appears to be strengthening and surpasses ideology and identity, as 
proven by a coalition between Partai Aceh and Partai Gerinda that was led by Prabowo 
Subianto, a former commander of the Indonesia Special Force, one of the influential corps 
during a military operation in Aceh. Another coalition occurs between Partai Nasional Aceh 
with PDI-P, a national party that typically opposes every peace attempt with separatist 
organisations, including GAM.  
 
In the economic settlement, institution-building has been dominant both in the transition and 
normalisation phases. There is an attempt of the institutionalisation of the reintegration 
agency (BRA) and the continuation of patron-client during the reconstruction phase to the 
transition and normalisation phase in the utilisation of the special autonomy fund. The 
participation of civil society is limited to the monitoring of the management of the special 
autonomy fund and another regional fund by the anti-corruption and good government civil 
society organisations. Interestingly, the poor performance of the Aceh local government in 
managing economic development has led to the shift of legitimacy from local government to 
the central government in terms of greater involvement in monitoring the utilisation of the 
fund.  
 
Identity demonstrates a similar trend of the stronger institution over participation. Malik 
Mahmud was inaugurated as the Wali Nanggroe for the second term by direct appointment 
without a democratic mechanism. Criticism over Wali Nanggroe performance and budget have 
been largely ignored. The hymn of Aceh that uses the Acehnese language invited criticism from 
the non-Acehnese ethnic minority. The sharia regime also grows stronger and more influential 
in Aceh local politics. The promulgation of qanun jinayah (an Islamic penal code) led to more 
frequent public corporal punishment and harassment of women. In sum, the attempts to 
alleviate cultural and religious deprivation have bred new grievances among minority groups 
and women.  
 
Human rights and justice as the last grievances illustrate different characteristics. The absence 
of transitional justice mechanisms, human rights courts and the Truth and Reconciliation 




normalisation. Aceh successfully established a TRC following persistent pressure from the 
coalition of civil society organisations and the  association of the families of the victims. While 
Aceh TRC is considered institutionally weak and slow, its existence is the proof of the 
achievement of the participation in post-conflict transitional justice.  
 
The development in the normalisation phase of peacebuilding in Aceh provides us with several 
features: democratic competition within GAM, the shift of legitimacy from local government 
to the central government in the management of peace dividends, stronger links with national 
politics, and ongoing grievances in identity and human rights and justice.  There has been 
robust political participation and democratic competition within former insurgents, better 
economic conditions as well as a greater level of security compared to the conflict era. 
However, there also several shortcomings in the field of politics, human rights and justice, 
welfare, and identity. Local party politics have mainly developed within GAM but have not yet 
occurred to non-GAM Acehnese. Human rights and justice experienced long delays in the 
process of transitional justice. The poor performance of the Aceh local government in utilising 
the special autonomy fund as the peace dividend has hampered the advancement and 
distribution of welfare among Acehnese. The superiority of one dominant ethnic group also 
relegates the aspiration of ethnic minorities to achieve equal rights in political, economic and 
cultural realms. 
 
Thus far peacebuilding has largely benefited elites in Aceh, an important factor to keep the 
durability, but it has not been manifested yet as inclusive peace to all Acehnese.  The elite-
centred peacebuilding in Aceh could be traced from the peace agreement in Helsinki. This 
peace settlement might be classified as elite-based, with the presence of GAM (and Acehnese 
ethnic groups) as the sole representative of the Aceh community and not complemented by an 
element of other civil societies in Aceh. Thus, it is not surprising that in the aftermath of the 
peace agreement, the elite groups represented by GAM, Acehnese ethnic groups and religious 
groups become the parties that reap the most of the result of peace, such as political power 
and material resources. While the provisions of the peace settlement do indeed address the 
grievances of all Acehnese, the implementation of the peace settlement in the peacebuilding 
phase gives most advantages to the elite groups in Aceh. The implication of this non-inclusive 
peacebuilding to the durability of peace is the risk of heightened tension and a return to 
violence when the power or resources enjoyed by elites is no longer available. It can be 
manifested when Partai Aceh or PNA finally lose their grip in Aceh’s local politics or when the 
special autonomy fund as the major peace dividend has been completely phased out. The elite-
based peacebuilding is also detrimental to civil society and disengages it from the peace 




initiative to establish local TRC, based on my research, the civil society groups in Aceh, 
especially those who work in the fields of human rights, justice and women have begun to enter 
an exhaustion phase. This is occurring due to a lack of funds, human resources and support 
from the government. Peace in Aceh remains intact entering the normalisation phase, but it 
must be made more inclusive to maintain its durability in the following years.  
 
8.5 Implications for the Literature  
The first contribution of my research to the literature is evidence that factionalism within rebel 
movements in post-conflict party politics do not necessarily lead to the relapse of conflict or 
continuing violence. The risk of violence that is instigated by the participation of former 
combatants in the political parties has been emphasised by Hillman (2012), while Dudouet 
(2009) highlighted the importance of internal party cohesion in the post-conflict era. The 
division within GAM that gave birth to Partai Nasional Aceh as the new GAM-based local 
political party has created democratic competition within the former insurgent group that is 
necessary to build local democracy in Aceh. It indeed contributed to the elevating violence in 
the early phase but over time, the level of violence reduced, and the two GAM-based local 
political parties complied with the final decision from the election commission. The relations 
between accelerated democratic competition and violence has been the primary criticism of 
the liberal peacebuilding approach that leads to the suggestion to establish political stability 
rather than accelerated election and democratisation or “institutionalisation before 
liberalisation” (Paris, 2007). However, in state-led peacebuilding exercises like Aceh, existing 
state institutions such as election commissions and police help reduce violence and direct the 
political participation into the relatively peaceful local democratic competition.  
 
My research also combines the concept of internal colonialism, an identity based centre-
periphery structural inequality (Hechter, 1975) with framing (Stone, 1979). In the case of Aceh, 
centre-periphery inequality that occurs nationwide in Indonesia was crafted by Hasan Tiro, 
the founder of GAM with the framing of the Indonesia-Java government as “neo-colonialist”. 
which successfully mobilised grievances into a rebel movement.  
 
The next contribution of my research is related to the normalisation phase. Several works of 
literature that discuss the normalisation phase of peacebuilding focus on externally-led 
peacebuilding cases. For example, Zanotti (2006) and Lemay-Hebert & Vizoka (2017) stressed 
that the condition of normalisation in the peacebuilding process is determined mostly by 
external actors which refers to the achievement of democratic and liberal values, while the 
definitions from CSIS and OECD emphasise the “withdrawal of outside intervention” and 




state-led peacebuilding that does not follow a specific path or values. The study reveals that 
the combination between strong national and local institutions, limited participation and 
bottom-up participation as well as a mix between patronage and democratic competition have 
contributed to the durability of peace in Aceh in the normalisation phase.  
 
Lastly, as a response to Aspinall’s new article on the durability of the peace deal in Aceh that 
accentuates the “strong undercurrent belief of separate Acehnese identity” and suspicion of 
the Indonesian government” (Aspinall, 2018, 18), I argue that ethnic minorities have 
constantly challenged the separate Acehnese identity that is primarily represented by 
Acehnese ethnic groups. This persistent discourse on the pluralism of Aceh identity will 
potentially weaken the narration of hegemonic identity of Acehnese in the long run. The 
suspicion of the Indonesian government could also gradually subside due to a stronger 
coalition between Aceh local political parties and national parties for national parliament 
member nomination, governor candidacy and the presidential election. The failure of the 
GAM-based local government in utilising the special autonomy fund to distribute equal 
welfare to Acehnese also has increased central government legitimacy in Aceh.  
 
The primary contribution of my research is its emphasis on durable peacebuilding in strong-
middle income countries with limited foreign assistance during the normalisation phase. I use 
the grievance and relative deprivation approach, also called a contingent approach by Eckstein 
(1980) as the source of conflict in Aceh as well as the methods of peace building. Although the 
contingent approach, in order to fix the broken system, tends to focus on rebuilding 
institutions and divorces the element of participation (Ockey, 2019), I found a different 
pattern occurred in the case of Aceh. Peace building in Aceh is indeed directed to build new 
institutions such as local political parties, reintegration agencies and customary institutions. 
However, given the democratisation process in Indonesia that preceded the peace building in 
Aceh, the elements of participation already existed and were sustained during the peace 
building phase in Aceh. This evident in the electoral participation that is marked by a high 
level of turnout in the local elections and later, in the form of civil society participation in 
establishing local TRC in Aceh when the establishment of similar institutions at national level 
is halted. The institution building (in terms of the establishment of local political parties, 
reconstruction and reintegration agencies, customary institutions and the sharia regime) that 
characterises the contingent approach contributes to the durability of peace in Aceh because 
it could redress the relative deprivation and grievance. In other words, the contingent 
approach might work in a peacebuilding effort that occurs in a strong-middle income 





Nevertheless, as the current trend shows, these institutions tend to be elite-based and adopted 
a patron-client network that undermines the element of participation. While the peace in Aceh 
has shown its durability during the past thirteen years, in the long run, the inherent approach 
should gradually replace the contingent approach. Several findings from my research reveal 
the dynamics of conflict that shows the shift from the conflict between the central government 
and rebel groups to the tension between the new elite in Aceh with the minority groups in 
peacetime. My thesis also describes the dynamics of political support and legitimacy for the 
national government and local government. This is where the inherent approach gains its 
prominence in the peace building in Aceh. The inherent approach that encourages 
reconciliation, building relationships and mechanism to predict and manage conflict as well 
as the rights and needs of the minority and sensitivity to the local culture  (Ockey : 2019, 
Lederach, 1997) will be essential to create inclusive peace in Aceh. As accentuated by Ockey 
(2019), after successfully maintaining its durability, peace in Aceh should move forward by 
ensuring the continuing alleviation of all potential sources of conflict rather than solely 
focusing on the transformation of the insurgent group into political contestation.  
 
8.6 Limitations of Research  
Notwithstanding several significant findings of this research, some limitations must be 
recognised. Firstly, this research could not elaborate further on the development of the local 
TRC in Aceh due to time constraints.  The emergence of a local TRC in the middle of the long 
stagnation of transitional justice at the national level is the appealing feature in state-led 
peacebuilding. The local TRC in Aceh was established as a result of persistent efforts from the 
community and civil society organisations and in the later phase, finally supported by the 
GAM-dominated local government. The second limitation which is also derived from time 
constraints is the lack of further analysis of the prospect of the special autonomy fund as a 
peace dividend in Aceh. This fund will phase out in 2028 and has created anxiety among 
people in Aceh. The special autonomy fund that is derived from the state budget is one of the 
most important markers of state-led peacebuilding. Hence, it is interesting to observe the 
dynamics between national and local government in negotiating the future of the fund to 
sustain the peace in Aceh.  
 
The next primary limitation is related to methodological problems. This research is lacking 
the full voice from civil society, especially the grassroots community. While I have attempted 
to include CSO activists as one of the categories of the respondents, they are the 
representatives of civil society whose opinions do not necessarily express the voice from the 
community. Also, the answers from respondents from particular categories such as local 




accordance with their political or ideological affiliation, while the response from the grassroots 
is expected to vary. I attempt to manage this problem by asking probing questions and 
balancing the primary resources from the interviews with the secondary data. The second 
limitation of this research is related to the single case study as the method of my thesis. Single 
case studies tend to create a “template trap” or generalisation since the subject of the research 
is chosen by the researcher based on particular purpose or purposive sampling (Hsieh, n.d). It 
may lead to outcomes that only fit the subject of the particular case (in my case, peacebuilding 
practice in Aceh). Thus, a comparative study which brings two or more cases together will be 
beneficial to complement this early work. 
 
8.7 Directions of Future Research 
There are several directions for future research that could be proposed. Several countries in 
Southeast Asia, such as Thailand and the Philippines also have the problem of sub-national 
conflict. The government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
had reached significant progress in the peace attempt for Bangsamoro. The peace agreement 
between the Government of the Philippines and MILF resembles the MoU Helsinki, with 
similar provisions of a peace dividend and acknowledgement of identity. In Thailand, 
meanwhile, attempts to reach peace are still ongoing. Therefore, there is a need to conduct 
more comparative research about the process of peacebuilding among these countries. This 
research is needed to contribute to lessons learned of the similar or different paths and choices 
for policy and strategy of peacebuilding. The case of Aceh contributes valuable lessons about 
the importance of capacity building in political participation, particularly regarding the 
establishment of local political parties. The second possibility is by researching each aspect of 
peacebuilding efforts, especially where the findings of this research lead to an appealing result, 
such as the role of the peace dividend and identity. A more comprehensive study of the peace 
dividend or peace fund is necessary as the experience of Aceh revealed that peace could be 
sustained by allocating ample amounts of the national budget for supporting peace and not 
entirely depending on foreign assistance. The role of identity in post-conflict peacebuilding is 
also an intriguing subject due to its highly “manipulative” nature. In most cases of internal 
conflict, the rebel movement often does not represent the entire population. When the 
majority rebel group is holding power after the conflict, there always is a possibility of 
discrimination against a minority group. During the struggle, the ethnicity or religious 
difference within the movement is often superseded by the greater aim of independence and 
the presence of the common enemy. After the rebellion, a reality of diversity emerges, and it 
could cause another rift over the distribution of political power, economic access or cultural 
entitlement. It may ignite a new cycle of internal colonialism similar to the one that led the 





Appendix I: Interviews Concerning Local Politics Phase 1 (2012-2013) 
 





1. Do you think 
political 
participation for 




If no, can you 
explain why? 
What is lacking in 
MoU? 
If yes, which part 




2. What is your 




Aceh five years on 
from the peace 
agreement? 
 
The establishment of 






The establishment of 






Do you think economic 
development for Aceh 
people is well 
accommodated by MoU? 
If not, can you explain to 
me why? 
If yes, which part of the 
MoU has accommodated 
the economic 
development in Aceh 
best?  
 




resources in Aceh. 
 
The right for Aceh to 
conduct development 
and administration of 
all seaports and 
seaports within Aceh. 
 
The role of BRR. 
 
Human Rights and 
Justice  
1. How satisfied are 




2. Do you think the 
problem of the 
rule of law is well 
addressed by  
MoU?  







problems in Aceh 
(related to conflict 
or not)? Do you 
think the security 









Interview with Lecturers and Analysts 
Phase 1 (2012-2013) 
 
Topics  Questions Probing  
Political Participation  
 
 
1. Do you think political 
participation for Aceh people 
is well-accommodated by 
MoU? 
If no, can you explain why? 
What is lacking in MoU? 
If yes, which part of the MoU 
is most accommodating of 
political participation? 
 
2.What is your opinion of the 
condition of  political 
participation in Aceh after 
five years from peace 
agreement? 
The establishment of the 
local political party 
 
Independent candidate  
 
 
Economic Development  Do you think economic 
development for Aceh people 
is well accommodated by 
MoU? 
If not, can you explain to me 
why? 
If yes, which part of the MoU 
is best accommodating the 
economic development in 
Aceh? 
Provision of 70% 
redistribution of 
hydrocarbon and other 
natural resources in Aceh. 
 
The right for Aceh to conduct 
development and 
administration of all 
seaports and seaports within 
Aceh. 
 
The role of BRR 
Human Rights and Justice  1. How satisfied are 
you with the 
implementation of 
MoU in concern to 
the human rights 
issue? 
2. Do you think the 
problem of the rule 
of law is well 
addressed by the 
MoU?  
 
3. Can you give me 
your opinion about 
the security problem 
in Aceh? (either it is 
related to conflict or 
not). Do you think 
the security problem 
is well addressed by 







The role of different 
stakeholders in formulating 
and implementing post-
conflict peacebuilding in 
Aceh. 
 
In your opinion which party 
have the most important role 













Interview with Central Government Officer and  
International/Donor Agencies Officer 
Phase 1 (2012-2013) 
 
Topics  Questions Probing  
Political Participation  
 
 
1. Do you think political 
participation for Aceh’s 
people is well 
accommodated by MoU? 
If no, can you explain why? 
What is lacking in MoU? 
If yes, which part of MoU is 
most accommodating of 
political participation? 
 
2.What is your opinion about 
the condition of political 
participation in Aceh five 
years on the from peace 
agreement? 
The establishment of the 
local political party 
 
Independent candidate  
 
 
Economic Development  Do you think economic 
development for Aceh people 
is well accommodated by 
MoU? 
If not, can you explain to me 
why? 
If yes, which part of the MoU 
is best accommodating the 
economic development in 
Aceh?  
 
Provision of 70% 
redistribution of 
hydrocarbon and other 
natural resources in Aceh. 
 
The right for Aceh to conduct 
development and 
administration of all 
seaports and seaports within 
Aceh. 
 
The role of BRR 
Human Rights and Justice  4. How satisfied are 
you with the 
implementation of 
MoU in concern to 
the human rights 
issues? 
5. Do you think the 
problem of the rule 
of law is well 
addressed by MoU?  
Can you give me your 
opinion about security 
problems in Aceh (whether 
related to conflict or not)? 
Do you think the security 
problem is well addressed by 
the MoU?  
 
The role of different 
stakeholders in formulating 
and implementing post-
conflict peacebuilding in 
Aceh. 
In your opinion which party 
has the most important role 










Interview with University Student 
Phase 1 (2012-2013) 
 
Topics  Questions Probing  
The dissemination of the 
MoU Helsinki to the wider 
community in Aceh 
 
1. Do you know about 
MoU Helsinki?  
2.  Have you ever read 




The implementation of MoU 
in the national and local 
legislation 
1. Do you know any 
national regulation 
which is derived 
from MoU?  
2. Do you know any 
Kanuns (local law) 
which are derived 
from MoU?  
 
 
The role of MoU in 
addressing the grievance as 
an underlying factor in the 
conflict in Aceh  
 
Can you tell me some articles 
in MoU which you consider 
as the most important to 
address the conflict in Aceh?  
 
Political participation 















Interview with NGO/ Peace-building Activist  
Phase 1 (2012-2013) 
 
Topics  Questions Probing  
 
The dissemination of the 
MoU Helsinki to the wider 
community in Aceh  
 
1. What do you know about 
the MoU Helsinki?  
2.  Have you ever read the 
full text of MoU 
Helsinki?  
 
The implementation of 
MoU in the national and 
local legislation 
1. Do you know any 
national regulation 
which is derived from 
MoU?  
2. Do you know any 
Kanuns (local law) which 
are derived from MoU?  
3. Do you know any 
undang-undang 
(national law) and or 
qanun (local law) about 
political participation in 
Aceh? What is your 
opinion about that law? 
Are you satisfied with 
those laws or what is still 
lacking and should be 
improved?  
4. Do you know any 
undang-undang 
(national law) and or 
kanun (local law) about 
economic development 
in Aceh? What is your 
opinion about that law? 
Are you satisfied with 
those laws or what is still 
lacking and should be 
improved? 
5. Do you know any 
undang-undang 
(national law) and or 
kanun (local law) about 
security, the rule of law 
and human rights in 
Aceh? What is your 
opinion about that law? 
Are you satisfied with 
those laws? Or, what is 










The level of participation in 
legislation making in 
regard to the 




Have you been invited to 
discuss the preparation of 
particular qanun before it is 
enacted by the DPRA (local 
legislative)  
If yes, what kind of participation 
did you perform in the Qanun 
making?         
 
The role of MoU in 
addressing the grievance as 
the underlying factor of the 
conflict in Aceh. 
Can you tell me some articles in 
MoU which you consider as the 
most important to address the 
conflict in Aceh? 
Political participation 
economic development. 












Interview Community Leader  
Phase 1 (2012-2013) 
 
Topics  Questions Probing  
The dissemination of the 
MoU Helsinki to the wider 
community in Aceh.  
1. What do you know about 
the MoU Helsinki?  
2. Have you ever read the 




The implementation of 
MoU in the national and 
local legislation 
1. Do you know any 
national regulation 
which is derived from 
MoU?  
2. Do you know any 
Kanuns (local law) which 
is derived from MoU?  
3. Do you know any 
undang-undang 
(national laws) and/or 
qanun (local laws) about 
political participation in 
Aceh? What is your 
opinion about that law? 
Are you satisfied with 
those laws or what is still 
lacking and should be 
improved?  
 
The level of participation in 
legislation making in 
regard to the 




1. Have you been invited to 
discuss the preparation 
of particular qanun 
before it is enacted by 
the DPRA (local 
legislative)  
2. If yes, what kind of 
participation did you 
perform in the Qanun 
making?  




The role of MoU in 
addressing the grievance as 
the underlying factor of the 
conflict in Aceh. 
 
 
Can you tell me some articles on 
MoU which you consider to be 
the most important in 
addressing the conflict in Aceh? 
Political participation 
Economic development  







Appendix II: Interview with Women’s Groups and Activists, Phase 2 
(2018) 
 
Topics Questions Probing  
Political Participation in 
Elections 
1. What is your opinion 
about voter turnout in 
Aceh local elections? 
Do you think people in 
Aceh were enthusiastic 
about casting their 
vote? What is the 
reason for their 
enthusiasm (or 
apathy)? 
2. Are you satisfied with 
the quality of 





3. What do you think 
about the management 
of local elections in 
Aceh? Were they 
conducted based on 
free, fair and 
confidential 
principles? Did you 
witness any violence or 
threat to voters?  








The selection mechanism of 
political parties’ members 




through Political Party  
1. Did you join any 
political parties? Is 
that local or national 
party?  
2. Do you think political 




3. How about the role of 
political parties in 
Aceh on endorsing 
policies related to 




















-The number of laws/qanun 






Gender and Identity  1. How do you see the 
position of women in 
Aceh after peace 
agreement? Do you 






after peace?  
2. What is your opinion 
about sharia law? 
What is its impact on 
women in Aceh?  
3. Do you think the ex- 
GAM members have 
gain advantages in 
politics as a result of a 
peace agreement? 
What are the 
advantages? Do you 
women/ female ex-
combatant also got the 
same advantages as 














Interview with Local Election Commission 
Phase 2 (2018) 
 
Topics Questions Probe  
Political Participation 
through election  
1. What do you think 
about public 
participation in local 
elections in Aceh?  
2. What is the challenge 
or obstacle in 
conducting the local 
election in Aceh? 
-Voter turnout trends  
Electoral Dispute 1. Could you tell me 
about the electoral 
dispute in Aceh during 
the past local elections 
in Aceh? What were 
the main causes of 
those disputes? 
2. How was the dispute 
be resolved?  
-Monetary politics 
Electoral Violence  1. What do you think 
about violence in the 
election in Aceh? Did 
they occur frequently? 
2. Did the violence in 
Aceh give impact to 
the voter?  
3. What are the problems 
encountered by KIP 
(Election Commission) 
to investigate the 
violent accident or 
intimidation? 
 
Women Representation  What is your opinion 
about the 
representation of 
women in Aceh 




-Affirmative action  
Local Politics Dynamics 1. What is your opinion 
about local political 
parties in Aceh?  Do 
you think they  
accommodated MoU? 
2. What do you think the 
causes of the breakup 
of local political 
parties of GAM? How 
did it happen?  
3. What do you think 






among local political 
parties in Aceh?  Do 
you think it will bring 
negative impact to the 
peacebuilding process 
in Aceh. Or on on the 
other hand, is 
competition necessary 
for healthy political 















Interview with Local Political Parties 
Phase 2 (2018) 
 
Topics  Questions  Probing 
Political Participation 
through elections 
1. What is your opinion about 
voter turnout in Aceh’s local 
elections? Do you think people 
in Aceh were enthusiastic 
about casting their vote? What 
is the reason for their 
enthusiasm (or apathy)? 
2. Are you satisfied with the 
quality of candidates in the 
local elections, both 
gubernatorial/mayoral and 
legislative election? 
3. What do you think about the 
management of local elections 
in Aceh? Were they conducted 
based on free, fair and 
confidential principles? Did 
you witness any violence or 
threat to voters?  
Voter turnout 
Political Participation 
through the political party  
1. Why did you decide to join this 
political party? 
2. Who are the constituencies of 
your party? (ex-combatant, 
youth, women, student, 
professional, urban, rural) 
3. What is your opinion about 
local political parties in Aceh?  
Do you think it had 
accommodated MoU? 
4. What do you think the causes 
of the breakup of local political 
parties of GAM? How did it 
happen?  
5.  What do you think about the 
dynamics and competition 
among local political parties in 
Aceh?  Do you think it will 
bring negative impact to the 
peacebuilding process in Aceh, 
or on the other hand, 
competition is necessary for 
healthy political development 
in Aceh?  
What do you think about 
political parties in Aceh in 
general, both local and national 
parties? Do you think they have 
accommodated political 


































Do you think they have 
represented the political 
aspiration of people in Aceh?  
Women Political 
Participation  
What is your opinion about women’s 
political representation in Aceh? 












Appendix III: List of Interviewee, Phase 1 (2012-2013) 
 
No  Category  Gender  Area  
1 CSO/Peacebuilding Activist Female  Banda Aceh 
2 CSO/Peacebuilding Activist Male  Banda Aceh  
3 Student  Male  Banda Aceh  
4 Local Political Party  Male  Banda Aceh  
5 Local Government Officer  Female  Banda Aceh  
6 NGO/Peacebuilding Activist & 
Local Political Party  
Male  Banda Aceh  
7 Lecturer/ Analyst  Male  Banda Aceh  
8 Lecturer/Analyst  Male  Banda Aceh  
9 CSO/Peacebuilding Activist Female  Banda Aceh  
10 Student  Male  Banda Aceh 
11 CSO/Peacebuilding Activist Male  Banda Aceh  
12 CSO/Peacebuilding Activist Male  Banda Aceh  
11 Lecturer/Analyst  Male  Lhokseumawe 
12 CSO/Peace building Activist Male  Lhokseumawe 
13 Student Male  Lhokseumawe 
14 Student Male  Lhokseumawe 
15 Student Male  Lhokseumawe 
16 Local Political Party  Male  Takengon 
17 Lecturer/ Analyst Female Takengon  
18 Lecturer/ Analyst Male  Takengon  
19 Student Male  Takengon 
20 CSO/Peace building Activist Male  Takengon  
21 Student Male  Takengon  
22 Student  Male  
23 Lecturer/Analyst Male  Takengon  
24 CSO/Peace building Activist Female  Takengon 
25 Local Political Party  Male  Takengon  
26 Lecturer/Analyst  Male  Jakarta  
27 Lecturer/Analyst  Male  Jakarta  
28 International/Donor Agencies 
Officer 
 
Male  Jakarta  
29 Lecturer/Analyst Male  Jakarta  






Appendix IV: List of Interviewees, Phase 2 (2018) 
 
No Category  Gender  Area  
1 Women CSO/Peacebuilding 
Activist 
Female  Banda Aceh  
2 Local Election Commission  Male  Banda Aceh  
3 Local Political Party  Female Banda Aceh  
4 Women CSO/Peacebuilding 
Activist  
Female  Banda Aceh  
5 CSO/Peacebuilding Activist 
&Lecturer 
Male  Banda Aceh  
6 Local Political Party and Lecturer  Female  Banda Aceh  
7 Local Government Officer  Male  Banda Aceh  
8 CSO/Peacebuilding Activist Male  Banda Aceh  
9 Local Political Party Male  Banda Aceh  
10 Local Political Party  Male  Banda Aceh  
11 Local Political Party Male  Banda Aceh  
12 Women CSO/Peacebuilding 
Activist 
Female  Banda Aceh  
13 Women CSO/Peacebuilding 
Activist 
Female  Banda Aceh  
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